Rivers, ecological health, and justice: international watercourses and long-term legal reform by Tamanna, Romin
  
 
  
© 2017 Romin Tamanna. All rights reserved. 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RIVERS, ECOLOGICAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 
AND LONG-TERM LEGAL REFORM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
ROMIN TAMANNA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law in Law 
in the Graduate College of the  
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2017 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
 
 
Doctoral Committee: 
  
 Professor Eric T. Freyfogle, Chair 
 Professor William J. Davey 
 Professor Lesley Wexler 
 Professor Kenworthey Bilz 
  
 
ii 
 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation deals with rivers that cross national boundaries and with the international law 
that applies to them.  It takes a critical look at that law, drawing upon normative standards that 
value justice among all people, without regard for where they live along rivers or for the 
negotiating strength of their home States, and that also value the long-term ecological health of 
rivers as aquatic systems.  The dissertation pays particular attention to the most vulnerable States 
of the world on watercourse-related issues; to States that are located downstream, that have 
relatively weak negotiating powers in comparison with their upstream neighbors, and that face 
critical development needs.  Bangladesh is used as the paradigm example.  The dissertation 
draws upon current law and recent legal experiences to formulate a new vision for the 
international law of watercourses, a vision that, if implemented, would recognize and protect 
rivers as complex ecological wholes while promoting social justice among all people dependent 
on such rivers.  In doing so, it puts forth an ambitious vision for long-term cultural as well as 
legal reform.  The vision is offered less as a proposal for current consideration than as a way of 
clarifying deficiencies in current law and gaining a better sense of the overall direction in which 
more modest law reforms should head.  
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Introduction 
 
In vital ways, rivers are the life blood of terrestrial landscapes, essential for the flourishing of 
plant and animal life and essential, too, for the people who live along or near them.  Meandering 
rivers pay no attention to human-drawn political boundaries.  As they cross jurisdiction lines, 
they link nations and peoples together in inescapable ways.  Uses of a river by one State thus 
inevitably affect people in other States, as well as other life forms and ecological processes.  
Uses of rivers that we make today also significantly affect future generations and the options 
available to them. 
This dissertation offers a critical look at the contemporary international law governing such 
watercourses, a body of law that, despite a long history, remains in its adolescence.  The 
literature on this law is quite considerable and rapidly growing.  Many commentaries on it 
undertake to distill and explain the customary international law of watercourses, a key step in 
knowing where we stand today.  These writings often identify tensions in current law and isolate 
emerging principles, ones that are not now part of the customary law but might soon be added to 
it.  Different international law organizations have contributed significantly to this body of 
writing.  Other writing on watercourses law reaches beyond this work of description and 
prediction; it is more critical and prescriptive.  This scholarly writing tends to focus on perceived 
inadequacies of current law and to identify next steps in the process of moving the law forward 
within the confines of prevailing economic and political constraints.  In terms of looking ahead, 
this latter writing goes beyond simply predicting where the law seems to be heading.  It calls 
affirmatively for particular legal changes, usually incremental ones and specifically designed to 
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make progress in customary international law (rather than, for instance, proposing entirely new 
conventions).  Much writing in this category aims to harmonize existing components of 
customary law.  Other law-reform proposals look to strengthen particular provisions 
(environmental ones, quite often) or to elevate in importance certain legal principles in 
comparison with other, competing principles. 
This dissertation offers a different, more ambitious contribution to the literature on international 
watercourses. It is a contribution that goes well beyond typical commentaries even as it builds on 
them and is possible only because of the important efforts of other scholars. 
This study steps back from current law and, in a sense, looks toward the horizon.  It looks to a 
more distant time when the law governing watercourses has developed to the point where it 
successfully keeps river corridors ecologically healthy and promotes full justice among all 
peoples whose lives are intertwined with watercourses.  It presents what might be termed a full 
normative assessment in that it asks and seeks to answer basic questions about the kind of law 
that would be needed to achieve our most lofty goals for our watercourses, goals framed in terms 
of ecological health, human flourishing, and social justice.  It takes a long-term perspective and 
is not constrained, in its proposals, to measures that are feasible today in light of the potent 
economic and political interests that resist change.  As explained below, the study pays particular 
attention to the most vulnerable nations of the world, those at greatest risk when watercourses are 
misused and those most in need of healthy rivers to promote their development goals. The 
dissertation uses Bangladesh as a case study of such a highly vulnerable nation, and for multiple 
reasons:  (i) it lies downstream on nearly all of the watercourses that cross its boundaries, (ii) it 
faces grave ecological dangers from upstream river uses, (iii) its neighbors include powerful 
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nations; and (iv) its low level of economic development leaves an urgent need for sustained 
economic growth.  
This dissertation, as will be clear, necessarily makes uses of important normative standards for 
judging the adequacy of current law and providing the framework for a major revision of it.  
These normative standards are set forth clearly with accompanying justification.  Necessarily, the 
proposed reforms of current law build upon these normative standards, and are valid and 
appropriate only insofar as the normative standards are accepted.  Readers who disagree with the 
standards will, of course, need to make appropriate modifications to the proposals put forth to 
accommodate their differing normative views.  Even for such readers, however, the dissertation 
ought to have considerable value.  By standing back and considering the long term vision, the 
inquiry is able to identify clearly on-going legal trends and to note tensions between and among 
them.  Among the benefits of this inquiry is that it identifies significant ways in which current 
law might be clarified and simplified and in which issues that now seem dominant (particularly, 
as will be shown, the supposed conflict between equitable/reasonable use and the harm-
avoidance principle) might be usefully set aside in favor of other, quite different ways of framing 
and phrasing the guiding legal principles and the present-day tradeoffs.  Most of all, however, 
this study invites readers to look much further ahead and to consider long-term goals for legal 
change—an invitation that should be useful even for readers with different normative views.   
Legal reform typically moves ahead incrementally, by small, uneven, and sometimes misdirected 
steps.   But the practical need for incremental change does not undercut the many benefits of 
looking to the horizon from time to time and identifying long-term ideals and aspirations.   If 
lawmakers could start from scratch, if they could ignore political constraints, what kind of 
watercourse law might they create?  What goals would the ideal law seek to promote and what 
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major components or provisions would the law need to include to achieve these lofty goals?  
More particularly, what kind of law would be needed to bring lasting justice and healthy rivers to 
a highly vulnerable nation such as Bangladesh?  Sound answers to such questions can provide a 
polestar for long-term legal change.  They can similarly provide tools to use to evaluate critically 
the law we now have.  
Ribbons of life.  Waterways are, in significant ways, living corridors that support all life even as 
they are also repositories for many of our wastes and provide vivid evidence of our misuses of 
surrounding lands.  Water-flows shape the geological forms of our landscapes, transport 
nutrients, and provide home and sustenance for myriad life forms.  For humans, rivers and their 
attendant life have long been useful for transportation, irrigation, silt transport, energy storage 
and production, and much more.  They are crucial to a community’s ability to meet the basic 
needs of its people as well as to the overall economic development of a region.  
In today’s world, freshwater has become an especially pressing global concern because of the 
increasing demand for this limited resource, with the steady rise in global population and 
continued economic growth.1 While the size of the world’s population has tripled over the last 
century, water consumption has increased by a factor of six; by 2030, global water requirements 
are expected to nearly double from those of 2005 and to exceed current accessible and reliable 
supply levels by 40%.2  Rivers are called upon, more and more, to meet these water needs.  As 
                                                 
1 Edith Brown Weiss, International Law for a Water-Scarce World (Leiden-Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2013) 1. 
2 “Charting Our Water Future,” 2030 Water Resources Group, accessed January 5, 2009, 
http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability-and-resource-productivity/our-insights/charting-our-
water-future. 
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water consumption increases, the flows moving downstream diminish and are otherwise altered, 
with widespread ecological consequences.   
As they provide important sources of fresh water, rivers also transport critically needed silt, 
which in many countries is essential to maintaining the fertility of floodplain soils.  Rivers such 
as the Nile sustained the fertility of adjacent lands for thousands of years as overflowing waters 
regularly deposited nutrient-rich silt onto them.  Water flows diminished by upstream 
withdrawals can become inadequate to carry this silt as a matter of physics and to overflow 
adjacent lands.  Such silt deposits are particularly essential in low-lying lands that are prone to 
subsidence (in the United States, the Louisiana bayous offer the best illustration).  Such alluvial 
lands can sink when cut off from their ongoing natural silt deposits—as they are when rivers are 
blocked by dams—leaving the sinking lands inundated or otherwise too wet for human use.  
Most such lands are adjacent to oceans so that the infiltrating water is salty.  Invading saltwater 
commonly kills native vegetation, leaving lands denuded and eliminating woody vegetation that 
provides needed protection against hurricanes, cyclones and typhoons.  Salt-water intrusion 
quickly contaminates freshwater, rendering it too salty for drinking or irrigation.  Increased 
salinity due to disrupted silt flows also degrades upland aquifers.  
In most of the world waterways provide vital sources of human food.  Human-caused pollution 
can degrade supplies of fish and other aquatic life, even wiping them out.  Beyond that, many 
aquatic species depend for their reproduction and survival on particular flow regimes.  Key life 
cycles may depend upon seasonal flooding, particularly for species that reproduce on floodplains 
or for which flood conditions provide needed protection against predators.   Natural flood 
regimes play key roles in keeping river bottoms from being silt-congested.  They can be vital too 
in keeping salt water from moving upstream and contaminating freshwater well inland.  
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Reservoirs in particular can significantly alter the temperature of downstream water flows, 
greatly harming the life forms adapted to historic conditions.  
Humans have long struggled to use rivers in ways that sustain these many life-supporting 
functions and traits.  The challenges of doing so become greater when watercourses transect 
national boundaries. Today some 263 international waterways (lakes and rivers) cross 
international boundaries, with an uncounted number of shared aquifers.3 Moreover, the basins 
through which these watercourses flow cover almost half of the Earth’s land surface area, and all 
but a handful of the world’s non-island States4 have portions of their territories in an 
international basin.5  International watercourses flow nearly everywhere and the issues they 
present are of widespread concern. 
These geographic facts, combined with mounting stress on water supply and water quality almost 
everywhere, highlight freshwater and water flows as key areas of concern between upstream and 
downstream States.6  Particularly when shared rivers face an overwhelming demand for water, 
conflicts among nations can readily occur, sometimes over a particular State’s right to use and 
divert waters at the expense of other riparian States, sometimes over alterations of flow regimes 
and silt loads that cause significant downstream disruptions.  Not surprisingly, various 
researchers have pointed to shared water resources as the single most likely route by which 
environmental change and ecological degradation might trigger interstate hostilities.7 
                                                 
3 Ken Conca, Governing Water: Contentious Transnational Politics and Global Institution Building (Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 2006), 93. 
4 That includes Denmark, Singapore and a few States on the Arabian Peninsula. 
5 Conca, Governing Water, 93. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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A highly vulnerable State.  If the international law of watercourses is to work well, promoting 
human flourishing and social justice while keeping waterways ecologically healthy, it needs to 
work for nations that are most at risk.  It needs to work for nations that reside downstream on 
major rivers and that do not hold strong bargaining power as against upstream nations.   It needs 
to work well for nations that are particularly dependent, not just on gaining access to a share of a 
river’s fresh water, but on other ecological features of its rivers—the timing of its water flows, 
the quality of the flowing water (including silt loads), and the river’s ability to keep salinity at 
bay.   
The basic facts about Bangladesh make it a suitable nation to illustrate the plight and needs of 
the world’s most vulnerable States.  The country lies at the farthest downstream ends of almost 
all of the international rivers that flow through it; and except in a few ways and settings, a 
downstream country usually is more susceptible of harms than an upstream country. Bangladesh 
faces huge environmental threats from rapid urbanization, deforestation, loss of biodiversity and 
loss of habitats, saline water intrusion, land subsidence, coastal erosion, groundwater 
contamination, recurrent flooding, and increasing natural calamities including cyclones due to 
climate change. And with poor infrastructural development, Bangladesh harbors one of the 
world’s largest populations,8 with countless millions of its people directly relying on water 
sources and flows for their sustenance and livelihood.  On top of that, Bangladesh has 57 
common rivers shared with other countries,9 including such big regional superpowers as India 
and China.  Given the disparate power relationships and unequal economic standing among the 
                                                 
8 Total population estimated at 160.9 million in 2015 as shown by the World Bank data, in “Bangladesh,” The 
World Bank, accessed March 6, 2017, http://data.worldbank.org/country/bangladesh. 
9 “The Joint River Commission Bangladesh,” The Ministry of Water Resources, accessed January 10, 2014, 
http://www.jrcb.gov.bd/. 
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South Asian co-basin countries, a nation such as Bangladesh often fails to fairly protect its 
interests through bilateral or regional negotiations.  Like other weak players in the world, it 
needs strong, morally sound international law to protect it.  
The basic legal principles and their deficiencies.   By way of setting the stage for what follows, it 
is useful to take a quick look at the basic principles that now guide the customary international 
law of watercourses and to take note of their tensions and chief inadequacies—all developed at 
much greater length in the following chapters. 
Although international water law, in the form of bilateral pacts and understandings, dates back to 
the early phases of human civilization, much of its current content emerged only over the past 
century.  Early law dealt with navigation and with the division of water flows among States.  
Only in recent decades has the law paid attention to waterways as more than transportation 
corridors and sources of water for consumptive use.  Only recently, that is, has it begun even 
modestly to understand rivers, floodplains, and associated plant and animal life as ecologically 
complex wholes and to show awareness that long-term human flourishing depends upon the 
ecological well-being of these wholes.10 
Early watercourse law, as noted, mostly had to do with navigation and toll collection along 
waterways.  Over the centuries that law evolved to a legal stance that seems widely accepted 
today:  a navigable waterway is open to navigation by nations that are adjacent to or crossed by 
the river, and not by others.  Largely over the past century, the concern of international law 
expanded beyond navigation to include the fair sharing of the water in a river.  This law 
borrowed heavily from the law of the United States dealing with rivers that crossed State lines.  
                                                 
10 Laurence Boisson De Chazournes, Fresh water in international Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
250. 
9 
 
The guiding, vague principle that emerged in the United States was the doctrine of equitable 
apportionment:  water flows would be divided among States equitably, on some sort of fair-share 
basis, taking into account a number of relevant considerations.11  Even with its vagueness, this 
fair-share principle sharply countered the alternative principle of territorial sovereignty, the 
principle under which a nation could freely use water flowing over its lands as it saw fit without 
concern for the interests of downstream nations.  The equitable sharing idea—equitable 
utilization, as it is commonly termed—is now widely understood as a foundational principle of 
customary international law, even as a few States (China, prominently) continue to insist that 
territorial sovereignty applies to water flows just as it applies to natural resources that are 
stationary within a State’s borders. Built on the US model,  equitable utilization was embraced as 
a principle of customary law by the ILA (International Law Association) almost five decades 
ago, and has gained strength ever since.  
In more recent decades, lawmakers and commentators have recognized that an upstream State 
can harm a downstream one even when it does not divert and consume more than its share of a 
water flow.  It can do so by contaminating a water-flow with pollution.   It can do so, as some 
now realize, simply by altering the seasonal timing of a water-flow, by blocking movement of 
aquatic life, and by stripping water of components (e.g., silt) that downstream users deem 
valuable.   This expansion of concern has been associated with a less-visible but nonetheless 
important recognition that downstream nations “use” water-flows simply by leaving them in 
place and allowing the water to sustain aquatic life and nonconsumptive human uses.   The 
                                                 
11 State of New Jersey v. State of New York et al. (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Intervener), 283 U.S. 336 (51 
S.Ct. 478, 75 L.Ed. 1104), 1931. In this dispute, the State of New Jersey sought to enjoin the State of New York and 
the City of New York from diverting any waters from the Delaware River or its tributaries. The Court held that the 
conflict was rightly governed, not by a strict application of the common law rules of private riparian rights, but by 
the principle of equitable apportionment applicable between the states of the Union. 
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principle that has emerged in the customary law, in simple form, is a duty on States using water 
to act in ways that avoid material harm to other States.  The do-no-harm principle is widely 
understood as a limit on, or in conflict with, the right of a State to utilize its equitable share of a 
water flow.  Indeed, the tension or conflict between these two principles—equitable utilization 
and harm-avoidance—is often viewed as the centerpiece or foundation of the international law of 
watercourses with States and commentators lining up on each side, some believing that one 
principle should take priority, others contending that the opposing principle is more weighty. 
As the harm-avoidance principle gained strength, so did largely independent concerns about 
water pollution and, to lesser degrees, concerns about other forms of environmental degradation.  
Pollution concerns showed up in various bilateral and regional watercourse agreements.  They 
also showed up visibly in a 1992 Convention of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)12 
and in the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses.13  The environmental provisions in such conventions, however, often seemed to 
stand apart from the basic principles of equitable utilization and harm-avoidance, even though 
they were plainly related.  It was, and still is, difficult to figure out how these several principles 
might fit together.  That confusion was heightened as writers on the law of watercourses, 
including convention drafters, began to interject the principle of sustainable development into the 
law, with little comment on how it might fit together with the other principles:  perhaps 
strengthening the environmental protections, but very possibly weakening them when needed to 
promote development goals.   
                                                 
12 The Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Helsinki, 17 
March, 1992, U.N.T.S. 33207. 
13 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourse, New York, adopted 21 May, 
1997, U.N.T.S. 52106. https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
12&chapter=27&clang=_en. 
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Over this same time period, yet another principle began to enter the vocabulary used to talk 
about the use rights of States.  This was the rising idea—often not presented expressly—that a 
State’s uses of water ought to be in some sense reasonable as well as equitable.   The adjective 
was often pieced together with equitable to form what sounded like a single standard of 
“equitable and reasonable utilization.”  But the term reasonable—also drawn mostly from U.S. 
law—in fact had a much different historical meaning to it.  Equitable was simply a matter of fair 
share in the division of water flows.  Reasonable was a factor that seemed to pay attention also to 
the efficiency of a water use, its suitability to a particular place, its consequences, and its social 
and economic value in comparison with competing demands for the same ways.  Reasonableness 
seemed to—or at least could—overlap with the harm-avoidance principle, and with the 
environmental provisions as well.  The insertion of the adjective brought far more questions and 
uncertainties than it did clarity—the same outcome as the addition of sustainable development. 
Similar confusion seemed to attend to the pushes to add yet another component to the formula 
that told States how they could and could not use watercourses.  This was the human-rights ideal 
of an individual right to clean water. In some way this factor, some said, ought to play role.  But 
what kind of role, particularly given that concerns about access to fresh water had less to do with 
direct uses of watercourses than they did with issues of physical infrastructure (water purification 
plants, pumps, pipelines) and water pricing?  When poor people had no water simply because 
they could not pay for it, the problem seemed to have little to do with watercourses as such.  
Even as these particular components of watercourses law took shape, a related, foundational 
issue continued to simmer.  What was the main purpose of this watercourses law?  Was it chiefly 
to provide a framework of principles for States to use as they went about negotiating bilateral 
agreements with their neighbors?  Was it instead or in addition meant to provide the impetus for 
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agreements among all States with land within a particular river basin; to stimulate whole-basin 
agreements?  Or was it to put principles in place that limited how States could behave without 
regard for any bilateral or regional agreements?  Was the law becoming a binding set of rules 
that limited uses of watercourses, directly and indirectly, as a matter of international law and 
apart from any express agreements?  Was it becoming a tool that weak, downstream States such 
as Bangladesh could draw upon to challenge what stronger upstream neighbors were doing?  
And did it reflect a growing recognition that the environmental conditions in a waterway were 
perhaps of legitimate concern to people who lived far away from them, perhaps to the entire 
world community?  
Then there is the one piece that almost no one wanted to talk about because it simply did not fit.  
This was the issue of dams and reservoirs, particularly on the main stem of major rivers.  A 
reservoir that blocked a river flow inevitably brought massive ecological change to the river.   A 
reservoir was not inherently inconsistent with the principle of equitable sharing; a State 
constructing a reservoir could still release to downstream States enough water to satisfy their fair 
shares.  But a reservoir radically altered the timing of water flows along with silt loads and water 
temperature.  It also typically blocked fish migrations and other travel patterns of aquatic life.  
How did such reservoirs fit together with the emerging environmental standards, with the ban on 
causing significant harm, and with the idea that uses of watercourses should be reasonable?   No 
one really seemed to know.  The major conventions of 1992 and 1997 largely pushed reservoirs 
aside.   Summaries of customary international law (the 2004 Berlin Rules,14 for instance) largely 
                                                 
14 The Berlin Rules on Water Resources, Berlin, August 21, 2004, by the International Law Association (ILA), 
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/ILA_Berlin_Rules-2004.pdf. 
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treated reservoirs as a foreign topic, much as they did navigational structures and uses.  The issue 
was simply too big to tackle and had to be left, it seemed, to local negotiations. 
The final (fourth) part of this dissertation examines in full the on-going trends in the law of 
international watercourses, drawing upon material in earlier sections.  It critiques the law using 
normative ideals and provides the outline for an overall reformulation of the law, a reformulation 
adequate to protect the legitimate interests of highly vulnerable States and their people.  Without 
looking ahead to that full consideration, however—to that legal critique and reformulation—it is 
useful at this point to identify significant ways in which these just-described legal components 
might be improved.  To highlight, at the beginning, possibilities for improvement in international 
law is to provide space for a more wide-ranging inquiry into present-day problems and ways of 
thinking critically about them. 
Of primary importance, a legal regime that protects the ecological health of rivers—and thus 
protects the people whose lives depend on that health—needs to begin by putting in place basic 
environmental protections for the rivers, in terms of water quality, minimum flows, and perhaps 
salt-water containment.  Minimum environmental stands could (and, as argued below, should) 
leave room for States to negotiate higher levels of protection.  But minimum standards are 
appropriately set at the international level and made binding on States.  Such standards need to 
operate as limits on all uses of watercourses, without regard for equitable shares and without 
being drawn into any overarching clash between equitable utilization and do-no-harm. 
Second, a State’s recognized uses of a watercourse need to include more than simply water 
diversions and water consumption.  They need to include various instream-flow uses.  They need 
to include the uses of river to sustain aquatic life, to combat saline intrusion, and to carry the silt 
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needed to maintain land levels and soil fertility cycles.  Such uses of watercourses may not 
always be accommodated; not all uses can be.  But they need to be on the table as options, as 
valid, recognized uses of watercourses, when water flows are allocated among competing 
demands. 
Third, the now prominent clash between equitable utilization and harm-avoidance is best set 
aside as being confusing and unhelpful.  As thus phrased the clash provides no real insight or 
guidance on how to select among competing watercourse uses.  Indeed, the dichotomy seems to 
suggest, as many have assumed, that lawmakers ultimately must favor one side over the other.  
No such choice is sensible.  The entire frame, as a way to highlight choices, should be cast aside.  
A far better approach is to put front and center the principles (i) that States should share 
watercourses equitably (already established for the most part) and (ii) that all uses must qualify 
as reasonable under multi-factor tests that take into account competing demands, economic 
efficiency, social importance, and other key factors.  The particular uses that get priority should 
be those that rank the highest based on this multi-factor assessment.  Reasonable use should 
become an ideal powerful enough to halt waste, inefficiency, low-valued water uses, avoidable 
ecological degradation, and similar misuses of watercourses.   
Fourth, international law needs to state clearly that watercourses are indivisible common 
resources and must be understood and managed as such, as single entities and ecological wholes.  
The rules governing watercourse uses must be understood and set at that whole-basin level, 
leaving bilateral agreements among States merely to add implementing details. 
Fifth, reservoirs and other watercourse structures simply cannot be given free passes and cannot 
become legitimate simply through bilateral agreement.  They must be understood as uses of 
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watercourses (or bundles of uses) and evaluated comparatively with other competing uses.  Rules 
governing and limiting all watercourse uses should apply to them, just as they apply to other 
uses. 
Finally, with the above principles in place there is no need to hold on to sustainable development 
or any similar vague phrase having to do with environmental protection and/or tradeoffs between 
the environmental and economic growth.  The law of international watercourses is already ahead 
of sustainable development law in terms of clarifying options and regulating activities (aside 
from the issue of dams).   The imposition of prescribed environmental standards, together with a 
more substantial, clear ideal of reasonable use, is likely to work better to accommodate 
conflicting interests than the vague, much-criticized principle of sustainable development.   
Similarly, the language of a right to clean water is usefully pushed aside except (as will be 
explored) when it helps prioritize among competing water uses in assessments of their relative 
reasonableness.   
These various points are, of course, set forth here simply in skeletal form.  They will take center 
stage in chapters seven and eight, after detailed considerations of current law in chapters five and 
six.  And when they return in full, they will be considered in light of normative ideals, tailored in 
part to the needs of Bangladesh and similar, at-risk nations.  To put them forth in this 
Introduction, however, is to help highlight issues that will run throughout the dissertation.   
•What roles should environmental concerns play when they clash with short-term 
development possibilities?   
•How should the law decide among competing waterway uses given not just that demand 
will typically outstrip supply but that many competing uses are inherently in conflict? 
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•How should governance structures be organized—how should power be allocated—
when actions in one part of a basin can so readily affect actions elsewhere?   
•How much lawmaking authority should reside at the international level, not locally, 
when States have widely different degrees of power given their sizes, economies, and the 
simple realities of terrain and water-flows?   
In some way, international law needs to supply answers. 
As mentioned above, this dissertation looks to the horizon and sets forth a goal for long-term 
legal reform. Although the current law appears headed in a sound direction, it preoccupies itself 
with the prevailing tensions among different freestanding principles to an extent that constricts 
its development. Such a desultory movement is also evident from the fact that current law has 
largely become a repository of widely differing principles and ideals. This trend must break, and 
the law should move ahead with a clear vision set as a goal –a vision of ecologically healthy 
rivers, where all water uses would be consistent with that health and would promote justice 
among all the people living near them. This dissertation seeks to serve that purpose. One 
important contribution of this dissertation is that it would start a new legal discourse by placing 
these ambitious perspectives on the table and then going from there. As explained in the last 
chapter (chapter 8), the value of such a work is more imperative today than ever for many basin 
States, especially the most vulnerable. 
This dissertation.  To sum up, water is the only scarce resource for which there is no substitute.  
Current international law is poorly developed, despite important improvements in recent 
decades.  At local levels, among neighboring States, cooperation over watercourses is often 
limited by conflicting goals and widely varied degrees of power.  Put simply, the need for 
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significant further change is overwhelming, constant, and immediate.15  Today’s resource 
conflicts will gain in frequency and intensity as water resources become relatively more scarce 
and as actions by and within nations trigger even greater impacts on neighboring States.16  
Reform efforts to interject environmental concerns into the law have brought more confusion 
than clarity, particularly with the recent interjection of vague principles such as sustainable 
development and an individual right to clean water.  Environmental standards need to gain a 
clear, firm place in the governing law and to expand beyond water pollution to include issues of 
land subsidence, siltation, water-flow regimes, and salinity intrusion.   Further, the overall legal 
regime needs to cover reservoirs, subjecting them, like other uses of watercourses, to 
environmental norms and more vigorous standards of reasonable use. 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation explores how rivers are used and are otherwise altered by human 
activities. This inquiry identifies the major types of trans-boundary effects that may follow from 
various water-development projects, paying particular attention to ecological and social harms. 
Chapter 2 introduces the fundamental environmental goals and principles set forth in some of the 
most important international declarations and conventions, including those that seek to integrate 
national development pursuits and environmental policies.  With these topics covered, the 
dissertation turns to the case of Bangladesh, used as an example of a high-risk State.  Chapters 3 
and 4 survey the rivers in Bangladesh and its water relations with its neighbors. These chapters 
also take up the shared legal measures that the country has undertaken, along with other basin 
States, to forestall or ameliorate water-related problems, particularly ecological ones. The 
                                                 
15 Jesse H. Hamner and Aaron T. Wolf, “Patterns in International Water Resource Treaties: The Transboundary 
Freshwater Dispute Database,” Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, Natural 
Resources Forum Vol. 23-1 (1998): 3-33.  
16 Ibid. 
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following two chapters (5 and 6) detail the existing legal regime dealing with international 
waters.  They narrate the development of international water law leading up to the 1992 ECE 
Convention and the 1997 UN Watercourse Convention. They also provide a critique of the latest 
ILA Rules of 2004 and outline some of the progressive developments in environmental 
protection of watercourses as evidenced in various regional and bilateral agreements entered into 
in the past decade and a half. 
Chapter 7 builds upon these overviews of contemporary law to isolate and evaluate the chief 
ongoing trends in the law.  It identifies the ways the many current pieces of the law fit together 
poorly, particularly the ways the various new environment-related elements have disrupted the 
once-clear principle of equitable utilization.  By clarifying the weaknesses of current law, the 
chapter sets the stage for major reform.  Chapter 8 presents and explains the major normative 
principles that should guide the international law of watercourses, paying special attention, as 
noted, to the plights of highly vulnerable States.  It then uses these principles to propose a 
reformulated and simplified international law for watercourses, guided by an overall vision of 
ecologically healthy rivers and social justice for the peoples dependent on them.  The proposal 
calls for management at the whole-basin level rather than through bi-lateral negotiations and 
anticipates a considerable expansion of control over watercourses at the international level and 
through international dispute-resolution mechanisms.  The chapter’s final part takes this 
reformulated law and considers how it would apply to the case of Bangladesh and its 
neighboring States.  It largely addresses a single question:  how well might this reformulated law 
resolve the acute, worsening watercourse problems in this multi-State region? 
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PART I:  Rivers, Development, and Environmental Challenges 
Chapter 1: Rivers and Human Uses 
 
On a tour to Africa in 1907, Winston Churchill was carried away by the grandeur of Lake 
Victoria. The moment he found the world’s second largest lake falling into the world’s largest 
river, the Nile, he wondered: “so much power running to waste … such a lever to control the 
natural forces of Africa ungripped, cannot but vex and stimulate the imagination. And what fun 
to make the immemorial Nile begin its journey by diving into a turbine.” 17 The immense 
treasure and potential of this falling water never went out of Churchill’s mind or the minds of 
other policy makers in London.  Thirty eight years, in 1954, the project came into being. As 
Churchill served as Prime Minister of the U.K. for the second time, the Nile waters at last dove 
into turbines and Lake Victoria became a reservoir. This dream project provided Uganda and 
Western Kenya at the time with 150,000 kilowatts of electrical capacity.  
The story of Lake Victoria and Churchill—and of Churchill’s dream of manipulating and 
transforming a freshwater body to meet human needs—illustrates how policymakers have been 
eager to explore the latent opportunities in this finite resource. Over 45,000 times in the last 
century, people have made the decision to build big water projects, often using the development 
projects as comparatively easy vehicles to greater power, prosperity, and development. For many 
decades the large water-development project was seen as the most impressive symbol of the 
power of humankind, and particularly of the State, over water.   More even than the tall 
                                                 
17 Eliot Elisofon, Life, November 20, 1950, 119. 
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skyscraper, the soaring dam in a wild canyon proclaimed human control over nature itself.  
Today, a century after Churchill visited Africa, we share our rivers and lakes with several million 
dams, large and small, and with tube wells, canals, aqueducts, and pipelines, all designed to 
delay or divert waters from the destinations where gravity would otherwise take them.  
Dams and other forms of river engineering have undoubtedly blessed the growth of civilization. 
With dams and relevant technologies we have turned mad rivers into sane ones, increased 
irrigable lands, controlled untimely and excessive flooding, illuminated cities and towns with 
hydropower, and in the process, met various political purposes. Nonetheless, such projects have 
brought profound changes to watersheds. Nothing alters a watershed as much as a dam. At the 
heart of the water-project debate are issues of equity, governance, justice and power; issues that 
underlie the many intractable problems faced by humanity. Such debates involve concerns that 
reach beyond the characteristics, physical features or the operation of water projects.  They deal 
also and more importantly with economic, social, and environmental concerns, concerns that 
transcend national boundary lines when a common water body is shared by two or more 
countries.  
While the governance of international rivers is predominantly seen as the domain of sovereign, 
territorialized States, the problems are far more complex; they are socially trans-national even 
when projects seem geographically local. The world is rapidly experiencing an industrial boom, 
and demands for the efficient exploitation and use of global natural resources are making States 
increasingly interdependent. A single waterway may be subject to many incompatible claims and 
uses. Such pressures on water resources, and the ecological externalities of their uses, have 
become major sources of tension among river-basin States.  
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After looking briefly at water uses and water-development projects, this chapter identifies the 
principal environmental, social, and human impacts flowing from water-development projects, 
both within a nation and also across boundary lines, with particular attention to the negative 
externalities that are often borne by neighboring States that play no direct part in the projects. It 
then turns to the challenges associated with two incompatible, nonetheless essential public aims: 
the drive for development and the desire to maintain ecologically healthy lands and waters. As 
the chapter’s final part notes, nations have wrestled to prioritize their competing uses of water, a 
collaborative task made more difficult by the lack of a well-crafted international and regional 
legal regime.  
 
The Engineering of a Finite Resource 
 
Earth is the only water planet, with three-fourth of its surface covered by water.  However, 
ninety-seven percent of this huge body of water is undrinkable salt water resting in the oceans.  
Two percent is currently locked up in ice caps and glaciers, and the remaining one percent forms 
freshwater.  Even this one percent is not readily available as seventy-five percent of it resides at 
inaccessible depths in underground aquifers, thus leaving only a quarter in lakes and rivers, to be 
used by us. One is reminded of the famous verse by Samuel Taylor Coleridge in “the Rime of the 
Ancient Mariner – “water everywhere; nor any drop to drink.” Further complicating matters is 
that this freshwater resource is unevenly distributed worldwide, thus making certain regions and 
people much more vulnerable. We heavily rely on this very small fraction of fresh water for our 
sustenance, for daily use, for irrigation, for hydropower, and for all other development activities. 
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At the other end of the spectrum is the demand for this limited water resource, which is 
inexorably increasing with the steady rise in global population. During the past three centuries, 
the amount of water withdrawn from freshwater resources has increased by a factor of 35, while 
world population has increased by a factor of 8. Extraction today is twice that of 50 years ago. 
With this trend in place, global water demand is expected to rise by a further 2-3 percent 
annually in the decades ahead.18 
Development impulses. Dams, diversions, and irrigation canals are all ancient technologies that 
humans have constructed since the dawn of farming. A dam is a form of barrier that holds back 
water, primarily to save, manage or prevent the flow of water into specific regions. A reservoir, 
in contrast, is an artificial lake used for storing water and is usually created by the construction of 
a dam. The foothills of Zagros Mountains are thought to have harbored, eight thousand years 
ago, an irrigation canal used by Mesopotamian farmers.19 The earliest dam remnants that have 
been found come from one that diverted Nile water near Memphis, in ancient Egypt, some 4,900 
years ago. The Han Dynasty in China during the second century B.C. was another early cradle 
for earthen dams, constructed mainly for irrigation purposes.20 Ever since then, civilizations have 
constructed such structures in different places and of different sizes and storage capacities.  
With the rise of development activities and increased population, societies faced greater needs 
for water supply, irrigation, flood control and navigation, which necessitated (or at least led to) 
more water projects for meeting these needs.  We have persistently undertaken manipulative 
river development projects in order to maximize the efficient utilization of this strained resource. 
                                                 
18 “Role of Dams,” International commission on large Dams, accessed March 6, 2017, http://www.icold-
cigb.org/GB/Dams/Role_of_Dams.asp. 
19 Patrick McCully, Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2001), 13. 
20 J.R. McNeill, Something New under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-Century World (New 
York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), 157. 
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As time passed, we refined our technological knowledge and started applying civil engineering, 
hydraulics, and fluid mechanics to these earthen forms and structures, leading in time to ever 
larger and stronger dams. This tendency became particularly apparent by the end of nineteenth 
century and into the twentieth century, when rivers were extensively developed for their greater 
potential for electricity generation. A major dam or series of dams became viewed as the 
cornerstone in the development and management of water resources in a river basin. Following 
that, multipurpose dams,21 modeled after the Hoover dam, turned out to be a lucrative option 
among developing countries—for instance, China, India and Brazil—since they could receive a 
wide array of domestic and economic benefits from a single investment. Big multipurpose dams 
became particularly popular from 1930s to 1980, with some nations continuing thereafter to 
build on a heroic scale.22 
Economic gain, a principal determinant factor for building large dams,23 soon began to be 
complemented by other external justifications for the projects. Big and large dams were seen as 
potent symbols for patriotic pride, power and conquest of nature by human ingenuity. Lenin, 
Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt, and Deng Xiaoping all encouraged massive water projects. 
Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, even regarded dams as the “temples in 
modern India.”24 Especially during the cold war era, there was an unspoken competition among 
the world leaders to construct large dams. During the 1960s, more than one large dam was 
completed per day, on average. By the 1990s, as the construction of river-development project 
continued, about two–thirds of the globe’s stream flows passed over or through dams of one sort 
                                                 
21 Multipurpose dams are dams constructed for two or more purposes; i.e. storage, flood control, navigation, power 
generation, recreation, or fish and wildlife enhancement etc. 
22 McCully, Silenced Rivers, 16. 
23 International standards including those set by the International Commission on Large Dams define large dams as 
higher than 15 meters and major dams as over 150 meters in height. 
24 McCully, Silenced Rivers, 16. 
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or another.25 In the words of environmental historian J. R. McNeill, the projects in combination 
amounted to a massive planetary plumbing project, intended to accommodate the needs of an 
evolving economy and for reasons of public health, geopolitics, and global power.26 
 
Benefits of water-development projects.  Water-development projects provide various economic 
and social benefits; including recreation, flood control, water supply, hydroelectric power, waste 
management, and river navigation. Most dams are built for several purposes (multipurpose dams) 
and produce a broad range of domestic and economic benefits. Dams and reservoirs can be 
effectively used to regulate river levels and flooding downstream of the dam by temporarily 
storing the flood volume and releasing it later. The most effective method of flood control is 
accomplished by a number of multipurpose dams strategically located in a river basin.27 Flood-
control dams impound floodwaters and then either release them under control to the river below 
the dam or store or divert the water for other uses. Such water projects have readily expanded 
and improved the irrigation zones, especially in the arid parts of the world. In addition, large 
urban areas depend heavily on water that is stored in reservoirs during high flows and later made 
available during periods of low rainfall. Finally, hydropower accounts for quite a substantial 
percentage of the total world electricity supply.28  Hydropower is again widely viewed as 
renewable, predictable, and non-polluting.   In fact, however, it comes with clear costs, 
sometimes greater overall than the costs of alternative power sources. 
                                                 
25 McNeill, Something New Under the Sun, 159. 
26 Ibid.,150. 
27 “Benefits and Concerns about Dams,” International Commission on Large Dams, accessed March 7, 2017, 
https://www.scribd.com/document/59706704/Benefits-of-and-Concerns-About-Dams. 
28 “Water,” The World Bank, accessed March 7, 2017, http://water.worldbank.org/topics/hydropower. 
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The unexpected costs.  As the construction of dams and reservoirs continued and studies of them 
mounted, it became increasingly clear that many of projects involved substantial and surprising 
costs, in addition to the known and expected costs of construction.  Some of the negatives of 
dams stemmed from their virtues. The true and exact impacts of river engineering in many cases 
are hard to quantify, and are often impossible to predict with certainty. Most of the dam projects 
in the last century were undertaken based only on short-term studies of small watersheds in 
temperate climates.  There was limited understanding of the functioning of large rivers in 
temperate regions, or of rivers of any size in the tropics.29 Most of the major rivers in Europe and 
the U.S. were diked, straightened, dredged and dammed long before their ecology or hydrology 
had been seriously studied.30  Further, particular designs for dams were used in different 
geographic locations worldwide, with little consideration of the unique features and flow patterns 
of the rivers being impounded. Not surprisingly, the lack of thorough study and hasty use of 
standard designs led over the decades to significant concerns, environmental as well as human.  
 
The Ecological Effects 
 
Before going into details about the ecological effects of dams, an anecdote can help set the stage. 
The saga of the Aral Sea in Central Asia and its disastrous plight over the past century has 
become a poster case for waterway abuse. According to the then-leaders of the USSR, the 
nation’s economic development required the harnessing of its rivers, which needed to give way 
to the will of the State and its planners. Stalin and his successors, in order to rapidly industrialize 
                                                 
29 McCully, Silenced Rivers, 30. 
30 Ibid., 31. 
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the country, undertook mammoth and heroic dam projects and irrigation canals along the Volga, 
the Syr Dar’ya and the Amu Dar’ya Rivers, which supplied water to the Aral Sea. As the dams, 
reservoirs and diversion channels started drawing more water from the rivers for use in 
irrigation, the level of Aral water soon started declining.31 In a zeal to achieve full independence 
in cotton production, policymakers sacrificed the Aral Sea, once the fourth largest freshwater 
body on earth.32 By 1980, the Aral got only a fifth of its former water inflow; by the 1990s it 
received at most a tenth, and occasionally nothing at all. In 1990 it became two seas as the 
declining sea level exposed a land bridge in the north.  Meanwhile the salinity of the water 
tripled between 1960 and 1993.  For a watching world, the Aral Sea came to symbolize the grave 
and irreversible environmental consequences that could accrue from a water project. 
The usual environmental impacts arising from large dams are often interconnected and 
overlapping because they disrupt the entire ecological chain in the water body.  Typically, such 
environmental impacts would comprise the following concerns:33 
1. Changes in downstream morphology of riverbed and banks, delta, estuary and 
coastline due to altered sediment load. 
2. Changes in downstream water quality; effects on river temperature, nutrient load, 
turbidity, dissolved gases, and concentration of heavy metals and minerals. 
3. Changes in the natural flow of the river or lake; changes in the seasonal timing of 
flows and in their natural fluctuations. 
                                                 
31 McNeill, Something New Under the Sun, 169. 
32 “Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Aral Sea,” Program in Water Conflict Management and 
Transformation, Oregon State University, accessed March 7, 2017, 
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Aral_Sea_New.htm. 
33 McCully, Silenced Rivers, 30. 
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4. Significant reductions in biodiversity due to the blocking of the movement of 
organisms and because of the habitat changes due to altered flow. 
5. Reductions in riverine, riparian and floodplain habitat diversity, especially 
because of elimination of natural flooding. 
6. Increased salinity levels in the water and water bed, thereby reducing the fertility 
of land and suitability of the waters for irrigation. 
7. Disruption of irrigation by interfering with the natural flooding and thus with the 
deposition of nutrient-rich sediment associated with such flooding. 
8. Greenhouse gas emissions caused by the storage dams and reservoirs as they lead 
to the decay of plants and carbon-rich soils. 
9. Coastal line erosion and submerging of deltas. 
10. Increased natural calamities and increased rate of havoc as river engineering (and 
resulting salinity) does away with the natural buffers.34 
Trapping sediments.  One important function performed by rivers is that they carry sediments 
that are washed away from the soils and rocks over which they flow. Such sediments allow 
natural replenishment of ecosystems as they are carried by flowing water downstream and 
deposited along the riverbeds and river banks, where they serve as natural fertilizer. Dams and 
reservoirs, however, significantly obstruct that chain by trapping loads of sediments within their 
walls, commonly capturing and retaining up to ninety percent of all incoming sediment.35 
Reduction in the sediment transport has impacts on channel, floodplain and coastal-delta 
morphology and brings changes to aquatic habitats for fish and other species. 
                                                 
34 William R. Freudenburg et al., Catastrophe in the Making: The Engineering of Katrina and the Disasters of 
Tomorrow (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 2009), 168. 
35 McCully, Silenced Rivers, 33. 
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The Nile Delta has historically been the most fertile zone on earth, fertility that supported the 
entire civilization in and around the Delta.  The Delta itself was created by the deposition of this 
silt or sediment, which had been building up for millennia and which kept enriching and 
extending the landmass every year.36 As a result of the High Aswan Dam on the Nile, more than 
98 percent of the Nile’s sediment today is deposited at the bottom of the vast Nasser Reservoir.37 
Thus, the massive construction project that was designed to cure flood-caused disruption and to 
expand irrigation had the effect of disrupting natural fertility cycles in ways that severely harmed 
Egyptian agriculture. 
Sedimentation loss also affects long stretches of coastline near river mouths, which become more 
prone to erosion by coastal waves when they lose the silt deposited on them by the incoming 
rivers.38 The sediment discharged through the Mississippi Delta, for instance, has fallen by more 
than half since 1953, mainly because of the huge dams built on the Missouri and Mississippi 
Rivers. The result of sediment deprivation, together with land subsidence due to oil and gas 
extraction, results in loss to subsidence of approximately 25 to 35 square miles of Louisiana’s 
land each year.39 Another example of such dam-caused coastal erosion is along the Bight of 
Benin, east of the mouth of the Volta River in Ghana. The dam there has virtually halted the 
supply of sediment, and the shoreline of neighboring Togo and Benin is now being eaten away at 
a rate of 10 to 15 meters per year.40 
                                                 
36 Deltas are formed by the accumulation of tens of thousands of years of deposits of river sediments, partly 
counteracted by their settling and compaction and by erosion from the sea. 
37 “Floodplain,” accessed March 7, 2017, http://www.scienceclarified.com/landforms/Faults-to-
Mountains/Floodplain.html#b. 
38 McCully, Silenced Rivers, 35. 
39 Mike Tidwell, Bayou Farewell: The Rich Life and Tragic Death of Louisiana’s Cajun Coast (New York: Vintage 
Books, 2004), 334. 
40 “Dams and Geology,” International Rivers, accessed March 7, 2017, http://www.internationalrivers.org/dams-
and-geology. 
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Alteration of flow.  Freshwater ecosystems contain a highly varied and rich biodiversity, which 
inevitably depends upon the “cycling of water and on functioning ecological processes and 
species assemblages.”41 Such a fine, varied balance of life forms requires maintaining particular 
water-flow regimes, in terms of both quality and quantity, and the most significant 
environmental impacts of hydroelectric dams are, arguably, due to the alteration of the affected 
river’s flow.  When river flows are altered, it is not merely the visible appearance of the river that 
is changed; rather, it is a cycle that has much deeper impacts, even beyond the river itself. 
Different types of dams and reservoirs result in different flow patterns, depending on the ways 
the structures are managed based on the functions they provide.   
In the case of reservoirs built to support power production, the reservoir is typically managed to 
keep the water level high, which in turn means storing more water from the river so long as it is 
available.  Water is allowed to flow downstream when and as the reservoir is called upon to 
generate power. Conversely, flood control as a reservoir-management goal requires that the 
reservoir’s level drop in advance of anticipated heavy flows (usually during the rainy season) so 
that the reservoir has available space to absorb the flood waters.  Flood waters often carry 
particularly heavy sediment lows, so their capture behind flood-control reservoirs often leads to a 
significant loss of sediment.  Minimizing the rate of sediment-capture by a reservoir on a highly 
seasonal river requires discharging as much sediment-filled water as possible during the flood 
season—a management approach inconsistent with using a reservoir for flood control or for 
water storage for the dry season. 
                                                 
41 McCully, Silenced Rivers, 34. 
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Some dams are constructed to capture seasonal flows to make them available for later diversion 
and consumption, often for irrigation or municipal use.  These reservoirs also greatly alter 
seasonal flows and sediment loads.  The same consequences come from dams that are intended 
in important part to help support navigation.  They do so by retaining water flows during heavy-
flow times and releasing the water as needed when navigation channels downstream need 
additional water to keep boats afloat.  Finally, reservoirs built in important part to sustain 
recreation and to provide amenities for water-front residences, as well as reservoirs built as 
cooling ponds (for instance, for nuclear power plants), are typically managed to maintain 
consistent water levels year round.  In regions with arid seasons, this means no releases of water 
downstream during parts of the year, a management approach that can leave a river stretch just 
below the dam entirely dry. 
In varying ways and degrees, all dams and reservoir significantly disrupt the flow regime of the 
rivers that they disrupt, producing downstream water flows that may differ greatly in quantity, 
timing, sediment-loads, and temperature from natural flow regimes.  
Temperature changes.  Dams and reservoirs, as noted, significantly alter the temperature of 
water released downstream, particularly in the case of hydropower projects; in them, water is 
typically released from lower levels in the reservoir, where it is colder.  Such temperature 
changes can disrupt the lifecycle of aquatic species by affecting their breeding, hatching and 
metamorphosing of larvae.42 Within the reservoirs themselves, the naturally flowing water of a 
river is replaced by largely stagnant pools—a major ecological change beneficial to some species 
and harmful to many others.  The surface layer of a reservoir, its water stagnant and perhaps sun-
                                                 
42 Geoffrey E. Petts, Impounded Rivers: Perspectives for Ecological Management (New York: Wiley, 1985), 175 – 
177. 
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baked, can become too warm for young fish of some species, even lethal for them, while the 
cooler water at lower levels can be fatal due to oxygen depletion. A general decline in native fish 
abundance in the Colorado River is attributed specifically to the cold-water releases from the 
middle levels of the reservoirs in the area.  
Tolls on aquatic species.  For the reasons already mentioned and several others, a wide range of 
water-development projects have proved to be highly detrimental to fish and other species in the 
water. River engineering substantially alters many of the freshwater habitats of the aquatic 
species and directly harms them by changing water temperature, increasing predation, and 
subjecting various populations to direct danger and stress. River fragmentation by dams and 
other water development projects have already wiped out a number of aquatic species, and have 
left many more endangered. 
Again, the huge loss of sediments in below-dam river flows inevitably changes the biological 
compounds in water and takes away the necessary nutrients vital for fish populations. The 
sediment-free clearer water also reduces camouflage for fish, thereby making them more 
vulnerable to their predators. Anadromous fish43 have suffered calamitous declines due to the 
loss of habitat behind dams. Out of the 170 fish species endemic to the heavily dammed Western 
United States, 105 are officially listed as threatened or endangered or are being considered for 
such a listing.  
Essentially, a dam without sufficient fish-passage options is a sufficient barrier to wipe out 
anadromous fishes by preventing them from reaching their spawning grounds. The annual run of 
adult salmon and steelhead trout in the Columbia River Basin is estimated to have averaged 
                                                 
43 Anadromous fish means fish which spawn in fresh water and spend a portion of their lives in the ocean. 
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between 10 and 16 million fish before non-native settlers arrived in the nineteenth century. 
Today, after decades of decline—especially due to the 130 or so dams in the basin—only some 
1.5 million salmon and steelhead enter the Columbia each year, and around three-quarters of 
these are hatchery reared rather than wild, river-spawned fish. The massive Grand Coulee Dam, 
built without any fish-passage facilities, cut off from the sea nearly two thousand kilometers of 
salmon spawning grounds on the upper Columbia, eliminating a once highly valued fishery.  
Ecosystem fragmentation.  In all of these ways, dams significantly impact aquatic ecosystems, 
altering the natural cycles of water flows, transforming the biological and physical characteristics 
of river channels and floodplains, and fragmenting the continuity of rivers.44 Damming a river 
disrupts riverine habitats by isolating the upstream and downstream ecosystems and cutting off 
species’ migratory abilities, which seriously disturbs their historical spawning habits.45 Such 
fragmentation has already wiped out a number of aquatic species, and has left many more 
endangered. Swedish ecologists, Mats Dynesius and Christer Nilsson, concluded based on the 
estimated degrees of damage to river systems in the U.S., Canada, Europe and the former USSR 
that fully 77 percent of the total water discharges of the 139 largest river systems in these 
countries is “strongly or moderately affected by fragmentation of the river channels by dams and 
by water regulation resulting from reservoir operation, inter-basin diversion and irrigation.”46 
Evaporation and loss of river water.  Dams in tropical or arid regions lead to the evaporation of 
huge amounts of water from reservoir surfaces, evaporation that quickly lowers reservoir levels 
and diminishes the water-efficiency benefits of these huge monetary investments.  For instance, 
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the annual average of 11.2 cubic kilometers of water evaporated from the Nasser Reservoir 
behind the Aswan Dam is around 10 percent of the water stored in the reservoir and is roughly 
equal to the total withdrawals of water for residential and commercial use throughout Africa.47  
Evaporation itself becomes a major use of water from a reservoir, a use that is fully consumptive 
unless the evaporated water returns as rainfall to the same river basin. 
The warm and arid environment around Lake Powell behind Glenn Canyon Dam is very 
conducive for high rates of evaporation. Today, twenty percent of the Colorado River's annual 
flow is lost to evaporation and seepage from its reservoir system.48 Such a huge loss of river 
water from the reservoir is one of the main reasons for the increased salinity in the reservoir 
itself and in water flowing downstream.  High salt concentrations are poisonous to aquatic 
organisms and they corrode pipes and machineries. The increased salinity of the Colorado River 
costs Southern California’s water users millions of dollars each year.49 
Landscape disruption. The flooding of vast areas of landmass in the formation of reservoirs, 
including wetlands and tropical rainforests, is one of the main examples of landscape disruption 
by dams. Moreover, altered water flows and sediment capture together can bring about river-
bank and coastal erosion and, in places, river-bank collapse.50   
Methane gas and carbon dioxide emissions: Hydropower is commonly viewed by proponents 
and others as a clean and virtually non-polluting energy source. However, recent scientific 
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studies chart the release of sometimes very substantial greenhouse gases by large-scale 
hydroelectric developments.51 During the first years after a reservoir is filled, the decomposition 
of submerged vegetation and soils can lead to releases of huge amounts of methane and carbon 
dioxide, which before entering the atmosphere can drastically deplete the level of oxygen in the 
water thereby harming aquatic life. According to critics, in tropical areas of Brazil, where large 
dams produce more than ninety percent of electricity generation, the dams’ reservoirs emit such 
a high amount of methane gas that the dams in combination contribute more to climate change 
than would an equivalent of power generation from fossil-fuel power plants.52  
Mercury contamination: The first indication that reservoirs could exacerbate mercury 
contamination problems came from South Carolina in the mid-1970s.  Since then, elevated 
mercury levels in fish have been recorded from reservoirs in a variety of locations, including 
Illinois.53 The mercury itself largely comes from coal combustion and is carried either by air or 
by leakage from coal ash pits.   What the reservoirs add to the mix is that the mercury is retained 
by the reservoirs, from there entering food webs and concentrating over time in the tissue of top 
predators and carrion eaters, both fish and birds.  Fish mercury concentrations have increased in 
all reservoirs for which pre- and post-impoundment data have been collected. Mercury in fish 
can attain particularly high levels in large reservoirs with comparatively small water discharges. 
Elevated mercury levels in fish are related to the degree of flooding of terrestrial areas involved 
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in reservoir creation: other factors equal, the more land flooded proportional to the volume of the 
reservoir, the higher the mercury levels in fish. 
 
The Social Consequences 
 
The human impacts of water development projects are as dramatic as the ecological ones, for 
good and ill. Over the last several decades, builders of dams have evicted millions of people, 
almost all of them poor and politically powerless.  A significant portion of those evicted come 
from indigenous and aboriginal population, the most marginalized section in any society. While 
local people are often supposed to be among the prime beneficiaries of such development 
projects, many projects in reality have taken a heavy toll on them. 
Displacement. There are no exact statistics on how many people have been displaced so far due 
to dam construction and operation. According to an estimate of the World Commission on Dams, 
the number is likely between 40 to 80 million worldwide.54  In the instance of the Richand 
project in India, many people did not even receive advanced warning and had to flee for their 
lives, leaving their homes and valuables, once the flood water actually rushed into their 
neighborhoods.55  
Even when displaced peoples are relocated and provided with new lands and means for survival, 
many of them experience their relocations as distinctly adverse events in their lives, ones that 
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disrupt their settlement patterns and add costs to their economic livelihoods. The High Dam at 
Aswan provides a good example of how dam construction may cause significant trans-boundary 
displacement. The High Dam at Aswan, Egypt, resulted in the relocation of 50,000-60,000 
Nubians56 in the Egyptian part of the Lake Nasser Reservoir and another 53,000 Nubians in the 
Sudanese part. The Egyptian Nubians were moved to new villages 20 kilometers north of Aswan, 
where serious problems developed with land allocation, soil quality, irrigation facilities, 
distances between allocated land and home villages, the government’s requirement that the 
settlers raise unfamiliar crops such as sugar cane, and the inappropriate, non-traditional housing 
provided.57 
The Sudanese Nubians were resettled in the Kashm el-Girba region to the southeast. The social 
structure of many of the old villages was severely disrupted because they were split up upon 
resettlement. Social tensions were exacerbated by settling three different ethnic groups together: 
the farmers flooded out by the Aswan development and two groups of local nomadic pastoralists 
being “sedentarized” by the government. Aside from cultural differences, the grazing practices of 
the pastoralists were incompatible with the cultivation practiced by the farmers.58 
Violence. Displacement alone is not the end of the story. Often, protesting people are put to 
torturous treatment by the builders. In1982, more than 3,500 impoverished Mayan Indians were 
illegally and forcibly evicted from their villages along the Chixoy River, Guatemala, to make 
way for a hydro-electric dam, a project, financed by the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank. Around 400 villagers from Rio Negro had been tortured, kidnapped and 
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killed by the time the dam wall was complete for opposing their relocation and seeking better 
compensation.59 
Livelihood and harvest disruption.  Where the resource base for a certain community is largely 
aquatic, and local residents need constant and unobstructed access to the lakes and rivers, dams 
and reservoirs carry a heavy price for them, both economically and socially. The biological 
changes in the water accompanied by the flow and temperature fluctuations take a toll on the fish 
population and their spawning activities, which can serve as a prominent source of livelihood for 
indigenous people. Harvest disruption also occurs because access to hunting, fishing and 
trapping areas are rendered more difficult, or even impossible, by debris, increased discharge, or 
by a reservoir itself.  A commercial fishery around the Aral Sea that formerly supported 60,000 
workers came to a halt once the gigantic freshwater lake diminished drastically in size and 
became more saline than the seas.60 Such subsistence-based economies are sensitive to industrial 
development because changes in the resource use and harvesting patterns directly affect the 
established systems of land tenure and resource management and the organization of production 
and distribution. 
Health concerns. Evidence from all different dam projects suggests that some populations 
become highly susceptible of getting sick after their resettlement to a new place. This can be well 
explained by the rates of malnutrition, poor health, and sanitation at resettlement sites. In an 
unknown environment, resettled groups can confront different types of diseases without their 
immune systems having sufficiently developed to fight them.61 Often the most serious health risk 
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attributed to a reservoir is that it harbors vectors like mosquitos and snails, which thrive in 
irrigation canals and along the edges of reservoirs.  
Another health risk with river development projects is associated with the influx of workers in 
the construction area and also from the mingling of diverse groups of people upon resettlement. 
Particularly in tropical developing countries, such reshuffling carries the risk of increases in a 
wide variety of diseases, such as tuberculosis, syphilis, AIDS, and measles. 
Dam collapses. There are plentiful examples of dam failures due to poor and imperfect 
engineering. If a dam collapses—perhaps the worst of all outcomes—the reservoir water 
typically sweeps away the entire area. In 1975, a series of dam bursts in Henan province of 
China left perhaps 230,000 dead.62 
 
Effects Carried Forward: Trans-boundary Harm 
 
Water knows no boundaries. Water flows not only ignore political boundaries, but also evade 
institutional classification and elude legal generalizations. Thus, a river carries the impacts and 
consequences springing from a development project from the actor country to the downstream 
country. A recent survey of international river basins revealed three striking facts about the 
extensive internationalization of the world’s waters.63  
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1. The number of international waterways (lakes and rivers) is larger than previously 
thought: 263, compared with a 1978 UN estimate of 214.64  
2. The basins through which these watercourses flow cover almost half of the 
Earth’s land surface area. 
3. Among the world’s non-island States, all but a handful (including Denmark, 
Singapore and a few States on the Arabian Peninsula) have some portion of their territory 
in an international basin. Among States occupying international basins, almost two thirds 
(ninety two) have at least half of their territory in an international basin; for more than 
one third (fifty), the figure is 80 percent or more of national territory.65 
Along with these 263 common rivers, there are again untold numbers of shared aquifers. Water 
has been a cause of political tensions between Indians and Bangladeshis, Arabs and Israelis, 
Americans and Mexicans, and all ten riparian States of the Nile River. Water, as noted, is a 
scarce resource and has no substitutes, and strong law is needed to govern its use given the often 
weak motivations that exist among countries to cooperate fairly and to keep watercourses 
ecologically healthy.66  
Addressing the challenges. Water-development projects have indeed helped promote economic 
development in many States. However, it is equally undeniable that they have exacerbated 
environmental and social problems.  Many scholars have claimed that the benefits emerging 
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from a dam are often exaggerated, with economic gains overstated and resulting costs 
understated.  As for hydropower dams, there is an important difference between a hydropower 
plant’s capacity and its actual electricity generation, a distinction that is often overlooked or 
hidden. Even many major dams are not created solely for hydropower and cannot be operated 
simply to generate it; operations must balance competing goals when, as usual, the goals call for 
different water-management methods.67  It is, therefore, crucial to estimate and weigh the 
perceived costs with the promised benefits, typically a challenging task given the unquantifiable 
nature of environmental goods and ecosystem services and the difficulties of putting money 
values on human suffering. However, even if we take into account numeric values of lost 
fisheries, livelihood and even restoration efforts, we get startling numbers.   The Bureau of 
Reclamation assumes that economic damages due to Colorado River salinity are approximately 
$750 million per year in the U.S., even without including the economic damages to the farmers 
in Mexico. 68  
Further, many potential dam sites are far from the cities and industries, and the resulting ill 
effects often do not reach the people who literally consume the benefits. This logically leads to 
unfairness concerns as the adverse effects have to be borne by the local and indigenous people, 
thereby making them much more vulnerable; for local people, the costs can greatly exceed the 
benefits that they enjoy. An estimated ten percent of humanity has already been directly harmed 
by dams, whereas the resulting benefits have gone disproportionately to economic and political 
elites and other interested groups. As a World Bank internal review states: “Dam and reservoir 
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operation is not dictated by optimization rules, but by the struggles of interest groups.”69  A fair 
approach would ensure an equitable distribution of the benefits and resources among all the 
stakeholders, net of the costs that they bear and with special sensitivity to respecting the 
traditional livelihoods and cultural integrity of local people.  
Along with nationwide environmental and social impacts, dams and other river development 
projects have trans-national consequences as well. Rivers and watersheds seldom adhere to 
national boundaries.  Even when the debate about a proposed project arises as a geographically 
“domestic” controversy, the resulting costs and social conflicts can easily be extensively and 
increasingly transnational. Over the past few decades, large dams and water infrastructure 
projects have become a globally linked arena of contentious politics among nations. This may be 
the reason why Aaron T. Wolf, an environmental policy expert, chose to term water management 
as “conflict management.”70 Researchers looking at the prospects for “environmentally induced” 
violent conflict have pointed towards shared water resources as the single most likely route by 
which environmental change might trigger interstate hostilities.71 Such possible conflict of uses 
over a scarce resource is nothing new, and it has existed since humans began exploiting rivers in 
earnest.  A historic understanding of trans-boundary adverse impact can be found in an 
inscription dated 1369 on the Anantharaja Dam in South India. Listing the conditions for good 
dam construction, it specified that a dam should not be placed on a site at the boundary of two 
kingdoms.72 
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As with territory, so with authority. An upstream nation, while considering dam construction, 
can easily ignore the ecological effects that might take place in downstream countries. Also, the 
latter group may remain ignorant of such a project or of its any potential negative outcomes. 
Even when aware of the facts of downstream harm, the acting State may disagree sharply with 
the interpretation of the facts taken by its affected counterpart.  States that are mutually aware of 
the likely consequences of a dam project might disagree significantly on  how best to use river 
water and river corridors generally and even on what the river actually entails and means. Robert 
Goodland, an ecologist with the World Bank and a frequent intermediary between the Bank and 
its critics, has identified no less than seventeen separate points of knowledge-based dispute 
between feuding States, including the nature and distribution of costs and benefits, the feasibility 
and desirability of alternatives, the capacity of governments to regulate effectively, and the 
essence of “development.” Such ramifications vividly illuminate the gaps in the national and 
international governance systems and the politicization now occurring at different levels.  
That said, the challenge of resisting a proposed dam within the politics of a State might well be 
easier than contesting it from the position of a downstream neighboring State.  In the wake of 
serious protests from local people, a democratic form of government may think twice about 
proceeding with a project for fear of losing political power in the next election. That fear is less 
strong in a country without a democratic form of government and hardly present at all in a 
dispute among two or more nations that share the river being dammed. The concerns of a 
downstream State might easily be ignored in the internal decision-making processes of the acting 
State unless there are internal political forces that step forward to raise their concerns.  Even 
then, the question arises:  Can a government be held accountable for such a unilateral action 
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when international law has long shown such respect for the concept of State sovereignty over 
territories and natural resources?   
Often, a downstream government may seem to be “okay” with a certain dam project for the sake 
of good neighborly relations, for lack of negotiation skill, or in exchange for particular benefits 
such as a share in electricity. Such a scenario leaves the affected population of the downstream 
States in a much more precarious situation, entirely losing the support of political leaders in their 
home State who ought to be representing their interests internationally. What options would 
affected citizens of a downstream State have in such a case? Recent decades have seen the 
emergence of what might be termed the trans-nationalization of opposition, through growing 
links among organizations of local affected people and a global advocacy network linking 
environmentalists, human rights activists, and indigenous peoples’ groups. A notable example 
may be the Tipaimukh dam controversy, where the people in Bangladesh themselves, while 
working independently alongside their government, have also approached different international 
advocacy groups and media for assistance, seeking to apply pressure against their own 
government and that of India (site of the proposed dam) and to present a petition against the dam 
to the United Nations.   
As this and many similar cases illustrate, dam-related controversies that were once largely 
internal matters within a State and among its people have become regional, or even sometimes  
international, disputes involving multiple stakeholders; i.e. the acting State, its affected people, 
downstream States, their affected people, international bodies, construction corporations, 
financers, civil society groups and more. This multi-stakeholder model makes the scenario even 
more complicated and can create particular difficulties attempting to align the concerns, stances, 
and goals of the various interests. Logically, international funding sources and multinational 
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corporations should pay close attention to such conflicts and be attentive to resulting harms.  The 
World Bank, however, while funding many dam projects around the world, mostly seems to get 
involved only in situations involving corruption while paying little attention to other ill-effects. 
For instance, the $1.8 billion Merowe Dam in Northern Sudan was funded by China Export 
Import Bank and Arab financiers, and built by Chinese, German and French companies. As the 
project moved forward, several people were killed and many more were brutally oppressed and 
injured in crack-downs by the security forces.73 Should not these institutions and bodies have a 
parallel role in monitoring whether their projects stimulate violations of human rights and 
whether the projects comply with required standards?  
 
Dams and the Need for International Law 
 
At present, some 140 bilateral and regional agreements regulate water flows and water allocation 
in international watercourses. Few of them, however, seriously address environmental concerns; 
while others, by failing to do so avoid engaging many of the human social costs.  As will be 
considered later in chapters 5 and 6, the United Nations Watercourse Convention of 1997 
includes provisions aimed at environmental protection but fails to integrate them well into the 
other guiding principles and largely exempts dam projects entirely from their provisions. In 
general, existing international legal instruments fall far short of addressing the full range of real-
world problems caused by major river structures; they are more attentive, often solely attentive, 
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to issues of water allocation and too often include conflicting provisions dealing with the 
responsibilities and liabilities of the State parties. Establishment of few global institutional 
arrangements such as Global Water Partnership (GWP), International Council on Local 
Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), and the Trans-boundary River Basin Initiative (TRIB) have 
been promising, though the effectiveness of these bodies have been much hindered by the limited 
scope of their decisional authority, their narrower geographic scope and finally, by the frequent 
lack of co-operation among the stakeholders.  
New dam projects are not likely to end given their apparent capacity to help address the basic 
needs of an ever-increasing population. Without question, however, more care and attention 
should be accorded to their full consequences and policymakers should proceed in a much more 
reasoned way. Despite technological advances in predicting the environmental effects of 
hydroelectric developments, a great deal of uncertainty still exists. Surprisingly, new kinds of 
major impacts resulting from hydroelectric development are still being identified. Mercury 
concentration and greenhouse gas emissions in new reservoirs are two such recent discoveries, 
refuting the sanguine view that hydropower is immensely clean.  
When harms are anticipated, steps need to be taken to alleviate them with new technologies 
developed to do so.   Some success has already been achieved in reducing harms to fish 
population by installing sufficient passage options, i.e. fish screens74 and fish ladders,75 and 
transporting fish on barges. However, these passage options, it should be clear, do not fully 
eliminate fish mortality; indeed, while reducing some dangers they expose the fish to new 
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threats, injury and stress. As for the many other ecological and human concerns, most are not 
easily amenable to technological refinement; they can only be addressed through more drastic 
options, such as dam removal. That idea was once unthinkable—dams once constructed were 
meant to stay forever.  But deadly experiences like the Aral Sea and the Nile River basin have 
given rise to a wide scale anti-dam movement throughout the world.  Dam opponents have urged 
State actors on many occasions to remove dams and affiliated structures from the rivers and to 
endeavor to restore the lost ecosystems. Though hydropower development or other forms of 
river-development projects have slowed since 1980s, they have never stopped.  New construction 
continues apart in various major river basins in the world, especially in developing regions. New 
construction aside, the world will long deal with the dangers of previously built giant structures. 
They are still with us. With the passage of time and age they become more fragile and prone to 
failure and unanticipated effects if not taken care of or maintained in timely ways.  
Less than twenty percent of the world’s estimated feasible hydropower potential has been 
developed so far.  The potential for harnessing this potential is particularly extensive in Asia, 
South America and Africa.  For new projects to promote human flourishing over the long term, 
States need to take a more holistic view of water-resource management and to proceed in a spirit 
of cooperation when altering international watercourses. A high priority should be given to the 
preparation and implementation of integrated management plans, endorsed by all affected 
governments and backed by international agreements. Sound integrated water resources 
management would recognize the full range of social, economic and ecological uses of water, 
cross-sectoral water management, and water management at multiple scale and levels.  There 
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will also be a need to coordinate local, regional, national, and transnational practices and 
institutions.76  
The drive to manipulate rivers has always had a strong transnational dimension, given the 
ecological effects for downstream nations including the often heavy toll on freshwater 
biodiversity, impacts on floodplain ecosystems, dam induced seismicity and calamities and more 
recently discovered greenhouse gas emissions from dam reservoirs. Jawaharlal Nehru, who once 
celebrated the big dams as the temples of modern India, came to term the too-frequent disastrous 
effects of them as the “disease of gigantism.” It is likely that an outright ban on new dams is 
neither desirable nor justifiable, given the special needs of the developing nations. But 
somewhere and somehow the balance of competing interests needs to be recalibrated. We should 
embark on new river-engineering projects only after much thought and well-considered 
evaluation and with full impact-assessment reports in hand. Where rivers cross boundaries, all 
affected States should be involved in the decision-making processes.  But consultation alone is 
far from enough, even when undertaken in good faith.  Much more is needed if rivers are to 
regain and retain ecological health and if the legitimate interests of all States—regardless of 
negotiation power—are to receive due weight.  International governance is needed, not just to 
provide the framework for inter-State negotiations but to put in place essential, basic protections 
for rivers as vital corridors supporting all life.  Law is needed also to ensure that entire basins are 
understood, as they should be, as single entities, properly managed only at the whole-basin scale.  
As chapters that follow explain, international law today falls far short of these lofty goals; it falls 
far short of providing adequate long-term environmental protection and of promoting full social 
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justice among all peoples.  Legal reform is much needed, and it needs to be guided by and aimed 
at lofty normative visions.  For that to happen, the visions themselves need to be talked about 
and to gain clarity and, in time, widespread international support. 
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Chapter 2: Principles of International Environmental Law 
 
Contemporary disputes about the management of international watercourses take place in the 
context of a larger discussion of how people inhabit the planet.  Particularly over the past 
century, the international community has paid increasing attention to uses and alterations of 
nature that, upon study and reflection, seem misguided, ecologically unsound, or socially unjust; 
to alterations, that is, that pose serious environmental and social problems.  Out of these various 
concerns have come major statements of international environmental policy.  These statements 
are an important part of the watercourse story, both because they color the ways people think 
about waterways and because they supply useful vocabulary for evaluating competing 
watercourse uses.  For reasons considered in later chapters, the law of international watercourses 
ought to contain its own, detailed norms designed to protect waterways and their ecological 
health; it should not rely on, or incorporate by reference, the vague environmental standards 
intended to guide human uses of nature generally.  To get to that conclusion, however, requires 
an assessment of these general statements of international environmental policy and of the 
politics the lie behind and around them. 
 
The Two Central Declarations 
 
International environmental law has come to depend chiefly on statements made in two 
significant international declarations:  the 1972 Stockholm Declaration77 and the 1992 Rio 
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Declaration.78 These Declarations, made twenty years apart, marked important developments and 
represented major milestones in the evolution of international environmental law. Though non-
binding in nature, they embrace and express some of the leading environmental principles and 
fundamental norms to guide States in their national policies and international activities. Taken 
together, these two documents demonstrate, for the first time at the international level, the 
importance of protecting the natural environment and for integrating environmental concerns 
into States’ developmental and other pursuits.  
The Stockholm Declaration was the result of the first wave of formulation of environmental 
principles, and was again the first of its kind to set norms governing human interactions with 
nature. It underscored the common duty of people to safeguard the natural resources of the earth, 
including the air, water, land, flora and fauna and especially representative samples of natural 
ecosystems, for the benefit of present and future generations through careful planning and 
management. Two decades later, the Rio Declaration reaffirmed many of the Stockholm 
principles.  As it did so it brought forward a few other key concepts in the realm of international 
environmental law. 
Although both are non-binding declarations, their repeated use and references made to those in 
other regional and international instruments have established these two as important documents 
in the field of international environmental law. Both declarations include provisions that, at the 
time of their adoption, were either understood to already reflect customary international law or 
expected to shape future normative understandings. This is more so for the Rio Declaration 
which, by expressly reaffirming and building upon the Stockholm Declaration, reinforced the 
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normative significance of those concepts common to both instruments.79 Today, many principles 
in these two Declarations have entered into the mainstream of international legal discourse and 
have taken the forms of customary international law.80 
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)—the same 
conference that produced the Rio Declaration—adopted yet another important document 
following the Rio Declaration, known as the Agenda 21.81 The Agenda 21 was formulated as an 
action plan, representing consensus reached by around 178 States for securing a global 
partnership aiming at a quality environment and healthy economy. It presented a set of integrated 
strategies and programs to halt and reverse the effects of environmental degradation and to 
promote environmentally sound and sustainable development in all countries. This was also 
another non-binding instrument, and it addressed a broad range of issues; e.g. continuing damage 
to ecosystems, the worsening of poverty, hunger and ill health, increasing world population and 
literacy etc. Comprising forty chapters, the Agenda 21 looks at social and economic dimensions, 
the conservation and management of resources for development, strengthening the role of major 
groups, and the means of policy implementation. 
All these documents set forth overarching goals to be achieved, prescribe some general 
directions towards using our environment, and apply to different aspects of environmental issues 
including different types of natural resources. Beyond these non-binding and broader policy-
oriented documents is the body of international environmental law in the forms of United 
Nations conventions, multilateral and bilateral treaties, and scholarly works of different 
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international organizations designed to address a particular natural resource or specific type of 
environmental problem.82 Also, there are the decisions of the International Court of Justice, 
arbitrational awards, and decisions of some national courts to the extent they have informed 
international environmental legal discourse.  
 
Eight Guiding Principles 
 
Careful evaluation of the various legal sources just mentioned reveal the prevalence of a few 
normative principles, many of which either found expressions in explicit language for the first 
time in the above mentioned declarations, or were later complemented and referred to in many 
other categorically addressed treaties. Among them are the no harm principle, the principle of 
sustainable development, the precautionary principle, the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility, the polluter pays principle, the principle of environmental protection, the principle 
of co-operation, and the principle of participation.  
Principle of no harm. One of the long-established principles in international environmental law 
is the responsibility of States not to cause significant harm to others. The notion discounts, to a 
great extent, the concept of absolute territorial sovereignty in the way it requires States to ensure 
that their activities within their jurisdictional limits avoid causing harm to areas beyond those 
limits. The concept first surfaced in the Island of Palmas Case83 between the Netherlands and the 
USA as early as in 1928, where the Permanent Court of Arbitration explained the concept of 
territorial sovereignty by qualifying it with a corresponding duty. The court went on to say that 
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“territorial sovereignty involves the exclusive right to display the activities of a State”; but this 
right comes with a corollary duty—the obligation to protect within the territory the rights of 
other States, in particular their rights to integrity and inviolability in peace and in war, together 
with the rights that States may claim for their nationals residing in foreign territory.84 Similar 
reasoning was endorsed later in the famous Trail Smelter case between the USA and Canada in 
1941,85 where the court concluded that “under the principles of international law, as well as of 
the law of the United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such 
a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons 
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and 
convincing evidence.”86 Although this was a case involving air pollution, the ruling holds much 
importance as applied to other shared resources as well. A slightly refined version of the 
principle later appeared in some of the international environmental agreements, including the 
Stockholm Declaration of 1972 and the Rio Declaration of 1992. In identical language, 
Stockholm Principle 21 and the Rio Principle 2 establish a State’s responsibility to ensure that 
activities within its activity or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or 
to areas beyond national jurisdiction or control. This obligation is balanced by the declarations’ 
recognition, in the first part of the respective principles, of a State’s sovereign right to “exploit” 
its natural resources according to its “environmental” (Stockholm) and “environmental and 
developmental” policies (Rio).  
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While at Stockholm some States still questioned the customary legal nature of the obligation 
concerned, the clear restatement of this principle in the Rio Declaration invigorated its 
importance, and today there is hardly any doubt that this obligation forms part of general 
international law. Thus in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons87 first, and again more recently in the Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay,88 the International Court of Justice expressly endorsed the obligation as a rule of 
customary international law.  
Principle of sustainable development: The concept of sustainable development runs like an 
unbroken thread through the Rio Declaration. And although the Stockholm Declaration did not 
yet use the term sustainable development, the concept similarly ran as a strong undercurrent 
throughout its text as well. However, both at Stockholm and at Rio, characterization of the 
relationship between environmental protection and economic development was one of the most 
sensitive challenges facing the respective conference. 
The concept itself was born from a conflict between developed States promoting environmental 
protection and developing States demanding opportunity for economic growth.  This conflict 
took center stage at the 1972 Stockholm Conference, where the two chief concerns took 
prominence. One concern was that strict environmental regulation would deny developing 
nations their right to economic betterment.  The competing concern was that unrestrained 
development would lead to environmental devastation and impinge upon others' rights to a 
healthy environment.  As these concerns collided, it became clear that a balance was needed 
between environmental considerations and development. Although the concept was in the air at 
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the time of the Stockholm Declaration, the term sustainable development, expressing the need 
for compromise between environment and development, was first applied in 1980 by the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN). The term has 
since been incorporated in different multilateral treaties, international declarations, foundation 
and planning documents of international and regional organizations, and other sources. While the 
term has become representative of the concept, a singular and consistent definition for 
sustainable development does not exist.  The most widely recognized and oft-quoted definition 
comes from the 1987 Brundtland Report, which explains it as “development that meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs.”89    
Although the Rio Declaration presented sustainable development as an overall beacon it did not 
define the term with particular clarity.  Principle 3 of the Declaration might be taken as its most 
clear definition. It explains that the right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet 
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations. Further, in order to 
achieve sustainable development, environmental protection must constitute an integral part of the 
development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it.90 At its best, this principle 
reflects a more action-oriented approach to protecting environment while undertaking 
development activities. Nevertheless, to this day the actual operationalization of the concept has 
remained a challenge due to its vagueness overall (what is being sustained?) and lack of clarity in 
the traits that define or illustrate sustainable development.  The two-part term aptly captures the 
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tension in future development but leaves to a later day the work of translating that tension into 
on-the-ground projects and activities. 
Precautionary principle: The precautionary principle or the precautionary approach in the 
international environmental law means that, when confronting threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, a lack of full scientific certainty about them shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
preventive or remedial measures. One of the clearest examples of this principle in operation 
comes from the measures taken under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer.91 The protocol called for the phase out of CFCs due to their apparent effects on the 
stratospheric ozone layer.  The protocol was adopted and implemented even though the scientific 
predictions and calculations that underlay it were far from scientifically conclusive. Later, the 
Rio Declaration reiterated that, in order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach 
should be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.92 Today, the concept is widely 
reflected in international practice, although there exists no single authoritative definition of either 
its contents or scope.  
Principle of common but differentiated responsibility. In view of the differing contributions by 
States to global environmental degradation, Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration introduced the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. The principle reflects the fact that States 
contribute in different ways and by different degrees to various aspects of global degradation.  
Given these differences, States ought to have both shared and individual responsibilities as part 
of their common task to address that degradation. Since its appearance in the Rio Declaration, 
the principle has become more commonly accepted as a cornerstone of the sustainable 
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development paradigm.  It has gained strength, even though it suffers from the same challenges 
and the normative deficiencies as the idea of sustainable development itself.93 The uncertainty 
arises in part because the principle is linked both to the idea of differentiated responsibility due 
to different contributions to existing problems and to the reality that States differ widely in their 
capabilities to take action due to differences in their development status. The linkage of these 
two realities was made clear in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.94 
That Convention not only accepts that developing countries need to comply with less strict 
standards than the developed countries (reflecting their lower contributions to the problem), but 
also accepts that they are entitled to technological and financial assistance in order to help them 
meet their obligations under the treaty (reflecting their much different development levels). 
Polluter pays principle: The Polluter pays principle recalls the well-established legal precedents 
that hold the polluter who creates an environmental harm liable to pay compensation and costs to 
remedy that harm. In the context of growing concern about the international economic 
implications of environmental control measures, the Council of the OECD (Organization for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development) formally propounded the polluter-pays principle in 
1972.95 Although first formalized internationally by the OECD, the principle has a long root.  
The concept was applied in the famous Trail Smelter arbitral award, which compelled Canada to 
pay compensation for damages in the United States caused by a Canadian source of air pollution. 
The award also required Canada to take steps to abate the pollution to avoid further damage. 
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Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration reaffirms the polluter pays principle by saying that national 
authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of 
economic instruments, implementing the foundational idea that polluter should, in principle, bear 
the cost of pollution. The principle has been widely accepted in the developed world and it has 
been included in many conventions and treaties, including the 1992 ECE Convention, the 1992 
Treaty of Maastricht, and the 1992 Paris Convention. 
Principle of minimization of environmental harm. This is the expression of a newer principle as it 
appears in the International Law Association (ILA)’s 2004 work on the Berlin Rules on Water 
Resources. Article 8 of the Rules framed this requirement as one of the general principles 
guiding State action. The commentary accompanying it articulated the principle as a current or 
emerging rule of customary international law.96 Although the Berlin Rules are limited in 
application to international watercourses, the commentary makes clear that the obligation to 
minimize environmental harm does not depend upon the harm arising in a transboundary setting 
only; it is a broader obligation derived from general international environmental law.97 Neither 
the Stockholm nor the Rio Declaration established environmental protection (that is, minimizing 
environmental harm) as an independent principle or State obligation.  Instead, they integrated 
this concern into the paradigm of sustainable development. Other, more specific documents, 
however, have taken stances similar to that of the Berlin Rules.  Neither the Biodiversity 
Convention nor the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, for example, limits the scope of States’ 
obligations by balancing them against development goals.  Instead they present environmental, 
biodiversity or wetlands protection as independent and focal objectives. On international waters, 
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the United Nations Convention imposes a general obligation upon States to protect the 
environment of international watercourses, an obligation recognized by the International Court of 
Justice in the Gabcíkovo-Nagymoros Case shortly afterwards. Similarly, the 1992 ECE 
Convention and a good number of recent regional treaties have endorsed this requirement of 
minimization of environmental harm, enough of them so that it is now likely to stand today as a 
fairly established principle of international environmental law. 
Principle of cooperation: Both the Stockholm and the Rio Declarations envisioned high levels of 
international cooperation on international matters concerning the protection and ecological 
enhancement of the natural environment. The Stockholm Declaration recognized the fact that the 
world faced, in effect, a growing class of environmental problems—not just individual, localized 
issues. The emergence of these problems in the regional or global context called for extensive 
cooperation among nations and concerted action by international organizations. The declaration 
provided expressly that environmental protection was to be handled in a cooperative spirit by all 
countries, big and small, on an equal footing.  It called for this cooperation to occur through 
multilateral or bilateral arrangements and other appropriate means.  
Later, the Rio Declaration strengthened the concept of cooperation, urging the development of a 
global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's 
ecosystems.98 Building on earlier statements, this document envisioned a “new level of 
cooperation” among the full range of stakeholders involved; i.e. among States, key sectors of 
societies, and people themselves. It particularly called for new international environmental 
agreements and other steps to protect the functional integrity of the global environment and the 
greening of development systems. In contrast to the Stockholm Declaration, which overlooked 
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transboundary concerns, the Rio Declaration unequivocally and in mandatory language called 
upon States to assess likely environmental consequences, and to inform and consult with 
potentially affected other States, whenever their proposed actions involved a risk of significantly 
harmful transboundary ecological effects.99 Today, the principle of cooperation appears firmly 
established on the international scene, and has been functioning as a cardinal theme in many 
international, regional and bilateral agreements. 
Principle of participation. One important aspect of the Rio Declaration is its strong emphasis on 
the roles of and participation by indigenous peoples and by women and the youth in the 
conservation, management, and development of the environment. The Declaration proclaims that 
“environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens at the 
relevant level.”100  It calls upon States to ensure that each individual has access to appropriate 
information, has opportunities to participate in decision-making, and, overall, receives justice in 
environmental matters.  
Although this principle of participation has antecedents, the Rio Declaration broke new ground 
by giving it such an expansive role.  The Declaration presented it, for the first time at a global 
level, as a concept critical both to effective environmental management and democratic 
governance. This principle found even a stronger expression in the Agenda 21, which recognized 
and required distinct decision-making roles for all major groups; i.e. women, indigenous people 
and their communities, youth and children, non-governmental organizations, workers-farmers, 
business and industry, and the technological community. 
                                                 
99 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, principle 19. 
100 Ibid., principle 10. 
61 
 
Since the 1992 Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, this principle has sunk firm roots in international 
community expectations, as reflected notably in the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus 
Convention), the 2010 UNEP Guidelines for the Development of National Legislation on Access 
to Information, Public Participation and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters and various 
resolutions of international organizations and conferences.  These expressions are adequately 
numerous and widely enough supported so that the normative provisions of Principle 10 of 
Agenda 21 could today be deemed imperative.101 
Besides these foregoing principles, the Rio Declaration added further objectives and goals into 
the mix; i.e. eradicating poverty as an indispensable requirement for sustainable development;102 
giving special priority to the needs of developing and the least developed countries;103 reducing 
and eliminating unsustainable patterns of production and consumption;104 promoting a supportive 
and open international economic system leading to economic growth and sustainable 
development in all countries while better addressing the problems of environmental degradation.  
 
Environmental Law and Watercourses 
 
Both the Stockholm and the Rio Declarations have been widely acclaimed given their roles in 
influencing and reshaping environmental concerns on a global scale. They brought forward key 
concepts and sought to recognize the interplay between humans and nature. On the downside, the 
Declarations evince a strongly human-centric approach by implying that States should be 
                                                 
101 Handl, Introductory Note. 
102 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, principle 5. 
103 Ibid., principle 6. 
104 Ibid., principle 8. 
62 
 
advancing environmental objectives so as to enhance human benefits, rather than stressing 
nature’s integrity itself or the moral status of other life forms and biotic communities. Rio 
Principle 1 unabashedly positioned “human beings … at the center of concerns for sustainable 
development,” much as the Stockholm Declaration, in Principles 1, 2, 5 and several prefatory 
paragraphs, postulated a distinctly instrumentalist approach to environmental protection:  such 
protection was a means to the desired end of human flourishing. Overall, the two Declarations 
consider the protection and improvement of the human environment as a major issue given the 
connections to the well-being of people and economic development throughout the world. Such 
an anthropocentric formulation contrasts with the focus of some other contemporary legal 
documents, e.g., the World Charter for Nature of 1982,105 and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity,106 whose principles of conservation are informed by the “intrinsic value” of every 
form of life regardless of its worth to human beings.107 Yet, even as they retained humans as 
normatively unique, pushing aside arguments about the intrinsic value of nature, there is no 
denying that the Stockholm and the Rio formulations have had strong impacts on international 
political-legal discourse and processes of decision-making.  Their various provisions and 
principles have significantly shifted the legal landscape.  
It is important to realize that the development of international environmental law has taken place 
alongside that of international water law. Indeed, much international water law can be thought of 
as a sub-set of international environmental law. While dealing with all types of natural resources, 
the Agenda 21 includes a specific chapter dedicated to freshwater resource management and 
                                                 
105 The General Assembly resolution 37/7, accessed March 7, 2017, 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r007.htm. 
106 The Convention on Biological Diversity, or the Biodiversity Convention, adopted at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, and entered into force, 29 
December 1993. 
107 Handl, Introductory Note. 
63 
 
protection. The chapter provides for objectives, courses of action to follow, and means of 
implementation to protect the quality and supply of freshwater resources.  It also calls for the 
application of integrated approaches to the development, management and use of water 
resources.108 About transboundary water resources, the chapter reaffirms their importance to all 
riparian States, and then calls for promoting co-operation among the concerned States in 
conformity with existing agreements and other relevant arrangements, taking into account the 
interests of all riparian States concerned. Finally, the chapter outlines the types of programs, 
orientations, and decision-making processes needed to address freshwater resources: integrated 
water resources development and management; water resources assessment; the protection of 
water resources; water quality and aquatic ecosystems; particular measures to protect drinking 
water supply and sanitation; steps to integrate water management and sustainable urban 
development; the protection of water for sustainable food production and rural development; 
and, in some manner, programs and actions to address the impacts of climate change on water 
resources. 
As noted already and discussed more fully later, the law on trans-boundary water issues includes 
the United Nations Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
adopted in 1997. This convention addresses environmental concerns but reaches well beyond 
them to standardize interstate water allocations and all other non-navigational uses of 
watercourses. The relevant environmental law affecting watercourses also includes the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Ramsar Convention. The Convention on Biological 
Diversity was developed and adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
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Development in June 1992 with a three-fold objective—the conservation of biological diversity, 
the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
out of the utilization of genetic resources. The convention defines biological diversity as the 
variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and 
other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes 
diversity within species, between species, and among ecosystems.109 Therefore, the Convention 
contributes to the international water law to the extent it relates itself to the conservation of 
aquatic biodiversity and aquatic ecosystems. Similarly relevant is the Ramsar Convention, or the 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, which 
provides a framework for wetland conservation.110 The convention encourages nations to identify 
and designate wetlands of international importance—rivers, marshes, coral reefs and similar 
areas—and establishes criteria for evaluation based on the ecosystem services that the wetlands 
provide. 
Criticism and the path ahead for watercourses law.  The Stockholm and Rio Declarations 
continue today to provide influential guidance on environmental protection and how best to 
reconcile it with needs for economic development. Their chief underlying principle of 
sustainable development, however, has been subject to strong, persistent criticism ever since it 
was introduced, and literature outside the law continues to articulate more particularized goals 
for environmental protection.  Looking ahead, it is clear that sustainable development as 
articulated in these declarations is not adequately clear or strong enough, either to protect the 
environment adequately or to resolve disputes between environmental protection and 
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development.  A more clear body of law is needed, one tailored to the particular contexts in 
which such clashes arise.  International watercourses provide one such context, and, as discussed 
below, watercourses law has moved beyond sustainable development to embrace more particular 
environmental standards.  For reasons considered in later chapters that trajectory needs to 
continue; new, better law is needed to add further specificity to environmental protections and to 
clarify the limits on development activities. 
Perhaps the most commonly expressed complaint against sustainable development—and 
sustainability as a freestanding goal—is that it is too vague.  According to critics the idea fails to 
make clear exactly what is being sustained and by whom.  A related complaint is that sustainable 
development brings together two ideas that are inherently in conflict without providing anything 
like the guidance needed to reconcile their differences.  Much development is environmentally 
degrading, and many forms of environmental protection can either put vital parts of nature off 
limits, thus restricting economic options, or add further costs to development projects so that 
they become unprofitable or uncompetitive.  An early, penetrating expression of this criticism 
was presented by environmental historian Donald Worster in an essay, “The Shaky Ground of 
Sustainable Development.”111  Worster illustrated the vagueness critique by cataloguing some of 
the many variant definitions of sustainability.  Many advocates of the term, he explained, linked 
it to the science of ecology, but ecology alone, Worster noted, was not sufficiently robust to give 
guidance without being supplemented by normative standards drawn from outside science,  As 
for sustainable development, it seems based on the questionable assumption that we can easily 
determine the carrying capacity of local and regional ecosystems.  It carried forward the old idea 
that nature was best understood as pools of natural resources.  Most of all, it envisioned that 
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environmental protection could and would be traded off against development goals without any 
deviation from the overall standard. 
The complaints of Worster and others were widely embraced, particularly by conservation voices 
working within or greatly influenced by the ecological sciences.   They were prone to formulate 
environmental standards that drew more on science but expressly went beyond science to 
incorporate key normative values.  A still-useful survey of normative concepts and goals in the 
conservation literature was issued in 1999 by three American scholars from different fields—a 
philosopher and two biological scientists.112  As they surveyed the literature, they divided the 
many normative alternatives into two main groups.  One group of proposals sought mostly to 
sustain the ecological functioning of natural systems, paying particular attention to soil retention, 
fertility cycles, and hydrologic systems.  In contrast with these functionalist normative visions 
were those in the second category, which focused instead on the biological composition of 
particular landscapes—often, although not always, seeking to protect or restore the full range of 
plant and animal species that inhabited a landscape before the advent of significant human 
change. 
The United Nations itself, after putting such emphasis on sustainable development, took a rather 
different approach in 2000 and following years when it undertook an international study of the 
status of the planet and human effects on it.  The resulting multi-volume report, titled the 
Millennium Ecosystem and issued between 2003 and 2005, assessed the planet by considering it 
as the source of various ecological services or ecosystem services, which the report identified 
and categorized.  By doing so, the report authors employed a normative standard that fit easily 
within what the American scholars had termed the functionalist normative approach, an approach 
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that assessed the condition of ecosystems, and thus set normative standards by which to judge 
human activities, based on the ecological functioning of such ecosystems.113  What was new in 
the “ecosystem services” approach was mostly the vocabulary; nature’s ecological processes 
were viewed in distinctly instrumental terms, based on their contributions to human flourishing.  
They were not, as they were for many conservation scholars, viewed as intrinsically valuable or 
valuable because of their roles in sustaining all life, not just humans.  
Looking back, it seems reasonably clear that the goal of sustainable development is best 
understood as a foundational point of beginning for thinking about humans and nature and 
charting the path ahead, a path that, as the principle makes clear, needs to include both 
environmental protection and continued development that allows the world’s most disadvantaged 
to get ahead.  Sustainable development, that is, provides a starting point or framework, which 
would give way over time as its elements were made clearer by the continued evolution of 
international law.  In time, sustainable development would be put behind, replaced by fuller and 
clearer principles of international law and the specific terms of particular conventions.   
As considered below, the international law of watercourses has in fact moved beyond sustainable 
development.  Current law remains unclear and its key elements fit together poorly.  But the law 
has progressed considerably, chiefly in the 1997 United Nations Convention considered above 
and in the more pollution-focused 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourse and International Lakes, put forth by the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe but recently opened for signing by all nations.  Further progress is needed; and current 
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law is nowhere near adequate to provide the clear guidance.  But it has progressed far enough to 
date to eliminate any need to hold on to sustainable development, or sustainability in general, as 
an overall organizing principle. 
The main criticism of sustainable development continues to follow the lines of argument of 
Donald Worster:  the ideal links environmental protection with development without making 
much effort to reconcile the conflict between them except by way of vague, lofty expressions.  
The conflict remains within the single principle rather than between independent normative 
goals.  A full, durable reconciliation of this conflict is not likely to come about, soon or perhaps 
ever.  But substantial progress can be made toward reconciliation, and international watercourse 
law needs to incorporate some form of reconciliation, tailored to the realities of watercourses and 
the many ways people depend on them. 
Reconciliation in the watercourses context is likely to begin by setting minimum standards for 
the ecological condition and functioning of major watercourses, standards that would be 
respected if at all possible by all human uses and development projects.  Only after satisfaction 
of these environmental standards would the tradeoff begin between further protection and 
intensive watercourse uses.  Even in that context, however, it is essential to recognize that 
ecologically healthy rivers support key uses that cannot be supported or undertaken when rivers 
are not healthy.  Thus, there is no uniform inverse relationship between environmental protection 
and human uses.   Many human uses require environmental protection.  The tradeoffs, then, are 
often between human uses that are possible only when rivers are healthy and human uses that 
are, instead, less ecologically sensitive; human uses are on both sides. 
With these environmental law principles covered, and criticisms of them identified, this study 
turns to the special case of Bangladesh as an illustration of a highly vulnerable nation dependent 
69 
 
for its long-term flourishing on a sound international law of watercourses.  How does this State 
use its many international watercourses, and in what ways might the actions of other States 
interfere with these uses?  Given these uses of watercourses and given the possible interferences 
with them, what types of environmental or other protections might Bangladesh and similar 
nations need if the nation is to flourish over time at levels similar to the flourishing that 
characterizes other, less vulnerable nations?   And what record of success and failure does the 
State have as it has reached out to neighboring States and sought to negotiate watercourse 
conventions that adequately protect its needs?  
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PART II: Bangladesh, Its Rivers, and Its Neighbors 
Chapter 3: Waters, Uses, and Conflicts 
 
Bangladesh, situated in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin (GBM basin), is endowed with 
extensive water resources. Its surface-water system consists of about seven hundred big and 
small river networks crisscrossing the country along with hundreds of beels and haors114 –
saucer-like depressed basins of a marshy character.115  In addition to these water bodies, the 
villages of Bangladesh are littered with numerous ponds of varying sizes, which serve as 
important sources of domestic water supply.116 These common, widespread water bodies have 
intimately linked the economy and social life of the country to water.  
Despite this overall abundance, seasonal changes every year play a vital role in varying water 
flows in Bangladesh, especially surface water flows, causing wide fluctuations in the amounts of 
available water. During the monsoon (June – October), the country receives abundant rainfall, 
ranging from about 3200 mm in the northeast to about 1600 mm in the southwest region, 
followed by severe scarcities of water during the dry season (January – May).  Reflecting this 
seasonal discrepancy, surface-water inflows to the country vary from a maximum of about 
                                                 
114 Haors and beels are local terms for natural depressions on a floodplain. There is no clear-cut distinction between 
haors and beels; larger ones are called haors and smaller ones beels. Haors are normally connected into a 
neighboring river system but do not represent dead rivers. Beels are defined as any definable water body or old 
riverbeds except oxbow lakes. In A Atiq Rahman, Saleemul Huq, Gordon R Conway, eds., “Environmental Aspects 
of Surface Water Systems of Bangladesh: An Introduction,” in Environmental Aspects of Surface Water Systems of 
Bangladesh (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1990), 2. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
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140,000 m3/s in August to a minimum of about 7,000 m3/s in February.117   This surface-water 
variation directly affects groundwater–recharge rates, thereby causing seasonal variations also in 
the availability of groundwater. Thus, whereas Bangladesh enjoys an abundance of water, the 
uneven distribution of water in terms of place and timing puts the country and its people at the 
mercy of nature. On one hand, the overabundance of water during the monsoon causes egregious 
flooding in Bangladesh, while on the other, scarcity in the dry season causes severe drought 
conditions leading to losses of crops and livestock, public health problems, and environmental 
degradation. 
Bangladesh lies across the delta of three major rivers, the Ganges-Padma, the Brahmaputra-
Jamuna, and the Meghna. Together with their tributaries and distributaries these rivers discharge 
about 5 million cubic feet per second of water into the Bay of Bengal at peak periods, and carry 
and deposit an annual sediment load estimated at between 1.5 and 2.4 billion tons. 118 
 
The Major River Systems in Bangladesh 
 
In combination the rivers in Bangladesh form one of the largest river networks in the world with 
a total length of about 24,140 kilometers (about 15,000 miles) and with exposed water covering 
about 7 percent of the country’s surface.119 The network consists of major rivers and their 
                                                 
117 Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh, s.v. “Water Resources,” accessed March 7, 2017, 
http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Water_Resources. 
118 A Atiq Rahman, Saleemul Huq, Gordon R Conway, eds., “Environmental Aspects of Surface Water Systems of 
Bangladesh: An Introduction,” in Environmental Aspects of Surface Water Systems of Bangladesh (Dhaka: 
University Press Limited, 1990), 4. 
119 Rahman, Huq and Conway, “Environmental Aspects,” 4. 
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tributaries and distributaries, including tiny hill-country streams and seasonal creeks and canals 
that wind throughout the country and serve as the life blood of communities. Dominated by its 
three major rivers—the Ganges/Padma, the Brahmaputra/Jamuna, and the Meghna Rivers—the 
network is among the largest on earth in terms of catchment’s size, river length and volume of 
discharge. The combined discharge passing through this overall system into the Bay of Bengal 
reaches up to 1,174 billion cubic meters annually.  The rivers are characterized by fine sandy 
bottoms, flat slopes, substantial meandering and channel shifting, and eroding banks.120 The 
rivers flow generally southward and serve directly and indirectly as the main source of water for 
irrigation and as the principal arteries of commercial transportation. 
The Ganges-Padma River System.  The Ganges (named the Padma in Bangladesh) is one of the 
major trans-boundary rivers in South Asia. To date, it has also been the most contested river 
between Bangladesh and India. The traditional source of the river is the Bhagirathi, a mountain 
stream that originates at about 23,000 feet in the Gongotri glacier on the southern slope of the 
Himalayan range.121 In total the Ganges has five headwater streams, the Bhagirathi, Alokananda, 
Mandakini, Dauli Ganga and Pinder.  As it flows downstream it is joined by a number of 
tributaries originating in other parts of the Himalayas within the boundaries of China, Nepal, and 
India.122 Crossing the high lands of the Himalayas, the river falls from 10,300 feet to about 1,000 
feet and then descends to 400 feet at Allahabad, India. From there, it flows in a southerly and 
south-easterly direction. The Ganges was probably the first river to break through the Indian 
                                                 
120 Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh, s.v. “River and Drainage System,”accessed March 7, 2017, 
http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=River_and_Drainage_System. 
121 Ziaur Rahman, A. S. M. Oliullah, Rezwana Nur, Water Sharing Discord between Bangladesh and India: People 
in the Crossfire (Dhaka: News Network, 2004), 24. 
122 Ibid. 
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shield-barrier during the Pleistocene upheaval.   Since then, the river has transported enormous 
quantities of sediment that, over time, has built up the largest part of the Bengal delta.123 
The total length of the Ganges from the slopes of the Himalayas to its mouth at the Bay of 
Bengal is about 2600 kilometers (1600 miles); and its total drainage area is 1,117,000 square 
kilometers, of which 861,390 square kilometers lie in India, 67,390 square kilometers in 
Bangladesh, and 188,220 square kilometers in Nepal and China.124  
                                                 
123 Nazmul Alam, M. Abul Kashem Mozumder, Tipaimukh and Beyond (Dhaka: A H Development Publishing 
House, 2009), 19. 
124 Salman M. A. Salman and Kishor Uprety, Conflict and Cooperation on South Asia's International Rivers: A 
Legal Perspective (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2003), 130.  
Figure 1: Rivers in Bangladesh (including 
border rivers). Source: The Joint River 
Commission, Bangladesh 
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The delta of the Ganges River starts at Farakka in West Bengal.  Downstream the river splits into 
two channels—the Padma and the Bhagirathi.  The Padma flows in a southeasterly direction, 
forming the boundary between Bangladesh and India for about 80 miles before entering 
Bangladesh, while the Bhagirathi flows southward in India into the state of West Bengal.125 
Within Bangladesh the Padma soon joins with the Jamuna River, near Rajbari, Goalondo. The 
combined flow of the two rivers constitutes the lower segment of the Padma, which continues to 
flow southeastward through central Bangladesh until it joins the massive Meghna river near 
Chandpur. There the Padma ends as an independent river under its own name.  The combined 
flow, using the Meghna name, moves southward to empty into the Bay of Bengal.  
The Ganges/Padma serves as the source from which about one third of the people draw their 
sustenance.  The river’s floodplain is described as active, moribund, and meandering; its chief 
physical trait is its continued towhead (sandbar) formation.126 The river’s sediment load is so 
substantial that it becomes, near Goalando, Rajbari, the nation’s most significant land-building 
river. 
The Brahmaputra-Jamuna River System. The Brahmaputra is also one of the world’s great rivers, 
ranking fifth in terms of total discharge and eleventh in drainage area.127 The Brahmaputra River 
rises in the northern and eastern slopes of the Himalayas (in the great glacier of Kailash range) at 
about 5,150 meters in the Tibet region. Known in Tibet as the Yarlung Tsangpo River, it flows 
                                                 
125 Salman M.A. Salman and Kishor Uprety, “Hydro-politics in South Asia: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Mahakali and the Ganges Treaties,” Natural Resources Journal 39 (1999): 295, accessed March 7, 2017, 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/narj39&div=32&id=&page= 
126 Khan and Rashid: 1985, in Impact of River Bank Erosion and Flood in Bangladesh: an Introduction in Riverbank 
Erosion, Flood and Population Displacement in Bangladesh, K. Moudud Elahi, Riverbank Erosion Impact Study, 
Jahangirnagar University (1991). 
127 Colin R. Thorne, Andrew P.G. Russell and Muhammad K. Alam, “Planform Pattern and Channel Evolution of 
the Brahmaputra River,” Geological Society London, Special Publications 75 (1993): 257-276, 
doi:10.1144/GSL.SP.1993.075.01.16. 
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across southern Tibet to break through the Himalayas in great gorges, where it is joined by many 
tributaries as it journeys throughout both China and India. A major tributary is the Manas, which 
originates in China and flows across Bhutan, thus adding Bhutan as a riparian of the 
Brahmaputra.128 The combined river then enters India through Arunachal Pradesh, where the 
river is known as the Dihang or Siang.  Upon entering Assam it finally becomes known as the 
Brahmaputra.  There its waters divide in the flatlands to form a braided pattern, at places 16 
kilometers of width.129 The river proceeds straight southward to enter Bangladesh near the 
Kurigram district. In the vast delta of Bangladesh, it merges first with the Ganges/Padma (as 
described above) and then with the Meghna, after which the mingled waters empty into the Bay 
of Bengal. 
The Brahmaputra River flows some 2,900 kilometers (1,800 miles) from its source in the 
Himalayas to its confluence with the Ganges/Padma River. The total drainage area of the river is 
480,000 square kilometers, of which 293,000 square kilometers lie in Tibet, 195,000 square 
kilometers in India, and 45,000 square kilometers in Bangladesh.130 Like the Padma, this river 
carries a high sediment discharge, ranking third in the world. In its lower course the river is said 
to be both a creator and a destroyer—depositing huge quantities of fertile alluvial soil but also 
causing disastrous and frequent floods.  
The Brahmaputra is an exceptionally dynamic river, changing its course and intensity over time 
as it journeys from the Himalayas to its confluence with the Padma River. Within Bangladesh the 
river followed a different route in recent past.  Due to heavy flooding the river shifted some 60 
miles westward and merged its flow with that of the Jamuna River. Overall the Brahmaputra is 
                                                 
128 Rahman, Oliullah and Nur, Water Sharing Discord, 26. 
129 Alam and Mozumder, Tipaimukh, 19. 
130 Rahman, Oliullah and Nur, Water Sharing Discord, 26. 
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characterized by pronounced seasonal rises and falls in the river flow, by fluctuations in the 
number and position of major channels active during floods, by the formation and movement of 
large bed forms, and by widespread bank slumping.131  
 
The Meghna River System.  The third major river forming the overall Bangladeshi river network 
is the Meghna. This river is comparatively smaller in length than the other two rivers; it runs for 
some 930 kilometers (578 miles) through India and Bangladesh. The total drainage area of the 
Meghna is about 85,000 square kilometers, of which 49,000 square kilometers lie in India and 
36,000 square kilometers in Bangladesh.132 The headstream of the Meghna originates in the 
Indian state of Mizoram, where it is termed the Barak.133 It later bifurcates into the Surma and 
                                                 
131 James M. Coleman, “Brahmaputra River: Channel Processes and Sedimentation,” Sedimentary Geology 3 (1969): 
129-239, accessed March 7, 2017. DOI: 10.1016/0037-0738(69)90010-4. 
132 Rahman, Oliullah and Nur, Water Sharing Discord, 27 (2004). 
133 Ibid., 26. 
Figure 2: The three major river systems in Bangladesh 
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the Kushiara within the Indian state of Assam just before entering Bangladesh. After making 
their ways into Bangladesh, both rivers are fed by tributaries such as the Singla, the Langai, the 
Manu, and the Khowai. 
After travelling well into Bangladesh, the Surma and the Kushiara reunite in the Kishoreganj 
district above Bhairab Bazar, where the river finally takes the name Meghna. From there, the 
Meghna flows southwest and joins the Padma (the combined flow of the Ganges-Padma and 
Brahmaputra) near the Chandpur district.  The Meghna at that point becomes mightier in the 
sense that the massive combined river uses its name. By water volume the lower Meghna River 
starting from this point is one of the largest rivers in the world, including as it does the flows of 
the three great rivers: Ganges/Padma, Brahmaputra, and Meghna. Near Bhola, just before 
flowing into the Bay of Bengal, the river divides again into two main streams in the Ganges 
delta, creating and flowing around a major island. The western stream of the Meghna is 
called Ilsha; the eastern one is called Bamni.134  
The Meghna River is predominantly a meandering channel, while in several reaches, especially 
where small tributaries contribute further sediment, braiding is evident with sand islands dividing 
the river into two or more channels.135 It is commonly called the mighty Meghna for being 
around 12 kilometer wide at times near its estuary and for carrying about four times the run off 
of the Mississippi River.136  
                                                 
134 Sheikh Fazle Elahi, Antorjatik Nodi Ain o Bangladesh-Bharat Panibirodh - International Law of Rivers and 
Bangladesh-India Conflict (Dhaka, 2010), 18. 
135 “Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna River basin, Water Report 37 (2011),” Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, accessed March 7, 2017, http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/basins/gbm/index.stm. 
136 Alam and Mozumder, Tipaimukh, 18. 
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The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) basin as a whole. As explained, the Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) river basin is one of the largest in the world with a total area of 
just over 1.7 million square kilometers.137 The rivers are said to form a single basin system both 
for historical reasons and because of the ways their flows ultimately intertwine a few hundred 
kilometers upstream of the mouth of the Bay of Bengal.  Still, each is quite sizeable and 
independently important and each displays unique physical attributes.  Further each of the three 
has tributaries that are important by themselves, in social, economic, and political terms, as well 
as for water availability.138 
                                                 
137 The total catchment area is distributed between India (64 percent), China (18 percent), Nepal (9 percent), 
Bangladesh (7 percent) and Bhutan (3 percent). In Eklavya Prasad Nandan Mukherjee,” Situation Analysis on 
Floods and Flood Management,” Ecosystems for Life: A Bangladeah-lndia Initiative, IUCN, International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (2014): 124. 
138 Asit K. Biswas, “Management of Ganges-Brahamaputra-Meghna System: Way Forward,” in Management of 
Transboundary Rivers and Lakes, eds. Olli Varis, Cecilia Tortajada and Asit K. Biswas (Berlin: Springer, 2008), 
143-164, accessed March 7, 2017, http://www.thirdworldcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/gbmspringer.pdf. 
Figure 3: The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) Basin. Source: The Joint River Commission, 
Bangladesh 
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The GBM river system functions as the third largest freshwater outlet to the world’s oceans; only 
the Amazon and the Congo have larger annual flows.139 (The Brahmaputra alone provides 50% 
of the flow, twice the contribution of the Ganges/Padma.140 ) Overall, the rivers during flood 
season carry nearly 6 million cubic feet per second (cusecs) 141 of water to the Bay of Bengal, in 
the process transporting approximately 13 million tons of suspended sediment per day.  As 
noted, this sediment-laden water flow causes the rivers to be extremely unstable with channels 
that regularly migrate laterally. Within recent times the rivers have occupied and abandoned 
numerous river courses. The long-term patterns have been for the Ganges/Padma to migrate 
eastward and the Brahmaputra to shift westward, largely due to major faults or fractures in the 
earth's crust and plate tectonics.142 
Viewed as a whole the GBM basin is one of the world’s most dynamic and diversified in terms 
of climate, population, and cultural factors. For water managers the basin is particularly 
challenging given its wide variations in water flows, temporally and spatially. During the intense 
monsoon, excess water causes extensive flooding that disrupts normal life and economic 
activities, while the scarcity of water in the dry season restricts productivity and growth.143 
Climatic conditions range from cold and snowy in Bhutan to meso-thermal, micro-thermal, and 
tundra and taiga conditions in Nepal, to the humid and tropical monsoon-influenced climate of 
Bangladesh.144  Again, the basin is characterized by low precipitation in the northwest of its 
upper region and high precipitation in the areas along the coast. High precipitation zones and dry 
                                                 
139 Salman and Uprety, Hydro-politics in South Asia. . 
140 Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, s.v. “Brahmaputra,” Max Planck Institute for Comparative 
Public Law and International Law, accessed March 8, 2017, http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL. 
141 Cubic feet per second = 0.0283 cubic meters per second. 
142 Alam and Mozumder, Tipaimukh, 19. 
143 Rahman, Oliullah and Nur, Water Sharing Discord, 28. 
144 “Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna River Basin, Water Report 37 (2011),” Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, accessed March 8, 2017, http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/basins/gbm/index.stm. 
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rain shadow areas are located in the Brahmaputra River basin, whereas the world’s highest 
precipitation area is situated in the Meghna river basin.145 
The basin harbors a total of 630 million people,146 almost one tenth of the world population, with 
the majority living in rural areas and the major chunk of the population poor.147 The population 
continues to increase steadily, and population density is very high in a large part of the basin.148  
 
Groundwater in Bangladesh 
 
Along with utilizing surface fresh-water systems, Bangladesh also makes extensive use of its 
groundwater sources. River-borne sediment deposits have created fluvial-deltaic sediment layers 
throughout Bangladesh, many dating from the Pleistocene and Holocene ages.149  They are laden 
                                                 
145 M.Q. Mirza et al., “Trends and persistence in precipitation in the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna river 
basins,” Hydrological Sciences Journal 43, Issue 6 (1998), accessed March 8, 2017, doi: 
10.1080/02626669809492182. 
146 “Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna River Basin, Water Report 37 (2011).” 
147 In 2008, the total population in Bhutan, which is entirely located in the Brahmaputra river basin, was estimated at 
687,000 inhabitants, of which 66 percent is rural. About 95 percent of the population lives in the southern 
subtropical zone or in the central mid-mountainous zone of Bhutan, mainly in the relatively gentle sloping areas of 
the river valleys. In Nepal, located entirely in the Ganges river basin, the total population was 28.8 million, of which 
almost 83 percent rural. The total population of Bangladesh is 160 million (73 percent rural) of which 122 million 
inhabitants live inside the GBM river basin. The total territory of India has a population estimated at 1 181 million 
inhabitants (71 percent live in rural areas), of which 476 million inhabitants live inside the GBM river basin (World 
Bank, 2010). In the total territory of China, the population is about 1 345 million, of which 57 percent are living in 
rural areas. However, only 1.7 million inhabitants are estimated to be living in the GBM river basin (World Bank, 
2010), in “Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna River Basin, Water Report 37 (2011).” 
148 Population density in the basin area ranges from 6 and 18 inhabitants/km2 in China and Bhutan respectively, to 
195, 432 and 1013 inhabitants/km2 in Nepal, India and Bangladesh respectively, in “Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna 
River Basin, Water Report 37 (2011),” 3. 
149 M. Shamsudduha and A. Uddin, “Quaternary Shoreline Shifting and Hydrogeologic Influence on the Distribution 
of Groundwater Arsenic in Aquifers of the Bengal Basin,” Journal of Asian Earth Sciences 31, Issue 2 (2007):177–
194, accessed March 8, 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jseaes.2007.07.001. 
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with water and operate as productive fresh water aquifers.150 These aquifers occur both at 
relatively shallow depths beneath the broad alluvial floodplain, alluvial fan and deltaic deposits 
(5–20 meters below ground level (mbgl)), and also at comparatively deeper depths (15–45 mbgl) 
underlying the Madhupur clay and Barind clay deposits in Bangladesh151  
These underground aquifers resemble the just-described surface-river systems in terms of their 
acute seasonality, particularly the shallow aquifers beneath the Ganges/Padma and Brahmaputra 
floodplains. These heavily used aquifers are recharged annually by river flows in this region.  The 
extreme variation in these seasonal rivers flows–with 80% of the annual discharge occurring 
during the four-months of monsoon—translates into a similar seasonal variation in aquifer 
recharge rates.152 This variation in recharges is heightened further because the surface-water 
shortage during the dry winter leads to increased water withdrawals for crop production. Higher 
surface-water uses reduce aquifer recharges, while the dry-season groundwater withdrawals 
directly lower groundwater levels.  Thus, groundwater availability displays many of the same 
seasonal traits as surface water availability.  As noted below, the low aquifer levels, particularly 
late in the dry season, cause further problems due to salinity intrusions and land subsidence. 
 
 
 
                                                 
150 Edward McBean, Andrew deJong, and Bahram Gharabaghi, “Groundwater in Bangladesh: Implications in a 
Climate-Changing World,” Water Research and Management 1, No. 3 (2011): 3-8, accessed March 8, 2017, 
http://www.wrmjournal.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=98&Itemid=101. 
151 P. Ravenscroft et al., “Arsenic in Groundwater of the Bengal Basin, Bangladesh: Distribution, Field Relations, 
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Water Use in Bangladesh 
 
Water and life in Bangladesh are inextricably connected. Water and river corridors sustain the 
people in many ways. The rivers and other surface water bodies (haors, beels, lakes and ponds) 
all make major contributions to the agriculture and general economy of the country by providing 
navigation routes and sustaining fisheries and irrigation. Underground water sources, on their 
side, have been particularly pivotal in meeting drinking-water needs countrywide in addition to 
supporting irrigation. Groundwater use in particular has undergone dramatic expansion over the 
past four decades, mostly attributable to increased dry-season agricultural irrigation.153  
The following are some of the principal ways that water and water resources have been 
extensively used in the country, along with some of the non-consumptive, in–stream flow 
services that the rivers provide.  
Irrigation. Irrigation is the primary water use, accounting for most of the surface and 
underground water withdrawals in Bangladesh. In 2008, the total water withdrawal was an 
estimated 35.87 km3, of which 31.50 km3 (88 percent) was for agriculture, 3.60 km3 (10 percent) 
for municipalities, and 0.77 km3 (2 percent) for industries.154 Approximately 79 percent of the 
total water withdrawal comes from groundwater and 21 percent comes directly from surface-
water sources.155 In Bangladesh, about 94% of all irrigated land is under small-scale and 
                                                 
153 T. Shah et al., “Groundwater: A Global Assessment of Scale and Significance,” in Water for Food, Water for 
Life: A Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture, ed. D. Molden (London, UK: Routledge, 
2007), 395-419. 
154 “Irrigation in Southern and Eastern Asia in figures: AQUASTAT Survey – 2011,” Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, accessed March 8, 2017, http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2809e/i2809e.pdf. 
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traditional irrigation.156  These extensive irrigation uses sustain an agriculture sector that 
contributes about 19.29% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employs 63% 
percent of the total manpower, directly and indirectly.157 
Irrigation other than overflow irrigation—that is, other than irrigation that occurs when 
floodwaters overrun farm fields—began in earnest in Bangladesh between 1960 and 1970 with 
the construction of large-scale multipurpose irrigation, flood-control, and drainage projects. 
However, these relatively costly projects supplied water to only about 7 percent of the total 
irrigable area.158 Though the country has abundant surface-water resources, particularly in the 
monsoon season, its flat deltaic topography and the instability of major rivers make large 
reservoirs, and thus gravity-based irrigation systems, technically difficult and costly. Without 
such surface-water storage facilities, irrigators can only use surface water by means of overflow 
irrigation or direct withdrawals of river water, both of which are, as explained, difficult or 
                                                 
156 This includes irrigation by age-old traditional water lifting pumps, as well as pumps operated by electric motors 
or engines. Bangladesh uses extensive uses of shallow tubewells, deep tubewells (for underground water sources), 
motorized pumps, low-lift pumps for the purpose of irrigation. The country also uses manual pumps including Doan, 
swing basket, BRRI diaphragm pump, rower pump, treadle pump, hand tubewell, and hand sprinkler. Doan is a 
manually operated boat-shaped wooden trough, closed at one end and open at the other. The closed end is tied with a 
rope to a long wooden pole which is pivoted as a lever on a post. A weight, a large piece of stone, or a ball of dried 
mud, is fixed to the shorter end of the lever. The open end is hinged to the discharge point. The trough is dipped into 
the water by applying the body weight and the force of the operator. Water is lifted by the counter weight on the 
beam and is emptied Irrigation by swing basket. Swing basket consists of a basket or shovel-like scoop to which 
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being lifted in Bangladesh through 26,704 deep tubewells, 4,69,226 shallow tubewells, 56,829 low lift pumps, 
1,42,132 manual pumps, and more than 5,65,000 indigenous water lifting devices, in Banglapedia: National 
Encyclopedia of Bangladesh, “Irrigation,” accessed March 8, 2017, 
http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Irrigation. 
157 Source: DAE/AIS 2013, BBS 2006 & 2012. In T. F. Khan, M. W. Ullah and S. M. Imamul Huq, “Assessment of 
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practically impossible during the dry season owing to the limited availability of surface water. In 
combination these facts have led to massive increases in groundwater withdrawals.  
Through the 1950s Bangladeshi farmers chiefly supplemented overflow irrigation only with 
traditional means using human and animal traction; i.e. the swing basket159 and “doan.”160  
Groundwater withdrawals for dry-season irrigation began during the 1960s to 1970s. Initial 
groundwater withdrawals for irrigation relied on deep (depth >80 mbgl) tube wells (DTW) 
installed by the Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB).161 The country soon shifted 
instead to shallow tube wells (STW), following the identification by hydro-geologists of large 
quantities of groundwater at relatively shallow depths.  Thousands of STWs were installed 
during the eighties. With a growing population and rising food needs, groundwater irrigation by 
these deep and shallow tube wells has expanded rapidly since then. As a result, the area irrigated 
by groundwater in Bangladesh has grown from 4% to 70% between 1972 and 1999.162 Today, 
during the peak of the dry season from March to April, 63 percent of the country’s irrigation 
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comes from groundwater extraction by shallow tube wells.163 Winter cultivation of the high-
yielding Boro rice uses more irrigation water than any other agriculture practice or crop.164  
Navigation.  With some 700 rivers and tributaries crisscrossing the country, Bangladesh has one 
of the largest inland waterway networks in the world. The total length of its waterway is about 
13,000 kilometers, of which 8,433 kilometers are navigable in the rainy season while about 4,800 
kilometers are navigable in the dry season.165 Inland water transport has always been an easier, 
more accessible and relatively cheaper means of transport in Bangladesh. Moreover, during 
widespread catastrophic events, such as the floods or cyclones that ravage Bangladesh quite 
frequently, water transportation often remains the only mode of communication throughout the 
affected zones.166 
This river network of Bangladesh plays a vital role in national life as the most important 
transportation artery supporting the country’s economy. The inland ports and landing ghats serve 
as feeder ports to the two seaports of Bangladesh.  In addition to the cargo that moves from one 
inland port to another, inland ports handle about 40 percent of the country’s total foreign trade.167 
Boats made in the country are the most widely used carriers on the rivers and waterways of 
Bangladesh. They transport passengers and merchandise on a large scale. Mechanized water 
transport is mainly operated by the Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Corporation (BIWTC), 
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which runs ferry and launch services along the main routes. Besides, there are also water 
transportation services run by private companies.168 
Although waterways have faded in relative significance in recent years with the rapid 
infrastructural development of roads and highways, they remain vital transportation corridors, 
year-round in the case of traffic to and from the coastal districts and throughout the entire 
country during the monsoon season. The network connects almost all major cities, towns, and 
commercial centers and is expected to retain its significant role in national life and in the 
economy for the foreseeable future. Thus, keeping the rivers and waterways in navigable state 
has always been an important national goal.  
Fisheries.  The inland-water fisheries of Bangladesh are among the most productive in the world.  
Given its warm climate and vast surface water sources (including ponds dug specifically for fish 
cultivation), fishing is an integral part of the nation’s economy and food culture. Bangladesh's 
total fish production totaled about 3 million metric tons (mt) in 2010 – 11, and average annual 
growth rate of fish production in the last three years is 6.11%.169 Fish and fishery products are 
the country's third largest export commodity, contributing about 4.43% to national GDP and 
2.73% to foreign exchange earnings in 2010 – 2011.170 
Fisheries also play a major role in employment and as a source of nutrition. The fisheries sector 
employs an estimated 1.4 million commercial fishers.171 Yet another 11 million people indirectly 
earn their livelihood by fishing or in fisheries-related employment.  Most of these (an estimated 
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9.5 million people (73 percent)) are involved in subsistence fishing on the country's flood 
plains,172 a number that increases to 11 million between June and October each year. There are 
3.08 million fish farmers, 1.28 million inland fishermen, and 0.45 million collectors of fry (fish 
and shrimp).  It is estimated that fisheries and related activities overall support more than 7 
percent of the country's population.173 In terms of nutrition, the sector provides almost 63 percent 
of the national animal protein consumption.174 
Drinking water.  Much of the nation’s surface water is too polluted to drink without expensive 
and unavailable water treatment.  This pollution has stimulated measures to provide the 
population with alternative drinking water sources that are safer and more accessible.  That effort 
in recent decades has chiefly involved replacing surface water supplies with groundwater, and 
millions of shallow, hand-operated tube wells have been installed throughout the country to help 
achieve the goal. Today, underground sources currently meet most of the drinking water supplies 
in Bangladesh. In Dhaka city alone, for example, 97% of all water demands are met by 
underground water.175  This reliance on groundwater has improved drinking-water quality, but it 
exacerbates groundwater withdrawals and thus the various environmental problems and 
vulnerabilities linked to such withdrawals. 
 
These, then, are the principal ways that Bangladesh uses its freshwater resources to sustain its 
large population. Like other relatively flat parts of the globe, Bangladesh has not really been able 
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to use its water resources for hydropower generation, despite its massive water flows. The 
country has so far constructed only one such hydropower project176 and the potential for more is 
modest because of the overall flat terrain and the high population density.  Population density is 
particularly restrictive given that reservoirs in flat regions necessarily take up much larger spaces 
and displace more people. 
 
Ecological Roles of Water Flows 
 
In addition to meeting these direct human water needs, these freshwater bodies and underground 
water sources in Bangladesh also bestow extraordinary in-stream flow services and perform the 
crucial job of supporting the surrounding ecosystems on which the huge population depends.  
Sediment load, delta formation and preventing coastal erosion. As we have seen, the GBM river 
system transports enormous amounts of sediment every year in a process that has been 
replenishing and extending the Bengal Delta for ages and continues today. This is what formed 
the Bengal Delta on which most of modern-day Bangladesh lies. It is also what nourished the 
soil’s fertility and made it ideal for agriculture. Further, the deposition of sediments carried by 
these river systems helps extend the coastlines, thereby reducing coastal erosion and land-sinking 
that would otherwise take place. 
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Pushing back salinity from freshwater.  An especially important function performed by the river 
flows in Bangladesh is their role in pushing back salinity from the Bay of Bengal. The combined 
flow of the major rivers, especially during the rainy season, keeps saltwater from moving inland, 
contaminating the waters for human use and harming aquatic animals and plants. This salinity-
protection function is essential for multiple reasons and it explains, more than any other reason, 
why the river systems need to maintain minimum flows. Sufficient surface-water flows, as they 
recharge underground aquifers, also protect the coastal aquifers from saline water seepage below 
ground, a danger that, if realized on any significant scale, would be catastrophic.  In the case of 
aquifers the saline-contamination danger is quite real:  dry-season withdrawals already 
sometimes drop water tables below sea level, triggering widespread saltwater intrusion, the 
downward leakage of arsenic concentrations, and the general degradation of water resources.177  
Protecting aquatic diversity and surrounding ecosystems.  The freshwater systems in Bangladesh 
are crucial for maintaining ecological balance and for providing habitat for aquatic species. The 
country possesses a rich array of aquatic species and resources with ecosystems that are very 
diverse biologically. Ecological health, like direct human water uses, is threatened by saline 
water intrusion.  The danger is most grave to the ecosystems and the biodiversity of the southern 
coastal regions of Bangladesh but could reach further much further inland if river flows are 
further diminished or if groundwater levels drop.178 Bangladesh harbors the Sundarbans, the 
largest mangrove forest in the world and a UNESCO heritage site. A fine balance of fresh and 
salt water is required for the Sundarbans to remain healthy (in much the same way that a distinct 
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balance is needed to maintain the crab fisheries in Chesapeake Bay).  A minimum surface water 
flow is therefore essential to enable the surrounding environment to perform its own natural 
functions of preserving aquatic diversity. For many aquatic species, it is important also that this 
flow contain something close to historic sediment levels and stay within historic temperature 
ranges.  Thus, historic natural flows with unaltered conditions as to sediments and temperature 
have helped the rivers in Bangladesh sustain their aquatic biodiversity and, in the process, their 
surrounding ecosystems.  
Flooding as a mixed phenomenon.  Bangladesh is well known for its ravaging annual floods that 
cause enormous loss of life and damage to crops and property. Flooding has always come as a 
mixed blessing for Bangladeshis. Flooding destroys crops and homesteads and brings vast 
economic losses, particularly when flood waters stay longer than usual. At the same time, this 
recurrent flooding created the entire Bengal delta with its rich alluvial deposits and incredible 
natural fertility. Embankments and levees are sometimes used to control flooding in specific 
places. Flood-control reservoirs, common elsewhere in the world, have not been feasible for the 
same reasons that frustrate hydropower generation: the flat terrain and the high population per 
unit of land area.  Further, the major portions of the river basins—including the places where 
flood-control reservoirs might be constructed—are in upstream neighboring countries.179  
Like all other water-development efforts, flood control and drainage (FCD) improvement 
projects severely disturb existing hydrological cycles, and changes in the flood regime would 
bring about adverse consequences, some predictable, others unexpected. Flood-protection 
embankments prevent the overbank spill of flood waters at high river stage, thereby reducing 
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overland flooding and floodplain sediment deposit.180 Complete flood control thus would deprive 
the basin’s soils of vital nutrients and would also affect the flora and fauna of floodplains.181 
Similar costs arise when flood protection takes the form of reservoirs that, in operation, trap the 
sediment carried by floodwaters, sediment needed not just for soil fertility but to avert land 
subsidence.  Water-retention projects, like the flow reductions caused by upstream withdrawals, 
would also cause low flows at the river mouths thereby aggravating salt-water intrusion.  
To sum up, Bangladesh makes extensive uses of both its surface and ground water sources for 
agricultural irrigation and for drinking water supply. The rivers and other surface freshwater 
bodies support fishing industries that provide the major source of protein to the people. Also, 
inland waters have always been used for navigation within the country. Beyond these vital 
functions, freshwater resources have long provided instream-flow and ecological services, 
including sedimentation transport and discharge, salinity control, and the protection of aquatic 
ecosystems. Unlike its other upstream basin counterparts, Bangladesh could never utilize its 
massive water flows for hydropower due to its geographic location and land terrain. 
As seen above, water scarcity during the dry season has become an ever-increasing concern. 
Much of the concern relates to direct withdrawals within Bangladesh itself, from its rivers and 
aquifers.  But the scarcity problem is importantly caused also by actions occurring in other States 
upstream.  Upstream water diversions, particularly in the Bihar and West Bengal provinces in 
India and also Nepal, have had substantial effects. Moreover, the construction of the Farakka 
barrage (a diversion project) just above the Indian-Bangladeshi border has considerably 
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decreased the dry-season flow of the Ganges into Bangladesh, causing or exacerbating major 
environmental problems within the country.182 
Irrigation, as noted, causes problems when water tables fall too low, thereby concentrating 
pollutants (in the case of surface waters) and reducing natural protections against salt-water 
intrusion.  Beyond that, irrigation uses of water add further contaminants to the water and thus 
cause problems when irrigation water not used by the plants or lost to evaporation returns to the 
rivers. Irrigation return-flows are often more saline and contain agricultural contaminants such as 
fertilizers and pesticides. The same general pollution problem can arise in connection with 
industrial uses of water: discharges from industrial plants typically contain industrial effluent, 
often laced with heavy metals and organic pollutants. Where water is used as a coolant, the 
returned water may be of a much higher temperature than the stream itself.183 In a word, even 
water uses that return water to a river, thereby sustaining the flow, often degrade rivers with 
contaminants.  
 
Managing Waters in the GBM Basin: Nature of the Conflicts 
 
The water-related problems in the GBM basin resemble other typical discords between upstream 
and downstream riparian users. While South Asia has been endowed with abundant freshwater 
water resources, a lack of coordinated planning along with newly added political boundaries has 
compounded the region’s water problems, problems that, as explained, are aggravated by wide 
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seasonal variations in rainfall. On individual water issues, the populous countries such as India, 
Bangladesh, and Nepal have often been unable to agree on their respective strategies and 
management plans. 
In South Asia, arrangements in the form of regional agreements were initiated by the British 
when it exercised control over greater India.  The British Government entered into agreements 
with various then-existing Indian states covering the construction and regulation of irrigation 
canals.184 Since then, a number of bilateral agreements, treaties, or memoranda of understanding 
have been signed among the riparian countries. Those instruments include the 1920 Agreement 
between Nepal and India (then within the British empire) for constructing the Sarada Barrage on 
the Mahakali River; the 1954 Agreement between Nepal and India on the Kosi Project; the 1959 
Agreement between Nepal and India on the Gandak Irrigation and Power Project; the 1977 
Agreement between Bangladesh and India on sharing of the Ganges waters at Farakka and on 
augmenting its flows; the two Memoranda of Understanding in 1982 and 1985; the 1996 Treaty 
between Nepal and India concerning the integrated development of the Mahakali River; and the 
1996 Treaty between Bangladesh and India on sharing of the Ganges waters at Farakka.185 
This dissertation primarily concentrates on the case of Bangladesh; that is, on how Bangladesh, 
as the most downstream nation in the basin, has engaged with other riparian States regarding 
water issues. It does so by considering three instances of ongoing and looming conflicts over 
border-crossing watercourses. The three conflicts are: the dispute over the Farakka barrage 
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(diversion dam) on the Ganges River between Bangladesh and India; India’s proposed river 
interlinking project; and the emerging Yarlung Tsangpo River project, still in an early stage.  In 
combination, the three projects cover the two largest rivers in the GBM basin (the Ganges and 
Brahmaputra (or the Yarlung Tsangpo River as it is called in China)); they illustrate the nature 
and type of water disputes and use-conflicts in the region; and they underscore the long-term 
need for basin-wide management. 
Dispute over the Ganges/Padma: the Farakka Barrage.  This longstanding dispute between 
Bangladesh and India concerns the construction and operation of a barrage across the Ganges 
River in Farakka, just 17 kilometers (11 miles) upstream of the border with Bangladesh. The 
purpose of the Farakka barrage was to divert water from the main stem of the Ganges into the 
south-flowing Bhagirathi-Hoogli River in order to maintain the flow of the Hoogli River, 
keeping the river navigable and the port at Kolkata accessible. Incidental purposes for the 
barrage were to combat salinity intrusion and to supply drinking water to Kolkata.186 The barrage 
was to have a length of 7363 feet, and was designed to divert 40,000 cusecs of water from the 
Ganges to the Hooghly River.187 
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As may well be perceived, such a diversion would materially diminish the flow of water entering 
Bangladesh, a prospect that quickly caused tension between the countries. India’s intent to 
construct Farakka barrage first became evident in 1951 via newspaper reports.  The reports 
prompted then-Pakistan (before the independence of Bangladesh in 1971) to object officially to 
the Indian plan as early as October 29, 1951.  India replied that the project was still in conceptual 
framing and that Pakistan’s concerns were "hypothetical."188 Over the next decade, Pakistan (on 
behalf of present Bangladesh) made clear that the proposed barrage would significantly reduce 
its incoming water flows, seriously reducing water tables, curtailing irrigation options, and 
worsening salinity intrusions. As a conciliatory step, Pakistan proposed various co-operative 
measures governing the river systems to the east.  It recommended that the two States together 
seek advisory and technical assistance from a UN body and that the project be examined jointly 
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by experts of both countries. India responded unfavorably to these offers, with the exception of 
agreeing to “exchange data on projects of mutual interests.”189 Expert-level meetings between 
the two countries eventually commenced on June 28, 1960.  However, these meetings 
accomplished little success and construction of the barrage began in 1961. Pakistan then 
attempted several times to arrange a minister-level meeting, an offer repeatedly rebuffed by the 
Indian counterpart on the ground that such meetings should await the compilation of full data on 
the project.190 Instead, India agreed to secretary-level meetings.191 Throughout these meetings, 
Pakistan sought an agreement requiring the equitable sharing of the Ganges waters; it did not 
seek to halt the project entirely.  On its side, India continued to insist that a comprehensive 
agreement was not possible until the data at hand were complete and accurate.192 Construction of 
the Farakka barrage concluded in 1971 and testing began. 
As Bangladesh gained independence from Pakistan, a change occurred in what Bangladesh 
interpreted as the indifference of India towards concerns about Farakka. The first evidence of 
change came in 1972 when the governments of newly independent Bangladesh and of India 
signed the Statute of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission,193 creating a body to 
oversee common river issues. Along with maintaining a liaison, the Commission was to work to 
harness the rivers common to both countries for their mutual benefit. Although the statute made 
no reference to the Farakka barrage or to other Ganges issues, it represented a move toward co-
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operation and showed an apparent openness to the joint management of rivers that the countries 
shared. 
The Ganges/Padma typically fails during the dry season to supply sufficient water to meet basic 
needs.  The governments of both countries endorsed this fact in a joint declaration on May 16, 
1974, observing further that, during periods of minimum flow, augmentation of the river flow 
was needed to meet the basic requirements of the two countries. They agreed to assign the task of 
determining the optimum method of augmentation to the Joint Rivers Commission.  They also 
resolved that an agreement between them was needed on how best to divide the river flow during 
the low-flow season before the Farakka project should begin full operation.194 Five Commission 
meetings and one minister-level meeting were held between June 1974 and April 1975, at which 
the two sides put forth widely differing proposals for augmenting the Ganges flow. Bangladesh 
proposed the construction of storage facilities along the headwaters of the Ganges tributaries in 
Nepal, thereby drawing Nepal into the planning. India opted instead for diverting Brahmaputra 
water to the Ganges at Farakka by a link canal, a proposal involving a more radical reengineering 
of the basin system.195 The two augmentation strategies faced challenges from their adversaries 
and no consensus emerged. 
In the meantime, at a minister-level meeting in Dhaka between April 16 to18 in 1975, India 
asked that, as an interim measure while discussions continued, a feeder canal at Farakka be run 
during the current period of low flow to learn more about the barrage’s effects. The two sides 
agreed to a limited trial operation of the barrage, with discharges varying between 11,000 and 
16,000 cusecs in ten-day periods from April 21 to May 31, 1975, with the remainder of the flow 
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guaranteed to reach Bangladesh.  Once the trial period ended India continued to divert Ganges 
waters at Farakka throughout the 1975-76 dry season, at the full capacity of the diversion 
(40,000 cusecs out of a dry season average flow of 50,000 cusecs) without negotiating a new 
agreement with Bangladesh. With India thus unilaterally controlling the river flow the barrage 
and its operating methods became a significant source of conflict.  Bangladesh charged that India 
diverted too much water during the dry season and released too much water during monsoon 
rains. For Bangladesh the consequences of the project were acute in terms of desiccation of 
tributaries, salinization along the coast, and setbacks to agriculture, fisheries, navigation, and 
industry.196 Four more meetings between June 1975 and June 1976 yielded no results.  
In January 1976, Bangladesh presented its concerns to the United Nations (UN).  It sponsored a 
resolution calling on India to share more water and to consider the interests of Bangladesh when 
operating the Farakka barrage. The resolution failed to pass, but the UN General Assembly in a 
Statement of Consensus called on the parties to resolve the issue amicably. This ultimately led on 
November 5, 1977, to the Ganges Waters Agreement. The agreement included a formula to share 
the Ganges waters at Farakka, to govern for five years and thereafter based on mutual agreement. 
The Joint Rivers Commission was again charged to develop a long-term solution for augmenting 
the dry-season flows of the Ganges.  Nevertheless, by the end of the five-year life of the 
agreement, no solution had been worked out.197  
Upon the expiration of the agreement in 1982, Bangladesh and India failed to frame any 
workable agreement except for a Memorandum of Understanding, again on an interim basis. 
This Memorandum authorized temporary allocations of water for the 1983–1984 dry seasons. 
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When this Memorandum also expired in 1984, India nonetheless continued operating the 
Farakka barrage. Another similar compromise was reached in 1985 with the signing of the Indo-
Bangladesh Memorandum of Understanding, which addressed dam operations between 1986 and 
1988 and established a Joint Committee of Experts to help resolve development issues.198 
Between 1988, when the last agreement lapsed, and 1996, no agreement was in place between 
India and Bangladesh. India granted Bangladesh only a portion of the flow of the Ganges, with 
no minimum flow guaranteed and no special provisions for drought years. Each side kept 
roughly to its positions as stated above, with little room for compromise. Finally in 1996, a new 
treaty was signed between the two riparians, based generally on the 1985 accord. It delineated a 
flow regime under varying conditions and had a term of 30 years.199  
This Treaty between the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the 
Government of the Republic of India on Sharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka, signed on 12 
December, 1996, is basically a water-sharing treaty between the two countries. As the hefty 
name suggests, it formulates a recipe for allocating Ganges water during the lean season.200 It did 
not include a plan for augmentation of the river flow, an issue on which the States remained far 
apart.  The most notable change in the 1996 treaty from the 1977 agreement was its introduction 
of a new formula for the distribution of Ganges waters from January 1st to May 31st, the 
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region’s dry season.  If the treaty expires as scheduled on 2026 without a further understanding, 
the States could again enter a post-treaty period marked with uncertainty and insecurity. 
It must be remembered that the Ganges treaty is all about water allocation and sharing during dry 
seasons. It addresses, that is, Bangladesh’s immediate needs for dry season water and India’s 
stated needs for water to sustain its port and irrigation. The treaty does not address directly the 
many ecological concerns caused or exacerbated by the barrage’s significant alteration in the 
natural river flow.  Further, the treaty does not deal with extreme events and how they are best 
accommodated, nor does it cover upstream activities in other States. Notably, Nepal, China, and 
Bhutan, not parties to the treaty, have their own development plans that could impact the 
agreement. Finally, the treaty does not contain an arbitration clause to ensure that the parties 
uphold its provisions201 and otherwise lacks any enforcement mechanism except through 
diplomatic undertakings. 
India’s River Interlinking Project.  Another major concern for Bangladesh in its water dealings 
with India has been India’s envisioned river interlinking project, a massive project—the biggest 
conceived by India to dates—that would connect 37 rivers in India through some 30 links and 36 
dams202 and feature massive diversions of water from the Ganges/Padma and the 
Brahmaputra.203  Aside from its ambitious scope, the project is also noteworthy because it was, 
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in effect, commanded by the Supreme Court of India in 2002 in response to a writ petition 
challenging the paradox of water abundance in certain parts of India and drought conditions in 
other parts.204 India initially proposed to interlink the Ganges and the Cauvery in 1972 and to 
that end created the National Water Development Authority.205 When implementation of this 
work mired for a number of reasons, the Supreme Court directed the government to move ahead 
and complete the project by 2016. It instructed the government to nationalize all rivers in the 
country, to take appropriate steps to interlink the rivers, and to formulate a scheme whereby 
water from the west flowing rivers could be channelized and equitably distributed.206 
The idea of interlinking India’s rivers was motivated by concerns about the disparate regional 
distribution of water and the juxtaposition of frequent floods in some places and droughts in 
others.  The project would maximize the utilizable amount of water in water-rich regions without 
letting the water be “wasted.”  The entire river linking project primarily comprises two 
components, the Himalayan Component and the Peninsular Component. The Northern 
Himalayan Component would link fourteen Himalayan rivers in Northern India, including the 
Ganges and the Brahmaputra, by means of a series of storage dams in India, Nepal and Bhutan. 
The Brahmaputra and its tributaries would be linked with the Ganges, and new canals would 
transfer surplus water from the eastern tributaries of the Ganges to the west.  
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The Southern Peninsular Component features four major parts: the interlinking of Mahanadi-
Godavari-Krishna-Cauvery Rivers and construction of storage basins at potential sites in these 
basins; the interlinking of west-flowing rivers, north of Bombay and south of Tapi; the 
interlinking of Ken-Chambal; and finally the diversion of other west-flowing rivers.207 
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Figure 5: The Himalayan Component of the River Interlinking Project.  Source: 
National Perspective Plan (NPP), National Water Development Agency, India 
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Once implemented, this project is expected to support the irrigation of 35 million hectares (Mha) 
and power generation of 34 million kilowatts (KW).  According to proponents it would also 
provide indirect benefits in the form of flood control, enhanced navigation, water supply, 
expanded fisheries, pollution control, recreation facilities, and additional employment.208 The 
estimated initial cost was calculated at $120 billion, a number that has risen due to delays and 
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Figure 6: The Peninsular Component of the River Interlinking Project. Source: 
National Perspective Plan (NPP), National Water Development Agency, India 
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technical issues. Proponents have responded to concerns about cost overruns by contending that 
the costs remain negligible compared to the project’s expected benefits.209 
Environmental and social impacts in Bangladesh from River Interlinking Project. All of the 
engineering works and water routes of the river interlinking project would be located within 
India.  The project, however, would effectively cut Bangladesh’s share of water from both the 
Brahmaputra and the Ganges. Under the current proposal, India plans to divert 173 billion cubic 
meters of water per year from the Brahmaputra, amounting to 193,703 cubic feet per second.210 
This rate of diversion is greater than the total flow volume in the Brahmaputra River during the 
dry season.211 Such a drastic reduction of flow could prove catastrophic for Bangladesh as a 
downstream country, economically, socially, and ecologically. The Brahmaputra provides the 
bulk of the country’s total water supply—about 75% of the total available flow during the dry 
season—and performs the critical function of pushing back salinity.212 Overall, the project would 
reduce the available Ganges flow in an amount roughly equal to the adverse impacts already 
caused by the Farakka barrage, lessening water flows in many parts of the State.213  
The consequences of this project for Bangladesh would extend well beyond the loss of water for 
uses within Bangladesh.  The proposed dams in the Himalayas would trap a significant portion of 
the river’s sediment load and deliver clearer water to the lower delta leading to the various 
problems mentioned above related to soil fertility, land subsidence, and mangrove forest loss.214  
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The delta regions comprising both Bangladesh and West Bengal in India would undergo erosion 
and submergence due to lack of sufficient fresh water and sediment supply.215 
Continuous and consistent flows in the rivers are fundamental for the protection, restoration, and 
preservation of the aquatic environment and biodiversity. As noted, altered-flow patterns in the 
Brahmaputra and the Ganges would change the temperature, silt-load and other biological 
components of water, thereby threatening aquatic ecosystems.  More particularly, already 
endangered aquatic species and even species now thriving in the coastal zone habitat will be 
vulnerable to these physical changes.216 Estuarine ecosystems are sources of rich fishery 
resources and also serve as the critical habitat for migratory fishes and other organisms.217 The 
proposed diversions and damming of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra would seriously affect the 
aquatic health of these ecosystems considered as biotic wholes.218 To take an example, according 
to Bangladeshi forest officials, about seventeen percent of the total Sundari trees of the 
Sundarbans have already succumbed to the top-dying syndrome due to increased salinity, a 
problem that the river interlinking project would exacerbate.219 
With its natural capacity to flow even during dry season, the Brahmaputra plays the pivotal role 
in preventing saline-water inflow. The continuation of this flow is particularly critical given the 
appreciably diminished dry-season flow of the Ganges due to the Farakka barrage.  The expected 
drop in the Brahmaputra flow, together with declines in the Ganges flow, would significantly 
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worsen salinity intrusion into the Lower Meghna and throughout the south-central and north-
central regions220 with catastrophic impacts on agriculture and fisheries.221 
Beyond its effects on surface-water bodies and flows in Bangladesh, the river interlinking project 
would also significantly affect the State’s groundwater systems. Decreases in the surface-water 
flow will substantially interrupt recharge of the underground aquifers. As we have seen, the lack 
of recharge in those aquifers during dry season is already a concern.   An additional reduction of 
water in the wet season would contribute further to a gradual lowering of the underground water 
table. This would allow more saline waters to infiltrate the coastal-region aquifers, rendering 
water sources undrinkable and threatening public health.222 
Although one of the stated objectives of the river interlinking is to reduce flooding of the 
Brahmaputra during the wet season, many studies conclude that the project might well bring 
minimal gains given that most of the reservoirs will be placed in acute-flood areas. Other 
evidence suggests that the overall dams might simply spread the flooding around, into areas not 
typically flooded.223 Further and as noted, effective flood control often creates ecological 
problems by disrupting natural silt deposition.  Finally and most evidently, the project would 
worsen water shortages in Bangladesh during the dry season and accelerate the frequency of 
drought-like conditions.224 In the process, the project would intensify river-bank erosion and lead 
to extensive sand-bar formation, disrupting navigation as well as fisheries.225 
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India’s river interlinking project has been controversial within India itself as well as 
internationally.  The project has been continuously critiqued, by scholars, engineers, and social 
and environmental activists and within civil society generally.226 In addition to issues of cost and 
feasibility, critics have expressed worries about the ecological impacts of such a massive project. 
In May 2003, the Government of India’s Ministry of Environment and Forests raised 23 
environmental concerns about the scheme.227 Many independent researchers and environmental 
and social activists have pointed particularly to the seismic hazards, especially in the Himalayan 
Component;228 while many others worry about the transfer of river pollution that accompanies 
inter-basin water transfers and about losses of forests and biodiversity due variously to 
submergence and losses of water.229 Many states within India that would be affected by the 
project have raised similar environmental concerns.230 Water-rich states, perhaps predictably, 
have been most prone to resist the project, displaying a reluctance to share their water with drier, 
more drought-prone states.231  
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As noted, the Supreme Court of India has pushed the Government to move ahead with the inter-
linking project, in part on grounds of social equity within India but also on the mistaken belief 
that the water diverted by the project would otherwise go to waste.  Bandyopadhyaya and 
Praveen (2003) have countered this assumption, noting that, “from a holistic perspective, one 
does not see any 'surplus' water, because every drop performs some ecological service all the 
time. The ecosystems evolve by making optimal use of all the water available. If a decision is 
taken to move some amount of water away from a basin, a proportional damage will be done to 
the ecosystem, depending on the service provided by that amount of water. Thus, no amount of 
water in a river basin can be taken out without causing some damage to the ecosystem services. 
In other words, there is no 'free' 'surplus' water in a basin that can be taken away without a 
price.”232 The water flowing into the sea is not wasted; it is a crucial link in the water cycle. 
When the link is broken, the ecological balance of land and oceans, fresh water and sea water, 
also gets disrupted.233 Dismayed by the overall project’s delay the Supreme Court pushed the 
government yet again on February 27, 2012, setting a date for project completion and appointing 
a high-powered committee to oversee planning and implementation.234 It issued a writ of 
mandamus to the Central and the state Governments concerned to comply with its directions 
effectively and expeditiously.235  
Taking neighboring States’ interests into account. In its actions the Supreme Court in India was 
not heedless to international repercussions. It took notice of them by saying that implementation 
of the project should preferably occur with the consent of neighboring countries.236 But in doing 
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so, the court referred only to Nepal, an upstream State that included the sources of some of the 
affected rivers.  In the court’s estimation, the project would bestow benefits to Nepal and in some 
manner uplift India’s international role.237 The court made no reference to Bangladesh and the 
project’s effects on it. According to observers, even Nepal’s interests have not been adequately 
addressed in the project design.238 So far India has not agreed to speak with Bangladesh on the 
matter, nor provided official notification about it despite objections and protests raised by 
Bangladesh from the beginning.239  
The next water dispute: The Yarlung Tsangpo River Projects by China.  Yet another major 
dispute is arising in one of the natural water towers of the world, the Tibetan Plateau, source of 
no fewer than six major Asian rivers: the Indus, the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, the Salween, the 
Mekong, and the Yangtze.240  
The Tibetan Plateau and the Himalayas accumulate water in the form of ice and glaciers, which 
as it melts seasonally forms or contributes to the various rivers. The region is particularly 
significant because both of the nearby growing powers, China and India, are looking to it for 
water to meet growing needs.  Both countries, along with Bangladesh and seven other Asian 
nations (accounting together for about 47 per cent of the world’s people), already depend heavily 
on water flows from this Plateau.241 Experts warn that, due to global warming, the Himalayan 
glaciers are shrinking at twice the rate of other glaciers worldwide. This reality, combined with 
increasing water consumption, desertification, rapid industrialization and pollution, mean that 
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demand for the pristine and previously plentiful water of the Tibetan Plateau is increasing. 
Aware of the problem, China and India have taken steps to grab larger shares of it.  
Against this backdrop, even more disputes are likely to swirl around the Brahmaputra River. The 
river, again, originates in the Tibetan plateau and passes through China, India and Bangladesh. 
Although not traversed by the river, Bhutan is entirely within its catchment basin and contributes 
water to it through four tributaries. The river is known as Yarlung Tsangpo River in China, as the 
Psangpo River in Tibet, and as Brahmaputra in both Bangladesh and India.   
Until recently this great Himalayan River has been among the least engineered, largely due to its 
route: it flows directly eastward along the Himalayas through the Tibetan plateau before taking a 
sharp turn to enter India, cutting through largely impassable mountain terrain.  In India, the river 
travels a relatively narrower stretch of the Arunachal Pradesh before making its way into 
Bangladesh.  The remoteness of this area and the significant fall of the river have discouraged 
countries from attempting to control it.  Only recently have India and China focused on this river, 
recognizing its suitability for large reservoirs to store monsoon runoff, regulate floods, augment 
dry-season flows, and produce hydroelectricity.242 
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As seen earlier, India is moving ahead with its plan to divert Brahmaputra River water through 
its river interlinking project. On its side, China has also initiated large-scale plans. Currently, 
Chinese engineers are working on a series of hydropower projects.  According to several media 
reports (unconfirmed by China) some twenty eight dams are either planned or under construction 
along the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra river.243 
Apparently the most ambitious of these Chinese projects is one proposed on the Great Bend of 
the Brahmaputra River, close to the Indian border. From here the river enters India and meanders 
to reach Bangladesh. China seeks to use the river’s 8,000-foot elevation drop in the Great Bend 
to generate electricity. This proposed mega-hydro project of about 38-49 GW would entail 
almost twice the generating capacity of the Three Gorges Dam, now the world’s largest 
hydropower plant.244 For the lower riparian States—India and Bangladesh—the hydropower 
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aspects of the project are less worrisome than China’s intent to divert water from this area as part 
of the South-to-North Diversion Scheme. The Chinese Ministry of Water Resources’ 2005 report 
envisions three man-made rivers, channeling water from the Tibetan Plateau to China’s arid 
north.245 Of the three, it is the planned Yarlung Tsangpo diversion that is the most controversial 
and technologically challenging.246 The scheme would supply water to relieve the stressed 
Yellow River basin in northern China, supporting irrigation, farming and domestic needs.247  
For Bangladesh, these Chinese plans are especially troubling given that China’s water diversions 
would add to those planned by India. Individually the projects would likely have grave effects.  
In combination the consequences would be even more severe.248 As noted, the country receives 
most of its surface water from the Brahmaputra during dry season.249 A sharp fall in the dry-
season water flow of the Brahmaputra due to these projects could devastate Bangladesh in its 
agriculture, fishing, and ecology with particular harm coming from the reductions in needed 
sediment deposition and due to increased salinity. 
Although China has yet to officially disclose the full scale of the project, the country has, on 
different occasions, described the proposed Tsangpo projects as run-of-the river (ROR) type 
projects in which water is diverted away from the river to generate electricity and then reunited 
with the river.  The dams would allegedly help alleviate flood problems and erosion in 
downstream India and Bangladesh, thereby aiding them. But the mountain water in these projects 
– mostly from snow melt – is not the water that causes flooding; that water comes from the 
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monsoon rains on the southern side of the Himalayas. Given the locations of China’s planned 
hydropower projects, it might (Bangladesh fears) hold water during the dry season, using it for 
power generation or irrigation, and freely release water during the rainy season with damaging 
consequences for the lower-riparian countries 
A further serious threat related to China’s vision comes from the seismic activities linked to the 
geophysical mountain-building processes at work in this region. The Great Bend area has high 
seismic activity due to its proximity to the geological fault line where the Indian Plate collides 
with the Eurasian Plate.  Ruptures of dams due to seismic activity could be disastrous for the 
Tibetan region of China as well as for downstream India and Bangladesh.  
 
These three major development programs—the Farakka barrage, the Indian river interlinking 
project, and China’s plans for the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) River—put in stark form the 
vulnerabilities of Bangladesh.  The challenges facing that nation are unique in detail, but in 
important ways resemble challenges facing other high-risk nations located at the mouths of 
major international watercourses.  
Chapter 4 continues the study of Bangladesh by examining further the legal responses the 
various basin countries have employed in order to resolve contentions and meet their reciprocal 
interests.  It assesses how well these legal responses have addressed the underlying concerns, 
paying particular attention to the ecological ones.  
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Chapter 4: Bangladesh and Current Law in the Region 
 
This chapter builds upon the previous one by looking more closely at the experience of 
Bangladesh in using diplomacy and other legal means to protect itself against the adverse 
effects of watercourse modifications by upstream States.  Over the decades the nation (and 
Pakistan, before the independence of Bangladesh) has entered into various arrangements and 
understandings with India concerning the Ganges/Padma River.  Apart from India, as noted in 
the last chapter, no substantive agreements of significance exist between Bangladesh and 
other States in the region.  Nepal has expressed interest on several occasions in becoming 
involved in tripartite treaty negotiations but has not yet done so; so far, the two States have 
only set up a Joint Commission of Experts to examine their water relations. India, in contrast, 
has at least three major treaties with Nepal. As explained, all existing agreements in the GBM 
basin concern water allocation and none of them, except the Mahakali treaty of 1996, 
addresses environmental conservation or the protection of minimum flows. These agreements 
are all bilateral ones, with no other co-basin States involved.  Neither Bangladesh nor India 
has any treaty with China, although Memoranda of Understanding do cover the sharing of 
flood-season hydrological data.   
This chapter reviews these various arrangements, including ones to which Bangladesh is not a 
party, noting more carefully their terms and consequences and assessing their effectiveness 
from the point of view of Bangladesh.  It concludes with observations about the limitations on 
current diplomatic efforts and the challenges under current international law of achieving 
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basin-wide management plans fair to all States.  By doing so it sets the stage for considering, 
in the next chapter, watercourse law set at the international level. 
Bangladesh – India 
As reviewed in the last chapter, Bangladesh is a downstream riparian neighbor of India in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna river basin, and shares 54 transboundary rivers with India. 
Following Bangladesh’s independence in 1971 a good neighborly relation began between the 
countries, leading in time to the adoption of the Statute of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint River 
Commission.250 The statute created the Indo-Bangladesh Joint River Commission, which was 
charged with maintaining a liaison between Bangladesh and India on questions relating to 
their common rivers. Although the statute was signed at a time when Bangladesh inherited the 
Farakka dispute from then Pakistan, it did not make explicit reference to the existing Farakka 
barrage. Predictably enough, the Farakka issue soon emerged on the ground and led to the 
1977 Ganges agreement as a temporary solution. Upon the termination of that treaty five 
years later, two more Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) came into being.  They too 
lapsed according to their terms, leaving the Farakka barrage unregulated. Following a series 
of ups and downs in the countries’ water relations over the ensuing two decades, 
disagreements on the Ganges water at Farakka were finally settled by a treaty in 1996, written 
to last for thirty years.  
It is noteworthy that, with the exception of the Statute of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint River 
Commission, these various agreements have all dealt with the Ganges River, especially with 
the contentious Farakka issue. Bangladesh has no diplomatic or regulatory arrangement with 
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India relating to the Brahmaputra River, despite its major concerns—reviewed in the last 
chapter—about India’s river interlinking project. As explained below the two countries did 
initiate diplomatic efforts to regulate dry-season water allocation of a second river, the Teesta, 
but the diplomacy has yet to yield results.    
Statute of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint River Commission, 1972.  The Indo-Bangladesh Joint 
River Commission was established on a permanent basis pursuant to a joint declaration of the 
Prime Ministers of Bangladesh and of India on March 19, 1972. The declaration was soon 
followed by a statutory charter, signed on November 24, 1972, which assigned to the Joint 
River Commission (hereinafter JRC) the task of promoting joint efforts to maximize benefits 
from the common river systems.251 The JRC was specifically charged, as an intermediary 
between the States, to generate ideas, programs, proposals and projects to promote the overall 
goal of cooperative river managements. Article 4 of the statute enumerates five overlapping 
functions of the JRC, including repeated references to flood control and flood forecasting.252 
Both article 4(i)(a) and article 4(i)(d) reinforce the objective of managing the common rivers 
to maximize benefits for the two countries and their people. 
Bangladeshis had high hopes that the JRC would make progress on contentious river issues, 
given its role as the only institutional forum for addressing the issues.  Results, however, have 
been meager.  The JRC has made significant progress only toward its goal of accurate and timely 
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flood forecasting.  Its other anticipated efforts, including research projects, have yet to take 
place.253  The statute creating the JRC has little to say about environmental impacts or the 
sustainable use of water.  Also absent from the statute is an arbitration clause with a well-defined 
mechanism to resolve differences.  Given this deficiency, it has been easy for the two States to 
hold tight to clashing policy stances that frustrate joint action. 
The use of the words “for harnessing the rivers common to both countries” at the onset of the 
statute’s preamble implies that the powers and duties of the JRC extend beyond  any particular 
river or rivers to encompass all fifty four of the common, trans-boundary rivers. Such a wide 
jurisdiction has the potential to promote uniform policies, an approach that, certainly on the 
surface, would seem efficient.  But such a goal is a lofty one, and its achievement in retrospect 
required a more robust and stronger institution, better able to reconcile strong conflicts.  In its 
current form and structure, the JRC lacks the power and leadership to take on the fifty-four 
rivers, particularly to deal with the enormous challenges posed by the Ganges, the Meghna, and 
Brahmaputra Rivers and the human and natural demands placed on them.254 
The overall vision of the JRC suffers from another practical inefficiency.  In operation the JRC is 
not really a single jointly run entity.  It is more accurate to say that it comprises, in effect, two 
parallel national river commissions operating in tension. The existence of the dual commissions 
makes decision-making more challenging and time consuming and makes cooperation even more 
                                                 
253 Member, Joint River Commission, Bangladesh, in discussion with the candidate in November, 2013. 
254 Anumita Raj, “Achieving Water Security, Part 3: Striving for “Blue Peace” in the Eastern Himalayas Toward a 
True India-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission,” EarthDesk, Dyson College Institute for Sustainability and the 
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intractable. Without question a single commission with representatives of both countries would 
manage the shared water resources in a more meaningful and collaborative manner.   
Despite the weakness of this record the JRC marked an important forward step in cooperation on 
water issues by Bangladesh and India.  If it has not brought resolution to any critical issue it has 
nonetheless usefully functioned as a forum for raising and addressing important trans-boundary 
water concerns. With just a few adjustments to its structure and overall mandates the JRC could 
become stronger and more effective, at least in dealing with widely recognized problems.  
Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the 
Government of the Republic of India on sharing of the Ganges waters at Farakka and on 
augmenting its flows, 1977 and the two Memorandums of Understanding. As explained in 
chapter three, the 1977 agreement was entered into between Bangladesh and India for an 
immediate, temporary resolution of the Ganges water problems at Farakka. In the wake of 
continued diversions of Ganges water at Farakka, Bangladesh presented a protest claim to the 
United Nations General Assembly.255  The international community pressed the States to find 
an amiable solution at the General Assembly.  The States accepted the guidance and worked 
together, particularly to address the then-urgent dry season situation at Farakka.  The resulting 
document—the 1977 agreement—devised a formula for sharing the water at Farakka between 
the State parties.256 The agreement created a specialized Joint Committee, charged with 
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providing data to the two governments, overseeing the water sharing, and submitting annual 
reports. It also included a modestly detailed process for conflict resolution.  Under the 
agreements, the Joint Committee would examine any difficulty arising out of the agreement’s 
implementation.  Any dispute not resolved by the Committee would go to a panel of an equal 
number of experts nominated by the each government.  If still unresolved, the matter would 
be resolved through diplomacy by the two governments.257 
The agreement was designed to last for five years with the option of renewal by mutual 
agreement. The Joint Committee was tasked, during this period, to undertake a feasibility study 
for a long-term solution to problems within the basin.  The Committee failed to formulate a 
solution by the time the five-year life of the agreement concluded and the agreement lapsed due 
to non-renewal by the parties. 
The two Memorandums of Understanding. After the expiration of the 1977 agreement in 1982 
Bangladesh and India negotiated two interim arrangements, designed as temporary solutions to 
the Farakka problem, in lieu of any long-term understanding. The two memorandums of 
understanding were signed in 1982 and again in 1985 respectively, each for two-year term. The 
expiration of the latter MoU in 1987 was followed by a legal vacuum that extended through 
1996.  During the period, India, unrestricted by any agreement, continued diverting water at 
Farakka during the lean seasons. 
The Treaty between the Government of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh on Sharing of the Ganga/Ganges Waters at Farakka, 12 December, 1996. The 
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Ganges Treaty of 1996 marked a breakthrough in cooperation between India and Bangladesh 
on the question of Ganges water by setting a formula for overall water allocation at Farakka 
that would last for thirty years. Like its 1977 counterpart, this treaty includes a special 
formula for water-sharing during the dry seasons.  
Along with these provisions dealing with water sharing the treaty in its preamble includes 
objectives for making optimum utilization of the water resources in terms of flood 
management, irrigation, river-basin development and hydropower generation for the mutual 
benefit of the peoples of the two countries.  Under the treaty, both parties recognize in 
particular the desirability of augmenting the flows of the Ganges over the long term and they 
commit to formulate an augmentation plan in a spirit of mutual accommodation.  Indeed, the 
goal of long-term augmentation is put forth as equal in importance to water sharing.  The 
treaty, however, does not detail any criteria or guidelines of formulating the desired plan and 
no plan has been produced.  Even loftier are the provisions in the treaty dealing generally with 
all present and future water problems relating to the other 53 rivers shared by the two nations.  
The treaty encourages both nations to reach water-sharing agreements covering these rivers, 
guided by principles of equity, fairness and no harm to either party.  To date no such 
agreements have been concluded.258  
The 1996 Farakka treaty led many Bangladeshis to hope that the water disputes related to 
Farakka had ended.  The treaty, as noted, does establish a water-allocation regime, an 
important and valuable step.  But it fails in any significant way to take account of the geo-
physical features of the Ganges River.  Like its earlier 1977 counterpart, the treaty remains 
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silent on any environmental protection, ecological needs or the practice of sustainable water 
use. 
Framework Agreement on Co-operation for Development between Government of the 
Republic of India and Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2011. A mostly 
symbolic but nonetheless important further step took place with the signing on September 6, 
2011, of a general cooperation agreement between Bangladesh and India for achieving 
common goals and developments. The agreement emphasizes the desirability of promoting 
trans-border cooperation on the management of shared water resources, not just for a fair-
sharing of water flows but also on hydropower development, on ecosystem preservation, and 
in the areas of connectivity, trade and economic cooperation. 
Although written only in broad, generic terms, the 2011 agreement touches on, for the first 
time in any bilateral treaty between Bangladesh and India, environmental or ecosystem 
considerations. In Article 6, for example, the parties agree to develop and to implement 
programs for environmental protection and to respond to the challenges of climate change 
through means of adaptation. In addition, the parties are called on to collaborate on projects of 
mutual interest to preserve common ecosystems and, as far as possible, to coordinate their 
responses in international fora. 
Another notable feature of the agreement is that it goes beyond the strictly confined bilateral 
cooperation, and envisions sub-regional and regional cooperation to enable both countries to 
realize their developmental aspirations, their shared destiny and their common vision of a 
peaceful and prosperous South Asia. This undoubtedly is a stepping stone in the right 
direction, and raises hope for more concrete and comprehensive regional frameworks or pacts 
in near future.  
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Teesta River Agreement: a treaty still awaiting.  In recent years, much of the continuing 
discussion on watercourses between Bangladesh and Indian has had to do with the Teesta 
River and a proposed agreement covering it.  If concluded, the agreement would be the first 
one applicable to a common river other than the Ganges.  As such, the discussions and the 
draft agreement terms are rightly viewed as precedent-setting.  
The Teesta has its source in Sikkim, whence it flows through the state of West Bengal in 
India before entering Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, the river joins the Brahmaputra River at 
Fulchori. The total length of the river is 309 kilometers (192 miles), and it drains a basin of 
12,540 square kilometers (4,840 square miles).  
Sharing of the Teesta water has become a contested battleground between the two countries, 
especially between the Indian state of West Bengal and Bangladesh over dry-season water.  In 
1983, an ad-hoc water sharing agreement allocated to the two contestants 39% and 36% of the 
water flow respectively.259 The possibility of a new treaty surfaced in January 2011.  An 
amicable secretary-level meeting between the countries suggested that a Teesta water sharing 
agreement was imminent, one that would divide the flow equally between the parties while 
setting aside 20% of the water to maintain a minimum flow.  A draft agreement including 
these terms was later agreed to by India’s then-Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh.260  
Despite support for the draft treaty by both the Bangladeshi government and the central 
government of India, the Teesta River agreement stalled, apparently because of concerns 
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raised by the state of West Bengal in India. The state government, which was a coalition 
partner of the central government, refused to approve the treaty, fearing that the loss of 
higher-volume water diversions to the lower riparian areas would cause problems in the 
northern region of the state, especially during drier months.261 Despite this pressure tactic—in 
effect a demand for a higher water share—the draft treaty remains alive while India continues 
its efforts of domestic political consensus-building. Both countries express optimism that they 
can finalize the treaty in the near future.262 
 
Bangladesh – Nepal 
Little needs to be said about the Bangladesh-Nepal bilateral link.  Large parts of the two 
nations are located in the Ganges basin but the States have yet to conclude any water-related 
treaty.  In contrast, Nepal has committed to at least three major water agreements with India, 
which in turn, as explained, has a major water treaty with Bangladesh, all related to the waters 
of either the Ganges or its headwaters. An obvious next step is the development of a 
multilateral water management scheme involving all co-basin States.  The lack of such a 
scheme is one of the current major shortcomings of the transboundary water framework of the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) basin in South Asia. 
Bangladesh on several occasions has expressed interest in tripartite treaty negotiations 
concerning the Ganges but no negotiations have begun.  The only step in that direction, a 
small one, has been the establishment by Bangladesh and Nepal of a Joint Committee of 
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Experts, intended to examine water relations and the respective interests of the parties.263 The 
Committee continues to exist, and its goals remain, but its smooth functioning as a body has 
been hindered due to political turmoil in Nepal since 2009.264 
 
Bangladesh – China 
The same basic story of noncooperation applies to the links between Bangladesh and China.  No 
water treaty is in place nor is any under consideration.  The only formal tie is a Memorandum of 
Understanding on hydrological data sharing during the flood season.  The MoU was jointly 
signed on September 16, 2008, and applies to hydrological information of the Yarlung 
Tsangpo/Brahmaputra River. According to the Memorandum, China will provide Bangladesh 
with hydrological information in flood season from three hydrological stations along the 
mainstream of the Yarlungzangbu River.265  
As explained by the Chinese Ministry of Water Resources on its website,266 the Memorandum 
was signed to further enhance bilateral cooperation on water issues between the countries and to 
help Bangladesh improve its flood-control measures and disaster relief in the Brahmaputra River 
Basin.267  
 
India-Nepal 
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To fill in the picture of regional water arrangements it helps to bring in bilateral agreements 
between regional States other than Bangladesh.   
In its relation to Nepal, India plays the role of downstream nation and has found it necessary to 
seek protections as part of its efforts to develop its upstream rivers, control massive flooding, and 
capitalize on the hydroelectric potential in hilly Nepal.  Bilateral understandings and treaties 
between India and Nepal date back to an Exchange of Letters of 1920 between the British East 
India Company and Nepal regarding the construction of the Sarada Barrage in the Mahakali 
River, and to the 1950 Treaty and the Letters of Exchange of 1950 and of 1965. The Kosi 
Agreement of 1954, the Gandak Agreement of 1959, the Joint Communique of 1992 regarding 
the Tanakpur Barrage, and finally the Mahakali Treaty of 1996 are among the significant 
agreements between the two nations, mostly designed to realize the hydropower potential of the 
rivers covered by them.268 It is important to note that the Mahakali (called Sarada in India), the 
Kosi, and the Gandak are all tributaries of the Ganges River:  they all originate in Tibet, travel 
through the territory of Nepal, empty into the Ganges in India, and then enter Bangladesh.  
Management of the rivers is thus of direct concern to Bangladesh, which is necessarily affected 
by changes to the timing and nature of the water flows. 
The Nepal-India Joint Committee on Water Resources (JCWR) was formed pursuant to the 
decision taken by the prime ministers of both countries in 2000.  It was envisioned as a 
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procedural mechanism to manage overall India-Nepal water relations and to facilitate 
implementation of their various bilateral agreements.269 
 
Agreement between His Majesty's Government of Nepal and the Government of India on the Kosi 
Project, 1954.270 Originating in Tibet, the Kosi is one of the most important tributaries of the 
Ganges, and is Nepal’s largest river. From Nepal, the Kosi flows into India in the state of Bihar.  
Its heavy seasonal flows bring severe and frequent floods into the state. India and Nepal signed 
this treaty to control the flooding, to generate hydro-electricity, and to provide water for 
irrigation. The treaty objectives were to be achieved by constructing a barrage, headworks and 
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other appurtenant works. The agreement established an Indo-Nepal Kosi Project Commission to 
implement the objectives and to resolve any disputes arising between the parties. The Kosi 
Barrage, also named the Bhimnagar Barrage, was built between 1959 and 1963 and straddles the 
Indo-Nepal border. 
This water-management facility was located within the Nepalese territory but was financed 
entirely by India, which retains operating control. In exchange for the use of its land, Nepal 
receives rental payments and a share of the hydroelectricity. The treaty includes various 
provisions that made the project possible, provisions (i) authorizing investigations and field 
surveys into Nepal’s territory by India; (ii) authorizing the construction and other uses of lands in 
Nepal; (iii) leasing particular project areas to India for a period of 199 years; (iv) requiring 
payment of royalties and compensation by India; and (v) requiring the development of 
communication systems by India in the project area.  
The agreement, within few years of its conclusion, appeared to have restricted Nepal's own use 
of waters for irrigation and other purposes, requiring a treaty revision on 19 December 1966 to 
re-establish Nepal's rights. The revised provision of the treaty relating to water rights guarantees 
Nepal’s right to withdraw water from the Kosi River, from the Sun-Kosi River, and from other 
tributaries of the Kosi River within the Kosi basin as may be required for irrigation and any other 
purpose.271 On its side India held the right to regulate all the balance of water supplies available 
from time to time in the Kosi River at the barrage site and to generate hydropower.272 
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As noted, one of the main rationales motivating the Kosi agreement and the resulting project was 
to control downstream flooding. The Kosi experience, however, soon demonstrated the difficulty 
of achieving that goal given fluctuating water flows and the river’s natural silt load.  A breach of 
the embankment along the Kosi River in 2008 inundated lands with flood waters and displaced 
millions of people, both in Nepal and southward along the Ganges River within India.273 The 
embankment breach occurred in large part because of sediment build up in the river over fifty 
years, which elevated the water flows in unnatural ways.  Levees and other containment 
structures were not increased in height and strength to deal with the every-higher river.274 Unless 
the river can regain the power to move silt further downstream the problem will only worsen, 
forcing efforts either to raise levees higher or to find ways to divert floodwaters into designated, 
controlled areas. 
The Kosi agreement does not address environmental concerns of the Kosi River; i.e. sediment 
loads and their transportation downstream, maintenance of a minimum flow, protection of 
aquatic species and other riverine ecosystems, and related adverse ecological effects. 
The Sapta Kosi High Dam Project. The governments of India and Nepal have further agreed to 
conduct joint investigations and relevant studies for the preparation of a Detailed Project Report 
(DPR) on the Sapta Koshi High Dam Multipurpose Project and the Sun Kosi Storage-cum-
Diversion Scheme to meet the objectives common to both countries; i.e. development of 
hydropower, irrigation, flood control and navigation. The Sapta Kosi dam is envisaged as an 
883-foot high, concrete or rock-filled dam, with an underground powerhouse, producing 3,000 
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MW at 50% load factor. Another barrage is planned for the Sapta Kosi about 5 miles 
downstream of the Sapta Kosi High Dam to re-regulate the diverted water.275 
After an exchange of Letters of Understanding between the two governments in June 2004, a 
Joint Project Office (JPO) was set up in August, 2004 to undertake detailed field investigations 
for preparation of a Detailed Project Report (DPR) on the Sapta Kosi High Dam Project at 
Barakshetra, in Nepal.276 The field investigations of the JPO will include within their scope of 
study the field works of the Sun Kosi diversion scheme (which entailed constructing a dam at 
Kurule so that the Sun Kosi water could be diverted to the Kamla basin through a tunnel). In the 
Kamla basin, a dam coupled with a barrage is also envisaged, and included within the study 
efforts of the JPO.277 The project is still in the early pre-construction phase, with field 
investigations delayed by the political climate in Nepal.278 
Agreement between His Majesty's Government of Nepal and the Government of India on the 
Gandak Irrigation and Power Project, 1959.279  The Gandak is another tributary of the Ganges 
River that originates in Tibet, flows through central Nepal, and finally enters India through the 
state of Uttar Pradesh where it joins the Ganges. Like the Kosi agreement, this agreement also 
envisioned irrigation and power generation made possible by a new barrage, canal-head 
regulators, and other appurtenant works. This project will also lie entirely within Nepal and is 
also being financed by India. Nepal is to receive benefits chiefly by taking a share in the hydro-
electricity. Like its Kosi counterpart, this agreement stipulates terms regarding payment of 
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compensation to Nepal for incidental uses of its lands and other properties and for acquisitions 
while doing surveys and other investigations.  It also addresses the construction, operation and 
management of the project by India. 
This agreement affirmed Nepal’s rights to withdraw water for irrigation or any other purpose 
from time to time, but only to the extent that such withdrawals would not prejudicially affect the 
water requirements of the project. This qualification on water use had the effort of curtailing 
Nepal’s right to use the Gandak’s water within its territory, essentially for trans-valley uses in the 
months of February to April. In the wake of ensuring controversies in Nepal over the limitation, 
adjustments were made allowing Nepal to withdraw from the river or its tributaries, for irrigation 
or any other purpose, such supplies of water as may be required from time to time in the Valley. 
As for the trans-Valley uses of Gandak waters, it was contemplated that separate agreements 
would be entered into between Nepal and India covering them during the months of February to 
April only.280 
Certainly, the revised agreement was an improvement over the previous one, although the trans-
valley uses of Gandak water for the months of February to April were still restricted. This has 
prompted Nepal to seek further revisions dropping the clause restricting such use inside Nepal – 
a claim yet to be addressed.281 
Treaty between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and The Government of India Concerning 
the Integrated Development of the Mahakali Barrage Including Sarada Barrage, Tanakpur 
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Barrage and Pancheshwar Project, 1996. The most recent and a more comprehensive treaty 
between Nepal and India has been the Mahakali treaty of 1996 governing the Mahakali River, 
the principal tributary of the Ganges. The cornerstone of the Mahakali treaty is the 
implementation of the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project. At the same time, the treaty also 
addresses power allocation from two other existing barrages: the Sarada barrage and the 
Tanakpur barrage.  
A noteworthy aspect of this treaty is that the barrages it covers, the Sarada and the Tanakpur, 
were completed in 1920 and 1992 respectively, long before the treaty. The Mahakali Treaty in 
effect absorbed the management regime established by the 1920 Sarada Agreement, the 1991 
Memorandum of Understanding, and the 1992 Joint Communiqué for Tanakpur Barrage.282 The 
only substantive addition to existing arrangements was a provision in the treaty endorsing 
construction of the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project.283 Hence, from a structural viewpoint, the 
Mahakali Treaty combines three distinct treaties related to the water sharing of the Mahakali 
River (the Sarada Agreement, the Tanakpur Memorandum of Understanding and the 
Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project), and extends the legal duration of the entire framework for 
another 75 years from its entry into force.284 
As stipulated, the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project would be constructed on a stretch of the 
Mahakali River where it forms the boundary between Nepal and India. The treaty endorses the 
equal right of the countries to use the Mahakali waters, and requires implementation of the 
Project in accordance with the Detailed Project Report (DPR) jointly prepared by them. It gives 
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each country an equal share in the energy production.285 The project remains under construction. 
Required field investigations for the project were completed by a Joint Project Office (JPO) in 
2002.  The decision was made at a 2008 meeting of the Joint Committee on Water Resources 
(JCWR) to set up the Pancheshwar Development Authority (PDA) as soon as feasible for the 
development, execution and operation of the project.286 
The Mahakali treaty is the only treaty involving the GBM river basin to include specific 
reference to ecological protection and maintenance of minimum flows. Article 1(2) of the treaty 
requires maintenance of a minimum water flow downstream of the Sarada Barrage in the 
Mahakali River to sustain and preserve the river ecosystem. In order to maintain the flow and 
level of the waters of the Mahakali River, Article 7 further requires each party not to use, 
obstruct, or divert the waters of the Mahakali River in ways adversely affecting its natural flow 
and level except by an agreement between the Parties. However, this does not preclude the use of 
the waters of the Mahakali River by the local communities living along both sides of the 
Mahakali River, not exceeding five percent of the average annual flow at Pancheshwar.  
In order to monitor and implement its provisions, the treaty establishes a Mahakali River 
Commission, and proclaims that the commission shall be guided by the principles of equality, 
mutual benefit, and no harm to either party. One of the stated functions of the commission is to 
make recommendations to the parties for conservation and utilization of the Mahakali River.  
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The Treaty discourages any unilateral development of the river and approves the principles of 
cooperation, consultation and notification. It states that any project to be developed on the 
Mahakali River, where it is a boundary river, should be designed and implemented by an 
agreement between the parties based on the principles established by this treaty. It, therefore, 
makes it an obligation for either Party to reach an agreement before commencing any project on 
the Mahakali River.  
In addition to these various projects and agreements other multipurpose projects are in the works, 
principally the Kamla and Bagmati multipurpose projects and the Karnali multipurpose project. 
The Joint Project Office (JPO) has been entrusted to undertake the feasibility study of Kamla 
Dam and a preliminary study of the Bagmati Dam Project.287 
 
India – China 
 
Like Nepal, China lies upstream of India but China’s willingness to cooperate on watercourse 
issues has been much less.  The major rivers originating in China and then entering into India are 
the Brahmaputra in the North-East and the Indus & Sutlej in the Northern part of the country.288 
Both countries have independently developed ambitious plans to engineer the Brahmaputra (or 
the Yarlung Tsangpo, as it is named in China). Despite the planning—and the fact that the plans 
are incompatible—the nations have no watercourse agreements aside from a various 
Memorandums of Understanding on data sharing. 
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The first two Memorandums of Understanding between India and China address the sharing of 
hydrological data on the Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo) River and the Sutlej (Langquin 
Zangbu) River respectively. The first Memorandum, crafted in 2002, called upon China to 
provide to India, during the term of the Memorandum, flood season hydrological information on 
the Yarlung Tsangpo//Brahmaputra River.  The information included water-level, discharge, and 
rainfall data from three river locations from June 1 to October 15 through 2007. The data were 
used by the Central Water Commission to formulate flood forecasts.289 A follow-up 
Memorandum of Understanding with essential the same terms was signed on June 5, 2008, 
covering a term of five years, and further renewed for another five years on May 20, 2013.290  
Another five-year flood-forecasting Memorandum of Understanding was signed in April 2005 
covering the Sutlej (Langquin Zangbu) River.  It was replaced upon its expiration in 2010 by a 
new five-year MoU.291 
The latest development in India-China’s water relation has been a separate and independent 
“Memorandum of Understanding on Strengthening Cooperation on Trans-Border Rivers” signed 
on October 23, 2013. This MoU does not specifically deal with any particular shared-water issue, 
but expands the types of hydrological information gathered at the three hydrological stations and 
requires disclosure to start earlier, on May 15 of each year instead of June 1 starting in 2014.292 
At the same time, the MoU entitles each party to “exchange views on other issues of mutual 
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interest.”293 On the institutional level, India and China have set up a Joint Expert Level 
Mechanism to discuss interaction and cooperation on provisions of flood season hydrological 
data, emergency management and other issues regarding trans-border rivers.294  
These various MoUs, covering merely the exchange of data, hardly begin to address the 
transboundary water issues between India and China, which is to say they lack any meaningful 
agreements on how the rivers can be used and altered and make no provision for joint use.  China 
has tended to classify data and information relating to its various water-development projects and 
plans, leaving India and other affected nations largely in the dark about them.  The latest MoU 
with India on “strengthening cooperation on trans-boundary rivers” may reflect a future 
willingness to become more cooperative as well as recognition of looming water tensions.  But 
China for the most part remains committed to a go-it-alone approach, possible because of its 
upstream location and its overall size.  The consequences of that stance, should it continue, will 
be significant for all downstream nations.  
Features and Challenges of South Asian Water Management 
A study titled “The Himalayan Challenge” by the Strategic Foresight Group (SFG), Mumbai, 
India predicts that, in next 20 years, the four countries in the Himalayan sub-region (India, 
Nepal, China and Bangladesh) will face the depletion of almost 275 billion cubic meters of 
annual renewable water.295 For comparison, this is more than the total amount of water 
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available in Nepal at present.296 As things stand today, the four countries in the GBM basin 
lack anything close to the collaborative agreements or mechanisms needed to deal adequately 
with their transboundary waters. India, as explained, has bilateral agreements with both 
Bangladesh and Nepal separately, but not with China. Similarly, Bangladesh has agreements 
only with India, not with Nepal or China, except for flood forecasting MoUs with the later.  
The lack of an adequate overall framework on water management, or even a joint forum for 
discussion, is a very significant deficiency.  It presents the grave possibility that the region—
the most populous on earth—will become the scene of sharply conflicting national desires and 
policies, and perhaps soon.  The predicament is worsened by the lack of any universally 
accepted global platform to resolve such cross-border water conflicts. The UN convention on 
non-navigational uses of international water courses from 1997, which took effect in 2014 
when the minimum number of signatories was reached, does provides a mechanism to address 
if not resolve trans-border waters.  But none of the GBM basin States are yet parties to it and 
China in particular disputes the underlying premise that international watercourses are 
common resources calling for shared governance.  (The 1997 convention and other 
international agreements are taken up in chapter five.)  
Absence of multilateral or basin-wide approach.  It is notable how South Asia, featuring one of 
the most important river basin systems on earth, has failed to move beyond bilateralism as the 
dominant approach for addressing watercourse issues even as the GBM basin includes more than 
two nations. Except for the Indus River Treaty, which does include a third party, all water-related 
agreements so far reached are bilateral. Bilateralism has traditionally been the official policy of 
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India.  China’s very minimal cooperation has also taken this form.  Only Bangladesh and, to a 
lesser extent, Nepal have showed interest in tripartite or regional arrangements.  
India’s emphasis on bilateralism is based on its assessment that multilateral negotiations are less 
focused, more complex, lengthier and thus difficult to reach.297 Its stance might also reflect a fear 
that smaller countries could join hands and make common cause against the nation.298 India’s 
preference for bilateralism is clear, for instance, in its insistence on distinct institutional forums 
for discussing issues.  The Joint River Commission (JRC), as discussed, serves as the common 
forum between Bangladesh and India, while the Joint Committee on Water Resources (JCWR) 
serves the same role for discussions between Nepal and India.  India has claimed that neither 
commission has the jurisdiction to allow involvement in its affairs by a third nation, thus 
undercutting the power of either to promote larger-scale assessments and discussion.  
Bangladesh, in contrast, has repeatedly expressed a desire to include Nepal within the Ganges 
framework.  Its stance is apparently grounded in three rationales. First, inclusion of Nepal would 
facilitate augmentation of the Ganges water (a goal of Bangladesh and also (ostensibly) of India) 
by opening the option of constructing storage dams along the Ganges headwaters in Nepal to 
hold water for dry-season release. Secondly, Nepal could side with Bangladesh on key 
negotiating issues and thereby better counterbalance India’s dominant strength.  Finally, a three-
party arrangement could improve regional stability through the sharing of electricity generated 
by water projects. India and Nepal have reached agreement, as seen, on the management of the 
Sapta Kosi barrage, expected to produce 3500 MW energy, but their discussions have remained 
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bilateral.  Bangladesh’s proposal that it become involved in such projects, perhaps sharing in the 
energy generated, has to date found little support.299  
As India contends, bilateralism does simplify negotiations and thus make agreements more likely 
and timely.  However, it is often preferred also as a means to undercut the formation of coalitions 
and otherwise to preserve a nation’s bargaining power.300 The distinct downside is that 
bilateralism largely frustrates basin-wide management, breeding insecurity and limiting the 
mutual benefits that regional cooperation could achieve.  Already the lack of shared management 
has resulted in different and sometimes incompatible national water policies and priorities, 
thereby intensifying water problems. Moreover, what the countries often ignore is that 
independent negotiations with neighboring States in a single basin can increase transaction costs 
and limit the range of water-management options.   
 
Regional watercourse cooperation seems most likely to generate sizeable benefits if it covered 
the full range of relevant watercourse issues and management options. For instance, a 
collaborative pact could allow Nepal to supply hydroelectric power to India and Bangladesh. 
India could supply Nepal with navigation and transit rights, along with construction financing 
and engineering expertise, while promising clear minimum flows and water-storage benefits to 
Bangladesh.  Bangladesh in turn could provide navigation and transit rights to both Nepal and 
India (to its eastern states).301 But optimizing these resources for the common good of the region 
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would require a multilateral approach and a regionally constituted vision of water resources 
development.  It would also require the involvement of China, which, as noted, as so far shown 
little interest in any cooperation. 
Inequalities in State power and their effects.  Cooperation in the GBM basin has been 
significantly strained by the unequal power relationships. India and China are viewed as much 
stronger parties in terms of power and strategic locations compared to the other co-basin States – 
Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan. China has exercised its power by largely refusing offers to 
cooperate.  India’s comparatively strong position is seen in its insistence on bilateral agreements, 
its slow pace of working with Bangladesh, and its practice of charging ahead as it pleases when 
agreements expire.302  The twin dangers of big-country insensitivity and small-country anxiety 
are prevalent in South Asia and tend to obstruct prudent outcomes.303 On the small-country side, 
the situation prompts weaker nations to adopt tough stances during negotiations for fear of being 
considered weak and to complain at later stages that negotiations have been unfair due to power 
imbalances.  It similarly worsens the situation when difficulties or differences emerge in the 
course of operation of a treaty or agreement.304 
During the last few decades, India’s relations with its smaller neighbors have improved 
significantly, but the longstanding distrust of the “big brother” has not disappeared, for either 
Bangladesh or Nepal.  This lingering distrust fuels suspicion and mistrust, which in turn 
dwindles opportunities for cooperation. It also leads parties, after treaties or memorandums of 
understanding are signed, to worry about implementation and to signal doubts that other 
signatories will perform fully and in good faith.  Such doubts were clearly evident during the dry 
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season immediately following the signing of the 1996 Ganges treaty, when the Ganges water-
level dropped sharply at the Farakka and left little flowing into Bangladesh.   
In such complex situations, or even in cases involving unequal parties, a third-party intervention 
can often prove useful. Many longstanding conflicts around the globe have either been settled or 
reduced in magnitude because of skillful third-party mediation.305 However, such a third-party 
involvement has always been rebuffed in South Asia with one exception; i.e. the Indus Waters 
treaty with Pakistan (where the World Bank plays an important role). In the Indo-Nepal 
negotiations on shared rivers, proposals to involve a third party were not brought forward by 
either party and the agreements entered into by these two nations were in fact negotiated prior to 
the Indus Treaty itself.  
Bangladesh has long wanted to internationalize the problems relating to Ganges water, and it 
attempted to involve the United Nations in the negotiation process. Its effort failed partly 
because of resistance from India, which denied the need for third-party involvement on the 
Ganges and insisted that the matter be left for the parties themselves to resolve.306   
As for India and China, the strength wielded by each has so far led mostly to stalemate on the 
Brahmaputra/Yarlung Psangpo River.  China, though, has the natural advantage of controlling 
the upstream reaches of the river system and has far less to lose from noncooperation than does 
any other basin State.  The same can be said of India in its dealings with Bangladesh:  Its 
upstream location gives it much less incentive to cooperate and to respect the ecological realities 
and needs of Bangladesh.   
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What must be kept clear, perhaps above all, is that negotiating parties in water disputes are rarely 
if ever on an even playing field. The relative power of the bargaining States is important.  Just as 
important if not more so is a State’s location upstream or downstream.  Because of these 
imbalances, which can at times be extreme (as in the Bangladesh-China relationship), it is far 
from even-handed to insist that States work out their differences simply through diplomatic 
negotiation.  Weaker and downstream States may lack anything like the power they would need 
to insist that stronger and upstream States use a watercourse equitably and in ways that sustain 
the ecological health of the watercourse downstream. To submit a dispute to negotiation by 
highly unequal parties is to give preference to the stronger one.  
 Institutional arrangements and dispute resolution: Role of the commissions. India has different 
commissions with its neighbors to deal with inter-State water problems. The Joint River 
Commission operates between Bangladesh and India to deal with Ganges water dispute. Among 
the other shared commissions in the region are the Permanent Indus Commission, established 
between India and Pakistan; the Mahakali and the Gandak Commissions; and the Kosi 
Committee established between India and Nepal. These institutional forums have been vested 
with various administrative, legislative and/or judicial responsibilities.  
In terms of effectiveness, the Permanent Indus Commission has so far been more effective than 
the other river commissions, especially the JRC with Bangladesh. This can be attributed mainly 
to two reasons.  The Indus Commission came into being under a treaty that actually settled a 
water dispute, thereby freeing the commission to devote its time and resources effective 
monitoring of treaty performances; the JRC, on the other hand, continues to wrestle with and be 
142 
 
involved in a bitter, unresolved inter-country dispute.307 Also, the JRC has a vastly wider and 
more difficult task to perform than other commissions given the number of rivers (54) within its 
jurisdiction and charge.  Indeed, since the treaty signing in 1996 the JRC has yet to agree upon 
the treaty’s main focus – devising a formula to augment the Ganges flow during dry seasons. 
The success of any treaty depends to a considerable extent on the effectiveness of the institution 
entrusted with implementation of its arrangements.  That effectiveness in turn is usually 
enhanced by the presence of a permanent entity that functions as a secretariat. None of the 
various commissions in South Asia take this form.308 
Dispute Resolution.  Alongside legislative functions to formulate plans and policies, the Joint 
Committee under the Ganges treaty in 1996 has been provided with the judicial task of resolving 
disputes between the parties. The Joint Committee is entrusted with examining any difficulty 
arising out of the treaty implementation or the operation of the Farakka Barrage.309  In case of 
failure by the committee to resolve any difference or dispute, such difference or dispute would be 
referred for resolution to the Indo-Bangladesh Joint River Commission. When the Joint River 
Commission fails to achieve a resolution the treaty refers the matter to the two governments 
“which shall meet urgently at the appropriate level to resolve it by mutual discussion.”310  As 
such, the treaty establishes a political means, not arbitration, as the method for resolving treaty-
related disagreements.311 This mechanism seems quite different from the Mahakali treaty of 1996 
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between India and Nepal. The dispute resolution mechanism in the Mahakali treaty is relatively 
elaborate and advanced, calling for an independent arbitration in the final stage of a dispute 
rather than referring it to the governments themselves. The lack of an arbitration or independent 
tribunal between Bangladesh and India was especially felt in the wake of tensions during the first 
year of the Ganges treaty. 
Preeminent absence of ecological concerns in the South Asian agreements. High among the 
deficiencies of the various current bilateral agreements in the GBM basin is the near total 
inattentiveness to ecological concerns.  Only the Mahakali treaty between India and Nepal 
includes provisions for protecting a minimum flow and even that agreement refers only to water 
quantity. The Ganges treaty, as seen, is basically a water-sharing treaty between Bangladesh and 
India with no reference to ecological or environmental concerns. The earlier agreement in 1977 
and the two ensuing memorandums between these two countries similarly remained silent on 
environmental issues.  
All of the water treaties in the GBM basin have been entered into during the latter half of the 
twentieth century. Even the most recent treaties, however, have paid no real attention to the 
recent, significant developments in international law on the environment and on the equitable 
and sustainable uses of watercourses.312 None but the Mahakali treaty requires the maintenance 
of minimum flows for ecological purposes.  Not one shows concern for water temperature, 
sediment load transport, or the plight of aquatic species.  
Changes in the policies and interpretation of international principles depending on the location 
of countries; i.e. upper riparian or lower riparian. Another notable feature of the GBM-basin 
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water governance is the variation in the interpretation of international water-law principles 
depending on whether the interpreting country is an upper riparian or a lower riparian and, 
similarly, in the relative willingness of States to commit to overarching principles.  As for the 
later, an influential precedent has been the Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan 
(although operates beyond the GBM basin).  That treaty expressly denies that anything in it shall 
serve as a general principle of law or any type precedent for later arrangements.313 A similar 
provision was included in the preamble of 1977 agreement between India and Bangladesh, and 
again in the preamble of 1996 agreement between these two nations. A provision of this type, 
barring the establishment of any principles, leaves the parties free to revert to other stances, even 
to noncooperation, when other problems arise.  Conspicuously, the agreements between India 
and Nepal contain no similar provision against such precedential force.  India as a downstream 
State is interested in setting precedents of sharing and cooperation; India as an upstream State it 
not.314   
Augmentation process. As noted, one of the proposed improvements for managing waters at 
Farakka has been a scheme to augment the flow of the Ganges during drier months. The 1977 
agreement and later ones through 1996 have all endorsed the ideas. The 1977 agreement and the 
1982 MOU entrusted the Joint River Commission with the responsibility of carrying out 
investigations and studying schemes for augmentation and set timetables for the work.315 When 
little got done the 1985 MOU transferred the duties to a Joint Committee of Experts established 
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by the MOU. That committee thus far has similarly failed to agree on any workable augmenting 
scheme as the two States have pushed widely different plans.  
India's augmentation proposal consists of a plan to construct a link canal to connect the 
Brahmaputra River with the Ganges River at a point above the Farakka Barrage. The link canal, 
according to India, would help increase the flow of the Ganges River during the dry season by 
diverting water to the Ganges River from the Brahmaputra River.316 Bangladesh, fearful of the 
environmental, social, political, and economic consequences of India’s proposal, has rejected it. 
Bangladesh was also concerned that the link canal might further exacerbate the flood situation in 
the country during the monsoon season.317 Bangladesh has proposed instead the construction of 
storage reservoirs at the upper reaches of the Ganges in both India and Nepal to store water 
during the monsoon season for release during the dry season. It is important to note that India's 
proposal centered on using the Brahmaputra River to resolve the problems of the Ganges, 
whereas Bangladesh's proposal aimed at using the Ganges River itself to solve its erratic water 
flows. As argued by Bangladesh, water is best transferred over time; while according to India, it 
is best transferred over space.318 India, however, rejected Bangladesh’s augmentation proposal 
because it wanted to reserve the upstream waters of the Ganges River for its future needs. 
Moreover, India preferred a bilateral approach and did not want to regionalize the issue by 
involving another riparian, in this case Nepal.319   
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Both countries, therefore, have consistently recognized the need for a long-term solution but they 
remain unable to find a suitable means. The final Ganges treaty in 1996 once again recognizes 
the need for bilateral cooperation in “finding a solution to the long-term problem of augmenting 
the flows of the Ganga/Ganges during the dry season.”320 But the goal has seemingly become 
more abstract and even more distant.  Unlike the previous agreements, it takes a step back by 
including no terms or timetables for a joint study. Neither does the treaty create or entrust any 
committee with the responsibility of carrying out such a study 
Internal Domestic Politics. The domestic politics within the nations in this region have played 
dominating roles in determining inter-State relations, including their water relations. Some even 
argue that the national leaders like to prolong such disputes for internal political purposes or 
sometimes to strengthen bargaining positions while dealing with other concerns or issues.321 
India, for example, had a relatively better relation with Bangladesh upon its independence from 
Pakistan. That relationship soon deteriorated because of internal political changes in Bangladesh 
in 1974.  Relations turned upward again in 1977 with the coming of a new government in 
India.322  Improved relations smoothed the way for the Ganges Water agreement in 1977. Upon 
its expiration, and the expiration of the two ensuing MoUs, the political climate was such that 
further agreement was elusive. Only with the coming of new governments in both States was it 
possible to conclude the Ganges Water Treaty of 1996 with its thirty-year term. Thus, political 
calculations and power dynamics within the countries have impacted water relations on a number 
of occasions.  
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What this record shows is that water conflicts can and do become more difficult to resolve 
through purely diplomatic means when domestic politics get in the way.  It is not always the case 
of conflicts over water worsening political relationships; to the contrary, difficult political 
relationships can easily render water disputes more intractable.323  Diplomatic means of dispute 
resolution, in short, are weakened and delayed by political instability.   This reality is usefully 
linked to the conclusion reached above, about the distorting effects on negotiated water 
arrangements of overall imbalances in State power and in the relative location of States upstream 
and downstream.  When these major factors are combined, they cast serious doubt on the 
likelihood that State diplomacy will yield equitable, ecologically sound plans of water 
management.  Some of these problems might be lessened when all States within a basin negotiate 
together, just as the managements options expand.  But new problems arise in multi-party 
diplomatic discussions and the tendency exists for negotiations to skip over the most contentious 
points.   
Diplomatic negotiations, in short, are gravely limited as methods of addressing watercourse 
issues, even as they are, in some settings, the only available option.  Far better in many ways is 
rule-setting that occurs at the international level, through processes that weaken if not eliminate 
imbalances in States’ negotiating power and that are not dragged down by political turmoil 
within particular States.  It is for this reason that pressures have risen for the increased use of 
international law and lawmaking.  In the view of many it is the only means to promote 
ecologically healthy river-management regimes that are fair to all States, the weakest included. 
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PART III: International Watercourse Law 
Chapter 5: The Road to the 1997 UN Watercourse Convention 
 
The various bilateral agreements considered in the last chapter emerged against the backdrop of a 
body of law governing international watercourses set at the global level.  This Part looks 
critically at that global-level law, paying special attention to the recent developments—mostly 
beginning in 1992—that are of greatest continuing importance.  This chapter begins that inquiry 
by offering an historical account of the guiding principles and agreements on transboundary 
water uses up to and including the 1997 UN Watercourse Convention.  The next chapter takes 
the story beyond that date, looking most closely at the Berlin Rules of 2004, intended by drafters 
as both a full expression of existing law and a prescription for future legal change. As explained 
in the next chapter, the Berlin Rules largely address longstanding problems and conflicts by 
expanding the number and nature of distinct principles that would guide the management of 
watercourses and their uses.  In doing so, however, the Rules fail to clarify how the many 
principles might fit together, a deficiency that already exists and that becomes more acute in the 
scheme incorporated in the Rules.   
In its early history, the international law of watercourses largely addressed issues of navigation, 
particularly matters of free passage and toll collection.  In time these topics were resolved so that 
the law today on them is reasonably clear.  Only in the twentieth century did attention turn to 
water allocation; that is, to dividing water flows quantitatively among riparian States. How much 
water could one State take given the competing demands of other nations? The first major step in 
addressing that question in a generalized way—apart from the particular divisions of water flows 
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undertaken in bilateral agreements—came in 1966 in the form of Rules prepared by the 
International Law Association, known as the Helsinki Rules.  These Rules, as explained below, 
set forth a framework centered on the right of each State to claim a “reasonable and equitable 
share” of uses of a watercourse subject to obligations to avoid causing pollution that substantially 
injures another State.  It gave particular preference to existing uses when they conflicted with 
later uses, thus emphasizing priority in time.  By slow steps these Rules formed the basis in 1997 
of a UN Convention on non-navigable uses of waterways, which stands today as the single most 
important document in international water law. This convention similarly declared the right of 
States to make reasonable and equitable use of a watercourse, but it juxtaposed that principle 
with a second one, that States avoid causing substantial harm.  The UN Convention incorporated 
environmental concerns at greater length but, as discussed below, failed to reconcile the 
environmental provisions with the principles of equitable utilization and harm-avoidance.  It also 
did not meaningfully address the challenges of dams and reservoirs—one of the most significant 
issues of the time. The UN Convention added various new ideas and principles into the mix, 
including the idea that watercourse uses be reasonable and that they be consistent with 
sustainable development, and it largely pushed aside the preference for existing uses contained in 
the Helsinki Rules.  The result of these various elements was a document rich with normative 
ideas, so much so, however, that States with widely differing desires could typically point to one 
or more provisions that seemed to legitimate the practices that furthered their particular interests.  
The document was confusing also on whether it was aimed chiefly at stimulating bilateral and 
regional agreements or whether it was aimed instead at setting standards at the international 
level.   
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Meanwhile, work progressed on dealing with the particular issues of watercourse pollution, a 
move that produced, most prominently, a 1992 Convention of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (ECE), originally meant for signature by European States and recently 
opened for signature by all States.324  This convention committed States to the national adoption 
of water pollution laws and programs.  It, too, however, failed to address the challenges of dams 
and reservoirs, and did not explain with any clarity how its environmental provisions fit together 
with the equitable utilization principle or with the principle of sustainable development. 
This chapter reviews this historical trajectory, beginning with several early international 
instruments that drew attention to the non-navigational uses of international waterways prior to 
the 1966 Helsinki Rules. It then analyzes those Rules and the two subsequent international water 
law instruments, the 1992 ECE Convention on pollution and waterway degradation and the 1997 
UN Watercourse Convention.  By way of preface the chapter lays out the principal background 
theories of sovereign control over water resources along with the normative idea, most developed 
in U.S. water law, that rights to use waterways should be allocated based on priority of 
appropriation, regardless of the location of the use and its comparative social value.   
 
The Principal Theories in International Water Law 
 
Historically, different States have resorted to different positions on the foundational question of 
State power over watercourses that cross national borders.  The competing views, variously 
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supported over time, are commonly divided into four categories that reflect widely differing 
views of sovereign power:  absolute territorial sovereignty; absolute territorial integrity; limited 
territorial sovereignty; and community of interests.  Existing alongside them—although not 
really part of international law—is the doctrine of prior appropriation, best known from its 
widespread application in western States of the United States. This doctrine is usefully added to 
the consideration because it offers an alternative to the four principal international theories, an 
alternative that puts far greater stress than any of the four theories on protecting existing water 
uses at the expense of new ones. 
Absolute territorial sovereignty. Absolute territorial sovereignty is a legal stance that recognizes 
the power of a State to control and use waterways within its boundaries as it sees fit, without 
concern for effects on other States.  Under it, a State using water has no legal responsibility for 
harm caused to a downstream State.  The position is considered extreme in that it maximizes the 
power of a State to act as it likes while minimizing its corresponding power to complain about 
the actions of other States.  Predictably, this view has appealed over time to strong upstream 
States, those that, for physical reasons, need not worry about diversions and pollution occurring 
upstream of them.   
The idea of absolute territorial sovereignty is often associated with the “Harmon Doctrine,” a 
legal stance named after an opinion delivered in the late nineteenth century (1895) by a U.S. 
Attorney General in a dispute between the U.S. and Mexico concerning the Rio Grande. The 
controversy stemmed from diversions of the Rio Grande water by the farmers and ranchers in 
Colorado and New Mexico in the U.S. that sharply reduced the water flowing into Mexico.  In 
his opinion on the conflict, Attorney General Judson Harmon concluded that “the rules, 
principles and precedents of international law impose no liability or obligation upon the United 
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States” and that any acceptance of the claim made by the Mexican farmers would be “entirely 
inconsistent with the sovereignty of the United States over its national domain.”325 Harmon 
grounded his stance in part on the alleged absolute sovereignty of every nation, as against all 
others, to control and use waters within its own territory,326 a principle he found embedded in 
international law.  The legal stance benefitted the United States under the circumstances, given 
its upstream location.  It has held similar appeal over the decades to other States similarly 
located.327 
While there was some support at the time in favor of the Harmon doctrine, and as such for the 
theory of absolute territorial sovereignty, the principle was already then losing traction.  Within a 
half century it had declined significantly in influence as nations and observers paid more 
attention to non-navigational uses of watercourses.328 Even as support declined, however, the 
theory continued to appear in occasional diplomatic exchanges and in disputes between and 
among co-riparians, though it was rarely reflected in the actual resolutions of those 
controversies.329 The authority of the doctrine was weakened in particular by the fact that the 
very dispute that gave rise to its common name was not resolved based on it.  In the end the U.S. 
entered into a treaty with Mexico apportioning the waters of the river into national shares.330 
Absolute territorial integrity. In stark contrast to the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty 
is the principle of absolute territorial integrity.  Under it, each State enjoys the right to an 
uninterrupted flow of water in international watercourses; each State has a legal right, that is, to 
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the natural integrity of a watercourse within its territory, free of significant alterations by any 
other State.   This too is an extreme position—the flip side of absolute sovereignty—in that it 
maximizes the power of a State to complain about harms it suffers while necessarily reducing the 
powers of States to use waters intensively, at least when their actions harm other States. This 
principle is generally associated with downstream States that seek to challenge interferences with 
natural flows by upstream States.  Strictly applied the principle would severely limit the ability 
of an upstream State to develop the waters of a transboundary river should it cause any harm to a 
downstream State.331  A State at the mouth of a river would be much less constrained, given the 
lack of any further downstream State, but some river alterations do have upstream consequences 
and thus could be challenged based on this doctrine.  (Upstream consequences arise when 
migrating fish are disrupted; perhaps more importantly, they can arise when downstream 
diversions lead to salt water intrusions the spread upstream.) In general, this principle protects 
rivers as ecological wholes and for this reason appeals to environmental interests.  
This principle, like the principle of absolute sovereignty, falls short of balancing the interests 
between upstream and downstream nations.  One complaint is that the principle unfairly hampers 
upstream States that develop their water resources more slowly than their downstream neighbors.  
Taken literally it could effectively prohibit any development in such upstream States that may 
adversely affect the water flow to a downstream State.332 This would prohibit not only 
diminutions in water quantity or quality but also dams and other sorts of river engineering that 
alter the timing of water flows (often by moderating natural seasonal flow variations).333 Because 
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of this imbalance and its tendency to hamper development the principle of absolute territorial 
integrity has not enjoyed broad international support.  Even the few States that have relied upon 
the principle in isolated controversies have not seemed to resort to in an absolute manner.334 
Limited territorial sovereignty.  The first two principles are in essence factually myopic and 
legally anarchic, as the prominent legal scholar Stephen McCaffrey has put it.335 They look at 
water use from an extreme, rights-based approach with little concern for corresponding duties 
and other co-riparians’ rights.  Appropriately, more moderate, balanced views gained ground 
during the twentieth century.  Among them was the principle of limited territorial sovereignty, a 
stance soon widely embraced as States negotiated over watercourse conflicts. According to this 
legal principle, the sovereignty of a State over its territory is qualified by an obligation to avoid 
using the territory in a way that causes significant harm to another State.336 Put otherwise, States 
sharing an international watercourse have rights to use its waters, rights that are, in principle, 
equal, which means each State must respect the similar rights of others.   The ideal of “equality 
of rights” of States when it comes to watercourses337 is thus the core feature of limited territorial 
sovereignty. Various State practices and the decisions of international tribunals now support this 
proposition, which was proclaimed as early as the Madrid Declaration of 1911.338 The very 
concept of equality of right comports with the principle enunciated in Article 2(1) of The UN 
Charter, which proclaims the sovereign equality of all U.N. Members.339 
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Among the rulings consistent with this third principle is the well-known ruling in the Lake 
Lanoux Arbitration.340 That ruling rested upon what the arbitrators viewed as a binding “rule 
prohibiting the upper riparian State from altering the waters of a river in circumstances 
calculated to do serious injury to the lower riparian State.” The guiding principle as thus phrased 
was linked to the causation of serious or significant injury from the alteration or reduction of a 
water flow. The principle received strong support in the more recent and widely cited 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dispute, discussed below.341  
Two other disputes, although not involving international watercourses per se, also yielded 
prominent endorsements of the ban on significant border-crossing harm—the Corfu Channel 
case342 and the Trail Smelter case.343 In Corfu Channel, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
re-affirmed “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other States.”  Similarly, the arbitral tribunal between the USA and 
Canada in the Trail Smelter dispute atated that, under principles of international law, no State has 
the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury (by fumes, in 
this instance) to the territory of another when the injury is serious and is established by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
Community of interest.  Related to this third principle is the fourth one, sometimes termed the 
“community of interest” stance.  It expresses the idea that a community of interests in the water 
is created by the natural, physical unity of a watercourse. Although the principle can be found in 
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the writings of some philosophers,344 it was first expressly upheld by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) in its 1929 decision concerning the Territorial Jurisdiction of the 
International Commission of the River Oder.345  In the ruling, the Court stated that common legal 
rights arose from the existence of a navigable waterway separating or traversing several States, 
rights that extend to the whole navigable course of the river and that do not stop at the border of 
the most upstream nation.  Another prominent manifestation of this fourth principle appeared in 
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, which reaffirmed that all riparian States enjoy perfect equality 
in the use of the whole course of the river.  In its ruling, the ICJ drew jointly on the principles of 
limited territorial sovereignty and community of interest. As the court explained the situation, 
“the community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a common legal right, the 
essential features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian States in the user of the whole 
course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of any one riparian State in 
relation to the others.” 
Doctrine of prior appropriation.  One of the central tasks of international watercourse law is to 
prescribe principles for reconciling competing uses of watercourses.  Among the simplistic ways 
of doing so—along with the first two principles above—is the idea of favoring and protecting 
uses based entirely on the date when they began.  Many legal approaches pay attention to the 
relative dates of competing activities reconciling conflicts between them.  The doctrine of prior 
appropriation gives that single factor not just influence by dominance. First in time becomes first 
in right without regard for other factors, including the location of the water use and its 
comparative economic and social utility. 
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Prior appropriation is most prominently used as the basis of water-law systems among the 
Western States of the United States.  Under the doctrine in its original, pure form, the earliest 
users of a watercourse have the right to claim their full amounts irrespective of the needs of any 
subsequent users. This priority gives early users the right to veto newcomers claiming a share of 
the available water resources if there is not enough to go around.346 Before States began 
requiring permits, a water use was dated from the moment that the user physically diverted the 
water from the stream and put it to a use that was deemed beneficial under standards that 
considered nearly all uses beneficial:  Physical diversion and beneficial use were the only 
requirements.  Unlike the first two absolute territory-based principles, prior appropriation favors 
neither the upstream user of water nor the downstream user.  Commonly, however, downstream 
States develop their water first, particularly when upstream uses depend upon the construction of 
dams, reservoirs, and other major projects.  The approach thus more often favors downstream 
States. 
Prior appropriation has worked tolerably well in most Western States of the U.S. although 
problems with it continue to mount as later, higher-valued uses have pressed against the 
longstanding claims of earlier, low-valued water uses.  In international settings, however, the 
principle seems highly problematic, even as it does often make sense to offer limited protection 
to existing water uses when they clash with later ones.  Practically speaking, it is usually much 
easier to determine the temporal priority of use between two non-State parties within a single 
State, unless one of the uses in an interstate dispute is clearly new.  No international tribunal 
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provides an effective, low-cost way to resolve conflicting temporal claims.  Even within the 
United States, where disputes between States can be taken to the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
relative priority of particular water uses located in different States is not viewed as 
determinative.  (Temporal priority, that is, is determinative only in conflicts between users within 
a single State.)  Interstate disputes in the U.S. are litigated between States as such, not between 
users, and are resolved by an allocation of water between the States.  As between States, the 
guiding doctrine is that of equitable apportionment, which pays attention to overall patterns of 
use in the competing States but does not prioritize individual uses on any fine-tuned calculation 
of temporal priority. 
As will be seen, one of the key issues in international law has to do with the degree of protection 
of existing water uses.  Existing uses were granted quite considerable protection in the early 
Helsinki Rules.  That preference did not carry over with anything like the same strength into later 
international documents.  
 
The Emergence of International Water Law 
 
As different non-navigational uses of water became more common, the need arose for a body of 
law to govern them, establishing rights and resolving disputes.  The need for legal standards 
seemed particularly apparent when States chose to assert absolute sovereignty, using something 
like the reasoning of the Harmon Doctrine.  Clear guidance also seemed more needed as actual 
State practices over the decades seemed to give rise to a discrete body of customary norms.  Over 
the past century, this important job of clarifying and codifying customary principles applicable to 
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international waters has been collectively carried out by three international bodies, the 
International Institute of Law (IIL), the International Law Association (ILA) and the 
International Law Commission (ILC). The first ever effort at codification was undertaken by the 
International Institute of Law (IIL) and resulted in the Madrid Declaration of 1911.  
The Madrid Declaration, 1911.347 As suggested by its hefty name, the International Regulation 
regarding the Use of International Watercourses for Purposes other than Navigation - 
Declaration of Madrid set out, for the first time, international rules regarding the use of 
international watercourses for purposes other than navigation. The document marked a 
significant development in international law. It acknowledged for the first time the fact that 
riparian States are in a position of permanent physical interdependence, a reality that weakened 
or even undercut the idea that a State might claim sovereign autonomy over a watercourse 
section within its borders. The document thus directly challenged the sovereignty ideas 
incorporated in the Harmon doctrine.  The Madrid Declaration highlighted the various non-
navigational uses of rivers and acknowledged the failure of international law at that time to 
regulate and protect them. The Declaration divided international streams into two kinds – those 
that form the border of two States and those that traverse the territories of two or more States.  It 
sought to regulate both types.  
In the principles it put forth, the Declaration set a responsibility-oriented tone by calling on 
States to protect watercourses and their uses. It prohibited any injurious alterations of water 
flows and attempted to prevent the discharge of any injurious matter into them.  It prohibited 
detrimental injuries to the banks and enjoined States not to seriously modify the constitution or 
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the essential character of a stream. The Declaration also cautioned States not to interfere with the 
utilization of the common stream by other States or individuals. Although the principle of 
reasonable and equitable use had not yet appeared in the law, the Madrid Declaration nonetheless 
supplied a sound and useful start for the development of international water law involving non-
navigational uses. 
The Dubrovnik Statement, 1956.348  Next after the Madrid Declaration came another work of the 
Institute of International Law (IIL) in 1956, popularly known as the Dubrovnik Statement. It 
marked another significant phase in the development of international water law by introducing 
new concepts that would soon become of central importance—the requirement for consultation 
in the case of proposed new waterway projects, principles of dispute resolution, and a 
requirement that river basins be understood as integrated units. 
As for the terminology, the Dubrovnik Statement went from using the term “common stream” to 
“international river,” which it defined more simply as a river that flows through or between the 
territories of two or more States. The Statement significantly muted the claimed principle of 
absolute territorial sovereignty by requiring that a State exercise its control over a watercourse 
segment with due consideration for its effects upon other riparian States.349  In general terms it 
called on a State to avoid injury to other States when it could do so through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence.350 The Statement also required States to prevent any pollution of water that 
causes substantial injury to another. 
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In terms of interstate agreements and dispute resolution, the Dubrovnik Statement encouraged 
riparian States to devise a mechanism of weighing the benefit to one State against the injury done 
to another through a particular use of water. It listed several factors for this weighing analysis, 
including the right of each State to make reasonable use of water. Other listed factors including 
the extent of dependence of each State upon that water; the comparative social and economic 
gains accruing to each and to the entire river community; pre-existent agreements among the 
States concerned and pre-existent appropriations of water by one State. As explained below, the 
Helsinki Rules, finalized a decade later, would draw upon these factors by incorporating them 
into its complex definition of the reasonable and equitable utilization of water. 
As mentioned earlier, this Statement introduced the idea of mandatory consultation in the case of 
new works on international rivers and called for arbitration in case of any differences. Even more 
significant as a further legal development was the Statement’s description of a river basin as an 
integrated whole, not a fragmented collection of water-flows and stream segments. The 
Statement thus went beyond the concept of an international river, one that formed or crossed 
State borders, to a much broader concept of a river basin including all of its water flows.  
Further, it called upon States to join each other in making full utilization of such waters, both 
from the viewpoint of the river basin as an integrated whole and from the viewpoint of the widest 
variety of uses of the water. In retrospect the Madrid Declaration of 1911 displayed a pro-
downstream tone; the Dubrovnik Statement, in contrast, sought to balance for the first time the 
interests of upstream and downstream users with the goal of assuring the greatest benefits to all 
riparians. 
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The Resolution on the Use of International Non-Maritime Waters - Salzburg, 1961.351 Following 
soon after the Dubrovnik Statement was a 1961 Resolution of the Institute of International Law 
(IIL), issued in Salzburg to deal with the rise in major waterway construction projects.  The 
Resolution recognized the common interest of riparian States in maximizing the use of available 
natural resources, including water, and it nudged States toward greater joint planning and 
reciprocal concessions in order to achieve this goal.  As it did so, it reiterated the principle that a 
State should take steps to avoid causing prejudice to another State.   
Like the earlier two instruments, this Resolution upheld a State’s right to make use of the waters 
flowing across or bordering its territory but only subject to the limitations imposed by 
international law and also to the exercise of similar rights by other States concerned. In case of 
any disagreement upon the extent of such rights of use, the Resolution recommended settling it 
on the basis of equity, taking into consideration the respective needs of the States as well as any 
other circumstances relevant to any particular case. 
The focal point of concern in the Salzburg Resolution was relatively different than that of the 
earlier two works of the IIL. It mostly addressed the then-widespread application of modern 
techniques on shared watercourses, particularly hydro-electric powers, storage dams, and modern 
irrigation facilities, and sought to generate a regulatory framework that allowed them to proceed 
in ways that did not unduly disturb other States’ rights on water.   
The Resolution made clear that each State may proceed with such works or watercourse uses 
only on the condition of preserving for other States the benefits to which they are entitled, with 
adequate compensation for any unavoidable losses or damages.  A further condition was that 
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such a work or use may only be initiated after due advance notice to those States. The Resolution 
included a detailed negotiation and dispute-resolution process to address objections by another 
State to a proposed watercourse project or new use.  It further provided that disputes that States 
could not resolve on their own be submitted to judicial or arbitral settlement. 
 
The Helsinki Rules 
 
A major step forward in the emergence of a developed, authoritative law of international 
watercourses covering non-navigable uses came with the completion in 1966 of The Helsinki 
Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers.352  The document was legally non-
binding yet it soon gained influence and remained the most quoted set of principles and rules 
until the adoption of the UN Watercourse Convention in 1997.  The Rules were crafted by the 
International Law Association (ILA) with work extending for more than a decade.  The effort 
began when the ILA established a committee in 1954 with the aim of clarifying and restating 
existing international law as it applies to the rights of States to utilize international waters. The 
committee first reported at a conference held in Dubrovnik in 1956. The final Rules consisting of 
thirty seven articles were approved by the ILA as the Helsinki Rules at its 52nd conference held 
in 1966.  
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Unlike the previous works by the IIL, the Helsinki Rules govern both navigational and non-
navigational uses of international waters.  The Helsinki Rules further hold importance as the first 
full iteration of key notions in the realm of international water law; i.e. regulation extending to 
international drainage basins; the introduction of the principle of reasonable and equitable 
utilization of waters; the applicability of these rules to tributary ground water as well as surface 
water; and the incorporation of rules for basic environmental protection. The Rules define a 
drainage basin in Article II as “a geographical area extending over two or more States 
determined by the watershed limits of the system of waters, including surface and underground 
waters, flowing into a common terminus.”  
As perhaps its central principle the Helsinki Rules provide (in Article IV) that each State is 
entitled, “within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the 
waters of an international drainage basin.”  The various competing principles are brought 
together in an overall assessment of competing uses and of whether, in a given situation, a State 
is or is not exceeding its reasonable and equitable share. The terms “reasonable,” “equitable,” 
and “beneficial” are not separately defined although they are terms that are borrowed from other 
legal settings—U.S. water law in particular—where they have been (and still are) used separately 
and with different meanings. The Helsinki Rules in effect blend the terms and their meanings 
into a single assessment test that considers the many relevant factors, including the type of use 
(beneficial?), how and where the use is undertaken and with what efficiency, caution, and 
consequences (reasonable?), and whether a State exceeds it fair share of the water uses 
(equitable?).  Article V lists many relevant factors while cautioning that its list is not exhaustive.  
Factors include the geography of the drainage basin and how it is divided among the basin 
States; the hydrology of the basin, including the contribution of water by each basin State; the 
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climate affecting the basin; past utilization of the waters of the basin, including existing 
utilization; the economic and social needs of each basin State; the population dependent on the 
waters of the basin in each basin State; the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying 
the economic and social needs of each basin State; the availability of other resources; the 
possible avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of the basin; the 
practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin States as a means of adjusting 
conflicts among uses; and the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied without 
causing substantial injury to a co-basin State. Remarkably in light of later legal developments, 
the Rules do not include a separate reference to a State’s obligation to avoid harming another 
State.  That principle plays a role in the Rules more indirectly, as it relates to various of the 
enumerated factors used in the reasonable and equitable analysis. 
The Helsinki Rules devote separate chapters for all different concerns such as pollution, 
navigation, and timber floating. The Rules refer to “water pollution” as any detrimental change 
resulting from human conduct in the natural composition, content, or quality of the waters of an 
international drainage basin. It requires a basin State—“consistent with the principle of equitable 
utilization”—to prevent any new form of water pollution or any increase in the degree of existing 
water pollution which would cause substantial injury in the territory of a co-basin State; and to 
take “all reasonable measures” to abate existing water pollution to such an extent that no 
substantial damage is caused in the territory of a co-basin State. In case of a violation of these 
requirements, the Rules require the responsible State to cease the wrongful conduct and 
compensate the injured co-basin State or to enter into negotiations with a view to reaching a 
settlement. With regard to navigation, the Rules incorporate the customary international law 
principle that grants each riparian State the right of free navigation on the entire course of the 
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river or lake on a reciprocal basis. It seeks to equate all uses of international rivers by stating that 
no use or category of uses is entitled to any inherent preference. 
Finally, the Rules include a chapter for the prevention and settlement of disputes, and require 
notification to other riparians of any proposed construction or installation that would alter the 
regime of the basin or give rise to a dispute. 
Two aspects of the Helsinki rules deserve emphasis before moving on, given that later iterations 
of the law would deviate from them.  One key issue in any water-law regime relates to the 
protection of existing water uses from interference by later ones.  To what extent, in other words, 
does a legal regime allocate water use-rights based on priority in time, the cardinal principle of 
the prior appropriation system?  The issue draws considerable attention in the Helsinki Rules, 
which give qualified but nonetheless emphatic protection to earlier uses, a protection that (as we 
shall see) diminishes in later formulations.  The overall assessment of a State’s reasonable and 
equitable share of a basin’s water includes attention to “the past utilization of the waters of the 
basin, including in particular existing uses.” (Art. V, II, 4).  The topic returns, and receives 
special attention, in Article VIII.  It protects “an existing reasonable use” of water “unless the 
factors justifying its continuance are outweighed by other factors leading to the conclusions that 
it be modified or terminated so as to accommodate a competing incompatible use.”  Perhaps 
significantly, this qualified protection for existing uses is not linked to a State’s reasonable and 
equitable share” of water; it is a freestanding protection.  Added to these provisions dealing with 
existing uses is the above-mentioned material on water pollution.  It also protects existing uses 
by directing States to avoid pollution that causes substantial injury—typically, one supposes, 
injury to existing uses—insofar as this can be done “consistent with the principle of equitable 
utilization.”  In short, while the protections for existing uses are qualified, existing uses 
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nonetheless are singled out in the Helsinki Rules as somehow different, and more worth of 
protection, than other water uses.   
Also noteworthy in the Helsinki Rules, in light of later developments, is the broad definition of 
pollution contained in them.  As defined in Article IX, pollution includes “any detrimental 
change . . .  in the natural composition, content, or quality” of a waterflow.  As thus defined 
pollution would seem to include (as is does under the U.S. Clean Water Act), any alteration in 
water temperature and the addition or removal of silt, as well as the addition of chemical 
compounds commonly understood as pollution.  The water-temperature element is important in 
that discharges from reservoirs are commonly much cooler than undisturbed natural water flows.  
At the same time, rainfall running off denuded lands is often warmer in temperature.  As for 
siltation, the importance of the issue was highlighted in earlier chapters.  Again, reservoirs 
commonly capture silt, thus altering downstream flows and depriving lower riparian lands of the 
benefits silt can provide. Importantly, the definition of pollution, while broad, does not reach to 
alterations in the timing of water flows; that issue, and the harms sometimes associated with it, 
enter the Rules only as they relate to the issue of reasonable and equitable share.  
Although it is a non-binding instrument, the Helsinki Rules has had immense influence in the 
development of international water law.  It codified for the first time the prevalent customary 
norms and rules relating to international waters, thereby creating a framework or structure for 
States to follow. The document restated key principles, and put forth, front and center, the 
principle of reasonable and equitable share as the cardinal rule of international water law. 
Although the Rules did not include an overarching, separate duty on a State to avoid causing 
significant harm—a duty that would soon make overt appearance—the idea was embedded in 
several parts of the Rules, including the multi-factor test for reasonable and equitable share and 
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protections for existing uses.  Overall, the Helsinki Rules gained immediate respect.  It was soon 
accorded the status of customary international law. 
 
The Problem of Pollution 
  
The legal documents described so far in this chapter have all dealt principally with issues related 
to water allocation; with conflicts over diversions of water flows and water structures that alter 
the quantity and timing of those flows.  Pollution as such was an ancillary although rising 
concern.  While the Helsinki Rules were gaining support, proceeding slowly to become (as it 
would in 1997) a U.N. Convention, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE) turned its attention to pollution as a distinct problem.  Drawing heavily upon the U.S. 
Clean Water Act and similar pollution statutes inspired by it, the Commission in 1992 released 
its Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
Lakes.  Negotiated and adopted by the member States of the UNECE in Helsinki, it entered into 
force in 1996.353 Initially designed as a regional instrument, amendments to it that took effect in 
February 2013 opened the convention to signing by any UN Member State, thus making it a 
universally applicable legal framework for transboundary water cooperation.354   
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While the ECE convention preceded the 1997 UN Watercourse Convention (discussed below), it 
was nonetheless influenced by the ILC’s then-on-going negotiating process over it, resulting in 
similarities with respect to provisions relating to pollution control and reduction, reasonable and 
equitable use, and cooperation between riparian States.355 This difference in focus between the 
two documents—the ECE convention focused on pollution; the UN effort on reasonable and 
equitable use356—can be attributed to several facts:  the number of negotiating parties was 
smaller for the ECE Convention; the nations involved shared homogenous geographic traits and 
conditions; and water problems in the ECE region had more to do with the protection of water 
quality and of related ecosystems than with water allocation.357 
As its title suggests, the ECE convention aims at protecting the environment of transboundary 
waters.  It directs signatories to engage in the ecologically sound and rational management of 
transboundary water resources.  In doing so, it recognizes the protection and use of 
transboundary waters as important and urgent tasks, and expresses concerns over the existence 
and threats of adverse changes in their conditions. This is in part a framework agreement in the 
sense that it provides an intergovernmental platform for the day-to-day development and 
advancement of transboundary cooperation, leaving the specificities to be addressed in other 
bilateral or multilateral agreements.  But key parts of the convention impose obligations on 
signatories directly, including obligations to control and license pollution sources and to require 
point-source polluters, and dischargers of hazardous wastes, to use the best available technology 
to reduce their pollution.  It is thus an example of duties imposed at the global level, limiting 
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how individual States can use waters without regard for the outcomes of any bilateral and 
regional agreements. It protects downstream States, that is, even when they are unable to protect 
themselves through bilateral and regional agreements.  
In pursuit of its pollution-reduction aims the ECE convention imposes a general obligation on 
parties to use “all appropriate measures” to prevent, control and reduce any “transboundary 
impact,” a term that includes “any significant adverse effect on the environment resulting from a 
change in the conditions of transboundary waters.”  Effects on the environment in turn include 
not only direct effects on water, but also effects on human health and safety, flora, fauna, soil, 
air, climate, landscape and historical monuments or other physical structures or the interaction 
among these factors. Indeed, effects encompass consequences to the cultural heritage or social-
economic conditions of a State resulting from alterations to those riparian factors. 
“Transboundary water” is defined with similar breadth.  It includes any surface or ground waters 
that mark, cross or are located on boundaries between two or more States. With respect to ground 
waters, both confined and unconfined aquifers are covered by the convention.   
In using transboundary waters, the convention requires parties to do so in a reasonable and 
equitable way.  It directs them to cooperate on the basis of equality and reciprocity for 
developing harmonized programs and strategies. The convention seeks to accomplish the stated 
objective of preventing and reducing transboundary impact by requiring parties to undertake 
relevant legal, administrative, economic, financial and technical measures. These measures 
mostly involve the adoption of various anti-pollution efforts through the application of best 
available technology and best environmental practices. Apart from these measures, the 
convention enjoins parties to carry out necessary environmental impact assessments and to 
promote the sustainable management of the water resources based on an ecosystem approach. 
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Each party is additionally required to define and establish water-quality objectives and water-
quality criteria for the purpose of reducing transboundary impacts. 
Overall the convention is quite forward-looking with respect to institutional mechanisms and 
provides for meeting of the parties for continuous review and implementation of its provisions.358 
As part of the convention’s joint-management mechanisms, the parties are called upon to draw 
up joint monitoring and assessment programs, to facilitate joint research and development 
activities, to establish channels for continued exchange of information, and to set up warning 
mechanisms for critical situations. One innovative approach of the Helsinki Convention is its 
emphasis on public participation and its requirement to make available to the public all pertinent 
information relating to the conditions of transboundary waters.   
Several elements of this convention are worth emphasizing. 
First, while directed at pollution the convention includes a requirement that parties to it take “all 
appropriate measures” to use waters “in a reasonable and equitable way,” a requirement that goes 
well beyond pollution concerns.  Of interest here is that the convention borrows but modifies the 
language used in the Helsinki Rules.  The latter admonished parties to limit their water uses to a 
“reasonable and equitable share.”  The ECE convention changed “share” to “way.”  The shift in 
wording perhaps reflects the histories of the two adjectives and the different ways they have been 
used, chiefly (as noted above) in U.S. water law. Reasonable has been used to limit the ways 
water may be used, in terms of type and efficiency of a use and of the place and social value of 
the use, particularly in comparison with competing uses.  Equitable on the other hand has 
typically referred to the fair sharing of water between two States; it refers to how water flows are 
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allocated and divided, rather than to the specific ways they are used within a State.  The shift in 
the ECE convention from “share” to “way” suggests a desire by the drafters to put less emphasis 
on the sharing of water and more on the need to limit particular low-valued or degrading uses of 
water, wherever located, and to divide water by favoring the most valuable water uses over the 
less valuable ones.   Further, a requirement that all uses be reasonable constrains water uses 
within a State, even when the State itself is not claiming more than its equitable share of the 
water flow. 
With this requirement for reasonable and equitable uses, even with the term relatively 
undeveloped, the ECE convention does qualify as an overall convention governing non-
navigational uses of water, thus inviting comparison with other similar legal arrangements. 
Second, the ECE convention roundly endorses three key principles long espoused by 
environmental advocates, and instructs that parties “shall be guided” by them.  The principles 
are:  (i) the precautionary principle, which urges preventive action even when suspected harm 
has not been fully proved and causation established; (ii) the polluter-pays principle, requiring 
that a polluter bear the costs both of pollution control and of the resulting harms; and (iii) the 
principle that actors today should live in ways that do not compromise the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.  The convention does not add detail to these general 
principles, but does obligate parties to employ them. 
Third, like the Helsinki Rules, the ECE convention (as noted above) employs an exceptionally 
broad definition of transboundary “impact” and “effect.”  Given its breadth the definition seems 
to include changes in the temperature of water flows and their silt loads. It expressly includes 
effects on all life forms and, in doing so, seems to sweep broadly to draw in all physical changes 
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to ecosystems that humans deem degrading. Unlike in the Helsinki Rules, the convention 
language on transboundary effects does take the express form of an obligation to avoid harm; it 
is a “do-no-harm” type of provision, not merely (as in the Helsinki Rules) a list of factors 
relevant in determining reasonable and equitable sharing or uses of water. This ban on causing 
harm, however, is significantly weakened.  The convention states that parties merely must “take 
all appropriate measures” to prevent, control and reduce their harms, guided by the three 
overarching principles just listed. 
Fourth, the convention borrows liberally from U.S. water law by distinguishing between 
pollution discharged from discrete pollution points and pollution that comes instead from the 
runoff of rain from human land uses, what is termed “nonpoint source” pollution. Like U.S. law 
it mandates the use of best available technology to reduce point-source pollution and calls only 
for more general measures to reduce non-point pollution.  The result of this differential treatment 
in the United States is that point-source pollution has declined markedly while nonpoint 
pollution has largely continued, in places even becoming worse. Polluted run-off from land-use 
activities has, in the United States, proved very difficult to address because it is not subject to 
easy technological fixes; it requires, often, fundamental changes in the ways lands are used, 
particularly significant increases in permanent land cover and changes to drainage practices. 
Supplementing these mandatory point-source controls are requirements—again, also found in 
U.S. law—that States prescribe water-quality standards that limit tolerable pollution levels in 
waterways.  Here, too the U.S. experience is instructive:  Water-quality standards are useful in 
identifying waterway segments that are unduly polluted; States must periodically identify all 
waterway segments that exceed maximum water-quality pollution standards.  But the standards 
themselves prescribe no steps to diminish high pollution levels and violations of them do not 
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yield penalties.  The ECE convention, just like U.S. law, offers no explanation on how States can 
and must deal with their overly polluted watercourse segments.   
Finally and as noted above, the ECE convention is significant in that it does go beyond setting a 
framework for negotiations among States to deal with pollution problems and water uses that are 
not reasonable and equitable.  It directly regulates State action by insisting, as noted, that 
measures be taken to reduce harmful effects and that States license and require pollution control 
technology for point sources.  The convention thus stands as a prominent example of limits on 
waterway use set at the global level, not simply by negotiations at local levels. 
 
The 1997 U.N. Convention: An Overview 
 
The Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1997, 
was the first attempt by the United Nations to frame a set of international rules governing 
nonnavigable uses of watercourses. It codifies prevalent norms and introduces some of the newer 
concepts in international water uses. The convention was adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on May 21, 1997, and came into force on 17 August 2014,359 bringing to a close a 
long and turbulent law-making effort. The United Nations General Assembly first addressed the 
issue of international rivers in 1959. As noted above, it assigned the work of preparing a 
watercourse convention to the International Law Commission (ILC) in 1970.  Not until 1994 
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could the ILC agree on and complete the draft articles of the convention, which were then 
negotiated in the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly, convened as a “Working 
Group of the Whole.” These negotiations were open to all UN member States and to State 
members of specialized agencies of the United Nations. Three years of negotiations produced the 
version adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1997 by a vote of 103 to 3 with 27 
abstentions. Ratification proceeded slowly despite the large number of signatories. Only in 2014 
had enough States (35) signed for the convention to take effect.  
The U.N. Convention is designed to promote the optimal and sustainable use, development, 
conservation, management and protection of international watercourses for the benefit of present 
and future generations.360 It is largely (although not entirely) a framework convention in that it 
addresses basic procedural aspects and a few substantive ones while leaving riparian States 
through negotiation to add particulars based on local needs and the characteristics of the 
watercourses in question.  As noted below, the vagueness on this point—on the ability of 
regional agreements to alter (particularly weaken) the mandates of the convention—is one of its 
several weaknesses.  Further, the convention fails to take account of grave imbalances in 
negotiating power due to location on a watercourse as well as to variations in political and 
economic strength. 
The convention is divided into seven parts containing thirty seven articles and includes an annex 
on arbitration. Considered as a whole, the convention underscores the concept of cooperation 
between States and entitles every State in a river or lake basin to be party to any agreements 
governing that basin. It puts particular emphasis on two points:  the principle of equitable and 
                                                 
360 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1997, preamble. 
176 
 
reasonable use of a watercourse and the obligation of States to avoid causing significant harm to 
other watercourse States. Fitting uneasily with these two principles—which themselves fit 
together awkwardly—are several strongly worded admonitions to avoid environmental 
degradation. The convention also provides for regular consultation and exchanges of 
information, and for reliance on peaceful means of dispute resolution. 
Unlike the Helsinki Rules that laid down rules both for navigational and non-navigational uses, 
the UN Watercourse Convention applies only to non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses. According to the convention, a watercourse as defined encompasses both surface 
water and groundwater that, by virtue of their physical relationship, constitute a unitary whole 
that normally flows into a common terminus. An “international watercourse” is defined to mean 
such a watercourse, parts of which are situated in different States.361 
The convention does not affect the rights or obligations of a watercourse State arising from any 
existing agreement; they remain in force. Parties to such agreements, however, are urged to 
harmonize their agreements with the basic principles of the convention. The convention further 
states that an agreement may be entered into with respect to an entire international watercourse 
or any part thereof or a particular project, program or use.  This cannot occur, however, if the 
agreement adversely affects, to a significant extent, uses of the watercourse by a State that has 
not consented to the arrangement.  
The convention entitles every watercourse State to participate in the negotiation of, and to 
become a party to, any watercourse agreement that applies to the entire international 
watercourse.362 When an agreement applies only to a part of the watercourse or to a particular 
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project or use, a watercourse State is entitled to participate and to become a party to the extent its 
use is significantly affected.363 
After setting these general objectives and initial guidelines, part II of the convention presents the 
cornerstone elements of the law of international watercourse—the requirement that all uses of a 
watercourse be “equitable and reasonable” (Art. 5) and the obligation of States to “take all 
appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States.” 
(Art. 7) The convention incorporates both of these principles, setting them side by side without 
attempting to reconcile them.  In this respect it differs from the Helsinki Rules, which (as noted 
above) took harm into account in the “reasonable and equitable share” analysis rather than as a 
freestanding limit on watercourse uses.  Overall, the harm-avoidance principle in the convention 
closely resembles the similar provision in the 1992 ECE convention.  
Equitable and reasonable utilization.  The Convention follows the same approach adopted 
earlier by the Helsinki Rules which established the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilization as the guiding principle of international water law, and reiterates to a large extent the 
factors laid down in the Helsinki Rules.364 (The shift in language from “reasonable and 
equitable” to “equitable and reasonable” does not seem significant given that the terms are not 
separately defined or used.)  The principle as incorporated in the Convention obliges States to 
utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner so as to promote its 
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optimal and sustainable use, taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned 
and consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse. 
The convention does not define what an equitable or reasonable utilization is, but lays down 
several factors and circumstances to be taken into account. Among these factors are the 
geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural 
character; the social and economic needs of the watercourse States; the relative populations 
dependent on the watercourse; existing and potential uses of the watercourse;  conservation, 
protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of the watercourse and the 
costs of measures taken to that effect; the effects of the actions in one watercourse State on other 
watercourse States; and the availability of alternatives to a particular planned or existing use. 
The weight given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in comparison with other 
relevant factors.  In the end, all relevant factors are to be considered together in determining 
whether a State’s use of a watercourse is equitable and reasonable.365  Under Article 10, no use 
of a waterway enjoys inherent priority over any other use in the absence of any agreement or 
custom to the contrary except that, in case of conflict, “special regard” is given to watercourse 
uses that serve “vital human needs.”   
Significantly, the UN convention gives no particular priority to existing uses of watercourses 
when they conflict with new ones except to the extent that existing uses are protected by the 
harm-avoidance principle.  Indeed, the express Statement that no use enjoys inherent priority 
(Art. 10) seems aimed at expressly disavowing special protection for existing uses, which is to 
say it weakens if it does not nearly eliminate the importance of priority in time.  The language in 
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the UN convention is particularly noteworthy given the strong protection for existing uses 
included in the Helsinki Rules, which served as the basis for the U.N. convention.  
Obligation to avoid harm. The principle of equitable and reasonable utilization is followed by 
the obligation to avoid harm in Article 7 of the convention.366 The no-harm principle suggests 
that watercourse States should take all appropriate measures when utilizing an international 
watercourse to avoid causing significant harm to others. If significant harm is nevertheless 
caused, all appropriate measures are to be taken to eliminate or mitigate such harm.367  On these 
points, the convention largely repeats provisions of the 1992 ECE convention. 
Seemingly, this harm-avoidance principle does not express an absolute limitation on causing any 
harm but constrains only harms that are “significant” in nature.  The convention, however, fails 
to explain what types of harm are significant.  The limit is further weakened because a State 
merely needs to undertake “all appropriate measures” to prevent the harm; the ban is not 
absolute, even when harm is significant. 
General obligation to cooperate.  One salient feature of the convention is its insistence on the 
obligation to cooperate. Article 8 obliges States to cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, 
territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain optimal utilization and 
adequate protection of an international watercourse.  It specifically encourages them to consider 
the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions. 
Planned measures.  The UN convention has a separate section dealing with plans to develop 
water-management structures within an international watercourse, what the convention vaguely 
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terms (without a definition) “planned measures.”  The convention imposes a duty on parties to 
exchange information and to consult and negotiate with other States before taking action.368  For 
any such measures that may have a significant adverse effect on watercourse States, the 
information exchange needs to include available technical data and the results of any 
environmental impact assessment.369 When a planned measure is inconsistent with Articles 5 or 
7, the proposing State is required to enter into consultations and, if necessary, negotiations with a 
view to an equitable resolution of the situation.370 Meanwhile, the convention bars work on the 
proposed measures while negotiations are ongoing.  This legal stance is augmented in a 
confusing way by a later section in the convention, Article 25, dealing with “regulation,” a 
term—this time defined—which means “the use of hydraulic works or any other continuing 
measure to alter or otherwise control the flow of the waters of an international watercourse.”  
The Article instructs States to cooperate in efforts to regulate water flows and to share the costs 
of structures they have agreed to help undertake.371  Importantly, it is silent on the legal 
consequences when a State objects to a proposed “regulation” because of its harmful effects. 
Planned measures and hydraulic structures can, of course, cause radical changes to watercourses, 
particularly when they entail significant water diversions or alterations in the timing of water 
flows.  Reservoirs routinely disrupt the flow of silt, block fish migrations, and alter the 
temperature of downstream water flows.  Once in place, they also diminish water-use options 
downstream, in effect claiming primacy based on priority in time as against later-arising water 
uses downstream.  All of these characteristics would seem to clash with the basic principle of 
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harm-avoidance and with the seemingly deliberate decision in the convention not to give 
primacy based on priority in time.  At bottom, the provisions on planned measures and hydraulic 
structures fit quite poorly with the rest of the convention.  They large stand apart from, and thus 
curtail, the two guiding principles of equitable and reasonable utilization and harm-avoidance.  
Pollution control and the protection and preservation of ecosystems and the marine 
environment.  Much as the planned-measures provisions seem to disrupt the overall structure of 
the UN convention, so too do the various provisions dealing with environmental protection.  The 
convention’s several environmental provisions appear in Part IV of the convention (Articles 20-
23), entitled “Protection, Preservation and Management.”372 Article 20 establishes a general 
obligation to “protect and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses.”  Although 
vague in phrasing, the obligation is exceptional in that it goes well beyond the principle of 
avoiding ecological change harmful to other States. Indeed, the principle seems to limit action by 
a watercourse State that degrades a watercourse located within the bounds of that State.  
The convention builds on this general obligation in the following section (Article 21) by offering 
an equally broad ban on pollution that causes harm either to other watercourse States or, 
significantly, to the environment generally or “the living resources of the watercourse.”  Much as 
in the 1992 ECE convention, pollution is defined very broadly.  It includes “any detrimental 
alteration in the composition or quality of the waters of an international watercourse that results 
directly or indirectly from human conduct.”373  As in the ECE convention, this definition would 
seem to include alterations in silt loads and water temperature.  It also goes beyond point-source 
discharges of pollution to encompass land uses that resulted in polluted run-off.  Section 3 of the 
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Article obligates States to work in tandem to develop pollution-control measures similar to those 
envisioned in the ECE convention.  Their specific obligation is to “consult” with other States, 
upon request, with a view to agreeing on pollution-control measures, measures that all of the 
consulting States would presumably be required to adopt.  The measures include “techniques and 
practices” to reduce both point and non-point source pollution (for instance, one assumes, 
technology-based standards) as well as water-quality objectives and criteria.374  
Supplementing the ban on pollution that significantly harms a watercourse’s “living resources” is 
a duty on States (Article 22) to “take all measures necessary” to prevent the introduction of any 
alien or new species into an international watercourse insofar as that may have detrimental 
effects to that ecosystem.375 The wording of the duty is significant:  Its call for “all measures 
necessary” is distinctly stronger than the Article 7 harm-avoidance principle, which calls more 
modestly for States to “take all appropriate measures.” The same stronger language appears also 
in Article 23, which requires States to protect and preserve the marine environment, including 
estuaries.  Again, the duty is to “take all measures . . .  that are necessary,” rather than simply “all 
appropriate measures.”  Despite the strong, clear language of these provisions, the Working 
Group responsible for the convention in a Statement of Understanding has contended that the 
duties entail only a due diligence standard. 
Taken as a whole the pollution-prevention provisions of the convention are open to various 
interpretations.  Several provisions, as noted, impose clear duties on States to protect and 
preserve ecosystems, especially estuaries and the marine environment, and to avoid pollution that 
harms the environment, apparently without regard for effects on other States.  On the other side, 
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the only express action that a State must take is to consult with other States on methods of 
pollution control and on water-quality standards.376  These specific action elements hardly seem 
sufficient to enable a State to carry out its sternly worded overall duties.  A State might consult 
in good faith, and adopt the various pollution-control and water-quality measures reached in 
consultation, yet still violate the general standards in material ways.  It is not clear what legal 
consequences might then ensue.  It is similarly not clear whether States unaffected by pollution 
or ecosystem degradation would have standing to file complaints against an offending State, nor 
whether States in a region, by entering into a regional agreement, could weaken their duties for 
environmental protection. 
Regarding installations, facilities and other works related to an international watercourse, the 
convention requires watercourse States to employ their best efforts to maintain and protect 
them.377 It also directs them to consult when any State believes a facility could harm it 
significantly due to its operation or maintenance, to any “willful or negligent acts,” or simply to 
the “forces of nature.”378  
Settlement of disputes.  Article 33 of the convention addresses the important topic of dispute 
resolution.  It calls upon parties to settle disputes by negotiation and mutual agreement.379  
Should that fail, the convention recommends submission of the dispute to a third party, to 
arbitration, or to the International Court of Justice.380 Should these methods fail, disputes are to 
addressed by a “Fact-finding commission” set up and operated in the manner set forth in the 
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convention.381  Disputing States are expected to consider the report of such a commission “in 
good faith.”382 As one commentator has observed, the recommendation of a commission should 
carry great moral weight even though one or more disputing States could ignore it.383 
The Tension between Reasonable Use and Harm Avoidance 
During its twenty-three years of work on the UN convention, the ILC tested and incorporated 
different approaches and principles as it endeavored to craft a convention based on progressive 
principles.  Its work was not done in isolation; it interacted regularly with the General Assembly 
and its diverse membership.384 The most contentious issue surrounded the wording of articles 5 
and 7 and their relationship with each other. The two articles were (and are) viewed as 
conflicting—the one authorizing equitable and reasonable uses, the other admonishing States to 
avoid significant harm.  To no surprise, UN member States divided among themselves as to 
which principle ought to take priority. Lower riparians tended to favor the harm-avoidance rule 
because of their greater vulnerability to harm and the lesser chance that their own actions would 
cause harm.385 Conversely, upper riparians tended to favor the principle of reasonable and 
equitable utilization because, taken alone, it provides more latitude for States to use watercourses 
intensively. Debate on various drafts of the convention tended to divide the UN membership 
between upstream and downstream nations and occupied the ILC throughout its work.  
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Looking back, the Helsinki Rules of 1966 seemed to elevate equitable and reasonable utilization 
(or reasonable and equitable, as the Rules expressed it) over the harm-avoidance principle 
although the harmfulness of a water use made it less reasonable. In the ensuing years, the ILC 
tried out various ways to accommodate the two principles. One proposed approach, put forth by 
Stephen M. Schwebel, called for determinations of equitable and reasonable use to be resolved 
by consultation among the affected States.386  The idea drew strong opposition from ILC 
representatives from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe because it seemed to envision dispute 
resolution by third party, a possibility they disliked.387 It was finally the East German member of 
the Commission, Professor Bernhard Graefrath, who proposed the final version of equitable and 
reasonable utilization linked to the dispute resolution provisions now in Article 33.388 
Article 7 of the 1994 draft articles expressly limited the obligation of a State to avoid causing 
significant harm by calling only for “due diligence.” It provided that, when significant harm 
nonetheless occurred, the affected States were to consult on the problem, taking into account the 
enumerated factors in article 6, possible changes in the harm-causing water use to avoid the 
damage, and the possibility of compensation.  This version drew opposition from downstream 
States, which saw it, correctly, as distinctly favoring use over harm-avoidance.  Sensing a dead 
head, the Working Group crafted an entirely new version of the article. 
In its final form, Article 7 requires a State causing significant harm to take measures to eliminate 
or mitigate such harm “having due regard for articles 5 and 6” (on equitable and reasonable 
utilization).389 The tripartite formulation of articles 5, 6 and 7 quickly became known as the 
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“three article package” and was understood as a compromise.  As Lucius Caflisch noted, the 
compromise seemed sufficiently neutral on the basic equitable-use-versus-harm-avoidance 
conflict to allow a number of lower-riparian States to accept it.390  
The ultimate compromise was sufficient to achieve adoption of the convention by the General 
Assembly but worries on the issue lingered and they delayed the convention’s entry into force.  
Notwithstanding the balancing language, the prevailing view today is that the convention 
subordinates the harm-avoidance principle to the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilization.391 As Salman M.A. Salman has reasoned, the issue of harm is included in the Article 
6 factors determining equitable and reasonable utilization. These factors include the effects that 
water uses in one watercourse State have on existing and potential uses in other watercourse 
States.  In Salman’s view, this arrangement seems to make harm a factor relevant in evaluating 
equitable and reasonable use, rather than a distinct limit on use.392  As for the Article 7 statement 
of harm-avoidance, it envisions that harm might well occur.  It requires only that the State 
causing the harm to take “all appropriate measures, having due regard to Articles 5 and 6 in 
consultation with the affected State,” to mitigate it or, and where appropriate, to discuss 
compensation.  This arrangement also implies that a particular use can be equitable and 
reasonable, and take place, even though it causes significant harm that cannot be mitigated.  In 
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short, a careful reading of Articles 5 –7 of the convention in the view of many subordinates 
harm-avoidance to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.393 
Making sense of the environmental provisions. As noted, part IV of the convention includes 
strongly worded provisions protecting and preserving ecosystems and curtailing pollution. 
Environmental concerns also appear elsewhere in the convention—in various parts of the 
preamble and in the sections dealing with equitable - reasonable utilization and harm avoidance.   
As for the preamble, it predictably expresses all of the ideal but conflicting objectives by calling 
for the utilization, development, conservation, management and protection of international 
watercourses and the promotion of the optimal and sustainable utilization thereof for present and 
future generations. As it does so, it recalls the principles and recommendations adopted by the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in the Rio Declaration of 1992 
and in Agenda 21.  Similarly, the utilization provisions of Article 5 insist that uses of 
watercourses be consistent with “adequate protection” for them.  The list of relevant factors in 
Article 6 goes further, attending generally to “geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, 
ecological and other factors of a natural character” while drawing specific attention to the 
“conservation” and “protection” of water resources.  The latter terms, in Article 6.1.(f), are 
weakened in their effects by being joined with other, quite different terms (development and 
economy of use) and by being qualified with a reference to “the costs of measures taken to that 
effect.”  
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As Charles B. Bourne points out in his Notes and Comments, the “adequate protection” language 
of article 5 is particularly intriguing given its placement in the convention.394 It appears, not in 
the list of factors relevant in determining equitable and reasonable use, but directly in the 
opening provision authorizing uses of a watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner.  
Under Article 5.1., a State’s use of a watercourse must “tak[e] account” of the interests of the 
watercourse States concerned and be “consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.”  
Used in this way, the language seems to be part of the definition of equitable and reasonable use, 
not merely one of the many conflicting factors that enter into an assessment. Given this 
placement, should watercourse protection involve an absolute limit on watercourse uses?  Should 
it be understood as embedded in the definition of equitable utilization?  
One approach to this question begins with the common claim that equitable utilization was, prior 
to the convention, already a principle of customary international law, and it existed without being 
qualified by the “adequate protection” language.  (All of the five Special Rapporteurs for the 
ILC’s work held this view, which appeared in the ILC’s commentary on article 5.395)  In the view 
of some, the “adequate protection” language makes best sense, given the already established 
principle of equitable utilization, when it is read not as a recasting of the principle but as the 
expression of a particularly important factor to use when assessing the equitable and reasonable 
nature of a particular use.396  The difficulty with this approach is that it cannot explain why the 
language appears where it does, in Article 5, rather than in the list of factors in Article 6.  Article 
6 provides that the various listed factors are to be considered together, with none having special 
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priority.  Article 5 is written in a much different manner, with fewer provisions that each seem 
essential.  Article 5 (1) states, in brief, that a State may (a) use a waterway in an equitable and 
reasonable manner when it (b) takes into account the interests of other States and (c) acts 
“consistent with adequate protection for the watercourse.”  Article 5 (2) presents the same 
general scheme, this time from the perspective not of a single State but of all States considered 
together.  Collectively these shall participate in the use, development, and protection of a 
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner.  This includes, 5 (2) confirms, “both the 
right to utilize the watercourse” and the duty to cooperate in its “protection and development.”  
The term protection, to be sure, is not defined and thus unclear.  But the structure of both 5 (1) 
and 5 (2) gives not hint that utilization takes priority over either cooperation or protection.  When 
a State can engage in its equitable share of all uses that are consistent with watercourse 
protection, then all provisions of the article are given full effect. 
This uncertainty over Article 5 is linked to the uncertain status of the convention’s principal 
environmental protections in Articles 20 through 23.  These provisions, summarized above, 
provide plainly that States must protect and preserve ecosystems, avoid pollution that causes 
substantial harm, and take all measures necessary to avoid introducing harmful species and to 
protect the marine environment, including estuaries.  These provisions seem absolute.  How then 
do they fit together with the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization and harm 
avoidance?   
According to the relevant ILC Commentary, these provisions are brought together by means of 
the language of Article 5 with its language on adequate protection.  Particularly Articles 20 and 
21 are in effect elaborations of the “adequate protection” limit on equitable and reasonable use.  
Indeed, the ILC commentary asserts that, due to the linkage among Articles 5, 20, and 21, States 
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must use watercourses only in ways that maintain them as much as possible in their natural 
state.397 In a similar fashion, the ban on harm-causing pollution in Article 21 (2) is viewed in the 
ILC Commentary as giving specific content to the general principles contained in articles 5 and 
7.398   
This interpretative approach gives weight to all of the Articles of the convention, and indeed 
takes them all seriously.  But in doing so it seems to curtail significantly the central principle of 
equitable utilization.  If as the ILC Commentary proposes the environmental protection 
provisions are taken literally and if, further, they are given full weight by incorporation into 
Article 5 by way of the “adequate protection” language, then they seem to control whenever 
applicable and thus to override the principle of equitable utilization in any case of conflict.399 
States then could use their waterways only in ways that guarantee their adequate protection.  This 
dominant role for environmental protection could be understood in two ways—either as giving 
primacy to environmental protection in case of conflict or as declaring that any water use that 
degrades a waterway or causes significant harm is unreasonable and inequitable per se.  The 
latter understanding was put forth by Professor McCaffrey in his Fourth Report to the ILC.400  
These various approaches, however, are far from adequately clear to enjoy widespread support.  
Moreover, as Professor Lammers among others have pointed out, the strict application of the no 
substantial harm principle may in certain circumstances lead to results which are quite 
inequitable.401  A no-harm rule could in a specific factual setting severely limit water uses by 
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upstream States while allowing such uses in downstream States, an outcome that seems 
inconsistent with the fair sharing norm of equitable utilization. A law that sanctions unreasonable 
and inequitable results is, one would think, jurisprudentially and morally weak. A more just and 
practical interpretation of Article 5, therefore, is perhaps the one that interprets the “adequate 
protection” language—and indeed Articles 20 through 23—as supplements to the guiding 
primary principle of equitable utilization.402 This interpretation of Article 5 finds support in the 
ILC's commentary on the article in its 1994 Report to the General Assembly, where it is stated 
that the second sentence of paragraph 1 elaborates upon the concept of equitable and reasonable 
utilization.  The second sentence provides that watercourse uses should be undertaken “with a 
view to” achieving the goals of optimal and sustainable use, due consideration for the interests of 
other States, and adequate protection of the watercourse.  In this interpretation, the second 
sentence serves as an overall goal or aspiration for water use and planning that in practice guides 
decisions about equitable and reasonable utilization.403 
These environmental protection provisions also need to be understood in light of the general 
harm-avoidance principle in Article 7.404  Many types of harms could run afoul of this 
provisions, including economic, social, and cultural harms as well as environmental ones. It 
appears significant that environmental harms are the only ones singled out for special elaboration 
in later Articles.  The arrangement suggests that they are of particular concern and should draw 
special regard. 
As noted earlier, downstream nations have tended to give priority to provisions of the convention 
that limit harm, including the environmental protection articles.  In the common view, the harm-
                                                 
402 Bourne, “Primacy of the Principle of Equitable Utilization,” 220. 
403 Report of the International Law Commission (ILC), 218-219. 
404 Conca, Governing Water, 100. 
192 
 
avoidance provisions are considered more protective of the environment, while the principle of 
equitable and reasonable utilization is deemed more pro-development.  In practice, though, the 
environmental protection element of Article 7 is distinctly constrained by two key words – 
significant and appropriate.  The convention, as noted, does not prevent States from causing any 
harm, but only those harms which are significant in nature. It also requires States to undertake 
only appropriate measures to prevent the harm; if the measures do not succeed in doing so, the 
harm can presumably continue.  Indeed, Article 7(2) clearly envisions that significant harm can 
and will occur.  States, again, are obligated to use “all appropriate measures” to mitigate the 
problem, but their actions can rightly give “due regard for the provisions of articles 5 and 6,” 
which is to say due regard for their own right to engage in equitable and reasonable uses.  The 
language gives States grounds to continue practices that cause significant harm so long as they 
are taking steps to reduce the problem.  What is left unclear is whether this latitude exists in the 
case of environmental harm prohibited by Articles 20 through 24.  As noted, environmental 
harms are singled out for special attention.  One can easily read the qualifications of Article 7 as 
inapplicable to them, particularly to harm that involve exotic species or that degrade estuaries.  
When those harms are involved, the stronger language of Articles 22 and 23—demanding that 
States employ “all measures necessary”—would seem to control over the looser language of 
Article 7, calling merely for “all appropriate measures having due regard for the provisions of 
articles 5 and 6.”  
In the end, the U.N. Convention does not satisfactorily integrate the central principles that it 
embraces, the principles of equitable and reasonable use, of harm-avoidance, and of 
environmental protection.  Strong provisions deal with each of these principles.  The convention 
fails to make clear—or clear enough—how they fit together, leaving States opportunities to point 
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to the particular language they like best as they charge ahead with their activities.  This failure is 
most acute when it comes to waterway construction projects, including reservoirs and diversion 
projects.  They are among the most harm-causing and environmentally degrading activities, and 
yet they are pushed off to the side in the convention with no real effort to reconcile them with the 
convention’s dominant principles. 
 
From Watercourses to Drainage Basins 
 
The 1997 UN convention holds immense importance in the development of international water 
law. It entails a coordinated international effort to establish universal rules for regulating 
international watercourses, and largely reiterates and thereby strengthens customary rules as 
applied to their non-navigational uses.  As it does so, the convention pushed strongly in the 
directly of greatly expanded protections for the environment. 
While acknowledging these achievements, it is still important to note that the UN Convention 
continues to focus attention on rivers as such—on watercourses—and fails to take the needed, 
big step of expanding the inquiry to consider entire drainage basins as such.  Watercourses are 
used in conjunction with surrounding lands, and waterway degradation is often caused by land 
uses.  Alterations in water flows are similarly due in many cases not to engineered changes in the 
water flows but to actions taking place throughout a basin.  Watercourses will not be ecologically 
healthy until the maintenance of their health is a guiding limit on land uses everywhere. 
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The 1997 Watercourse Convention is meant as a component of international law designed to 
address an international subject matter – international watercourses. The convention defines a 
watercourse as “a system of surface waters and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their 
physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus;”405 and an 
“international watercourse” is “a watercourse, parts of which are situated in different States.” As 
observed by Stephen McCaffrey and Mpazi Sinjela, such a definition accords with hydrological 
reality and usefully draws attention to the ways surface and underground waters interact to make 
up an international watercourse.406  The convention’s acknowledgement of this hydrological 
reality is particularly worthwhile considering the restrictive definitions provided in previous 
instruments,407 and significant also as a step that further softens the traditional conception of 
territorialized nature. 
Despite this, however, the convention’s emphasis remains on watercourses as such, as opposed 
to a more holistic watershed or catchment basin concept. And although it has alleviated the 
territorial concept, the convention’s emphasis on international watercourses draws the 
traditionally sharp, territorial line between the domestic and international spheres.408 The basic 
problem is framed as one of cooperatively managing a resource that flows across borders, rather 
than integrating crucial land-based ecosystemic considerations that ignore borders.409 State 
responsibilities for “domestic” watercourses are largely beyond the scope of the regime, despite 
the “significant harm” inherent in the globally cumulative problems of loss of freshwater 
biodiversity, damage to critical ecosystems, and the depletion of natural capital.410 Even where 
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domestic responsibilities are invoked, the sharply territorial distinction between the domestic and 
international spheres is reproduced. Thus, States are charged with preserving ecosystems and 
controlling pollution individually and, where appropriate, jointly.  They are similarly tasked with 
protecting marine environments tied to watercourses (e.g.; estuaries) individually and, where 
appropriate, in cooperation with other States. The States as such remain the primary actors, 
despite having boundaries that often fragment and ignore watershed lines.  The States as such are 
instructed to pay attention to actions “in their respective territories” (Art. 5 (1)).  In these 
provisions and others the UN Convention retains an outlook based on human-drawn national 
boundaries.  It has not taken the bold step of addressing catchment basins at the basin level.  It 
has not yet fostered a paradigm of integrated watershed management.411  
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Chapter 6: Developments Since 1997  
 
This chapter continues the story of the previous one, looking at legal developments since the 
adoption of the 1997 Watercourse Convention by the UN and highlighting the progressive 
developments of international water law. It pays particular attention to the major revisions of the 
Helsinki Rules by the ILA, incorporated in some haste as the Berlin Rules of 2004, and discusses 
various other regional and bilateral agreements entered into over the last two decades. As 
explained below, the Berlin Rules were intended to clarify existing and emerging customary 
international law on watercourses, not to step distinctly ahead of it.  Nonetheless, the Rules 
incorporate significant changes from their predecessor and from the 1997 U.N. Convention, 
particularly changes to enhance environmental protection and increase the rights of injured 
parties. Recent agreements over the past 20 years similarly reflect and advance the movement of 
international law toward enhanced environmental protection and ever-stronger calls for 
international cooperation. 
The previous chapter discussed how, from the emergence of the Harmon doctrine on State 
territorial sovereignty to the adoption of the UN Watercourse Convention, international water 
law gradually incorporated key principles applicable to uses of transboundary waters and 
disputes relating to them.  As discussed in prior chapters, these various international documents 
did not for the most part really embrace the basin-wide management of international freshwater, 
nor did they fully integrate concerns for ecological protection except for a few general 
obligations for watercourse protection and related controls on transboundary water pollution.  
These management principles would become more important in the Berlin Rules on Water 
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Resources of 2004 and, to various degrees, in recent regional treaties.  These documents go 
further to integrate environmental and human-rights concerns into the management of 
transboundary waters.  Together they give evidence of a new era of international water law.  
This chapter considers the Berlin Rules at some length, highlighting how the document both 
reflects and goes beyond earlier legal documents.  The chapter then turns to several prominent 
regional agreements, ones that reflect creativity in tailoring treaty provisions to the unique 
hydrological and environmental realities of particular basins.  The agreements considered here 
are:  the Danube River Protection Convention of 1994, the Convention on the Protection of the 
Rhine of 1999, the Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) of 2000, the Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin 
of 2002, the Convention on the Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika of 2003, and the 
Agreement between the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania and the Government of 
the Republic of Macedonia for the Protection and Sustainable Development of Lake Ohrid and 
its Watershed, 2004. 
It is useful to assess these regional agreements for three reasons:  When taken together they 
reflect the trajectory of international water law from and after the adoption of the 1997 UN 
Watercourse Convention; all of them except one412 involve at least four State parties and feature 
more comprehensive efforts to address basin-wide challenges; and, finally, the agreements give 
special attention to the ecological needs of the concerned waterways and their surrounding 
environments.  The agreements display a deliberate effort to address environmental concerns, to 
treat watercourses as biologically rich, ecologically functioning systems rather than mere 
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channels for water conveyance, and to enhance the rights of States to participate in decisions 
affecting them and of parties harmed by unlawful acts to seek redress.   
Despite these forward steps long-lingering problems remain, particularly in the Berlin Rules.  
The Rules add various new environmental provisions—too many, it will be argued--but in the 
end leave largely untouched the dominant power of a State to make equitable and reasonable use 
of its waters, even when harm occurs to actors in other States and to the environment as such. 
The Rules give no overt protection to in-stream flow uses of waterways, including silt transport 
and the control of salinity intrusion.  With remarkable silence the Rules continue to ignore dams 
and reservoirs and their often calamitous consequences:  Such projects are covered in provisions 
calling for interstate cooperation but it is unclear whether and to what extent they are subject to 
the general rules governing waterway uses.  Still, the Berlin Rules incorporate important 
advances and their limitations highlight the ways that further change remains needed, both to 
maintain ecologically healthy waterways and to give fair treatment to vulnerable nations such as 
Bangladesh. 
 
The Berlin Rules:  An Overview 
 
The Berlin Rules on Water Resources, 2004 embrace a new paradigm of international water law 
in their heightened emphasis on ecological integrity, sustainability, public participation, and 
minimization of environmental harm—principles not clearly reflected in the Helsinki Rules and 
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only developed in fragmented ways in the UN Watercourse Convention.413 The Berlin Rules are, 
in effect, a revised version of the 1966 Helsinki Rules and likewise are non-binding in nature 
except insofar as they accurately present customary law.  Beginning in 1996, the International 
Law Association (ILA) undertook to reformulate the Helsinki Rules with the dual purposes of 
restating the contemporary customary norms and reflecting the progressive developments of 
international water law. The ensuing discussions took place during different ILA conferences.   
At its seventy-first conference held in Berlin the ILA gave final approval to the Berlin Rules and 
issued them as the latest authoritative expression of customary international law, this time 
applicable to all waters, national as well as international.  
The Berlin Rules incorporate the experiences over the decades since the Helsinki Rules were 
adopted.  They integrate the provisions of international environmental law, international human 
rights law, and international humanitarian law relating to war and armed conflict into the 
paradigm of shared water resources. The Rules provide, for the first time, specific provisions 
relating to the protection of all aquatic environments other than marine waters, including 
(nominally at least) the protection of ecological integrity and the maintenance of minimum 
ecological flows. The Berlin Rules also incorporate provisions relating to:  the rights of persons 
for access to water; public participation; regulation of groundwater; issues of navigation; and the 
protection of waters and water installations during war or armed conflict. Worth noting is that the 
Berlin Rules include within their scope both national and international waters, putting this 
document in sharp contrast with the Helsinki Rules and the UN Watercourse Convention, 
applicable only to transboundary waters. The Berlin Rules are more comprehensive and detailed 
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than their predecessors. They consist of 73 Articles and are divided into 14 chapters.  Chapter 1 
(Article 1-3) gives the document broad importance by applying the key parts of the Rules to all 
waters, national and international. Article 3 defines key terms used throughout the text of the 
Berlin Rules. Many terms are carried over with little change from the original Helsinki Rules.  
Others are entirely new, including the terms drainage basin, aquatic environment, ecological 
integrity, environment, environmental harm, groundwater, management of waters, sustainable 
use, and vital human needs. 
Chapter II (Article 4-9) sets forth general principles applicable to all waters:  the right of public 
participation, the obligation to use best efforts to achieve both conjunctive and integrated 
management of waters, and duties to achieve sustainability and minimization of environmental 
harm. Chapter III (Article 10-16) thereafter enumerates the basic principles applicable solely to 
international waters. After presenting the principles of participation and co-operation by the 
basin States the Chapter sets forth new versions of the two principles that dominated the 1997 
UN Convention: the right of States to engage in the equitable and reasonable utilization of water 
and the duty on States to take all appropriate measures to avoid significant transboundary harm. 
As considered below, the two principles are more tightly intertwined than in the UN Convention, 
with revisions that arguably weaken claims that the right to use water is more important than the 
duty to avoid harm. These two basic principles have again been developed in significant detail in 
the remaining chapters of the Berlin Rules. The refinements in the Rules applicable solely to 
international waters (principally found in chapters III, IX, and XI) pertain mostly to 
environmental protection and public participation. 
Chapter IV (Article 17-21) contains provisions relating to the rights of persons in the 
management of waters. This chapter begins by proclaiming the right of every person to 
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sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible, and affordable water to meet that individual’s 
vital human needs. This Chapter also lays down provisions requiring public participation and 
access to information, education to promote and encourage understanding of the rules, and 
protection of particular communities.  Further, it features an obligation for States to compensate 
persons or communities displaced by water projects or programs. 
Chapter V (Article 22-28), one of the most important chapters in the Berlin Rules, deals with the 
protection of aquatic environments. It requires States (i) to take all appropriate measures to 
protect the ecological integrity of waterways to the extent needed to sustain ecosystems 
dependent on particular waters, and (ii) to ensure flows adequate to protect at least minimal 
ecological integrity of the waters of a drainage basin. The Chapter also requires States to take 
steps to prevent the introduction of alien, harm-threatening species into aquatic environments 
and to keep hazardous substances out of the waters. Finally, Article 27 calls upon States to 
prevent, eliminate, reduce, or control pollution in order to minimize environmental harm. The 
Berlin Rules require the application of the precautionary approach in implementing all these 
provisions (but does not embrace polluter pays). Chapter VI (Article 29-31) requires States to 
undertake prior and continuing assessments of the impacts of programs, projects or activities that 
may significantly affect the aquatic environment, and lays down detailed procedures for the 
impact assessment process. Chapter VII (Article 32-35) sets forth obligations for cooperative and 
separate responses to extreme situations, including highly polluting accidents, floods and 
droughts. 
Another noteworthy element of the Berlin Rules is the inclusion of all groundwater within the 
regulatory scope of Chapter VIII (Article 36-42), which calls for the conjunctive management of 
water—that is, management that treats surface water and ground water as a single, 
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interconnected resource.  Up until 2004, groundwater was addressed at the international level 
mostly as an adjunct to surface waters.  In the Berlin Rules groundwater is considered both in 
general provisions governing aquatic environments and in its own chapter. The Berlin Rules 
attend, for the first time, to the distinct characteristics of groundwater and lay down specific 
principles and provisions for the management of aquifers. The Chapter makes it explicit that the 
Rules apply to all aquifers, whether or not an aquifer connects to surface waters or receives any 
significant contemporary recharge. 
Chapter IX (Article 43-49) of the Berlin Rules deals with navigation while Chapter X (Article 
50-55) addresses the protection of waters and water installations during war or armed conflict. 
Chapter XI (Article 56-67) on International Cooperation and Administration covers a number of 
procedural topics, including the exchange of information; notification of programs, plants, 
projects or activities and detailed procedures for such notification; the establishment of basin-
wide joint management; compliance review; and sharing of expenses. Chapter XII (Article 68) 
imposes responsibility upon States for breaches of international law relating to the management 
of waters or to the aquatic environment. Chapter XIII (Article 69-71).  It then sets forth various 
legal remedies, including a right for any person, public body, or non-governmental institution to 
obtain redress from any threat or actual injury related to the management of water or the aquatic 
environment in a State. The Berlin Rules end with chapter XIV (Article 72-73), which prescribes 
rules for the settlement of international water disputes by peaceful means, and if necessary, by an 
arbitral tribunal or a competent international court. 
 
Berlin Rules:  Breadth of Application 
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With this overview in place it is possible to evaluate the Berlin Rules in terms of its most 
significant provisions, seeking to identify the important strengths and limitations of the Rules. 
As noted in the overview, the Rules seek to bring together all customary international law 
dealing with waters.  They thus include navigational uses as well as nonnavigational ones and 
govern groundwater resources as well as surface waters.  Many of the environmental provisions 
also apply to water bodies, both surface and groundwater, located within a single State.  They 
thus push States to take steps to protect their internal water resources.  These are major advances. 
By applying many (though not all) of its provisions to waters within a State the Berlin Rules 
reach beyond the more limited provisions of the original Helsinki Rules and of the UN 
Watercourse Convention, which focused purely on transboundary problems. The broader reach 
reflects the reality that the international community is increasingly interested in sustaining the 
ecological of all waters (and lands), wherever located.  
A longstanding problem in water management has been the historic tendency to treat 
groundwater and surface water as separate resources, even though they are, in the vast majority 
of settings, hydrologically connected.  The solution, proposed for decades, has been to manage 
them together in what is termed conjunctive management.  The Berlin Rules, in a useful advance, 
press States to embrace conjunctive management.  Article 5, titled conjunctive management, 
instructs States to “use their best efforts” to manage all waters—“surface waters, groundwater, 
and other pertinent water”—in a manner that is “unified and comprehensive.”  Article 6 goes 
even further, prescribing “best efforts” to integrate water management with the management of 
other resources.  Thus, for instance, forests and farmlands should be managed so that rainfall 
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running off them does not degrade waterways; mining should be done so that chemicals and 
leachate do not contaminate rivers and lakes. 
The commentary clarifies the rationale of pronouncing these two management criteria 
(conjunctive management and integrated management) in two different articles, which is to 
promote more comprehensive and rational management of water resources. It mentions that 
conjunctive management is a subset of the more general rule of integrated management, and 
that the term conjunctive management integrates the management of surface waters, 
groundwater, and other waters (such as atmospheric water). Conjunctive management, 
therefore, means management of the waters of a drainage basin as a whole by a regime that 
takes into account the entire hydrologic cycle.  
Article 36 makes Chapter VIII dealing with groundwater applicable to all aquifers, including 
aquifers that do not contribute water to, or receive water from, surface waters or receive no 
significant contemporary recharge from any source. This stands in clear distinction with the 1997 
UN Watercourse Convention, whose provisions apply only to international watercourses—
systems of surface waters and groundwater constituting, by virtue of their physical relationship, a 
unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus.  Transboundary aquifers do 
receive special attention (Article 42).  
In general, all of the Berlin Rules apply to groundwater just as they do to surface water 
(Article 36.2).  Article 38 instructs States to manage groundwater using a precautionary 
approach (a novel phrasing of the precautionary principle); Article 40 similarly endorses the 
goal of sustainability, though noting that sustainability of an aquifer can be based on artificial 
recharge and admitting that there is no truly sustainable way to use an aquifer lacking any 
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significant natural recharge.  Article 41 adds specific protections for aquifers from pollution 
and degradation of “hydraulic integrity.” States are directed to “take special care” to prevent, 
eliminate, reduce or control pollution of all types.  Because groundwater often moves slowly 
and unpredictably, it is often vulnerable to environmental damage, thus requiring special steps 
to assure their protection. The commentary clarifies that these provisions add to, without 
subtracting from, the general obligations to protect the aquatic environment (Chapter V) and 
provisions responding to extreme situations (Chapter VII). 
 
Berlin Rules:  Right to Use versus Harm Avoidance 
 
As we have seen, earlier legal documents on international watercourses have tended to put, front 
and center, the conflict between the right of a State to make use of the watercourses and its 
obligation to do so in ways that do not significantly harm water uses in other States.  
Downstream States, as noted, have often wanted to give primacy to the harm-avoidance 
principle; upstream States have commonly given emphasis instead to the right to use water.  So 
central has this tension been in recent decades that readers of the Berlin Rules rightly wanted to 
know, as their first question, what stance the Rules took on it. 
Given that the Rules set out to summarize existing and emerging law, it is no surprise that this 
tension remains in the Rules and retains its position as the central organizing element of the 
Rules.  In subtle ways the Rules integrate these two principles even more strongly than had prior 
conventions and legal summaries, giving the impression that neither principle takes priority.  A 
closer look, however, particularly one that attends carefully to the commentary (which was not 
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formally adopted by the ILA), suggests that the right to use water equitably and reasonably 
remains dominant in the sense that all other considerations—including the environmental 
provisions as well as the duty to avoid harm—are largely factors that enter into a balancing-of-
interests calculation by the State making use of the water.  A State apparently can still proceed 
with a use of water, despite harm and despite environmental degradation, if the balance of all 
relevant factors tilts in that direction.  At the same time, the Rules include numerous provisions 
that a harmed party can draw upon to cast doubt on a harm-causing water use.  A State’s decision 
to move ahead with a particular water use can thus be challenged, perhaps successfully. 
The Berlin Rules introduce this tension in the interestingly titled Article 12, Equitable 
Utilization.  Its predecessor in the 1997 Convention, provided (in Article 5) that a State could 
“utilize an international water courses in an equitable and reasonable manner,” taking into 
account (as discussed in the last chapter) “the interests of the watercourse States concerned” and 
“consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.”  Earlier, the Helsinki Rules prescribed 
that a State was “entitled” to “a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the 
waters.” While Article 12 of the Berlin Rules retains the term “utilization” in its title, the 
language of the Article makes no use of that term.  The Article speaks not about the “equitable 
and reasonable utilization” but instead about the right of a State to “manage the waters of an 
international drainage basin in an equitable and reasonable manner.”  That management (as taken 
up below) should have “due regard for the obligation not to cause significant harm to other basin 
States.”  The term “manage” is defined in Article 3(14) of the Berlin Rules to include “the 
development, use, protection, allocation, regulation, and control of the waters.”  Governing law 
has thus moved from a focus on distinct “shares” for States in a waterway to the equitable and 
reasonable uses of waterways by States to (in the Berlin Rules) the power and duty of States to 
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manage their waters in ways that, overall, qualify as equitable and reasonable.414  The step taken 
in the Berlin Rules, while retaining the words equitable and reasonable, would seem to shift the 
focus away from particular water uses—evaluating them as discrete activities—and to dwell 
instead on a State’s overall water management approach, including the steps a State has taken to 
protect, regulate and control water uses.  Still, the drafters of the Rules sought to present this 
Article as if it were only a modest reformulation of the older right to use water—hence the 
Article title (“Equitable Utilization”) and the first sentence of the associated commentary: 
“Today the principle of equitable utilization is universally accepted as basic to the management 
of the waters of an international drainage basin.” 
As seen, this Article 12 requirement to manage the waters of an international drainage basin 
in an equitable and reasonable manner is subject to “having due regard for the obligation not 
to cause significant harm to other basin States.” The Helsinki Rules addressed the obligation 
to avoid harm only through the factors used in determining whether a State was taking more 
than its reasonable and equitable share (Article IV), although the Rules did include (in Article 
VIII) strong protection for existing water uses—a type of indirect ban on causing harm. The 
UN Convention added a separate article (Article 7) on the obligation to take “all appropriate 
measures” to avoid causing significant harm.  The Berlin Rules contain a similar harm-
avoidance provision, phrased in broader terms and, like the right-to-use provision, framed in 
terms of waterway management.  Article 16 provides that States, as they manage their waters, 
“shall refrain from and prevent acts of omissions within their territory that cause significant 
harm to another basin State.”  This constraint applies more broadly than its 1997 counterpart 
in that it extends well beyond harm caused by discrete water uses to cover “all acts of 
                                                 
414 Salman M. A. Salman, 636. 
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omissions” within a State, including, presumably, land-use practices and public policies that 
indirectly affect waterways.  At the same time, this broader ban on transboundary harm—no 
longer, importantly, framed in terms of taking “all appropriate measures”—is qualified 
expressly.  The duty to avoid harm now shall have “due regard for the right of each basin 
State to make equitable and reasonable use of the waterways.” 
In this manner, the Berlin Rules create a circular path.  The right to use (that is, to manage 
waters) must be undertaken with due regard for the duty to avoid harm, while the duty to 
avoid harm is limited by due regard for the right to manage waters equitably and reasonably.  
The Commentary on Article 12, Equitable Utilization, purports to clarify this circularity, in 
the process drawing upon language from the Helsinki Rules—language long jettisoned.  It 
states that “the right to an equitable and reasonable share” of a waterway “carries with it 
certain duties in the use of those waters.” The right to use, that is, is qualified.  But to make 
that generalization is to leave open the harder questions. When is resulting harm so 
significant, in relation to the benefits of a water use, that the use must end?  The tension 
remains. 
Perhaps the single-most important sentence in the lengthy commentary on the Berlin Rules 
sheds more light on this clash of basic principles.  The commentary to Article 12 adds that 
“the interrelation of these obligations”—the right to use/share versus duty to avoid harm—
“must be worked out in each case individually, in particular through the balancing process 
expressed in Articles 13 and 14.”  The ending point, then, is a multi-factor balancing effort.  
Article 14 provides little guidance on that balancing except to say that States, as they go about 
managing their waters, “shall first allocate waters to satisfy vital human needs,” which in turn 
are defined as immediate human survival and the immediate sustenance of a household” 
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(Article 3.13).  Otherwise, no water uses have priority, including, importantly, uses earlier in 
time.  It is Article 13 the sets forth the key balancing test, and as such it might well quality as 
the most important Article of the Rules.   
Article 13—“Determining an Equitable and Reasonable Use”—reverts back to the approach 
of the 1997 Convention by evaluating uses as discrete activities; it does not retain the focus of 
Article 12 on how a State manages its waters.  Article 13 features a long list of relevant 
factors to take into account in making the all-important determination—including the natural 
features of a watercourses, the population dependent on it, the social and economic needs of 
the basin States concerned, the effects of a use on uses in other States, existing and potential 
uses of the water, the availability of alternatives, and so on.  Section 3 of the Article makes 
clear that all factors should be assess together, with the “the weight of each factor . . .  
determined by its importance in comparison with other relevant factors.” Perhaps most 
critically, the list includes “the effects of the use or uses of the waters of the international 
drainage basin in one basin State upon other basin States.” The inclusion of this element as 
one of many factors implies—to those inclined to read it this way—to reduce the harm-
avoidance principle to the status of simply one of many factors used to evaluate whether a 
water use is equitable and reasonable.  In this regard the Berlin Rules track the 1997 
Convention almost exactly.  In the Convention, the obligation not to cause significant harm 
appears as a separate duty (Article 7), but it also shows up (in Article 6 (d)) as one of the 
various factors (fewer in number than in the Berlin Rules) used to evaluate whether a water 
use is equitable and reasonable.  
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Berlin Rules:  Environmental Provisions 
 
As the commentary to the Rules points out repeatedly, the Rules contain more numerous and, on 
the surface, stronger admonitions to States to manage and use their waters in ways that are 
environmentally sound.  All of the provisions apply to all waters, both national and international.  
In the case of national waters, they seem to apply directly and in full.  When it comes to 
international watercourses and interstate disputes, the picture, predictably, is less clear.  Some of 
the environmental provisions appear on the list of factors used to determine whether uses of 
international watercourses are equitable and reasonable.  Others seem to appear as freestanding 
obligations, leaving it to the accompanying commentary to explain how they fit together with the 
vital balancing test in the context of interstate disputes over waterways.   
Article 7 of the Berlin Rules sets forth the already settled customary international norm of 
managing all waters sustainably—or, more precisely, the duty to “take all appropriate 
measures” to manage waters in that way.  As explained in chapter 2, the essence of the idea of 
sustainability was implicit in the Stockholm Declaration, which later appeared in its own 
terms in the Brundtland Report,415 and then more cogently in the Rio Declaration. With the 
passage of time and with the evolution of State practices this obligation has now obtained the 
status of customary international law.  
The recognition of sustainability as a basic principle of international water law is essential to 
assure the effective balancing of development against important social, environmental, and 
                                                 
415 As the Brundtland Report summarized the concept, sustainability supports economic growth that “meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. 
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ecological values.416 Whether a particular pattern of development is sustainable depends upon 
a careful analysis of the circumstances under which the development takes place. According 
to the commentary, sustainability generally requires the conjunctive and integrated 
management of the waters of a basin and the limiting of withdrawals to the safe yield of the 
each water source.  The commentary further states that, at the least, sustainability requires 
viewing waters as parts of ecosystems that cannot be managed effectively except by giving 
careful attention to the intimate interconnections of the parts of the system. The importance of 
attempting to achieve sustainability requires caution in altering these ecosystems 
irremediably. Determining sustainability must remain a highly fact-specific analysis of the 
proper uses of a particular resource in a particular setting. The basic notions captured in the 
phrase “sustainable use” include that the needs of future generations as well as the present 
generation must be taken into account in resource planning and use, that all persons should 
have equitable access to the resources they need (so that resources, whether renewable or not, 
ought not to be exhausted), and that resource management must take place in an integrated 
manner.  
As a freestanding principle, the duty to take “all appropriate measures” to promote 
sustainability applies to the management and use of all waters, apparently without 
qualification.  It is not, as the commentary makes clear, an absolute duty imposed on States; 
the “all appropriate measures” language amounts to, according to the commentary, a due 
diligence standard.  In the case of interstate disputes even this due diligence standard seems to 
weaken.  Sustainability is listed as one of the nine factors (or categories of factors) used to 
                                                 
416 The International Law Commission’s (ILC) Commentary to Article 7 of the Berlin Rules. 
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evaluate water uses under Article 13.  As such, it gets weighed against the other factors, likely 
losing strength in the process.  
The second environmental provision is Article 8, which requires States to take all appropriate 
measures to prevent or minimize environmental harm. The provision has no exact or distinctly 
similar predecessor in either the Helsinki Rules or the UN Watercourse Convention.  As the 
commentary suggests, this Article reflects the emerging rule of customary international law 
regarding the duty of States to minimize environmental harm, and is intimately linked to 
sustainability, equitable utilization, and the avoidance of transboundary harm. The 
commentary quotes from the judgment of the Gabcíkovo-Nagymoros Project Case, where the 
ICJ recognized both the obligation of sustainability and the obligation of protecting the 
environment as new norms of international environmental law. 
The principle of minimization of environmental harm is not spoken of in absolute terms in the 
Berlin Rules.  As in the case of sustainability, the obligation is simply to take measures that 
are “appropriate.”  Again the commentary makes clear that this is a due diligence standard.417  
Drafter of the Rules, as they explain in the commentary, made no effort to define “appropriate 
measures.”  According to the commentary, they should include procedural obligations 
regarding notice and consultation, environmental impact assessment, and a balancing of the 
social, ecological, and financial costs of an activity, a balancing that takes account of (i) the 
ability of a State or States responsible for the activity to bear those costs, (ii) the importance 
or the need the activity is intended to satisfy, and (iii) the nature and extent of the benefits 
expected to be realized from the activity.418 
                                                 
417 The International Law Commission’s (ILC) Commentary to Article 8 of the Berlin Rules. 
418 Ibid. 
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Just as with sustainability, this environmental duty applies directly to water uses and 
management within a State.  In the case of interstate disputes, it too is listed as a factor to 
consider in assessing whether a water use is equitable and reasonable.  The likelihood, again, 
is that it will lose force when it must compete with other balancing-test principles that endorse 
intensive water uses. 
Chapter V, entitled “Protection of Aquatic Environments,” contains a suite of further 
environmental protection provisions, building on the two just discussed.  It begins, in Article 22, 
with an instruction that States take all appropriate measures to protect the ecological integrity 
necessary to sustain ecosystems dependent on particular waters. The ILC commentary stresses 
the importance of this protection by terming it “the most basic obligation of basin States” when it 
comes to protecting biotic communities that depend on waters (as most do).  “Ecological 
integrity” is defined in Article 3(6) as “the natural condition of waters and other resources 
sufficient to assure the biological, chemical, and physical integrity of the aquatic environment.” 
In environmental writing generally, integrity commonly refers to the full suite of animals and 
plants that inhabited a place before humans significantly disrupted it; as a normative standard, it 
refers to natural areas largely unaltered and used by people in any noticeable way.419  In the 
Berlin Rules, the term is defined quite differently, or at least it operates to require much less.  
According to the commentary, the Rules expect only that a State will protect “some minimal 
level of ecological integrity”—only the “measure of integrity necessary for the survival of 
ecosystems.”  The meaning of this language is far from clear. Ecosystems always survive:  They 
simply change in response to human activities, often shifting to lower levels of ecological 
                                                 
419 J. Michael Scoville, “A Defense of Integrity as a Conservation Concept,” Ethics & the Environment (October 
2016), DOI: 10.2979/ethicsenviro.21.2.04. 
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functioning and biological diversity.  The commentary further confuses the issue by stating that 
three forms of integrity—biological, chemical, and physical—are necessary for ecosystems “to 
continue to function.”  The trouble with these words is that integrity refers chiefly to the 
composition of an ecosystem, not to its ecological functioning, and in any event ecosystems 
always function in one way or another with lesser or greater levels of primary productivity.   
As to the customary nature of this obligation, the commentary reckons that it is a recent 
development in the international and national legal systems, but at the same time highlights the 
fact that it has rapidly gained general acceptance by the States—a fact that is substantiated by 
reference to the obligation in Article 1(a) of the Belgrade Rules on the Relationship of 
International Water Resources with other Natural Resources and Environmental Elements, and 
in Article 20 of the 1997 UN Convention. Further statements of similar duties are found in the 
1992 ECE Convention,420 the Ramsar Convention,421 and also in many other treaties and legal 
instruments relating to the environment—enough to establish the principle within international 
environmental law. 
In the end, the duty to take “all appropriate measures” to protect ecological integrity seems to 
have little force to it, so little that one wonders why it was included.  Aside from the ambiguity 
of the term as used, the commentary acknowledges that application of the principle will involve 
“the often difficult balancing of conflicting needs” and notes that,” to a significant extent,” the 
duty will be discharged “through fulfilling the obligations of other Articles” of the Rules.”  Still, 
the principle has been introduced and in time it may gain force.  
                                                 
420 Articles 2(2)(b), 2(5)(c), 2(7) of the Berlin Rules. 
421 The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Ramsar, Iran, 
February 2, 1971, U.N.T.S. 14583, https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280104c20 
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The fourth environmental provision in the Rules—the second in Chapter V—instructs States to 
embrace a “precautionary approach” as they go about implementing all of their obligations 
under the Rules.  This means taking “all appropriate measures” to prevent, eliminate, reduce, or 
control harm to the aquatic environment when there is a serious risk of significant adverse effect 
on or to the sustainable use of waters, even without waiting for conclusive proof of a causal 
relation between an act or omission and its expected effects.  The commentary refers to this as 
the precautionary principle—the more common phrasing—without explaining why the drafters 
used their more novel wording.   
The Berlin articulation of the precautionary principle is arguably stronger than the Rio 
formulation (considered in chapter 2) in the sense that Rio required States only to employ cost-
effective measures for preventing environmental degradation, while the Berlin Rules call for 
taking all appropriate measures to that effect.  (The commentary asserts that this phrasing is 
“somewhat stronger.”)  Regarding the customary nature of the principle, the commentary 
mentions that the precautionary principle has appeared in almost all international environmental 
instruments adopted since 1990, and that it has also been affirmed by the International Law 
Association in principle 4 of the New Delhi Declaration.  
Related to the ecological integrity provision is Article 24, which instructs States to take “all 
appropriate measures to ensure flows adequate to protect the ecological integrity” of waters.  
This sixth provision, despite its vagueness and lack of real force, interjects an important new 
element in watercourse law, a recognition that water flows in rivers, apart from any human use, 
are vital and need protection.  According to the commentary, the drafters used the term 
“ecological flows,” rather than the more commonly used “minimum flows,” to accentuate that 
the flows should be adequate to maintain ecological integrity.  Appropriately, the commentary 
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explains that the adequacy of ecological flows will take into account seasonal variations “and 
other attributes that mimic natural patterns of flow.”  Even as it introduces an important new 
element in watercourse law, the provision as written suffers from the same deficiencies as the 
direct call to protect ecological integrity.  Given that adequate flows are essential to ecological 
integrity, it is unclear why the content of Article 24 is not contained within Article 22.  
The next two environmental provisions, in Articles 25 and 26, can be covered more quickly.  
Nothing is more disruptive of the biological integrity of an ecosystem than the introduction of an 
alien species detrimental to that environment. Addressing that concern, Article 25 directs States 
to take “all appropriate measures to prevent the introduction of alien species into the aquatic 
environment if they may have significant adverse effects on that ecosystem.” This requirement 
finds its legal basis in the Biological Diversity Convention and other environmental agreements, 
including agreements on internationally shared fresh waters; a similar rule appeared in Article 22 
of the 1997 UN Watercourse Convention. The Berlin formulation of this requirement goes 
beyond the similar provision in the UN Convention by dropping any requirement that an alien 
species harm another basin State; it is enough if the species harms ecosystems within a State.  
Article 26 similarly requires “all appropriate measures” to prevent the introduction of hazardous 
substances into waters. The term “hazardous substances” is defined in Article 3(12) as 
substances that are bio-accumulative, carcinogenic, mutagenic, teratogenic, or toxic. By covering 
indirect as well as direct introductions the Article necessarily encompasses an obligation to 
regulate the storage, handling, or management of such substances.422 
                                                 
422 ILC Commentary to Article 26 of the Berlin Rules. 
217 
 
A more extended provision, Article 27, deals with pollution generally by imposing a general 
duty to “prevent, eliminate, reduce, or control pollution in order to minimize environmental 
harm.” Unlike related provisions of the Rules, the directive is not limited to “all appropriate 
measures” but is more absolute in form. On the other side, the notion of minimization of 
environmental harm implies permissibility of some degree of harm.  Environmental harm” is 
defined quite broadly in Article 3(8) to cover injury to the environment, including any other loss 
or damage caused by such harm, as well as the costs of reasonable measures to restore the 
environment (actually undertaken or to be undertaken). In States that have adopted water-quality 
standards, all appropriate measures should be taken to assure compliance with the standards.  As 
with the directive to control hazardous substances, this provision on pollution is not limited to 
pollution that harms another State (as was Article 21 of the UN Watercourse Convention); it 
applies also to pollution that stays within a State.  Pollution-control methods should include the 
use of “best available techniques” and “best environmental practices”; the latter term refers to 
efforts to prevent or reduce the effects of non-point sources of pollution, while “best available 
techniques” refers to techniques applied to prevent or reduce the effects of point sources of 
pollution.  This pollution control provision of Article 27 is supplemented in Article 28, which 
calls upon States to formulate and adopt water-quality standards sufficient to protect public 
health and the aquatic environment.  
The final major environmental provision (Article 29) calls upon States to undertake an 
environmental impact assessment of any program, project, or activity that could “have a 
significant effect on the aquatic environment or the sustainable development of waters.” The 
effect of the provision, overlapping with Article 23, is to endorse a cautionary approach in the 
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context of programs and projects.423  The impacts that are to be assessed include effects on 
human health and safety, on the environment, on existing or prospective economic activity, on 
cultural or socio-economic conditions, and on the sustainability of water uses. Article 31 gives 
guidance on the content of such assessments, including consideration of alternatives and possible 
mitigation measures.  With this provision the International Law Association has recognized that 
the environmental-assessment practice has crystallized into a rule of customary international law, 
at least insofar as transboundary effects are concerned.424 The World Bank has gone even beyond 
that and now requires prior assessments before considering a loan or grant, regardless of whether 
the project will have transboundary effects.425  
Before turning to other provisions of the Berlin Rules, particularly their important provisions 
dealing with interstate consultation and the rights of injured parties, it is useful to evaluate these 
environmental provisions as a whole.  The sheer number of the provisions, and the prominence 
given them, attest to a clear desire to push States to take better care of their aquatic 
environments.  As written, the Rules feature provisions and terminology that can be used to 
challenge an environmentally degrading action or program.  They interject a multiplicity of ways 
of thinking critically about projects and programs. Examined closely, however, most of the 
provisions are each greatly qualified.  As thus qualified they do have force with respect to 
practices and activities within a State affecting domestic waters, although one wonders how these 
provisions would be enforced and by whom.  In the context of interstate disputes and 
transboundary harms, in contrast, the provisions seem even weaker.  Two of them (sustainability; 
                                                 
423 Alexandre Kiss, and Dinah Shelton, International Environmental Law (New York: Transnational Publishers, 
Inc., 1994), 203.   
424 In Supplemental Rules on Pollution, art. 3, and in the New Delhi Declaration, principle 4.2. 
425 The World Bank, Operational Directive 4.01 (1991). 
219 
 
minimize environmental harm), as noted, merely join the long list of factors to be considered in 
assessing whether a water use is equitable and reasonable; as such, they can be sacrificed in the 
pursuit of economic development, particularly to bring water to those without it.  The two 
integrity provisions are weakened by the vague and apparently weak concept of integrity that 
they employ.   The hazardous substances and alien species provisions are weakened by a State’s 
need to undertake only “appropriate” measures. The precautionary principle could bring change 
though it too is sufficiently vague to make enforcement difficult.  The general pollution 
provision does seem to have force—indeed, it is the most strongly worded of the provisions—
and it stands out for having real content.  Also valuable is the impact assessment duty, 
particularly given the ways that information included in publicly accessible assessments can be 
put to use by opponents of a project or activity.  
At bottom, States whose practices harm other States retain a strong legal position under the 
Berlin Rules in that they can justify a wide range of harms by pointing to the multi-factor test 
used to evaluate particular water uses.  The general pollution and impact-assessment provisions 
provide some meaningful constraint.  But they seem to leave key problems unaddressed, 
including the major problems faced by Bangladesh.  The provision on ecological flows only 
begins to provide a foundation to challenge radical reductions caused by upstream diversions.  
Significantly, the Rules do not view in-stream uses by a nation such as Bangladesh—using the 
water for silt transportation and salinity control—as existing uses that deserve serious 
consideration.  (Such instream-flow uses are only recognized as watercourse uses in Article 15, 
which authorizes a State to use more than its equitable share of a water-flow if other States in the 
basin are not using their full shares.)   Similarly, there is no express recognition that surface 
water is being used when it recharges aquifers.  A water project that traps silt and thus interferes 
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with the downstream transport of the silt would seem to violate the ban on pollution.  (Silt 
removal would alter the composition of water flow, and thus seem to qualify as a polluting 
activity.)  But the pollution-prevention provision has not been used in that way and no doubt 
many would view this as a misuse of it. 
  
Berlin Rules:  Dams, Reservoirs, and Other Projects 
 
Perhaps the most serious omission of the Berlin Rules is its failure to provide clear guidance with 
respect to the consequences of dams, reservoirs, and other major projects.  Predecessor 
documents (conventions, law summaries) tended to put such projects to one side, calling for 
interstate consultation on them but not subjecting them to the various rules protecting against 
water-related harm.  Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Berlin Rules have little to say.  
But it would have helped if the commentary explained the situation clearly and highlighted the 
topic as a major deficiency of current law. 
As explained in the next section, the Berlin Rules do have extensive and, in many ways, 
impressive rules mandating international consultation and cooperation on watercourse 
management.  Prominent among them is the provision in Article 10, which recognizes the right 
of each State in a basin to participate in the management of waters in the basin.  This provision 
does not ban agreements between and among fewer than all States within a basin, but, as Article 
10 states clearly, “a [water] use by one or more basin States shall not cause a significant adverse 
effect on the right of or uses in another basin State without the latter State’s express consent.”  
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(The provision appears in the context of interstate agreements, but literally applies to a harm-
causing action taken by any State even without such an agreement.) 
The various notification and consultation provisions, taken alone, seem to suggest that a State 
such as Bangladesh needs to protect itself against big projects by neighboring States through 
negotiation processes.  It can, as of right, demand information and opportunities to be heard; it 
can demand that impact assessments be undertaken in advance absent some need for special 
urgency.  But in the end these provisions do not directly limit the power of States to construct big 
projects, even ones with calamitous effects. 
What is left unclear is whether big projects are subject to the other provisions of the Berlin 
Rules.  Big projects would seem to collide with many of them. Diversion projects radically 
reduce water flows and change their timing and temperature.  When silt is trapped in reservoirs 
downstream waterways and adjacent ecosystems are radically altered, in ways the greatly change 
their ecological integrity.  They would seem to run afoul of even loose limits on minimizing 
environmental harm.  Perhaps most of all they directly undercut existing and prospective uses of 
watercourses by downstream States.  How can these consequences not violate the general 
principles of the Rules? 
If these general provisions of the Berlin Rules were intended to apply to big projects, the drafters 
certainly should have said so and illustrated how they might apply.  If they were not intended to 
apply, then that fact should also appear, with a recognition that such projects—in many basins 
the main causes of degradation—have been given a pass to continue fostering degradation.  The 
drafters then should have issued a call to the lawmaking community to craft rules to govern 
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them.   International law will not adequately meet the needs of downstream, vulnerable States 
unless they are reasonably protected from the consequences of such projects. 
 
Berlin Rules:  Notification and Consultation 
  
Before taking up the provisions in the Rules expanding the rights of States to demand 
notification and opportunities to consult, a few more particular provisions can be quickly 
addressed.  Chapter VII of the Berlin Rules deals with extreme situations and requires States to 
prevent, reduce, eliminate, or control all conditions of waters, whether resulting from human 
conduct or otherwise, that pose a significant risk to human life or health, harm to property, or 
environmental harm. This Chapter represents another application of the duty to minimize 
environmental harm. Whenever any harmful water-related condition exists within the control of 
a State, the State must notify others and any competent international organizations of such 
condition.  A related provision in the same Chapter deals with floods and calls upon States to 
cooperate in developing and implementing flood control measures and to develop contingency 
plans.  A shortcoming of this provision is that it requires a State to show due regard for the 
interests of other States likely to be affected by the flooding but includes no similar concern for 
the adverse environmental impacts that might ensue from flood-control measures. Chapter X 
incorporates provisions about protecting water and water installations during armed conflict or 
war, putting water projects, dams, levees, and the like off limits as military targets. It bans the 
poisoning of water supplies vital for civilian consumption as well as water diversions when long-
term, widespread harm would ensue. 
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Several provisions of the Berlin Rules push States in the direction of greater cooperation on 
watercourse issues. Article 10, already mentioned, gives States the right to participate in 
managing basin-wide affairs and protects them again harm when they are not included in 
regional agreements.  Article 11 sets out a broad duty of all States to cooperate with one another 
in managing basins for mutual benefit.  Article 56 imposes detailed duties on States to regularly 
provide to other States information on their waters, water uses, pollution sources, plans, projects 
and activities.  Indirectly a State can get even more information by participating in 
environmental impact assessments within another State; Article 18 makes environmental impact 
information available to those who participate in the process, and citizens of another State can 
(under Article 30) participate, just as fully as local citizens, if the nonnative person is “under a 
serious threat of suffering damage” from the program or project being assessed.  Article 57 
imposes broad duties on a State to notify “promptly” other States “or competent international 
organizations” that they might be affected significantly by a program or project; Article 60 adds 
to that by giving the affected State the right to demand an impact assessment.  Article 58 puts 
forth a similarly broad duty for States to consult with one another and with competent 
international organizations on “actual or potential issues,” not just proposed or on-going projects.  
Articles 64 and 65 encourage joint management agreements and set forth minimum requirements 
for them. 
These various provisions go far toward facilitating cooperation and consultation.  In the end they 
do not compel any State to refrain from a given water use.  But they do shed considerable 
international light on activities and increase the ability of outsiders to gain information and 
interject complaints.  They are, by and large, simply procedural provisions, but they interject 
procedures that no doubt will often lead to different final decisions. 
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Berlin Rules:  Enforcement 
 
In one of its most consequential provisions, Article 68, the Berlin Rules provide that States are 
responsible for their violations of international law relating to watercourses or the aquatic 
environment “in accordance with the international law of State responsibility.”  The Rules do not 
set forth, or even summarize briefly, that separate law of responsibility; doing so, the 
commentary adds, would be “beyond the scope of these Rules.”  Plainly, States are subject to 
challenge and suit in a court of competent jurisdiction if they fail to abide by mandatory 
requirements.  To that extent the Rules have teeth. 
Article 69 goes further to state that any injured party and anyone under a serious threat of harm 
can file suit in the courts of the State in which the harm originates or might originate.  The 
Article expands the range of possible plaintiffs to include “public bodies and non-government 
organizations with a proven interest regarding waters or the aquatic environment.”  Individual 
persons who are harmed by actions within their home State have the right to seek redress in their 
courts (Article 70).  Going much further, Article 71 requires a State to open its courts to 
outsiders—to citizens of other States and public bodies and non-governmental organizations 
from other States who either are suffering or face a serious threat of suffering (in the case of an 
individual) or have a proven interest in waters or the aquatic environment (in the case of a public 
body or nongovernmental organization).  
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These various enforcement provisions provide further evidence of the ways that international law 
is gaining ground in the context of interstate watercourse disputes.   The customary international 
law rules put forth in the Berlin Rules, far more than preceding documents, set forth a body of 
law that is binding on States apart from any treaty, convention or other agreement to which a 
State might have expressly agreed.  The binding rules, as explained, are often vague and loose.  
But they do exist and, to the extent the Rules are accepted as customary law, do have force.  
States can be held accountable.  
  
Other International Agreements 
 
This extended consideration of the Berlin Rules is usefully supplemented by quick looks at some 
of the more prominent regional agreements entered into over the past few decades.  They too 
give a sense of where international law is heading, and thus provide useful materials both for a 
critique of that law and for reform proposals.  They are drawn upon in chapter 7, which steps 
back from the various international and regional agreements to identify critically the major 
trends in the international law of watercourses. 
The only truly international watercourse conventions now in force are the two considered in the 
last chapter—the UN Watercourse Convention (1997; in force 2005), and the 1992 ECE 
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 
recently opened for signing by all States.  Neither of these has attracted as many as forty 
ratifying States.  This means that, for most States, the only binding agreements are regional ones. 
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In the case of States that are parties to the UN Convention, regional agreements also provide 
opportunities to fine-tune the general principles and, if they choose, to impose stronger duties.  
The history of international water treaties dates as far back as 2500 BC, when the two Sumerian 
city-states of Lagash and Umma crafted an agreement ending a water dispute along the Tigris 
River.426 Since then, a vast body of water treaties has evolved around the globe. The Food and 
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations has documented more than 3600 international 
water treaties dating from AD 805 to 1984.427 Most of these agreements concern navigational 
issues.  With increasing attention to non-navigational uses, more agreements from the last 
century have addressed water as a limited and consumable resource. The Transboundary 
Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) project of Oregon State University identified more than 
400 water agreements signed since 1820.428 That does not mean, however, that all of the world’s 
international river basins are covered by an agreement.  Many of them are not, and the extent, 
depth, and scope of regional agreements varies widely.429 On the other end, one single river, the 
Danube, has been the subject of at least 22 bilateral and multilateral accords.430 
Most early agreements included provisions relating to navigation, boundary delineation or 
fisheries.  By the twentieth century agreements commonly dealt also with water allocation, 
hydropower, flood control, and other water resource-based uses.  The trend to pay attention to 
environmental issues as such—to reach beyond utilitarian uses of the international rivers—
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largely began after the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
in 1992.  
The University of Maryland’s Harrison Program on the Future Global Agenda conducted a 
detailed study of the content of international river agreements for the period of 1980 to 2000.431 
The study consulted a final set of sixty two such agreements paying particular attention to the 
core principles of the 1997 UN Convention, including that of environmental protection.432 Out of 
62 agreements, 44 of them (71% of the data sample) mentioned environmental protection as an 
agreement objective; 19 of them (31%) had the environment as the primary focus while 42 of 
them (68%) had specific clauses relating to environmental protection.433 Overall, the 
environment was the second most frequently addressed issue after a requirement for consultation 
(82%), and consultation was often envisioned as a way to deal with environmental problems 
from watercourse projects.  The study further divided the data set into two time periods (1980 – 
1991 and 1992 – 2000) to examine patterns of temporal variation. It found that environmental 
protection provisions were more common during the second time frame (1992 – 2000).  
Seventeen agreements had environmental protection as one objective during the first decade, a 
number that increased to 27 during the last eight years. Similarly, 6 agreements in the Eighties 
listed environmental protection as the agreement’s main purpose, while 13 agreements did so in 
the Nineties. Environmental protection now receives greater attention, most likely due as much 
or more to the general upsurge in environmental concerns since the 1992 Earth Summit as it does 
to concerns about problems in specific river basins.434  
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Considered here are a few regional agreements entered into since 1992 that reflect these trends.  
They illustrate the creativity of States in formulating treaty provisions to meet the unique 
hydrological, political, and cultural realities of those particular basins. 
The Convention on the Protection of the Rhine, 1999.435 The Convention on the Protection of the 
Rhine was entered into by Switzerland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the 
European Commission on April 12, 1999.  Its objectives are to step up multilateral cooperation 
on sustainable development of the Rhine’s ecosystem, protect the flora and fauna in the river and 
on its banks, improve sediment quality, prevent flooding using ecologically sound means, meet 
drinking-water needs, and help restore the North Sea.  
The Convention takes account of the natural functioning of the Rhine River as it interacts with 
groundwater and alluvial areas. Its provisions apply equally to groundwater and to the aquatic 
and terrestrial ecosystems that interact with the Rhine or whose interactions with the Rhine could 
be re-established.  More broadly it deals with the entire Rhine catchment area, as far as pollution 
within it adversely affects the river and as needed for flood prevention.436 Overall the 
Convention aims at achieving sustainable development of the Rhine ecosystem in multiple ways:  
by maintaining and improving the quality of the Rhine's waters (including the quality of 
suspended matter, sediments and ground water); by protecting the population of organisms and 
species diversity; by preserving, improving and restoring the natural function of the stream; by 
ensuring sound flow characteristics taking into account the natural bed-load discharge and 
favoring the interactions between river, groundwater and alluvial area; by maintaining, 
protecting and reactivating alluvial areas as natural floodplains; by maintaining, improving and 
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restoring natural habitats for wild animals and plants in the water, on the river bottom and river 
banks as well as in adjacent areas, by improving living conditions for fish and the restoration of 
their free migration; by ensuring ecologically sound management of water resources; and by 
taking ecological requirements into account when developing the waterway, e.g., in the field of 
flood protection, shipping and the use of hydroelectric power. 
The Rhine Convention establishes an arrangement among States solely for environmental 
protection of the Rhine River and its catchment areas.  While it fosters and protects many 
watercourse uses, it envisions no development of the River except as needed to meet drinking 
water needs. 
The Convention on the Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika, 2003.437 This is a 
Convention among Burundi, Congo, Tanzania and Zambia to conserve the biological diversity of 
Lake Tanganyika and its basin and to promote the sustainable use of its natural resources. The 
Convention establishes sustainable development as the core principle guiding development of the 
Lake’s resources and uses the precautionary principle to promote preventive measures to 
forestall development impacts that pose environmental dangers.438 The Convention expressly 
recognizes Lake Tanganyika as a “shared heritage” of the riparian States with all States 
legitimately involved in its conservation and equitable utilization. 
Like other freshwater agreements, this Convention promotes efforts to control pollution. It goes 
further to give uncommon attention to the issues of sedimentation and biological diversity. The 
Convention calls for preventing all causes of excessive sedimentation by way of deforestation, 
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land degradation, destruction of wetlands, and otherwise.439  The preamble re-affirms the 
importance of conserving biological diversity set by the 1992 Convention.  It requires signatory 
States to develop, adopt, implement and enforce all appropriate measures to conserve rare, 
fragile and representative ecosystems and imperiled species and populations of flora and fauna.  
It further requires States to prevent the introduction of exotic species that may threaten the 
ecosystems, species, and genetic resources of the Lake basin.440 
The Convention is particularly wide-ranging in its embrace of general principles to help achieve 
its lofty aims.  It specifically endorses the principle of preventive action, the principle of 
participation, the polluter pays principle, and the principle of fair and equitable benefit-sharing in 
the use of the Lake and its resources. Of some note, the Convention title refers to “management” 
of Lake Tanganyika, not to its “development.”  Management implies more of a duty-oriented, 
coordinated oversight than does the word development.  
The Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River, 
1994.441 The Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube 
River, generally referred to as the “Danube River Protection Convention” or “DRPC,” is a 
Convention among the Danube basin States that was signed in Sofia, Bulgaria, in 1994 and came 
into force in October 1998. The Convention establishes a framework for bilateral or multilateral 
cooperation to protect the aquatic environment of the Danube River.  It promotes the 
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conservation, improvement, and rational use of water resources of the Danubian States by 
establishing the International Commission for the Protection of the river Danube. 
The Convention is mostly modeled after the 1992 EEC Convention in its provisions addressing 
pollution.  It endorses the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle, and the principle 
of sustainable management.  The Convention requires State parties to undertake specific water-
resources protection measures for the prevention or reduction of transboundary impacts; it 
defines transboundary impacts as any significant adverse effect on the riverine environment, 
resulting from a change in the conditions of waters caused by human activity, which extends 
beyond the jurisdiction of the impact-producing State. According to the applicable Convention 
provision, such impacts may affect life and property, the safety of facilities, or the aquatic 
ecosystems concerned.  
The Convention applies to the entire catchment area of the Danube River and deals broadly with 
water-related construction projects of all types, with water withdrawals and transfers, with water 
power utilization, with run-off issues, and with water storage-level control. In brief sections it 
addresses environmental impacts including deterioration in the hydrological conditions, erosion, 
abrasion, inundation and alterations in sediment flows.442  
The Convention puts central emphasis on sustainable water management.  It calls for 
environmentally sound development that maintains the overall quality of life, sustains access to 
natural resources, avoids lasting environmental damage, and protects ecosystems—all using a 
preventive, precautionary-type approach.  Particular provisions protect against water-quality 
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harms due to planned activities and call for steps to identify and protect the various biotope 
elements of the riverine ecosystems.443 
Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
(Revised), 2000.444  This is a Protocol among fourteen South African States (Angola, Botswana, 
Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) designed to foster closer cooperation for  the 
judicious, sustainable, and coordinated management, protection and utilization of shared 
watercourses. Given that much of Southern Africa relies on agriculture for subsistence, water is 
of special concern for the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Many 
watercourses in the region are shared among several member States, a situation that demands 
their development in an environmentally sound manner. To this end, the SADC initially passed 
its Protocol on Shared Watercourses on August 28, 1995; it was amended in August 2000. 
In the Protocol, member States agree to cooperate on projects and exchange information on 
shared watercourses, consulting with each other and collaborating on initiatives that balance 
development of watercourses with conservation of the environment. The Protocol resembles the 
UN Watercourse Convention of 1997 in terms of setting out principles governing water use and 
their protection. It requires signatory States to undertake, with respect to a shared watercourse, 
all measures that are necessary to protect and preserve the aquatic environment, including 
estuaries.445 On pollution, it asks parties to prevent, reduce and control such pollution and 
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environmental degradation of a shared watercourse causing significant harm to other watercourse 
States or to their environment, including harm to human health or safety, to the use of the waters 
for any beneficial purpose or to the living resources of the watercourse.446 It further calls upon 
States to take all appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate conditions related to a shared 
watercourse that may be harmful to other watercourse States, whether resulting from natural 
causes or human conduct, such as floods, water-borne diseases, siltation, erosion, salt-water 
intrusion, drought or desertification.447 As an aid to carrying out all these obligation the Protocol 
establishes an institutional framework to oversee the joint protection and development of the 
region’s shared watercourses. 
Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, 
1995.448  This is an Agreement among Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Viet Nam, entered into in 
1995 for continuing cooperation in the sustainable development, utilization, conservation and 
management of the Mekong River Basin and its water resources. The Agreement has, as its 
broader overarching goal, collaboration in the fields of irrigation, hydropower, navigation, flood 
control, fisheries, timber floating, and recreation and tourism.  Along with promoting these 
watercourses uses the Agreement seeks to protect the environment, natural resources, aquatic life 
and conditions, and ecological balance of the Mekong River Basin from pollution or other 
harmful effects.449 It recognizes the Mekong River Basin and its natural resources as immensely 
valuable for the economic and social well-being of all people in the Basin. 
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The Agreement requires State parties to make every effort to avoid, minimize, and mitigate 
harmful effects that might occur to the environment—especially to water quantity and quality, to 
the aquatic (eco-system) conditions, and to the ecological balance of the river system—from the 
development and use of the Mekong River Basin water resources or from discharge of wastes 
and return flows. The Agreement is among the very few water agreements in Asia to specifically 
address water flows by protecting mainstream flows from diversions, storage releases, or other 
actions of a permanent nature.450 The Agreement also binds parties with a stricter obligation to 
halt a water use or discharge when there is valid evidence of substantial damage to other 
riparians.451 
Agreement between the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania and the Government of 
the Republic of Macedonia for the Protection and Sustainable Development of Lake Ohrid and 
its Watershed, 2004.452  Signed in 2004, this Agreement between Albania and Macedonia 
exhibits how far States can go in managing a shared resource such as water. This Agreement 
describes Lake Ohrid as a site of exceptional scientific, aesthetic, and cultural value, along with 
its economic and environmental significance.  It seeks to protect all of these values while also 
promoting the watershed’s sustainable development.  (In 2014, Lake Ohrid and nearby Lake 
Presba were named a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve, fueling tourism that now threatens water 
quality).  
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The Agreement’s broad range of concerns is discernible in the diverse range of international 
agreements or conventions that it recalls in the preamble; i.e. the Convention concerning the 
Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage,453 the UN Convention on Biological 
Diversity,454 the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, especially as Waterfowl 
habitats (the Ramsar Convention),455 the Convention on  Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context (the Espoo Convention),456 The Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (The 
Aarhus Convention),457 the Convention on the Conservation of Wild Flora and Fauna and their 
Habitats in Europe (The Berne Convention)458 and the Convention on the Conservation of the 
Migratory Species (The Bonn Convention).459 
The Agreement’s various provisions underscore the need for a holistic approach to protecting 
water quality and conserving the integrity of terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems of the Lake Ohrid 
watershed.  The subject matters of the provisions range from pollution to biological diversity to 
cultural values. Environmental provisions require parties to prevent and control pollution; protect 
soil from erosion, depletion, infections and pollution; protect biodiversity, especially endemic, 
rare, threatened or endangered species; prevent the introduction and breeding of non-indigenous 
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animal and plant species; ensure the sustainable use of natural resources of the watershed; avoid 
serious damage to cultural values and natural landscapes; and prevent and control economic 
activities that could harm the Lake Watershed. To these ends, the Agreement requires both 
parties to faithfully apply the environmental standards; to monitor environmental conditions in 
the Lake and its watershed; and to honor the rights of individuals to obtain environmental 
information, participate in decision making, and obtain justice for environmental matters  
Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin, 2002.460  The Framework Agreement on the 
Sava River Basin was concluded between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and 
Yugoslavia to enhance cooperation in the sustainable development of the Sava River Basin and 
to establish an international regime of navigation on the Sava River. While the Agreement 
addresses navigation at length, it also promotes sustainable water management and protects the 
River Basin from various harms.  
 Sustainable water management in the Agreement means the integrated management of 
surface and ground water resources in ways that preserve, protect, and improve aquatic 
ecosystems (including flora and fauna and ecosystems of natural ponds and wetlands) while 
protecting against the detrimental effects of water (flooding, excessive groundwater, erosion and 
ice hazards). The Agreement requires parties to foster ecological integrity and to reduce harmful 
transboundary impacts, with “transboundary impact” defined as any human-caused adverse 
effect on the river environment that stretches beyond the jurisdiction of State where the action 
takes place. In order to achieve that purpose, the Agreement requires each party to have a 
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protocol on the issuance of specific regulations (licenses, permits and confirmations) for 
installations and activities that may have such a transboundary impact. 
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PART IV: A Path to Justice and Environmental Health 
Chapter 7: Directions, Currents, and Issues 
 
This final part of the dissertation builds upon the preceding chapters to isolate and evaluate 
critically the chief ongoing trends in the law of watercourses and then to offer proposals for 
reform taking into account the needs of vulnerable, downstream States.  This body of law 
remains in its adolescence, even as a few longstanding issues—navigation on rivers in 
particular—have largely been resolved and as many central principles have gained the status of 
customary norms.  The law has become a repository for widely differing principles, many added 
within the past quarter century in an effort to enhance the law’s attention to ecological concerns, 
to force greater international cooperation, and to curtail watercourse uses that are in some 
general sense not reasonable. The new principles and provisions, however, fit together rather 
poorly, creating considerable internal tension.  Further, while they push the law in good 
directions they do not push it as far as it needs to go.  Environmental rules need greater force if 
the world’s rivers are to regain their ecological health; the environment in some sense needs to 
come first, with watercourse uses allowed only insofar as consistent with that health.  Similarly, 
basin-wide management—a goal identified now for several decades—is unlikely to come about 
so long as locally strong States can dominate their weaker neighbors.  In all likelihood, more 
rules need to be put in place at the international level and not left to local negotiations among 
States with widely varied negotiating strength.  As for local management, shared governance 
need not mean one vote for each State, regardless of size.  But undue power cannot fairly go to 
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States simply because they reside upstream, giving them not just an earlier opportunity to divert 
water but immunity from many of the harms caused by diminished and altered water flows. 
The proliferation of principles and ideas in the body of law reflects clear dissatisfaction with it, 
particularly as it existed circa 1990.  They display uncertainty about the relative roles of binding 
international law and regional agreements. Dams and reservoirs still largely remain off to the 
side while pollution control measures have not yet been reconciled with longstanding principles 
of watercourse utilization except (under some conventions) as they directly control discrete 
pollution sources. As will be seen, important omissions in the current law include physical 
modifications of watercourses, land-cover change, and drainage practices, which in combination 
are likely more important forces of waterway degradation than are discrete pollution sources.   
 
Issues & Main Trends 
 
Growing recognition of international watercourses as individual units. The first distinct trend, a 
positive one, is the increasing recognition of international watercourses as coherent, individual 
units based on drainage basins.  To treat a watercourse as an individual unit is to recognize its 
physical unity and indivisible nature despite the presence of political boundaries. This sense of 
physical individuality of rivers has important implications.  It strikes at our age-old assertion of 
territorial and sovereign division of watercourses, calling into question assertions of State power 
based on the fragmentation of watercourses.  It recasts such watercourses as shared and common 
resources calling for joint management by all riparian nation States concerned—for 
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homogeneous policy and management throughout an entire basin rather than differential 
treatments to different political segments of a river.  
This idea of “oneness of rivers” marks a clear divergence from the once-popular principles of 
absolute territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity. As explained, these doctrines 
have given way to more moderate and forward-looking theories; i.e. limited territorial 
sovereignty and the concept of community of interest. The principle of limited territorial 
sovereignty, largely dominant today, requires the sharing of watercourses and imposes a vague 
but important limit on transboundary harm. This principle, however, falls short of treating an 
international watercourse as a single unit.  Greater movement in that direction is reflected in the 
community-of-interest principle, promoted by judgments of the ICJ and also by recent 
international documents and regional agreements that honor rivers as shared treasures.                                                                                                                                         
The community-of-interest principle extends the interests of all riparian countries to the whole 
course of a waterway, reflecting its natural, physical unity.461 The idea underlying the 
principle—that freshwater is something that should be shared by the community—is hardly new; 
it was historically embraced by Roman and Greek philosophers and poets. The Permanent Court 
of International Justice (PCIJ) revived and endorsed this understanding, reframing it as a 
community-of-interest principle, in its decision, Territorial Jurisdiction of the International 
Commission of the River Oder.462  That ruling had to do with a navigable river, which the 
tribunal described as a “single waterway” even as it ran through and along different political 
boundaries.463 How far the course meant to apply this doctrine was a bit unclear:  Did it apply 
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also to non-navigable river segments and to the full range of uses in addition to navigation?  (The 
tribunal may have meant this when it grounded it ruling in “the principles governing 
international fluvial law in general.”464) Later on, the community-of-interest principle as applied 
to non-navigational uses of a watercourse appeared clearly in the judgment of the ICJ in the case 
concerning the Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project (Hungary / Slovakia).465  
The community- or unity-of-interest principle was endorsed in the 1997 U.N. Convention, which 
defines a watercourse as “a unitary whole,” even as the Convention, as discussed earlier, vested 
States individually with the power to use a watercourse unilaterally and did not mandate shared 
governance. The principle was implicit also in the Convention’s reframing of “equitable and 
reasonable utilization” to require that water uses by one State take account of the interests of 
other States and be “consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse” (Article 5)—with 
watercourse, again, understood as a single whole. Other implicit references appear in provisions 
establishing joint management mechanisms or commissions; setting joint water-quality 
objectives and criteria; requiring joint protection and preservation of the ecosystems; entailing 
joint prevention, reduction and control of the pollution of an international watercourse; and 
calling upon States to take steps for harmonizing national policies to that effect.  
This community-of-interest idea relates to and reinforces the duty of cooperation. More than 70 
years ago, Professor Herbert Smith concluded that, because of the shared nature of water as a 
natural resource, a duty to cooperate arises that underlies all other rights and duties pertaining to 
water management. The first principle for Smith was that every river system is naturally an 
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indivisible physical unit, which, as such, should be developed so as to render the greatest 
possible service to the whole human community which it serves, regardless of State boundaries. 
Noticeably, Smith stressed the unity of the river to promote “development” of this shared and 
finite resource; today’s language tends to stress benefit-sharing, with or without development. A 
similar shift in focus, from the narrow approach of allocating a finite resource to the sharing of 
rivers understood as single wholes, appears in strategic priority seven of the World Commission 
on Dams Report (considered below).466  
This first trend in international watercourses law, while distinct and strong, has by no means 
swept away alternative views more inclined to divide river flows and authorize unilateral State 
action.  Most relevant here, the newer line of thinking has made little appearance in the bilateral 
agreements in South Asia.  
Growing international governance of shared watercourses.  Along with this recognition of the 
wholeness of rivers and river basins has come a shift toward increased governance of 
watercourses at the international level, restricting State liberties and displacing local flexibility.  
Many of the emerging, global rules of law—customary and convention-based—have dealt (as we 
have seen) with environmental and human rights concerns, rules that further illustrate the 
growing international inclination to preserve shared resources through cooperative management.  
International governance has spread in three ways:  through legal standards set at the 
international level, by increased institutionalization, and through an expanding role for 
international dispute resolution. 
                                                 
466 The Report mandates riparian States to go beyond looking at water as a finite commodity to be divided and 
embrace an approach that equitably allocates not the water, but the benefits that can be derived from it.  
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The rise of international standards is perhaps most evident in the expansion of international 
customary law.  This is best seen through the many provisions of the Berlin Rules, which purport 
to state principles that are or will soon be legally binding on States.  To the extent the Berlin 
Rules are accepted as binding law, they represent a significant shift of lawmaking power to the 
international level.  The 1997 UN Convention and the 1992 ECE Helsinki Convention, although 
binding only on signatories, are slowly expanding their international reach as more States 
commit to them. These conventions are particularly significant because they include provisions 
that are more precise than the broad principles of customary law and thus more restrictive of 
State and regional flexibility.  Precision is even more evident in regional agreements, some of 
which—the Rhine Convention, the SADC Convention—cover numerous States.   
The trend toward increased institutionalization is evident at the regional level, with the 
emergence of various types of jointly run organizations to structure interstate discussions and, in 
some instance, manage particular interstate water bodies.  Along with the increase in numbers 
has been a broadening in the scope of functions and powers.  The earliest institutions were set up 
to deal mostly with navigation and fishing rights. Later ones soon began to address issues such as 
hydropower generation, irrigation activities, flood control, environmental protection, and, in 
general, the joint and coordinated management of shared water resources. Today, their 
competencies in a few settings include the adoption of new standards and guidelines, brokering 
of negotiations, and information collection and dissemination.  Such regional governance 
arrangements have been encouraged by the more broadly applicable conventions – the 1992 ECE 
(Helsinki) Convention and the 1997 U.N. Convention.467   
                                                 
467 L. Boisson de Chazournes, “The Role of Diplomatic Means of Solving Water Disputes: A Special Emphasis on 
Institutional Mechanisms” in the PCA/Peace Palace Papers, Vol 5 of Resolution of International Water Disputes 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law, 2003), 91-110. 
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Regional organizations and commissions vary from one basin to another and from one region to 
another.  In general they serve as forums for information exchange, dialogue, and cooperation 
among the basin countries.468 Some are also entrusted with resolution of disputes in the event any 
conflict or disagreement arises. One general trend is toward expansions of the tasks and powers 
vested in such organizations.  Another is toward harmonization in that regional institutional 
arrangements that now commonly include similar provisions, including calls for integrated 
management and provisions for the exchange of notice and information in case of planned 
measures.  
The third trend toward enhanced international governance has to do with the international 
resolution of disputes—more disputes are being heard today by international tribunals or 
arbitrations than it was done decades ago, and with disputes involving larger numbers of issues.  
Related to this has been an increase in the involvement of non-state actors in water-related 
disputes, including international intergovernmental organizations, financial or investment 
institutions, and non-governmental organizations.  Disputes are now often heard by independent 
institutions dedicated for that purpose; such as locally constituted joint commissions and basin 
institutions (mostly set up by regional agreements), by separate fact-finding commissions, 
through international arbitrations, and by international formal dispute resolution bodies such as 
the International Court of Justice.  Along with their informal modes of dispute resolution, 
regional joint institutions and commissions are likely to play an increasing role in managing and, 
more importantly, preventing disputes. Alongside these there still exists the practice of referring 
disputes to more formalized international avenues like the ICJ and the PCA (Permanent Court of 
                                                 
468 Laurence Boisson De Chazournes, Fresh water in international Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
176. 
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Arbitration).  As for non-state forums, the Indus River Treaty between India and Pakistan 
designates the World Bank to serve as an independent party to facilitate dispute resolution.469 
International governance, particularly when matched with international dispute resolution, 
reduces the power and flexibility of individual States and weakens the power of States in 
stronger negotiating positions.  Still, many disputes—such as those involving Bangladesh—arise 
outside the context of any regional agreement or international convention.  Customary law still 
applies, to the extent it is recognized.  But no special dispute resolution mechanism exists nor is 
there, more importantly, any strong way to enforce judgments or arbitration awards.  Indeed, in 
this area of international law as elsewhere, no strong mechanisms exist to enforce compliance 
with international law, just as no formal means exist to monitor compliance.  This lack of 
effective enforcement necessarily weakens the force of the governing rules.  
The evolving tension between equitable and reasonable water use and the duty to avoid 
significant harm. As explained, watercourse law, as it applies to non-navigable uses, 470 centers 
around the rights of States to make equitable and reasonable use of water and the corresponding 
duty to avoid significant harm. How these principles fit together, and whether one or the other 
enjoys dominance, remains a lively topic.  The trend, as noted in the discussion of the Berlin 
Rules, has been for lawmakers to make ever clearer that the right to use water is a conditional 
right, conditioned on the avoidance of harm.  More and more limits—many of them 
environmental—are imposed on the longstanding right to water use.  Still, even as the new 
provisions are added, the tendency remains to talk about water law as if the new provisions were 
                                                 
469 The Indus River Treaty, India - Pakistan, Karachi, September 19, 1960, accessed April 18, 2017, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHASIA/Resources/223497-
1105737253588/IndusWatersTreaty1960.pdf. 
470 This includes the UN Watercourse Convention, other non-binding works of international scholarly bodies, 
various regional and bilateral agreements, judgments by international courts and tribunals, scholarly writings etc.  
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all subordinate to the central, two-part clash, and the issue remains:  Which of the two enjoys 
dominance?  When disputes arise they remain framed, in many instances, in terms of this 
dichotomy and disputing parties present their cases by endorsing one side or the other.  Scholars 
also often keep the dichotomy as the law’s central organizing feature. 
In an important way the history of this body of law can be traced in terms of this central tension.  
The tension was put in place in the original Helsinki Rules of 1966, which formulated the 
principles in such a way that equitable and reasonable utilization was the more dominant. During 
the ILC’s two decade-long work on framing what became the 1997 UN Convention, the two 
principles both enjoyed strong support.  The ILC in its discussions and deliberations at times 
attempted to strengthen and then again to weaken both of the provisions relative to the other. In 
the advanced stages of deliberation, the wording of the two principles and their relationship 
turned into the most contentious issue that the 6th Legal committee and also the United Nations 
General Assembly faced.  The negotiations and reservations finally led to a tripartite formulation 
(involving articles 5, 6 and 7), popularly known as the “three article package” since the 
formulation compromised the extreme views held by the two opposing groups.  This was done 
with a view to induce more States to adopt the convention.  A number of lower-riparian States 
viewed the final arrangement as reasonably neutral; it did not, they sensed, subordinate the no-
harm rule to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization las had the Helsinki Rules.  
Although this arrangement proved successful to move the Convention forward and gain U.N. 
approval, confusion on the issue soon surfaced and many States were reluctant to ratify it. 
Notwithstanding the balancing language, the view emerged—and prevails today—that the 
Convention continued to subordinate the no-harm duty to the principle of equitable and 
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reasonable utilization,471 chiefly because the harm resulting from a water use was expressly listed 
as a factor entering into the determination of equitable and reasonable use. 
The Berlin Rules, as explained in the last chapter, made another attempt to bring the principles 
together in a way that lessened the sense of dominance.  It did so by expressly conditioning the 
right to use with the duty to avoid harm.  Under the Rules, the right to use water (that is, to assert 
management control over it) requires that a State act in an equitable and reasonable manner 
having due regard to avoid significant harm. At the same time, the duty to avoid harm is 
conditioned by the right of other States to use water equitably and reasonably, a provision that 
the commentary suggests resembles the UN Convention provisions.472  At the same time, the 
final Rules continued to list the harm caused by a water use as one of many factors relevant in 
assessing whether the water use is equitable and reasonable—exactly the arrangement that led 
readers of the 1997 UN Convention to conclude that it gave preference to the right to use.   
The inherent problem with this long-simmering discussion stems from the juxtaposition of two 
contradictory principles and from the tendency to apply the principles to evaluate water uses in 
isolation.  Further, the principle that draws attention to the resulting harm looks chiefly if not 
solely to the harm caused to a State as such, or to another particular water use.  It does not 
directly consider the effects of a water use on the overall health of a watercourse or river basin.  
Further, it does not consider the relative merits of a particular water use in comparison with all 
other possible uses of the water, although these considerations do work their way into the long 
list of reasonable-use relevant factors.  The use versus harm-avoidance dichotomy, we need to 
                                                 
471 Salman M.A. Salman, “Entry into force of the UN Watercourses Convention: why should it matter,” International 
Journal of Water Resources Development 31 (2014): 1-13, accessed April 18, 2017,  
doi: 10.1080/07900627.2014.952072. 
472 ILC Commentary to Article 16 of the Berlin Rules. 
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recognize, is itself part of the problem. The harm-avoidance principle was added to modify and 
mitigate the effects of particular damaging water uses. It was needed because the starting point of 
legal analysis was the right of a State to use water.  But the right of a single State to use water 
need not be the starting point.  Other starting points are possible, and might well be more fruitful.   
International water law today has reached a point where the focus is shifting to the overall 
maintenance of a healthy, productive watercourse that fosters multiple uses. Regional water 
agreements, especially those entered into shortly before and after the adoption of the UN 
Convention, have illustrated some of the other possible ways to organize watercourse law. Of the 
regional agreements reviewed for the purpose of this dissertation, only two were modeled after 
the UN Convention insofar as they juxtaposed the equitable-and-reasonable rule and the no-harm 
obligation.473 The other agreements embraced a more holistic approach toward integrated 
management and protection of the watercourses.474 Several, as noted in the last chapter, referred 
to watercourses as sites of exceptional scientific, aesthetic and cultural value,475 not simply 
economic and environmental amenities. 
When watercourses are understood this way and their overall health made paramount, then 
watercourse law should put that vision front and center.  It should in some way insist that all 
water uses, individually and collectively, be undertaken only when and as they sustain this 
overall health.  As for which uses should go forward, the uses should be assessed against one 
                                                 
473 Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin, 12 March, 2002, UNTS Vol 2366, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280069231, and the Protocol on Shared Watercourses 
in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Revised), 2000.  
474 The Convention on the Protection of the Rhine, 1999, Bern, April 12, 1999, accessed April 20, 2017, 
http://www.iksr.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente_en/convention_on_tthe_protection_of__the_rhine.pdf. 
475 Agreement between the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania and the Government of the Republic of 
Macedonia for the Protection and Sustainable Development of Lake Ohrid and its Watershed, Albania – Macedonia, 
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another to identify those that generate the most benefits, with particular concern for meeting 
basic human needs.  This needs to take place in the context of a legal framework that does away 
with the intractable conflict between the right to use and duty to avoid harm.  As taken up in the 
final chapter, a new, better approach is possible. 
From fair shares to reasonable use and beyond.  As international law in the nineteenth century 
moved beyond crude notions of territorial sovereignty, it embraced, as we have seen, the idea 
that states should share watercourses.  The focus at the time was on water allocation—deciding 
how much water each State could divert and consume—and the idea added to the law was that a 
State should take only its equitable portion.  This principle and the language used to express it 
was largely borrowed from U.S. law, which had developed what it termed the equitable 
apportionment doctrine to divide river flows between and among U.S. states.  By the mid-
twentieth century, however, it had become clear that the challenge in managing interstate 
watercourses went beyond simply deciding how much water went to each State.  A water use by 
one State could cause harm in another due to its effects on water quality and on the timing of 
water flows, even when the harm-causing State did not take more than its fair share. Simply 
dividing water flows among the States was not adequate.     
This general problem led to the addition of another term—reasonable use.  What quickly gained 
currency was the idea that water uses by a State should be both equitable and reasonable, with 
reasonable taking into account factors other than simply the quantity of water diverted or 
consumed.  Reasonable use was also drawn directly from U.S. water law, although the general 
idea appeared in the laws of many States.  U.S. law used the concept as the overall limit of water 
uses by an individual riparian landowner.  Under riparian law, each landowner could use water 
on the riparian tract of land but had to share the river with all other riparians on an equal basis.  
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Early American law, borrowed from Britain, required that each riparian owner use a water flow 
only in modest, tightly constrained ways, in ways that left the water flow undiminished in 
quantity and quality except as needed to meet the most basic human and household needs.  By 
the mid-nineteenth century, that law of riparian rights had relaxed the water-use rules so that 
each riparian could use the water in any way that was reasonable, taking into account the water 
uses by other riparian landowners. The reasonable-use limit was thus the legal mechanism for 
resolving disputes between and among individual riparian landowners.  It was a limit that took 
into account all relevant factors, including the economic and social values of the competing 
water uses, their relative efficiencies, priority in time of use, and possibilities that one user or 
another might make changes in her water use so as to diminish the conflict.  One influential 
expression of the reasonable use test would appear in the U.S. Restatement (Second) of Torts,476 
which lists eight factors for determining reasonableness (including, as a sort of tie-breaker, 
priority in time of use). 
Under U.S. law, the equitable apportionment and reasonable-use rules were distinct in meaning 
and function.  The former simply divided water flows among States; the latter resolved (or 
purported to resolve) conflicts among competing individual users.  As the terms came together in 
international water law, however, they were fused into a single principle.  Water uses by a State, 
the law began to proclaim, had to qualify as reasonable and equitable (as the Helsinki Rules 
expressed it) or as equitable and reasonable (as documents since then have said).  When the 
terms were added to the law no effort was made to define them separately, and no such effort has 
been made since. In some interpretations, the core meaning of equitable and reasonable still has 
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to do with the fair sharing of water among States; for others, the many factors pertaining to 
reasonableness are given greater emphasis.  
While this was going on, concerns about the harms caused by water uses led to the addition in 
international water law of further provisions.  The Helsinki Rules of 1966 recognized the right of 
each State to a “reasonable and equitable share” of a watercourse, but it added more terms to the 
mix. What was being shared were the “beneficial uses” of the watercourse, a term that seemed to 
rule out uses that did not qualify as beneficial—a term that went undefined.  Further the Helsinki 
Rules added new provisions—in addition to a multi-factor test of “reasonable and equitable”—
admonishing States to prevent water pollution “consistent with the principle of equitable 
utilization.”  The Helsinki language was soon replaced with new language that continued the 
trend it began.  “Reasonable and equitable share,” as explained earlier, turned into “equitable and 
reasonable utilization” (and later, in the Berlin Rules, to management in and equitable and 
reasonable manner).  The language of beneficial use (a term employed in the prior appropriation 
system in the Western U.S. states) was dropped.  The Helsinki pollution provisions were greatly 
expanded upon in the 1992 ECE Convention but otherwise dropped for the time being.  The 
1997 U.N. Convention would use, instead of specific provisions on pollution, a more general 
principle proscribing significant harm—although again, as discussed at length, subject to a 
State’s right to make equitable and reasonable utilization.  The Berlin Rules would bring all the 
pieces together (except beneficial use), retaining the limit on significant harm and adding not just 
pollution-control rules but the wide suite of other environmental provisions considered in the last 
chapter. 
Pushed aside in this legal evolution was the idea that water uses earlier in time enjoyed 
protection when they conflicted with later water uses.  Article VIII of the Helsinki Rules 
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provided that an existing reasonable use could continue “unless the factors justifying its 
continuance are outweighed by other factors.”  Prior uses were thus presumptively favored, but 
could be curtailed.  That limited protection disappeared in the 1997 U.N. Convention, which 
merely stated that the effect of a water use on “existing and potential uses” was one factor in the 
overall balancing test.  That language, in turn, would be retained in the Berlin Rules.  But those 
Rules would add an Article (14), expressly stating that no use enjoyed a preference over any 
other except that States were instructed to allocate their water first “to satisfy vital human 
needs.” The Article’s language implicitly denied any special protection for existing uses as such.  
At present, as just discussed, the international law of watercourses continues to center on the 
clash or at least tension between the right to use and duty to avoid harm, with supplemental 
provisions pushed States to protect the environment.  In many commentaries—including the 
Berlin Rules—the term “equitable and reasonable utilization” is often reduced simply to 
“equitable utilization” (for instance, in the title to Article 12 and first sentence of the 
accompanying commentary).  This practices implies, for some readers, that the core idea remains 
one of dividing water flows among States in an equitable manner.  Equitable sharing does not 
mandate the equal division of water; it merely implies that all riparian States stand on an equal 
footing (having equality of rights) without any State reserving inherent priority.  The text of the 
Rules—both Article 12 taken alone, and, even more, the Rules considered as a whole—do not 
clearly support this extra emphasis on sharing as opposed to reasonable use.   
When the many relevant factors are brought together, including the harm-avoidance and 
environmental provisions, the result is an overall, highly complex, fact-based inquiry into the 
details of particular water uses, including alternatives to the uses.   Because the many factors are 
simply thrown into the mix—they are not legal requirements that each must be satisfied—the 
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result is vagueness and considerable uncertainty.  It is often impossible to predict in advance if a 
certain use will be protected against another since almost all uses of water are primarily and 
potentially reasonable; e.g. flood control, irrigation, power generation, recreation, and 
conservation.  The added terms of the law, that is, have brought confusion as much as clarity, 
leading some commentators to conclude that guiding central principle has simply been 
overloaded.477 The multi-factor test may come in handy once a matter or a dispute is submitted to 
an adjudicating body, a court (e.g. ICJ) or an arbitration; the factors provide materials to justify 
pretty much any outcome that the decision-makers deem appropriate. What happens in the 
absence of such a body remains unclear. In this regard, the articulation of the principles appears 
to invest States in the first instance with the responsibility of determining whether a particular 
use qualifies as an equitable and reasonable one.   
In application, the complex balancing test seems to call upon States not to comply with a 
standard but to exercise due diligence to conform to international standards. It is a task that can 
prove onerous job in practice.  A water use that may appear reasonable to one State may appear 
quite differently to a co-riparian.  State A, an upstream State wanting to exploit its hydropower 
potential, may deem it a justified use in view of its need for electricity. State B, a downstream 
State that has long withdrawn water for irrigation, may consider its use more important and 
deserving of priority in a clash with A’s planned use. How might such competing, yet apparently 
fair, uses be reconciled without formal conflict? One option is to enter into agreements to adjust 
competing needs on a case-by-case basis. But the multiplicity of conflicts, and of discrete 
agreements (costly and time-consuming to negotiate), can quickly render the approach untenable. 
In any event, a State making a good-faith effort to assess the reasonableness of a water use will 
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often need extensive information about present and prospective water uses in other States.478 
Obtaining the information can be challenging without a central organization that routinely 
acquires and organizes it. 
As one looks at the evolution of this law, it is clear that the law has embraced a series of overall 
frames, each crafted to overcome problems with the prior frame but none, so far, that has 
succeeded in keeping up with advances in science and senses of justice and fairness.  Territorial 
sovereignty gave way to equitable sharing, which in turn gave way to a frame that basically 
endorsed both a right to use and duty to avoid harm.  This third frame, though, does not fit well 
with the emerging beliefs that (i) rivers should be managed as a whole, not divided, (ii) the 
ecological health of the river as a biotic and geophysical system should be paramount, and (iii) 
waters should be used in ways that address the highest valued needs of people in the river basin.  
These rising ideas call into question the management of river sections by States acting on their 
own.  They put the ecological health of a watercourse as a baseline requirement, limiting all 
waters uses, not merely (as in the existing frame) as a factor to take into account.  They call into 
question all diversions of water outside a basin except in the rare instance in which diversions 
cause no noticeable ecological or social problems.  And they imply that, in the competition 
among competing uses and users, State boundaries should have little effect:  water should go to 
the highest valued unmet water needs, without regard for location.  
Environmental norms, their rise and proliferation.  This next trend needs little comment beyond 
what has already been said.  Over the past few decades environmental norms have become 
hugely important in the management of transboundary waters and they continue to gain 
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influence.  At the same time these environmental norms are broadening in terms of concerns, 
with clear evidence that this trend will continue. Early environmental concerns, as noted, mostly 
involved pollution problems.  Concerns soon expanded to consider other ecological issues, 
including the timing and quantity of water flows. On the horizon today are growing recognitions 
of the problems related to silt; land subsidence; salt-water intrusion; flood plains and fish 
spawning; and the roles of land cover change in affecting rivers. Needless to say, these are 
promising developments that certainly need to continue. The looming issue however is how these 
environmental standards might best be set forth, and how binding they should be:  Should States 
only be required to use due diligence to promote them or should new standards bind States with 
positive obligations? 
 The evolution of these concerns might usefully be divided into three stages, an initial stage 
involving pollution issues, a second, post-pollution stage aimed at general environmental 
protection, and the most recent stage of emerging norms involving broader ecological concerns.  
The risk of pollution on international waters and their prevention have long received attention 
since efforts to regulate international waters commenced.479  As pollution concerns gained 
attention the International Law Association produced several substantial rules on pollution that, 
by reference, applied to international waters. These rules encouraged States to strengthen their 
steps to prevent or correct the pollution of internationally shared waters, and gradually to bolster 
those strictures into obligations.480 The trend continued and consequently led to the adoption of 
the 1992 ECE convention, which put pollution control as the focal issue. The 1997 UN 
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Convention, though not as forcefully as the ECE Convention, continued this trend and adopted 
pollution concerns as undertones setting forth environmental obligations.  This progression 
matched the evolving practice of States, including multilateral and bilateral agreements, which 
also moved in the direction of prescribing definite obligations regarding pollution. These trends 
and State practices turned pollution control into a principle of customary international law. The 
Rio Declaration and other instruments made clear that this duty applied also to waters within a 
State’s jurisdiction as much as it did to international waters. 
With this steadily increasing recognition of pollution has come a broadening of the concept of 
harm or injury that international law sought to address. A clear step was taken in the ECE 
Convention, which drew attention broadly to “transboundary impacts,” a term that includes 
effects not only on the ecological environment but also on human health and safety, cultural 
heritage or socio-economic conditions.  A common trait of such expanded definitions of harm 
was that the definitions were rarely clear enough to apply to real-world changes brought about by 
water uses.  Varied documents put forth different thresholds for harm or injury.481  While they 
used adjectives like adverse or detrimental, the adjectives were not clear enough to distinguish 
changes to nature that were acceptable or good from changes that seemed harmful. 
The law’s movement beyond pollution gained momentum in the 1990s.  The movement was 
apparent in a number of regional and international water law instruments, including the 1992 
ECE Convention, the Rhine Convention, and the UN Watercourse Convention. In varied ways 
these documents pushed States to protect and maintain ecosystems, to forestall introductions of 
alien species, and to establish and achieve water-quality standards.  Even as they did so, 
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however, the documents were not so clear, as noted above, on how these principles fit together 
with equitable and reasonable utilization.  It was simply not clear how the various principles and 
instructions fit together; their relative importance was not explained.  This uncertainty was not 
diminished with the incorporation, into the equitable and reasonable-use mix, of ideals such as 
“optimal and sustainable utilization” and “adequate protection of the watercourse.”  
What might be termed the latest phase in this gradual, indistinct evolution has been, as noted, the 
addition of language showing heightened concern for the ecological functioning and overall 
health of rivers, recognizing watercourses as intrinsically valuable and comprehending them 
complete, interdependent systems. These new norms reach beyond the riverine environment to 
consider and conserve the complex ecological integrity of even larger natural communities. 
Ecological flows and the timing of flows are drawing more attention.  At the same time, efforts 
are underway to understand the functioning and interrelationships of surface water, groundwater, 
and alluvial plains, with efforts to protect aquifers even when not connected to surface water. On 
the horizon in rudimentary form are the recognitions of the problems related to sediment 
transportation, land subsidence, salt water intrusion, fish spawning, the roles of land cover 
change in affecting rivers, and the many benefits of keeping rivers connected to their floodplains. 
There are also increasing concerns about riverine biodiversity, especially endemic, rare, 
threatened or endangered species of flora and fauna.  
There is so far no clear indication how these emerging norms might best fit together with 
existing environmental rules.  It needs noting also that these norms are still emerging and have 
yet to attain customary status. They are primarily seen in dispersed regional agreements rather 
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than in overarching international instruments.482 Nonetheless, they hold immense importance and 
would seem to represent the next era of international water law. 
The addition of these new, more ecological elements gives even more cause to reconsider the 
still-dominant frames of international watercourse law.  Ideals and principles proliferate but 
without an overall structure to bring them together and express plainly the guiding purposes of 
the law.  For generations the law has chiefly sought to resolve disputes between and among 
competing State users of international watercourses.  With the law increasingly applying to 
waters within States, the international connection is weakening.  Many environmental provisions 
are inserted because people who live far from a river have become concerned about its ecological 
health and, in particular, its biodiversity.  This trend casts further doubt on the law’s 
preoccupation with interstate clashes.  Further the welfare of ordinary people is no longer the 
concern merely of the State in which they live; outsiders are legitimately interested as well.  A 
legal metamorphosis seems needed. 
Dams and reservoirs:  the big elephants still in the room. Nothing alters a waterway as much as 
a dam or a reservoir. Chapter 2 reviewed some of the ill effects of these projects in terms of their 
net social and environmental upshots. Their widespread existence across international waters and 
extensive, often interstate impacts give cause to formulate international governance standards. 
Surprisingly given their importance, international conventions have had almost nothing to say 
about them in express words.  As noted in the last chapter, both the UN Watercourse 
Convention, the Berlin Rules and the 1992 ECE Convention do include provisions relating to 
them, but the provisions are all procedural.   This nearly hands-off treatment reflects, one 
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assumes, a reluctance on the part of the framers of international agreements to bring these 
structures within regulatory schemes.  The reluctance may arise because lawmakers perceive 
dam construction as a matter of sovereign decision-making that is somehow immune from 
external interference.   For many States, dams are viewed as indispensable means to achieve 
developmental or economic goals and, as such, constitute an independent and extraordinary 
category of water use.  A rare exception at the international level is the work-product of an 
international collaborative, the World Commission on Dams, useful even though it is not legally 
binding on any party and does not purport to express customary law.  
A noteworthy feature of conventions and other documents that do include provisions affecting 
dams and reservoirs is that lawmakers shy away from using ordinary language to discuss them.  
They are referenced, not using clear terms, but as “planned measures,” “installations,” 
“facilities,” “hydraulic structures,” or “any other work.”   This indirect language raises some 
doubt about whether the structures are covered—if they were, why not say so expressly?  But no 
doubt they are covered, along with other construction efforts—locks, levees, diversion ditches.  
The various documents that cover them typically call simply for the exchange of information, 
consultation and negotiation on their possible effects.  The Berlin Rules, as noted in the last 
chapter, go further to allow a concerned State to demand preparation of an impact assessment for 
a worrisome project. Similar safeguards are frequently found in regional and bilateral 
agreements.  Similarly, provisions regarding planned measures were referred to in the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam case by the ICJ. Planned measures as enumerated in the UN 
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Convention have again found their place (as considered below) in the framework propounded by 
the World Commission on Dams.483 
Current international water law is confusing as it applies to dams and reservoirs in that the 
various leading documents do not state clearly whether their main provisions apply to them. 
Procedural requirements that apply to planned measures and the like do apply.  But as noted 
above, other provisions perhaps do not—a conclusion reached mostly because no accompanying 
commentary refers to them and because major dams in particular would seem to collide directly 
with their terms, particularly harm-avoidance provisions.  If constructing and operating a dam or 
a reservoir is understood as a use of an international watercourse, then it would have to comply 
with the equitable-reasonableness principle and also the do-no-harm principle, just as other 
watercourse uses do.  But if that were the case—if they were simply specific types of 
watercourse uses subject to the general rules—then why prescribe a distinct set of procedural 
rules designed only for planned measures, rules that seem to leave negotiating States to reach any 
end point that they like? Do they suggest that dams and similar structures are subject to more 
rigorous standards than other uses—the added procedural rules in addition to the principles 
applying to all water uses? The various documents supply no explicit answer. If higher, more 
rigorous standards were envisioned then big projects should have drawn mentioning in the 
general principles, given their importance and the need to handle them wisely to promote 
harmony and compatible water uses among States sharing an international drainage basin.484  
The more likely interpretation is that such projects somehow stand apart, for regional negotiation 
that takes place in the context of the general principles but is not bound by them.  In any event, it 
                                                 
483 Dams and Development: a new framework for decision-making, 2001, 
http://www.unep.org/dams/WCD/report/WCD_DAMS%20report.pdf. 
484 McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses, 406. 
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is not easy to distinguish clearly between the general substantive principles and the procedural 
rules:  the substantive obligation to evaluate whether water uses are equitable and reasonable 
may itself be thought of as a process while the substantive obligation not to cause significant 
harm also serves as a trigger to process.485 
Further evidence that the general principles for international watercourses do not apply directly 
to dams comes from the important report in 2000 from the World Commission on Dams (WCD), 
an ad hoc study group set up by the World Bank and the International Union for the 
Conservation in Nature.  Its final report, in 2000, discusses the challenges of large dams. In 
doing so it does not suggest that they are already subject to international watercourse law, 
implying plainly that such law does not apply.  (The Report, of course, predates the Berlin 
Rules.)   
The WCD report is worth considering, even though it lacks legal status and was not prepared, as 
ILA and ILC documents are, chiefly by international legal scholars. It reflects the controversies 
surrounding large dams as of 2000, controversy that then has become more intense since then.  
The group’s objective was to develop internationally acceptable criteria, guidelines and standards 
for the planning, design, appraisal, construction, operation, monitoring and decommissioning of 
large dams. The body comprised members representing a broad spectrum of interests in large 
dams, including governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), dam operators and 
grassroots people’s movements, corporations and academics, and industry associations and 
consultants.  Despite its lack of legal force (and lack of express grounding in international law) 
the Report offers a guide to States in devising national policies and negotiating agreements.   
                                                 
485 McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses, 397. 
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The WCD Report sets forth a generalized, step-by-step process for making decisions on water 
and energy development, called the “criteria and guidelines.” The proposed process includes an 
assessment of needs for the project, identification and study of alternatives, project preparation, 
project implementation, and pre-commissioning compliance checks, leading to project operation 
including adaptation to changing contexts.  To help guide the process the Report sets forth seven 
broad strategic priorities, intended to yield more equitable and sustainable outcomes. The first 
priority requires involvement of all stakeholders, recognizing their rights, assessing the risks of 
the vulnerable ones, and making a transparent decision with informed participation from all 
stakeholders. The second requires the comprehensive assessment of the full range of all policy, 
institutional, and technical options, covering social and environmental aspects as well as 
economic and financial factors. The third priority draws attention to existing dams, encouraging 
States to address outstanding social issues and strengthen environmental mitigation and 
restoration measures. The Report stresses that modifications to existing projects will often be 
necessary due to changes in water-use priorities, physical and land-use changes in the river basin, 
technological developments, and changes in public policy expressed in environment, safety, 
economic and technical regulations.  
Strategic priority 4 of the WCD Report is of special importance as it underscores the need for 
sustaining rivers and livelihoods. It acknowledges rivers, watersheds and aquatic ecosystems as 
the biological engines of the planet, and that they are the basis for life and the livelihoods of 
local communities. Basin-wide understanding of the ecosystem’s functions, and how community 
livelihoods depend on them, is thus crucial for ensuring environmental and social justice. 
Decision-making processes should value ecosystems, social and health issues in the process of 
project and river-basin development, avoiding impacts when possible and minimizing and 
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mitigation harm when not.  Selected rivers with high ecosystem functions—rivers in near-natural 
condition—should be maintained in their natural states, the Report recommends.  Particular 
attention should be paid to the protection if not enhancement of threatened and endangered 
species.  Priority 5 revisits the issue of concern for people, recommending impact assessments 
that consider the interests of all people in the region of a proposed dam—anyone whose 
property, livelihood or non-material resources might be affected by the dam or dam-related 
infrastructure such as canals, transmission lines, and resettlement developments.  People affected 
in this way should be among the first to benefit from the project. Priority 6 recommends full 
compliance with all applicable laws, regulations, criteria and guidelines. 
The last strategic priority of the WCD Report highlights the shared nature of an international 
river and offers recommendations to better regulate the resource. It borrows from the law of 
international watercourses to mandates that governing rules be based on principles of equitable 
and reasonable utilization and no significant harm as well as full disclosure and good-faith 
negotiation.  At the same time, it admits that dams materially disrupt water flows in ways that 
make actual water-sharing less possible.  The Report recommends, in place of sharing the water 
directly, that dam operators share the benefits generated by the dam, including hydropower.  In 
the end, the Report proposes a number of overlapping ideals and standards that seem nearly as 
hard to reconcile as the Berlin Rules.  As for dispute resolution, the Report recommends that 
conflicts States cannot resolve themselves be referred to an independent panel.  External 
financing bodies are urged to withdraw their financial support for a project whenever a State fails 
to negotiate with neighboring States in good faith.  
The WCD Report offers one perspective on the path ahead.  In effect it seeks to bring dams 
under the rubric of the general law of watercourses, including the principles of reasonable and 
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equitable utilization and harm avoidance.   Given that these principles, according to the Berlin 
Rules, have attained the status of customary international law, it would seem that they ought to 
apply, even as dams create special challenges that call for more particularized rules.486  What 
should be fully clear, as the Berlin Rules assert, is that planning for projects should engage all 
affected or interested parties and that it be based on full public access to relevant information, 
including the results of wide-ranging impact assessments,487 leading in effect to the embrace of a 
type of precautionary rule.488  Well-researched, publicly available impact statements are 
particularly vital, as the Berlin Rules make clear. In today’s world, most States require impact 
assessments for major projects, as do a growing number of international agreements, beginning 
(in embryonic form) with the General Convention Relating to the Development of Hydraulic 
Power Affecting More Than One State.489 Particularly useful as a precedent is the Espoo 
Convention prepared by the UN Economic Commission for Europe.490 Also known as the EIA 
Convention, it sets out the obligations of Parties to assess environmental impacts of certain 
activities at an early stage of planning. It also lays down the general obligation of States to notify 
and consult each other on all major projects under consideration—dams and reservoirs included it 
                                                 
486 Although absent in the Stockholm Declaration, this obligation soon made its appearance in the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development. Later, the UN Convention devotes an entire section (part III) to detailed rules on 
notification, consultation and negotiation concerning planned measures that may have significant adverse effects on 
other riparian States. During the drafting stage of the convention, these provisions did not seem to raise any 
disagreements among States, indicating that States began generally accepting the proposition that they have a duty to 
provide prior notice and relevant data to other parties. Recurrent reference of these obligations is found today in 
major international water law instruments, work of scholarly bodies, riparian agreements, writings of the 
commentators, claims by the States, dispute resolutions and so on. 
487 Chapter VI: Impact Assessments Article 29: States shall undertake prior and continuing assessment of the impact 
of programs, projects, or activities that may have a significant effect on the aquatic environment or the sustainable 
development of waters. 
488 Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton, International Environmental Law (New York: Transnational Publishers, 
1994), 203.   
489 Art. 2. 
490 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, adopted in 1991 and entered into 
force on 10 September 1997. 
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would seem—that are likely to have a significant adverse environmental impact across boundaries. 
The International Law Association now recognizes this practice as a rule of customary 
international law, at least insofar as transboundary effects are concerned.491 The World Bank, 
following suit, now requires prior assessment before considering a loan or grant, regardless of 
whether the project will have any transboundary effects.492  
More ways to improve water quality. A final important trend in the evolution of the law of 
international water courses brings together the growing number of legal principles and ideals that 
reflect a desire to improve water quality.  The continued addition of elements no doubt reflects a 
frustration among legal drafter and advocacy groups that prior provisions failed to accomplish 
the desired goals.  But if earlier provisions failed to improve water quality, will the newer 
elements bring significant change?  Perhaps in time they will, but only if they—or perhaps a 
subset of them—are given greater legal primacy than they now enjoy.  In the meantime, the 
proliferation of the provisions engenders confusion and creates possibilities for people and 
nations to get side-tracked.  
The basic principle requiring that all uses be reasonable supplies the foundation for water-quality 
protection, or it would if the term were clearly defined.  It fails to do so, however, when it is set 
forth—mixed with equitable utilization, as we have seen—as a multi-factor test that allows 
States to reduce water quality in the name of economic development.  The related principle of 
harm avoidance similarly bears on water-quality issues.  Degradation of water quality commonly 
harms downstream users, within a State and across State boundaries.  As explained, the harm-
avoidance principle was added because of the perceived failure of the equitable and reasonable 
                                                 
491 The Supplemental Rules on Pollution, art. 3 and the New Delhi Declaration, principle 4.2. 
492 The World Bank, Operational Directive 4.01 (1991). 
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utilization standard to diminish downstream harms.  No doubt it has and will have some effect, 
but its effects are weakened when, as usual, it is qualified by the right of a State to make 
equitable and reasonable utilization of a watercourse and when the concept of harm is not 
tethered to any particular water-quality standards. 
The various, more overt environmental standards working their way into the law provide more 
tools that water-quality advocates can draw upon even as the provisions, as noted, have not 
clearly taken priority of equitable utilization.  Most specific, of course, are the conventions such 
as the 1992 ECE Convention that expressly direct States to adopt and enforce water-quality 
standards.  Provisions protecting ecological integrity generally, or ecological water flows more 
particularly, also protect water quality given that reasonably clean water is typically needed to 
sustain native biodiversity. (Many ecosystems, to be sure, carry naturally heavy silt loads that 
limit the types of resident aquatic life.)  A general duty to minimize environmental harm 
provides similar protection, though it is weakened greatly when reduced to a mere due diligence 
standard or when States are left free to interpret and apply the principle as they see fit. More 
specialty protection is offered in regional agreements that address silt, soil erosion, land 
subsidence, saline water intrusion, floodplains, or the protection of habitat and aquatic 
biodiversity. 
A promising but so far little used legal approach to enhance water quality is to grant overt 
recognition and protection to water uses that occur with the water left in a river—commonly 
termed instream-flow uses.  One longstanding instream-flow use—navigation—typically does 
not depend on anything like clean water. Hydropower is also relatively insensitive to water 
quality. But other uses do depend on clean water, sometimes very clean, including fish 
propagation and human contact (bathing, recreation).  Water flows similarly move silt 
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downstream, keeping shipping channels open.  They carry silt also to floodplains where they 
nourish soil fertility; for this purpose, as discussed, water stripped of its natural silt loads is, from 
the perspective of floodplain farmers, much diminished in water quality.  High-quality water 
flows are also in use when they help sustain high-quality ecological communities or provide 
valuable aesthetic and recreational remedies.  In the US, for example, the federal Wild and 
Scenic Rivers Act works to protect instream flows for these purposes.  Passed in 1968, this Act 
can apply to segments of rivers that contain "remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and 
wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values."  Once designated under the federal statute 
such waterway segments are protected from projects that would affect their water flows. 
Protection for instream-flow uses of water can go well beyond simply the preservation of 
minimum stream flows—a related but different form of environment protection.  An upstream 
action on a river that disrupts a downstream instream-flow use interferes with another, existing 
use of a watercourse.  It is not merely a matter of running afoul of a vague environmental 
protection.  The purported reasonableness of a water use is lessened when it interferes with 
another water use.  The harm caused is in that instance also clearer.  The conflict is not between 
human use of a waterway and environmental protection; rather, it is between conflicting water 
uses, calling for a comparative assessment of their relative values.  Instream-flow uses would 
typically gain protection under a scheme (such as the Helsinki Rules) that, in resolving conflicts 
among uses, somewhat favored water uses earlier in time given that instream-flow uses have 
commonly been ongoing for generations if not centuries.    
Added to these various environment-protecting provisions is the general duty of States to 
promote sustainability or to engage only in sustainable development.  Sustainable development 
entered the public arena in the 1980s in an effort to balance environmental protection and 
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economic development.493  Notoriously vague and conflicted, sustainable development has not 
shown much force in terms of environmental protection.  Its environmental-protection content is 
simply too qualified and subject to tradeoffs. 494  The literature on sustainability has yielded a 
bewildering multiplicity of criteria, meanings, and expectations in different fields. For example, 
the field of economics has its own peculiar notion of what sustainability means495 while a 
different definition appears in the medicine and public health sector.496 Similarly, political and 
social scientists again speak of sustainable development in a slightly different manner.497   
As a means to protect the environment, sustainability (and, even more, sustainable development) 
is best understood as an early, crude tool to interject environmental concerns into development 
processes that paid little or no attention to them.  Within States—and now even within 
international arenas—this vague tool has paved the way for more precise, clear environmental 
protections.  With the emergence of more precise provisions, particularly ones not overtly 
qualified by development goals, sustainability and sustainable development seem no longer 
needed.  Indeed, their vagueness and pro-development content can have the effect of weakening 
other, more particular environmental provisions and diminish their force.  So long as a 
                                                 
493 The notion “sustainable development” first appeared in the World Conservation Strategy of the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature (1980), then in the book Building a Sustainable Society, by Lester R. Brown 
of Worldwatch Institute (1981), then in another book Gaia: An Atlas of Planet Management, edited by Norman 
Meyers (1984), and then most influentially in the so-called Brundtland Report, Our Common Future (1987), 
directed by Gro Harlem Brundtland, Norwegian Prime Minister and chairwoman of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development. 
494 Donald Worster, “The Shaky Ground of Sustainable Development,” in Global Ecology: A New Arena of Political 
Conflict, ed. Wolfgang Sachs (Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing, 1993), 132-145. 
495 Economists focus on the point where societies achieve a critical take-off into long-term, continuous growth, 
investment, and profit in a market economy. By that standard, any and all of the industrial societies are already 
sustainable, while the backward agrarian ones are not. 
496 In medicine and public health, sustainability is a condition of individual physiological wellness, a condition to be 
measured by physicians and nutritionists. Thus they focus on threats on water and air pollution or on food and water 
availability, or they talk about the threat of diminished genetic stock to the practice of medicine and the supply of 
pharmaceuticals. 
497 Political and social scientists speak of sustainable institutions and sustainable societies apparently referring to the 
ability of institutions or ruling groups to generate enough public support to renew themselves and hold onto power. 
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convention or document honors sustainable development, it provides a tool for pro-development 
interests to justify actions that degrade the environment, even actions that violate other 
provisions in the same convention or document.  If used at all, the term needs to be tied to 
precise environmental performance standards.  Yet if that can be done, then the environmental 
standards themselves can be put forward as the environmental goal, with no need to confuse 
matters by retaining sustainability as a frame.  
Two final tools deserve mention as further evidence of this sixth trend in watercourse law, the 
trend to proliferate provisions aimed at improving the quality of water flows.  One is the rising 
recognition of an individual human right to clean water for personal and household use. Absent 
in both the original Helsinki Rules and the UN Watercourse Convention, the ideal made its entry 
into international water law in the Berlin Rules and a handful regional agreements.  A right to 
water was recognized in the Dublin Statement498 and the African Charter on the Rights and 
Duties of Peoples.499  The aim of this right is to push States to provide for their people sufficient 
means of accessing safe and clean water.  Water supply, however, is chiefly a matter of internal 
infrastructure and pricing.  Are water lines and treatment facilities adequately developed so that 
plentiful water is widely distributed, and is water priced in such a way that all can afford it?  For 
many observers, these issues are matters for individual States as such to resolve, so that a right to 
water is best understood as a right that a person might assert against her home State, not a legal 
principle applicable to relations between or among States.   
A right to water would seem to add little if anything to the international law of watercourses 
except insofar as it gives priority, in clashes between competing uses, to water diverted to meet 
                                                 
498 Principle 3. 
499 Art. 24. 
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basic human needs.  That category of water use certainly deserves priority.  But when it is 
recognized as the paramount water use—as it is in the Berlin Rules that prioritize water for “vital 
human needs”—then there is little left for a right to water to do.  It is better omitted to keep the 
focus on other, more central provisions. 
Lastly, there is the requirement found in various conventions that a State in its actions not 
materially interfere with the ability of another State to comply with its obligations under 
international agreements.  Such provisions have drawn little attention in environmental 
discussions but, if taken literally, they could carry force.  Many States, for instance, are parties to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Ramsar Convention on the protection of highly 
significant wetlands. The duties of States under both agreements call for steps to protect natural 
areas, including in many settings watercourses and surrounding floodplain habitats.  Upstream 
water uses could easily diminish a State’s abilities to meet these obligations.  
 
*     *     *     *     * 
These various trends in the international law of watercourses, better really than the study of any 
individual document, illustrate where the law has been and where it is heading.  They also reveal 
tensions and problems within the field of law.  At this point in the law’s development, the law 
has broadened to include nearly all of the relevant concerns.  What is needed next is a way to 
bring the pieces together in a more coherent, satisfactory way.  To do that, however, it helps to 
have in mind a clearer goal for the law.  When the aim was simply to help States resolve their 
conflicts through negotiation, legal provisions could be relatively few.  But the demands on this 
body of law today are far greater and the law’s central aims have shifted.   
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The final chapter of this dissertation proposes that this body of law seek to protect the ecological 
health of all waterways and to do so in a way that is fair to all States and all peoples, regardless 
of location and economic and political power.  It is, to be sure, a lofty goal, well beyond political 
reach today.  But it helps nonetheless to look at the far horizon.  If we sought to accomplish this 
goal, if we sought to dream big, how might we reform the law that we now have? 
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Chapter 8: Justice, Lasting Health, and South Asia 
 
The critical comments in the last chapter on the major legal trends relating to watercourses 
provide the foundation for a new overall vision and for legal reforms to achieve that vision.  
Those legal reforms, once set forth, can be evaluated by seeing how they affect Bangladesh, a 
highly vulnerable State substantially reliant for its flourishing on watercourses and its ability to 
use them. 
   
A Vision of Flourishing Life 
 
As the last chapter contended, existing law on watercourses remains too centered around 
conflicts between individual States that seek to use watercourses in inconsistent ways.  The aim 
of current law, it was argued, is essentially to resolve or accommodate these disputes in some 
way, thereby reducing international tensions.  That overall frame produced the long-nagging 
dichotomy between one State’s ability to use water and another State’s right to complain about 
significant harm.  Legal drafters have tried but not really succeeded in resolving this clash in a 
way that is broadly satisfying.  Even if they could, however, the overall frame does not 
adequately take into account the interests of other States and people worldwide, who may also 
have serious interests in the environmental and social-justice aspects of watercourse disputes.  It 
also fails to address discrepancies in power among States, including the power that comes from 
an upriver location. Another frame seems needed.  
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Healthy rivers.  International law is clearly evolving in a direction that holds high the ecological 
health of watercourses understood as complex, interdependent biological and geo-physical 
communities.  That ideal—the vision of a waterway that, over its entire course, is ecologically 
healthy—provides a different, sounder point of beginning for international law.  The basic idea:  
start with the river itself and aim to keep it healthy, along with the riparian communities 
dependent on it.   
The notion of an ecologically healthy river is a broad one and has several components. It means 
not only keeping a river free from pollution, but sustaining a flow regime that is sufficient 
enough to regulate its overall natural and biological processes and that of the surrounding 
ecosystem. It includes a river bed that features a healthy hyporheic zone; that is, an ecosystem 
beneath the bed of a river or stream, saturated with water that supports the invertebrate fauna 
upon which river life depends. Ecologically healthy rivers are hydrologically connected to 
groundwater to sustain hydrological cycles.  They are also, for most of their length, connected to 
their floodplains so that high waters flow on to them, depositing silt, sustaining fish propagation, 
and buffering downstream flooding. Healthy rivers retain and support mixes of flora and fauna 
that resemble the biotic compositions present in them centuries earlier.500  In brief, ecologically 
healthy rivers are understood and embraced as ribbons of life, operating as ecologically complex 
wholes, rich in biodiversity. The ever-shifting bed and banks of many rivers, the groundwater 
below and nearby, and the surrounding forests, marshes and floodplains—all form parts of 
river of life and nurture a wide variety of biodiversity. 
                                                 
500 Living Rivers Foundation, http://www.living-rivers.org/Default.aspx?sifraStranica=32. 
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Rivers that are ecologically healthy have greater capacity than degraded ones to accommodate 
natural flooding, to transport nutrient-rich silt and dissolved minerals, to maintain temperature 
levels adequate for resident fish, and to push back encroaching salinity. These sorts of “self-
treating” or “self-healing” functions through ecological processes have been termed “regulating 
services” by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and are provided by all natural resources, 
rivers included.501 The transport of sediment deposits, as noted in earlier chapters, is particularly 
essential in low-lying lands prone to subsidence. Riverine ecosystems play vital roles in water 
purification and waste treatment, helping to filter out and decompose organic wastes introduced 
into inland waters and coastal and marine ecosystems.502 Finally, healthy rivers counteract 
natural land subsidence while keeping estuaries free of dead zones. 
Uses that respect river health.  In the new vision for international watercourse law, all uses of a 
waterway would be consistent with the maintenance of its ecological health.  River health, that 
is, would supply a base limit not just on individual water uses but on the totality of all water uses 
in basin, with water use broadly defined to include all land uses and construction activities that 
could degrade that ecological health.   Overall water diversions would be limited so as to 
maintain river flows needed for ecological health.  Construction projects would be limited, in 
their design and/or operation, so as to sustain river health with mitigation measures as needed to 
protect that health.  Plainly, this new vision of water uses clashes with older views that sought to 
use water as often and intensively as possible with little record for ecological consequences, 
including consequences that undercut the livelihood and even health of people downstream.  
                                                 
501 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Synthesis (Washington DC: Island 
Press, 2005), vii. 
502 Ecosystems and Their Services, Ecosystems and Human Well-being: A Framework for Assessment (Washington 
DC: Island Press, 2003), 58. 
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Today the ecological health of rivers is often degraded by dams, reservoirs, levees, diversion 
channels and similar construction projects.  While such projects provide benefits in terms of 
economy and development—short-term benefits, often—they also take massive ecological tolls 
and disrupt downstream water uses.  A vision that gave primacy to ecological health would not 
prohibit all such development activities.  Instead it would mean that developers employ pre-
development safety procedures, including thorough impact assessments and consideration of 
alternatives, and that they craft designs that in operation mimic natural flow patterns as closely as 
possible while providing passage routes for migratory species and adequately protecting aquatic 
habitat.  Again, this vision clashes sharply with long-dominant views of good river management, 
particularly the once-influential thought that projects above all should avert water waste.  It was 
believed in many regions (and is still alleged in South Asia) that every drop of water running to 
the sea without realization of its full commercial potential is a waste.  This misguided view fails 
to recognize how water is indisputably part of a continuous system where “waste” water is 
recycled back to the main channels through natural processes such as evaporation and seepage.  
It ignores even more clearly the many ecological functions, and human river uses, sustained by 
instream flows.  
The goal of ecologically healthy rivers requires attention to land-use practices, given that so 
many land uses (including irrigation and drainage practices) directly affect rivers. Land and 
water uses are inextricably intertwined to form a complete basin-wide whole. Changes in land 
cover and vegetation, for instance, can easily degrade rivers; for instance, by the conversion of 
wetlands or the replacement of forests with croplands or croplands with urban areas—all changes 
that strongly influence the timing and magnitude of runoff, aggravating floods, promoting 
artificial droughts, and diminishing aquifer recharge. Widespread levee-building routinely 
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aggravates floods downstream and degrades aquatic communities, especially for species that use 
floodplains for key life events.503 Runoff pollution from farm chemicals has been particularly 
damaging worldwide; it is the principal cause of many dead zones.  
This need to keep all water uses consistent with ecological health reflects not just concerns about 
human health and economic activities but the many strong bonds that people have with rivers.  
Rivers instill among many a deeply ingrained sense of collective belonging, tied to a common 
coordinate.504  People can create intimate bonds with their local environments and nature in 
idiosyncratic ways, turning to rivers as emblems for spirituality, sources of inspiration, and 
places for recreation. To maintain river health is to help secure and sustain these defining bonds.  
More broadly, many social benefits depend on overall river health, including such provisional 
services such as drinking-water supply, supporting fishery productivity, maintaining navigability, 
supplying biological and pharmaceutical resources, and more.  
Justice among all basin residents.  The third element of this new vision for watercourses entails 
the fair sharing of water basins by all people who dwell in them.  The ability to use a shared river 
should not vary greatly among people based on where they live—within what nation and where 
on the river.  When water uses must be limited—as they typically do—water should go to the 
highest valued uses wherever located (with value, as considered below, extending well beyond 
economic value).  People facing dire water shortages should not have to stand back while others 
devote water to low-valued uses. Upstream users should not enjoy water in ways that severely 
                                                 
503 Eric T. Freyfogle, Our Oldest Task:  Making Sense of Our Place in Nature (University of Chicago Press, 
forthcoming 2017), 184. 
504 Ajaya Dixit, “Rivers of Collective Belonging,” HIMAL South Asian 16, No. 10, (October, 2003), 
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undercut the livelihoods of downstream basin residents.  And again, all uses in combination must 
be consistent with the sustained health of the river as a functioning system.  
Given that many existing water uses of rivers degrade the rivers, or are uses that are simply not 
highly valued in light of unmet needs, this element of the vision inevitably calls for revisiting 
land-use and realigning them with a river’s functional needs. This might require readjusting the 
locations and changing the types of uses in the catchment area including increasing vegetative 
covers, breaching levees so that water can overflow some of the floodplains, and modifying 
wasteful irrigation practices. Wetlands, barrier islands, and other coastal zones should be well 
protected, less inhabited, or less intensively used505 given that healthy wetlands can play a 
critical role in mitigating risks associated with flooding.  Similarly, the presence of mangroves or 
coral reefs can drastically reduce the damages caused by hurricanes, tsunamis, cyclones or even 
large waves.  All of these functions need protecting, which means water uses and other human 
activities that undercut them need to be curtailed.  Cutbacks in such damaging water and land 
uses can free up water for other uses that rate higher overall, including water uses taking place 
within another State.   
This element of the new overall new vision is perhaps the most radical in the sense that it invites 
us to overlook State boundaries.  It focuses on the needs of all people within a basin and seeks to 
satisfy them fairly, insofar as possible treating all basin residents as equally worthy.  This vision 
is not inconsistent with the principle that States are each entitled to an equitable share of uses in a 
watercourse, but the fair-share principle is applied in a much different way and both fairness and 
sharing are calibrated so that similar water uses in different States are treated similarly.  
                                                 
505 Freyfogle, Our Oldest Task, 194. 
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Although the prioritization of water uses might be done by local users operating through a 
shared-management regime, some rules might properly be put in place from above, such as a 
presumed ban on diversions of water outside the watershed of origin.  When water is short, as it 
commonly is, the needs of those residing in the basin should come first or at least, in any priority 
ranking, enjoy a substantial boost over comparable uses taking place elsewhere.  
Diffusing power broadly.  The fourth element of this new vision—this new overall goal for 
international watercourse law—is that people affected by water-use decisions in a basin ought to 
have opportunity to participate in the decision-making.  This element too is a radical shift in that 
it suggests people living in one nation ought to have their concerns heard in decisions made 
about water uses elsewhere.  In the case of a transboundary river, everyone’s rights as well as 
corresponding duties properly stretch to the entire course of the river, including the surrounding 
drainage basin.  This means, at a minimum, a sharing of all relevant information, including the 
content of impact studies.  But it also goes to the nature of the governance regime that makes the 
key decisions.  It must take seriously the views of the people affected by its decisions through a 
participatory framework of local people taking due notice of their lives, patterns of livelihood, 
cultural values, and moral aspirations resulting in the fair distribution of the benefits springing 
from water-related activities 
Adding flexibility. The final defining element of this new vision interjects the need for flexibility 
over time.  The water use regime for a watercourse must have within it the capacity to shift water 
to higher and better uses, including the power to terminate, quickly or gradually, activities that 
are no longer consistent with the above principles; no longer consistent either with the 
maintenance of ecological health or with the principle of applying water to meet the highest 
priority needs wherever located.  Flexibility is needed so that use patterns can respond to shifting 
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conditions, evolving values, and expansions of human understanding.  Flexibility can and likely 
should be built-in using various tools, from time-limited use rights, to meaningful beneficial use 
limits on water uses, to market-linked trading rights schemes.   
Management:  basin-wide and flexible. Several of these elements, it should be clear, anticipate if 
they do not demand the creation and operation of a basin-wide management regime with 
substantial power to authorize and limit water uses and other activities affecting a watercourse.  
What is needed is a political order and institutional framework that would foster uniform policies 
and facilitate organized collective conservation basin wide.506 Successful basin-wide 
management would integrate water with other resources and establish a regime of laws or other 
norms facilitating such organized efforts and encouraging individuals to engage in the process.  
It would go beyond simply softening State boundaries that transect interstate watercourses to 
take account of the entire catchment basin. Good river management calls for at least rough 
coordination of land uses at fairly large spatial scales. No individual country along a 
transboundary river typically may have the sufficient means, mandate and power to take overall 
good care of the entire drainage basin. That task must be shared and requires an orchestrated 
effort by all of the riparians concerned.  
The need for flexibility in this management regime is particularly critical given the looming 
ravages brought on by human-induced climate change.  The dangers here are many and directly 
affect both the ways people might safely use watercourses and the increased needs for instream 
water flows to combat the dangers.  A particularly damaging likelihood (if not certainty) is that 
rising sea levels and more frequent, stronger storms will push salty sea water into the freshwater 
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systems, contaminating the water and killing vegetation not able to withstand the salinity. 
Climate change will also feature unusual seasonal variations in rainfall and water flows, leading 
in particular to dry-season water shortages that heighten rifts among co-riparian nations.  Strong, 
popularly supported governance systems will be essential to handle these tensions and reallocate 
water uses in response to them.  
A final note about this overall vision has to do with the possible intrinsic value of rivers; that is, 
value they might have or be thought to have that is unrelated to the many ways they promote 
human flourishing.  The issue is likely to gain more attention in coming decades or generations, 
as are the claims (voiced by humans) of other species to water to meet their needs.  This 
dissertation sets these issues aside for later, separate consideration, except to note that human 
senses and knowledge are inevitably limited and we cannot know for sure today what parts of 
nature, and what types of ecological interconnection, might promote our welfare in the future.  
Simple humility about human powers, apart from any overt recognition of nature’s inherent 
value, could rightly lead to caution in depriving other species and natural areas of the water they 
need to survive.   
 
A Reformulation of the Law 
 
Putting aside the current frame.  For the reasons discussed, the shift toward a new vision of 
ecologically healthy river systems is usefully begun by setting aside the current overall frame for 
the law of international watercourses.  The current frame has yielded a great deal of good by 
softening significantly the power of States to use waterways as they like and has, further, 
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usefully moved the discussion beyond the simple division of waterway into shares for each State.  
Today, water uses by one State can be challenged by others even if the State only uses its fair 
share, challenged either because of environmental consequences or because a particular water 
use significantly harms water uses in another State.  To move further ahead, however, a new 
frame is needed. 
The first step in legal reform is thus to retire the central dichotomy between the right to equitable 
and reasonable utilization and the corresponding duty of a State, consistent with its right to use, 
to take reasonable steps to avoid causing significant harm.  Much of the content of these 
principles can and should be retained, both the fair sharing of water among States and the need to 
adjust or limit particular water uses when they cause harm.  But these principles, or at least the 
normative content embedded in them, can be incorporated into the law in better ways.  As 
introduced in the first part of this chapter (and taken up again below), this normative content can 
appear in an initial baseline standard for environmental protection.  It can also appear in the 
requirement that water uses in a basin all be reasonable and that water be allocated to the most 
vital uses, including in-stream flow uses, with oversight by a basin-wide management regime. 
Setting minimum, baseline standards.  The first positive step in reforming existing law is to set 
baseline environmental-protection standards for a basin, standards that would limit the actions of 
all States and actors.  The objective is to ensure the healthy upkeep of international freshwater 
bodies and to entitle vulnerable States to fair claims to water without resorting to complex 
negotiations and international dispute-resolution mechanisms.  Basic environmental standards 
can help secure the overall ecological health of rivers, which in turn is vital for long-term human 
well-being and flourishing. After complying with these minimum bars, States may then go on to 
sorting out equitable and reasonable uses of the water following a multi-factor test. 
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Serious work, of course, is needed to decide which provisions or priorities should appear in the 
baseline standards. Many important and timely concerns are possible candidates for inclusion. 
The job is also burdensome given the apathy of many States toward environmental protection, 
especially upper riparians and those focused on immediate water resource development, often 
development that might conflict with baseline standards. However, this is the call of the day if 
we want to regain river health and provide vulnerable States with effective tools to seek their 
legitimate claims relating to water.   
The first obligation that should appear in setting baseline environmental standards is a general 
duty to protect and maintain freshwater quality. A majority of the today’s problems associated 
with shared freshwater and its resources are amplified by degraded water quality. Poor water 
quality invites grave humanitarian consequences, affecting human health and claiming lives of 
millions of people worldwide. At the same time, degraded water quality also affects fisheries, 
impacts agriculture, and interferes with recreational activities, not to mention its ecological tolls 
by degrading aquatic habitats and diminishing aquatic biodiversity.  
The maintenance of good water quality, as we have seen, is already considered vital and 
appears—mostly clothed in pollution terms—in many national policies and international 
instruments. The obligation to protect water, at least so far as it relates to the protection of water 
quality, has thus become (or is on the verge of becoming) a customary norm of international 
water law. What is needed is to extend international norms beyond pollution issues to cover other 
components of river health.  If binding environmental standards can be established and enforced, 
other environmental and social problems would become less acute.  Basin dwellers could enjoy 
more of the benefits of healthy water resources. Baseline standards, as the term implies, means 
standards beyond which States cannot descend.  States would remain free to elevate these 
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standards, imposing stricter normative standards themselves, though national policies or bilateral 
or regional negotiations.  
Baseline standards on water quality should address the water’s biological and chemical 
composition including water temperature. The pollution part will be comparatively easy to 
achieve since existing anti-pollution measures and water-quality standards around the world 
already provide clear precedents.  However, existing regulations mostly target point-source 
pollution with less attention to diffuse sources or runoff pollution.  Baseline standards would 
need to shore up this common deficiency by addressing all pollution sources, giving particular 
attention to agricultural practices and encouraging use of organic fertilizers and less harmful 
pesticides. Similarly, binding standards should, over time, push States to improve sewage 
treatment by expanding and upgrading wastewater treatment plants, at least to the point of 
ensuring reusability of water, curtailing waterborne diseases, and supporting aquatic species.  
Three special, knotty problems have to do with salinity intrusion, water temperature, and 
sedimentation or siltation.  The salinity danger, already mentioned, is severe in many estuaries.  
Ample freshwater flows are needed to keep salt from moving inland, just as ample recharges of 
coastal-area aquifers are needed to keep salt out of drinking water aquifers and away from barrier 
plants that cannot tolerate salt.  As for temperatures, many fisheries depend on water 
temperatures within natural ranges and are degraded when temperatures are too high (often due 
to land cover change) or too low (commonly a problem in water flows from reservoirs).  In the 
United States, water-quality standards include temperature stands keyed to native aquatic life.  
Unduly warm waters also are more prone to nurture disease bacteria.  The third issue, sediment, 
is similar in that aquatic life can evolve to thrive under the natural sediment levels of particular 
rivers.  Changes to those levels—increasing or decreasing sediments loads—can disrupt native 
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biotic communities, just as shortages of sediment, as noted, can deprive flood plains of nutrients 
and facilitate land subsidence.  All three of these problems pose special challenges for 
formulating standards given that healthy or appropriate levels are so context dependent.  Widely 
applicable numeric standards would not work; narrative standards, linking allowed changes to 
general standards of health, are more feasible but still difficult to formulate.  In all three cases, 
the maintenance of minimum ecological flows would mitigate the problems and prepare the way 
for more specific standards later. 
Next, rivers can remain healthy only if they retain stream flows that are adequate in quantity and 
that roughly mimic, in terms of the time of flow variations, the flow regimes to which native 
species have become adapted.  Adequate baseline standards to protect rivers thus need to require 
the maintenance of ecological flows. It is not feasible to maintain natural flows completely; that 
could be done only by barring most diversions and major construction projects. It makes better 
sense to expect States to maintain flows adequate to sustain a river’s ecological functioning.  The 
water volume and flow timing required to sustain that functioning will also be highly context 
dependent.  As noted, larger flows enable a river to push against salinity intrusions, recharge (or 
avoid draining) aquifers, and better degrade organic wastes.  
The environmental goals mentioned so far would all help promote another component of the 
overall environmental vision, the protection of aquatic biodiversity.  Freshwater species 
populations worldwide are declining at an alarming rate—on average by 50 percent between 
1970 and 2000 only.  Declines are largely caused by habitat loss or deterioration, the 
introduction of alien species, and habitat fragmentation caused by artificial barriers in rivers and 
lakes.  The environmental baseline rules that protect rivers should obligate States in general 
terms to take steps to address these dangers and to avoid water uses and construction projects 
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that exacerbate them. Most evidently, States should take steps to modify water projects (dams 
and levees in particular) by, for example, constructing fish passage options (installing fish 
screens and ladders) and breeching levees in particular places to provide habitat for species that 
reproduce on floodplains. 
These international-level goals should be drafted to take into account the various new 
environmental ideals and standards incorporated into such documents as the Berlin Rules.  As 
taken up below, however, basin-level management entities would also play key roles in pursuing 
those goals and indeed would be primarily responsible for doing so, including the work of 
tailoring broad ideals to local circumstances.  Two components of the Berlin Rules, however, are 
usefully eliminated from the environmental standards, at the international level and at lower 
levels.  One is the ideal of sustainable development, which suffers, as noted, from vagueness and 
has a built-in tension that resists all attempts to refine it.  In any event, it is best understood as a 
crude, early effort to interject environmental concerns into development planning.  It is best set 
aside in favor of the more refined and useful environmental standards proposed here.  So long as 
it is retained, it provides a tool for pro-development interests to cite when they charge forward 
with damaging projects.  If the international community is successful in setting baseline 
normative standards for all (as proposed here), then these standards in combination with a 
comprehensive reasonable-use analysis (discussed below), supplemented by stricter obligations 
at the basin level, would render the principle redundant. Similarly (and again as discussed 
earlier), the right to clean water emanates more from the human rights context and is primarily a 
matter of a State’s infrastructure, politics, and water pricing.  Such a human right is properly 
asserted at the State rather than international level.  Internationally and at the basin level the core 
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content of this right is best incorporated by giving priority, in all water allocation decisions, to 
meeting vital human needs.  
Favoring the highest priority uses. As explained, the idea of beginning with environmental 
protections is to set overall limits on all water uses so that they do not unduly degrade 
watercourse.  Once the ecological baseline standards are in place, all water uses must be 
consistent with them, collectively as well as individually.  A benefit of beginning in this way is 
that it becomes possible to simplify the law.  States still must share in their uses of waterways, 
and do so in an equitable manner.  But the guiding principle used to judge all water uses is that 
they must be reasonable taking all factors into account, including the social and economic 
importance of the water use.  When all water uses cannot be accommodated, then water should 
go to the most vital uses, those that rate highest on the priority scale.   
The evaluation and comparison of various water uses—deciding which ones are most 
important—is best done with a single, multi-factor standard, a standard that incorporates all 
considerations and does not (as now) stand in tension, within the law, with various freestanding 
norms that States are admonished to respect.  The basic idea is that the single test would do what 
multiple Articles of the Berlin Rules seek to accomplish.  Such a single testing criteria, along 
with the initial baseline normative standards, will better serve ecological and social purposes. It 
would insist that all water uses be reasonable using a multi-factor test that favors the highest 
priority needs, wherever located, without compromising ecological and social issues. 
If lawmakers prefer this multi-factor test could continue to use the language of “reasonable and 
equitable” to emphasize that it still includes the sharing of water among States.  But sharing 
would come about by devoting water to its highest valued uses wherever located; that would be 
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the first step.  If the resulting scheme seemed to favor one State unduly, adjustments could be 
made so that the overall sharing of water was essentially equitable among the States (calculated 
mostly on numbers of citizens dependent on the river and their levels and types of dependencies).  
But the beginning issue, to reiterate, would be about reasonableness, which would stand as the 
more critical and inclusive element.  It is the reasonableness test that determines whether a given 
water use can go ahead in the face of competing water demands.  
The concept of reasonableness of water use, as noted earlier, originated in the US water law 
jurisprudence.  As a guiding principle it succeeded the natural flow theory, which gave each 
riparian the right to enjoy the natural flow of a stream undiminished in quantity or unimpaired in 
quality.507  With the looming changes brought on by industrialization and urbanization the 
natural flow limited proved too confining because it allowed only modest water uses.  More 
intensive water uses seemed essential, economically, socially, and politically.  To accommodate 
new competing uses U.S. courts shifted to embrace the reasonable use rule, which allowed uses 
that changed river flows more significantly. As Justice Joseph Story explained it, all riparians 
had an equal right to make reasonable use of a stream’s natural flow, provided that such use did 
not interfere with the reasonable use of the water by any other riparian.508  The effect was to 
expand the powers of riparians to use water while curtailing their rights to complain about harms 
caused by upstream uses.  As the Michigan Court of Appeals stated more recently, the 
reasonable-use test entails a wide-ranging inquiry looking at the types and purposes of the uses 
proposed and their relative effects on the watercourse with a full consideration of all benefits and 
injuries.509 
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508 Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (CCRI 1827). 
509 Three Lakes Ass’n v. Kessler, 91 Mich. App. 371, 285 N.W.2d 300, 303 (1979). 
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At bottom, then, many factors are relevant to a full-scale inquiry into reasonableness, ranging 
from natural factors to social, economic needs to environmental protection with attention paid to 
both existing uses and alternatives.  Current international law, as we have seen, is similarly wide-
ranging in the factors it considers: geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, hydrogeological, 
climatic, ecological, and other natural features; the social and economic needs of the basin States 
concerned; the population dependent on the waters of the international drainage basin in each 
basin State; the effects of the use or uses of the waters of the international drainage basin in one 
basin State upon other basin States; existing and potential uses of the waters of the international 
drainage basin; conservation, protection, development, and economy of use of the water 
resources of the international drainage basin and the costs of measures taken to achieve these 
purposes; and the availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to the particular planned or 
existing use. Even more factors can be considered when relevant.510  
This dissertation does not undertake to craft a new reasonable use test with any specificity; doing 
so would be premature.  The basic idea, though, should be clear.  The inquiry must be wide 
ranging, and the aim is to figure out which water uses are most important.  Water shortages 
should be dealt with by curtailing that those are least important.  The inquiry, then, is overtly 
comparative.  It is not possible to evaluate one water use in isolation. A water use is reasonable 
only if it rates high in comparison with others. 
For various ecological reasons, as noted, it makes sense to favor water uses within a water basin 
over those potential (or even actual) water uses located in another basin, in a location where the 
return flow would not re-enter the watercourse of origin.  An out-of-basin use might still rise 
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high in the reasonableness test, even without a return flow, particularly if it is a seasonal use that 
occurs only during wet period.  But the presumption should be against it, and a basin-
management regime might properly bar such uses completely. 
When water becomes scarcer in a region—during dry seasons, for instance—sound water 
management requires that the least vital water uses be curtailed.  The list of acceptable water 
uses, that is, needs to include a plan for dealing with scarcity, some means to curtail some water 
uses during dry times while others are allowed to continue. This issue, too, feeds into reasonable 
use.  International law today is largely silent on the issue.  Guidance is needed.   
Finally, there is the matter of dams, reservoirs and other projects.  They, too, are water uses, and 
they cannot be exempt from the comparative tests that apply to other water uses.  They too must 
be allowed only when and so long as they qualify as reasonable in light of all relevant factors.  
One practical effect of dealing with them this way is that the law becomes simpler, doing away 
with the need for special standards to evaluate them—special standards that would, inevitably, 
create tension with the standards governing other water uses.  This coverage of dams and other 
projects should, of course, be undertaken overtly, using plain language that is clear to all.  In this 
regard, it is useful to follow the lead of the World Commission on Dams (WCD), which did 
employ plain language.  
Like other water uses dams and other artificial structures first need to comply with the minimum 
baseline standards, including standards protecting water quality, ecological flows, and aquatic 
biodiversity.  Many projects, the most damaging, will not satisfy this first hurdle.  Those that do 
then need evaluation in comparison with other water uses.  They need evaluation also in terms of 
whether the project, when added to other water uses within a State, has the effect of capturing 
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more than the State’s equitable share of water.  In the case of some projects, a State that exceeds 
its equitable share might justify doing so by diverting some of the project benefits to citizens in 
another State—for instance, by providing some of the hydropower from a dam. In the case of 
some major projects it may help to consider them not as a single use but as a package of uses, 
some of which may rate highly, others that may earn lower grades.   
As explored in earlier chapters, most international law dealing with big construction projects 
contains procedural requirements for them, rather than substantive limits.  This part of the law 
has become better developed, particularly in the Berlin Rules and in the recommendations of 
World Commission on Dams.  The procedural rules that they prescribe—governing notice, full 
information disclosure, opportunities to be heard, and the full consideration of interests of all 
people—are basically sound.  Among the procedural rules again are obligations to carry out 
thorough impact assessments and consideration of better alternatives. Little is needed to do on 
this issue other than to embrace and make binding all these various ideas at the international 
level.  The guidelines of the WCD, it will be recalled, are intended to govern the entire process, 
from the planning stage to the design, appraisal, construction, operation, and monitoring—and 
even, in the case of large dams, their decommissioning. The guidelines should apply to all 
construction projects, beyond just the dams and reservoirs considered by the WCD. They should 
thus apply to diversion channels, embankments, levees, barrages, and other sorts of water-
engineering structures.  
This dissertation does not call for an absolute ban or prohibition on constructing new dams and 
water structures. If development needs and other circumstances render dam-building essential, 
planning for it should proceed in the manner described here.  Insofar as possible project designs 
should seek to mimic the natural attributes of water cycles, for instance by interfering as little as 
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possible with seasonal flow patterns, water volume, water temperature, and sediment passage.  
Technological adjustments are often possible in the case of a run-of-the-river type hydropower 
project, which return nearly all of the water used to the river of origin. In such a project, running 
water is diverted from a river and guided down a channel, or penstock, which leads to a 
generating house where the force of the moving water spins a turbine and drives a generator. 
Used water is then fed back into the main river further downstream. The difference between run 
of the river and large, conventional storage hydro therefore is the absence of a dam and reservoir.  
Run of the river projects thus rely on coursing rivers to generate electricity as opposed to stored 
water.511  In doing so they disrupt natural rivers flows much less. Technological modifications 
can also accommodate aquatic species through the use of fish barges, fish ladders, fish screens, 
and so on. Such accommodations are less good for fish than a free-running river yet they can 
minimize many harms. Even so, technological advancements have their limits.  Main-stem dams 
inevitably trap sediment and no modification can materially reduce the problem. 
Reasonableness and social justice.  The multi-factor reasonable test proposed here draws into 
consideration a wide-range of factors relating to social justice, and necessarily so.  It has long 
been the case that people with power can harm the more vulnerable through the ways that they 
exploit nature.  Healthy rivers, as we have seen, are vital to the well-being of the people who 
interact with them or merely reside near them.  For them, rivers provide a variety of ecosystem 
services that support human flourishing. (The U.N.’s Millennium Ecosystem Assessment divided 
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them into four categories of services—provisioning,512 supporting,513 regulating,514 and 
cultural515--describing all as vital in sustaining good life, promoting the sense of security, 
assuring good health and fostering good social relations.516) For many others, rivers are a way of 
their life. In many settings, the harms caused by the degradation of ecosystem services are borne 
unfairly by the poor and local people who rely on those services the most, contributing to 
growing inequities and disparities across groups of people and sometimes serving as the 
principal factor causing poverty and social conflict.517  
Consideration of social justice issues blends in with the next major topic, the matter of basin-
wide governance.  Before getting there and as a prelude, it is worth reiterating that systems of 
power and governance have direct relevance to social justice.  Effective governance structures 
need to provide room and time to accommodate the voices of all affected people, particularly 
since damaging watercourse uses disproportionately affect people who are commonly excluded 
from decision-making processes.  Participation in turn requires transparency in processes and 
ways to hold the decision-makers accountable.  Among those commonly excluded are local and 
indigenous people, people living under poverty line, women, the youth and groups particularly 
dependent on ecosystem services or affected by their degradation.  Means must be found to 
empower such people: to empower the women who are often barred from taking part in the key 
decision-making processes in the society, the youth who are likely to bear most of the 
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consequences of decisions made today, and indigenous groups who are inextricably attached to 
their local surroundings, are dependent on local resource exploitation, and hold on to native 
norms and culture for their living enrichment.  Joining these voices need to be the many others 
that, to varying degrees, stand apart from government and from interstate negotiations—civil 
groups, social and environmental activists, multinational corporations, development banks, 
international financial organizations, and others. Due participation by relevant stakeholders 
contributes to decision-making processes by allowing better understanding of the impacts and 
vulnerabilities, the distribution of costs and benefits, and the identification of a broader range of 
response options. It further promotes transparency and accountability, reducing the likelihood of 
compromised outcomes. 
One desirable outcome of this kind of full participation could be a more fair distribution of the 
costs and benefits of water projects and water uses.  All humans are equal and deserve unvarying 
advantages and privileges. Yet some are more disadvantaged based on socio-political and 
economic factors as well as other sources of vulnerability. The same analogy is true for nation 
States as members of the international community. Despite their sovereign status and the notion 
of equality of States, some are plainly more vulnerable than others in terms of their geographic 
locations, the peculiar features of their watercourses and water uses, economic status, political 
power-play, regional influence, ecological threats and countless other factors. Just as it is 
critically important to hear the affected people’s voices in water uses, the needs and plights of 
these States should be heard as well. What is needed then is a regime that would take notice of 
and accommodate all these concerns of inequities and ensure the vulnerable States’ due 
participation in the decision-making process – a goal that can only be realized through a 
comprehensive basin-wide governance structure involving all basin States. 
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A multi-level governance system and integrated basin-wide management. The lofty goals set 
forth so far are only conceivable with the emergence and successful operation of watercourse 
management at the basin level, with important limits, as noted, put into place at the international 
level.  Given the global, shared nature of water resources, and their unique importance to life on 
earth, their management deserves to be a concern to the international community as a whole, and 
as such its cooperative management appears to be in the interest of all States.518 While States 
long adhered to more sovereignty-based claims in securing their national interests, as discussed 
in earlier chapters, the trend has gradually shifted toward an increasing sense of community. This 
need for more cooperative management is especially perceived among basin States by virtue of 
being tied physically to an interconnected river system. Basin management thus requires and 
seeks to stimulate high levels of cooperation and an emboldened sense of community interest 
among basin States. Today more than ever, the community interest is permeating international 
law.519 We now see the emergence of a new kind of obligation erga omnes binding on all States, 
in the self-interest of each and all across the global community.520  The trend, however, needs to 
continue pragmatically and more holistically to incorporate the concept more fully, to get to the 
point where local, national, and basin level water issues are interlinked within a global water 
system with management orchestrated at the global level.521  
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This dissertation proposes a multi-level system of governance for water resources, organized 
from top to bottom in hierarchy and incorporating the various elements of the foregoing 
approaches.  At the top would be a level of international governance that undertakes various 
functions.  It sets mandatory minimum environmental standards, applicable to all States 
irrespective of location and any specific agreements to which they are parties. This would entail 
broad-brush lawmaking, primarily by the United Nations, with details worked out by specialized 
agencies drawing upon the work of other international organizations and internationally 
respected scholarly bodies.  Also needed at the international level are designated oversight 
bodies to supervise and monitor compliance with these normative standards and vested with the 
power to do so.  Along with supervising the mandatory compliance in particular, an international 
oversight body would also support formation of, maintain liaison with, and facilitate cooperation 
among basin-based institutions. It basically would work as the central and overarching oversight 
body having jurisdiction over all individual basin States and basin organizations.  
Beneath this top level in the hierarchy would be individual basin institutions for each river basin 
in the world.  These would operate, as said, in liaison with the central overarching body. These 
basin institutions, operating at the whole basin level, would be more comprehensive in their 
scope and would play the pivotal role in managing water resources and ensuring their due 
compliance within the catchment area. In its practical effect, this basin-wide arrangement would 
discourage the current tendency of States to address interstate issues through bilateral 
negotiations. And if successful, it would facilitate cooperation and strengthen a sense of 
community among the riparian nations.  
The responsibilities of the basin institutions would extend beyond efforts to resolve local 
disputes amicably.  They would undertake intensive and thorough management planning, 
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devising basin-wide rules and policies, monitoring compliance with the applicable standards, 
mobilizing financial and technological assistance, facilitating market based approaches if needed, 
and sorting out differences.  These institutions are particularly needed to confront the looming 
effects of climate change: excessive flooding, prolonged droughts, higher sea levels, more 
intensive and numerous storms, and the like.  During such critical situations, often marked by 
high degrees of uncertainty, basin institutions can timely and effectively focus on those smaller 
geography-oriented areas by embracing effective adaptive management methods and making 
real-time allocations to adjust to changed conditions. Each basin institution may craft its own 
modes of operation based on the needs of the basin area in question, resulting no doubt in 
idiosyncratic features, even as they align with the broad-based international standards.  In time, 
however, one might anticipate the sharing of lessons and further work at the international level 
that could lead to the harmonization of local practices and standards.  
Once effective basin-wide systems are in place and operating, then would come the lowest tier—
domestic governance; that is, States charged with revising their practices and policies to align 
them with this higher-level management. States should make sure that their domestic laws, 
policies and practices are all compatible with these higher norms and would apply them to 
internal water management decisions and uses of rivers. For some basins this tier may be 
complemented with yet another layer of governance at the local or root level (especially in 
highly decentralized power systems).  
What is needed for such an effective basin-wide management is a version of Integrated River 
Basin Management (IRBM), a scheme entailing a dynamic, interactive, iterative and multi-
sectoral approach to water resources management. Such management looks to the basin as a 
whole – including its lands as well as its waters, as its scope of concern, not only guiding new 
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development activities but promoting good land use practices in the entire basin.  Similarly it 
acknowledges the interconnectedness of groundwater with surface water and seeks to 
amalgamate both in unitary management plan.  Once adopted, the IBRM approach would seek to 
integrate socio-economic, environmental, and human health considerations in the basin-wide 
decision-making. It would also stimulate the design, implementation, and evaluation of projects 
and programs that are both economically efficient and socially appropriate within clearly defined 
strategies, based on an approach of full public participation. Going further, it contemplates 
integration of sectoral water plans and programs within the framework of national economic and 
social policies and seeks to incorporate them basin-wide. 
Basin-wide governance systems should respect the legitimate interests of all basin States, 
without regard for territorial size, economic state, political power, or negotiating capacity. The 
framework thus must be one that checks against unilateral action by a more influential and 
wealthy State—such as the actions that have taken place in the GBM (Ganges-Brahmaputra-
Meghna) basin.  At present, as discussed, many river basins have no bilateral or multilateral 
treaties, let alone any basin-wide governance mechanism, and most existing treaties fail to 
include all the basin States concerned.   
One of the chief functions at the basin level will be the work of overseeing all water uses, and 
other actions affecting waterways, in an effort to achieve the ideals set forth above.  This work 
would center on the development and implementation of a standard of reasonable use, one that 
took into account conflicting needs (and all other relevant factors) and assigned priorities to 
them.  Necessarily the work includes the identification of possible water uses that should be 
disallowed or halted because they are simply not important enough.  This work requires careful 
attention to the needs of all basin residents.  It would give priority (as do the Berlin Rules) to 
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meeting vital human needs first.  It would also draw in the various environmental provisions that 
have surfaced in recent decades, what might be termed the new generation of environmental law.  
As considered earlier, these provisions will be taken into account in setting the minimum 
international environmental standards.  They will be more important, though, as basin-level 
entities go about giving content to the principle of reasonable use.  They should, to reiterate, gain 
traction through their incorporation into that multi-factor test.  They should not remain, as they 
now are, as freestanding principles that fit together poorly with the many competing principles.  
If needed and seems appropriate, the basin governance bodies might go beyond traditional means 
and try out market-based approaches to water allocation.  Such approaches may not work well in 
many basins; they could foster ecological declines and unjust social outcomes. Nevertheless, 
they could prove useful in some settings, particularly basins located in dry, arid areas. Even for 
wet areas they may prove beneficial in times of seasonal scarcity or sudden drought conditions 
by promoting the most efficient uses and curtailing the wasteful ones. Given the possible 
dangers, it makes sense to test water-marketing in limited, cautious ways to see if they foster 
efficiency (the market’s central aim) without deviating from the guiding ideals. An alternative 
means for fostering resource-reallocation over time is for the basin management entity to impose 
durational limits on particular water uses, a method that can free-up water over time, as limits are 
reached, for reallocation to higher valued uses.  
In some way, basin-management entities need to pay attention also to land uses in the basin and 
to consider them in their water planning.  It is not feasible or consistent with national sovereignty 
to give a regional entity over land use regulation.  But the entity can highlight the many ways 
that changes in land uses can improve water flows and river health and, in doing so, can urge 
States to take action.  Beyond urging action, it can consider in its own decision-making how well 
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or poorly a State has done in its land-use controls.  Harms to a river that good land use would 
have avoided could be counted against a State when water uses are being approved.  Put 
otherwise, a State could use up part of its equitable share of a watercourse by failing to make 
land-use changes that improve water flows and river health.   
Good land use inevitably requires considerable knowledge about local nature and the history of 
patterns of human use. It also requires consideration of the lifestyle, social norms, and culture of 
the people inhabiting the catchment area as well as sound knowledge of local ecological 
functioning.  At the larger scale, however, local details become less important and more 
important ecological realities take over.  Urban sprawl and the conversion of forests to crop lands 
commonly degrade water flows in quality and timing.  In a study carried out in the Spanish 
Basque Country, grasslands were found to supply the greatest amount of river water, followed by 
native woodlands, with exotic woodland plantations providing the least.522 Rapid deforestation 
has also been a driving factor of climate change and bringing on unusual flooding and extreme 
drought conditions. Loss of vegetative cover may erode soils in a catchment area leading to land 
subsidence. Especially in the coastal areas, loss of vegetative cover along with deterioration or 
loss of the buffer zones (as in mangroves) has proved catastrophic during natural calamities like 
cyclones.  Wetlands and marshlands help counteract the intensity of the flood effects by 
absorbing much of the floodwater. On the other side, human attempts to contain floods with 
artificial levees and embankments fragment floodplains from their rivers, often causing various 
ecological damages. Such artificial measures effectively put an end to overflow flooding, a 
                                                 
522 This study aimed to explore how land use decisions affect the volumes of fresh water provided by rivers and 
streams in the Basque Country. Fifteen catchments were studied, with similar geology, topography (shape of the 
land’s surface) and climate. Over two years, rainfall was analyzed and related to river flow levels in areas with the 
following land uses: grassland pastures, native woodland, and exotic (mainly pine) tree plantations. 
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natural process of replenishing land fertility. Such flood-control structures may diminish the 
harms from disastrous floods but they come at high costs—the loss of fertility, the loss of 
sediment to counteract land subsidence, and the loss of critical fish spawning grounds.  
These various ecological, land-use truths rise above the details of local people and their 
practices.  They are matters that basin-level entities can and should take into account in their 
planning and their evaluation of competing water uses and equitable shares.  
To work well, of course, this multi-tier management regime requires reasonably effective 
enforcement methods to ensure compliance.  Enforcement has long been a weakness of 
international law.  It is a weakness that, in this setting in particular, needs to be overcome given 
that sound decisions to deal with crises often need prompt implementation. Noncompliance can 
come at any level, and action at a higher level is needed to challenge it.  International 
enforcement is thus needed to challenge basin-management regimes to fail to abide by 
international standards.  Regional bodies, in turn, would be chiefly responsible for 
implementation and enforcement at the interstate level.  How this is done—what exact powers 
the regional body should wield—is hard to decide in the abstract, apart from local considerations.  
Should it have veto power over major construction projects?  Should it have similar power over 
major diversions—above a certain level?  Should it be able to prescribe generally which 
categories of water uses are permissible and which are not?  Should it, for instance, be able to 
impose standards on permissible irrigation methods and on amounts of water that can be used per 
hectare for particular crops in particular places (as is done in by agencies and courts in the 
Western U.S.)?  Indeed, might it make sense, looking ahead, to consider how a regional body 
might have authority to issue mandatory water-use permits for all major water uses in a basin?   
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Could it, looking even further ahead, oversee some sort of trading-trading rights scheme in 
water-use rights?  
All of the work of a regional management entity, enforcement included, could be aided by the 
involvement of officials from outside the basin region who have no loyalties to any particular 
basin State, officials akin to international arbiters, judges, or senior international agency staff.  
(The Indus Water Treaty, which uses the World Bank as a third party, offers a useful 
illustration.)   Involvement by outsiders could be critical, particularly in the early years of 
operation.  If the basin organization’s leadership is simply made up of people from basin States, 
representatives from a couple of States could possibly manipulate the process to favor their home 
States. Involvement of an independent party would therefore enhance transparency in the basin 
management and promote good faith among basin States in their water relations. Similar benefits 
can be achieved by ensuring due participation of all people concerned and of all appropriate 
stakeholders.  Democratic processes with ample public proceedings; expansive transparency and 
means of accountability in the basin-wide governance system; the involvement of neutral 
outsiders—all in combination might work as effective tools to promote participation and 
compliance by all basin States. In the end, the basin governance body should be able to admonish 
non-complying States, and in the case of continued noncompliance, to consider the factor in the 
next round of prioritizing and authorizing water uses. 
Basin management entities will not end disputes among States, however sound their governance.  
Disputes that do arise should be handled initially by the basic management entity in an effort to 
find a peaceful and amicable resolutions that conforms to the basic principles set forth above.  
The entity’s role could mostly follow the prevailing pattern: as is the case today with various 
specially constituted bilateral or regional commissions, the basin level management bodies could 
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act as the first fora for resolving disputes. Those that cannot be resolved there would thereafter 
be handled at a higher level, by, for instance, an arbitral tribunal or the International Court of 
Justice.   
Finally, different States within a single basin may encounter varied difficulties and problems in 
making sound use of their water shares.  They may be ill-suited to address these difficulties 
individually, without assistance from others in terms of technical and financial support or 
because a State goal cannot be achieved without some coordinated step by another State.  The 
basin-based bodies should facilitate this resource sharing and technology transmission among 
basin States.  This collaboration in mobilizing technological and financial measures should also 
be undertaken across basin lines. To that end, inter-basin partnerships might be launched where 
appropriate between, for instance, a river basin organization in the developing world and a 
similar organization in a more developed region for the sharing of technologies, perhaps to 
increase water-use efficiency, perhaps to reduce the impacts of climate change and nutrient 
loading.  A similar role of stimulating technology sharing could be played by an internationally 
constituted central oversight body. 
Consideration of a few particular elements of governance can round out this overview.  This 
reformulation of current law calls for a cumulative and wider, cross-sectoral analysis of plans 
and actions.  Within the complex and overlapping governance structures today, a conflicting 
policy decision affecting water resources (and land use practices) may come not only from the 
agencies charged with environmental and social welfare but also from other, multifaceted 
development agencies as well. Achieving homogeneity in national policies and goals, as well as 
integrating various cross-sectoral development activities, is thus important both for ecological 
health and social justice.  In very much the same way, harmonization and collaboration among 
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various basin and regional institutions and their policies will be required as the basin States go on 
to managing their waterbodies and catchment areas in general. 
In a similar manner, the sound management of river basins requires increased synchronization 
among various multilateral agreements.  The actions a State takes to comply with one agreement 
should not frustrate efforts to comply with another.  River basin management thus needs to pay 
attention to the full array of agreements applicable in the region, including environmental 
agreements, economic and development agreements, and human rights- related agreements.523 
Below is a chart comparing the major ways this dissertation seeks to reformulate the current 
provisions of international water law. 
  
                                                 
523 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Synthesis, 93. 
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Table 1. Current norms v. Proposed reformulations 
No. Current norms Proposed reformulations 
1 Two independent, yet conflicting and ill-
balanced principles of international water 
law: the equitable and reasonable 
utilization and the obligation of no 
significant harm. 
Retiring the dichotomy between the two 
central principles: the equitable and 
reasonable utilization and the obligation of 
no significant harm by introducing a new 
frame. 
The new frame would impose mandatory 
baseline environmental standards at the 
international level, followed by a 
reasonable use rule – governing and 
limiting all water uses. 
2 Environmental provisions often come as 
overlapping, freestanding corollaries to 
the two abovementioned principles and 
are usually conditioned by them. 
The international baseline standards 
would include specific environmental 
provisions:  
i. Duty to protect and maintain 
freshwater quality 
ii. Duty to maintain an ecological 
flow of water 
iii. Duty to protect aquatic 
biodiversity etc. 
Basin States would be free to impose 
higher environmental standards through 
basin-wide arrangements, giving 
particular regards to local sedimentation 
needs, salinity intrusion, water 
temperature, and timing of flows and so 
on. 
3 Current framework employs the term 
“equitable and reasonable” utilization with 
particular emphasis on equitable or fair 
allocation of water among States. 
 
Focus to be shifted from mere allocation 
to the comparative reasonableness of 
water uses. 
The allocation or sharing component 
would still be included in the equitable 
and reasonable use ideal, but the test of 
reasonableness would stand as the more 
critical and inclusive element. 
4 A multi-factor reasonableness test exists 
but with little guidance on how these 
factors relate to each other in terms of 
relative priorities.  
The multi-factor reasonableness test but is 
framed and analyzed in a way that would 
favor the highest priority needs, wherever 
located, without compromising ecological 
and social issues. 
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Table 1 (Cont’d). 
 Current norms Proposed reformulations 
5 Dams, reservoirs and other similar 
structures have not been addressed in clear 
terms. On many occasions, they have been 
made subject to a few procedural 
requirements only. These procedural 
requirements are again often conditioned 
by the two conflicting principles of 
equitable and reasonable use and no 
significant harm – rendering these 
provisions even less effective in practice.  
i. Dams, reservoirs and other similar 
construction structures are treated 
as uses of water. 
ii. As such, these structures would be 
brought under similar substantive 
provisions; i.e. mandatory baseline 
environmental standards, and 
reasonable use rule. 
iii. In addition, they would be 
subjected to the procedural rules 
(such as notification, exchange of 
information, environmental impact 
assessments etc.) as added 
safeguards. 
iv. Reformulation does not call for an 
absolute prohibition on dams or 
reservoirs but requires that project 
designs mimic the natural 
attributes of water cycles as much 
as possible and include 
technological modifications to 
minimize harmful effects on 
aquatic species and riverine life. 
6 Current legal framework is largely silent 
on how to deal with water scarcity – 
whether in times of droughts, or during 
dry season or any other unforeseeable 
situations induced by climate change.  
Requires a mechanism to deal with such 
emergency situations by curtailing the 
least vital water uses and by real time 
readjustment and reallocation of water to 
satisfy the most basic needs. 
7 No guidance on permissibility of out of 
watershed or inter-basin water transfers. 
Out of watershed water transfers to be 
discouraged heavily, since return flow 
would not return to the source and for 
resulting ecological tolls. 
8 Multiple approaches to improve water 
quality, making the whole scheme vague 
and ambiguous. Among them are overt 
environmental standards, no significant 
harm rule, reasonable use rule factors, 
interjection of the ideal of sustainable 
development, individual right to clean 
water, instream flow uses etc. – with little 
effort to streamline these provisions. 
In addition to the above-mentioned 
reframing of the law, the reformulation 
would simplify by eliminating two other 
ideals as not being helpful in practice – 
the concept of sustainable development 
and the individual right to clean water. 
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Table 1 (Cont’d). 
 Current norms Proposed reformulations 
9 Social justice aspects largely missing from 
the current framework except due process 
concerns appearing in disperse, and only 
in rudimentary forms. 
Ways to assure justice among nation 
States, however, are absent. 
i. The multi-factor reasonableness 
test would bring into consideration 
a wide-range of factors relating to 
social justice. 
ii. An effective governance structure 
would provide room and time to 
accommodate the voices of all 
affected people, as well as all 
stakeholders. 
iii. Enhanced transparency in 
processes and ways to hold the 
decision makers accountable. 
iv. Ensuring fair distribution of costs 
and benefits of water projects and 
water uses. 
v. Providing an equal platform to all 
basin States to raise their concerns 
on water related issues irrespective 
of any disparities in terms of size, 
geographic location, political 
influence, economic power and 
other attributes of vulnerabilities.   
10 No well-articulated system of governance 
internationally. Fragmented arrangements 
mostly seen in bilateral settings, and in a 
few regional settings. 
Proposes a multi-level system of 
governance, organized from top to bottom 
in hierarchy: 
i. International governance, entailing 
broad-brush lawmaking. Also 
needed at the international level is 
a designated oversight body to 
supervise and monitor compliance 
and to maintain liaison with basin-
based institutions. 
ii. Individual basin institutions 
operating at the whole basin level, 
and undertaking intensive and 
thorough management planning. 
iii. Domestic governance – individual 
basin States to revise their policies 
and practices to align them with 
higher level policies. 
 
307 
 
Table 1(Cont’d).  
 Current norms Proposed reformulations 
11 With a handful of regional exceptions, no 
such integrated management approach 
exists at a broader scale. 
An effective basin-wide management 
would require a version of Integrated 
River Basin Management (IRBM).  
The IRBM would look at the basin as a 
whole, integrate water with other 
resources, employ cross-sectoral 
approach, and facilitate a participatory 
framework. It would also integrate socio-
economic, environmental, and human-
health considerations in the basin-wide 
decision making. In some way, the basin-
management entities need to pay attention 
also to land uses in the basin.  
12 Market-based approaches not typically 
seen at the international, or even regional 
level. 
If needed and seems appropriate, basin 
governance bodies might try out – in a 
limited setting and without deviating from 
the guiding ideals – non-traditional means 
such as market-based approaches to water 
allocation, especially in dry, arid regions. 
They might also impose durational limits 
on particular water uses. 
13 Like other areas of international law, no 
hard and fast enforcement mechanism 
exists at the international level. Also 
lacking is any coherent compliance 
framework at the regional level. 
Enforcement needed at the international 
level to challenge basin wide-compliance. 
In turn, the basin-wide bodies would be 
chiefly responsible for implementation 
and enforcement at the interstate level.  
Exact enforcement tools and powers 
would be chosen based on specific local 
considerations. 
14 Most disputes today are resolved in this 
order: by diplomatic negotiations, by 
bilaterally constituted joint commissions 
and basin institutions, by separate fact 
finding commissions, by arbitral tribunal 
or by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). 
The reformulation proposes to retain most 
of the prevailing dispute resolution 
patterns with an important tweaking 
where basin level institutions are to act as 
the first and primary fora for resolving 
disputes. 
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River Health and Justice for the Vulnerable: Bangladesh 
  
As we have seen, Bangladesh lies in the GBM (Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna) basin—a basin 
characterized by dispersed bilateral agreements and ad hoc commissions, all focused on single 
rivers if not single water uses. Disputes in the basin have mostly revolved around the fair sharing 
of the waters year-round. On the horizon are proposals to engineer the GBM rivers, particularly 
the Brahmaputra and the Ganges, in ways that would compromise the overall ecological health 
of the rivers and frustrate the ability of all States in the basin to use their waters reasonably. 
Within the basin Bangladesh stands at the end of almost all transboundary rivers as empty into 
the Bay of Bengal.  As the most downstream riparian nation in the region, the country’s water 
flows and water quality are dependent on good upstream uses by other basin countries, not just 
on what takes place within Bangladesh.  Further, it is a developing country with a massive 
population, and its people and their lifestyles are intimately connected to water. The country’s 
geographic location, economic state, big population, and looming environmental threats—all 
qualify it as a highly vulnerable State.  
Given these circumstance, how would Bangladesh—and by extension similar States--fare under 
this proposed reformulation of the international law of watercourses?  Of particular interest, 
would the legal regime proposed here adequately sustain the health of the major rivers, allowing 
them to transport sediment, nourish land fertility, and flush out salinity? 
Clearly Bangladesh would benefit from the mandatory baseline standards set at the international 
level, standards that would obligate the GBM basin States to maintain a minimum ecological 
flow in their rivers and otherwise protect and maintain freshwater quality and biodiversity. These 
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binding obligations, taken together, would effectively mitigate many of the problems associated 
with sediment loss, land subsidence, land fertility, and salinity intrusion while protecting aquatic 
biodiversity. As they complied with these baseline ecological obligations the basin countries 
would also be called upon to articulate their own, higher and more specific environmental 
standards, taking into account these much-needed ecological functions and other particular 
features of the basin. Many rivers in the GBM basin, including the Ganges, are heavily polluted. 
Existing laws in the basin States (including Bangladesh) address pollution mostly from point 
sources, leaving out potentially more damaging diffuse sources. The reformulation proposed here 
would provide tools to limit and curtail such land-use activities, including irrigation practices, 
which might pollute the waters or otherwise interfere with river health (by, for instance, 
increasing salinity levels in the freshwater, a threat felt by Bangladesh in particular). 
After these ecological concerns come the many use-conflicts between and among the basin 
States, clothed either in ecological claims or development claims. The basin is water abundant 
except during the dry season.  It can easily accommodate different types of nonpolluting water 
uses.  The most serious use-conflicts have to do with major diversions that reduce water flows 
substantially and from major construction projects. The case of Farakka, for example, pitted 
Bangladesh’s claims of adverse impacts—on its irrigation and on the rivers ecological 
functioning—against India’s demands to divert water southward down a Ganges tributary to 
facilitate navigational access to the Kolkata port.  Similarly, the ongoing river interlinking 
project by India pitted India’s desire to divert Ganges and Brahmaputra waters to arid areas for 
irrigation, improved navigation, and hydropower production against Bangladesh’s many claims 
of resulting harm due to substantially reduced water flows (including reduced sedimentation, 
increased salinity, harm to aquatic species and agriculture, exacerbated dry-season scarcity. What 
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these disputes highlight is how water uses can be, and routinely are, in conflict with one another 
in the GBM basin.  Some mechanism is needed to resolve the disputes. The reformulation 
supplies a means to do that.  
The work of resolving such conflicts will be aided by putting aside the now-entrenched 
dichotomy between the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization and harm avoidance.  
Doing that simplifies the process of reconciling or choosing among competing water uses. On 
different occasions thus far, this clash between use and harm has paralyzed efforts to address 
basin water problems jointly, primarily between Bangladesh and India. It is worth noting that this 
alleged clash apparently, favoring one country over another, was the reason cited by India when 
it refused to endorse the UN Convention. Under the simplified new reformulation, all water uses 
in the GBM basin would be evaluated based on a single, multi-factor reasonable use standard. 
The test would weigh, as in the above-mentioned two scenarios, not only claims raised by 
Bangladesh and India (and their other needs) but also the interests, if any, of the three other basin 
States.  The single test of reasonableness, taking into account all possible factors, would better 
serve the entire GBM basin, ecologically and socially. The law would protect those conflicting 
uses among basin States that are more reasonable; those that are more important and consistent 
with the maintenance of ecological standards and human well-being.  In doing so it would 
prevent or at least reduce many of the ill effects that Bangladesh would otherwise suffer while 
allowing Bangladesh to engage in high-quality water uses. Further protection would come when 
and as the GBM basin formulates its own sets of additional, more objective standards for 
reasonableness and river health, tailored to context.  
As seen, many of the looming water problems in the GBM basin arise from major projects 
planned by India and China to develop their rivers intensely. The reformulation proposed here 
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would bring these projects, and others like them—dams, reservoirs, barrages, diversions, 
levees—within the ambit of “uses” of waters, thereby subjecting them to the same standards set 
for regulating other water uses. This would mean that these projects would have to satisfy the 
initial ecological baseline standards, followed by an evaluation of their reasonableness in 
comparison with other competing water uses in the basin. The projects would also be subject to 
the various rules proposed here to govern decision-making processes. India, in the case of its 
planned diversions, and China, in the case of its conceived plans along the Yarlung Tsangpo 
(Brahmaputra) River, would be obligated to share detailed information on their projects, 
including the results of impact assessments, and to allow involvement by all stakeholders—
within Bangladesh as well as other GBM basin States.  
 With regard to the India’s planned river interlinking diversions within the basin, the 
reformulation would limit India’s rights to do so except to the extent the diversions do not 
materially impact the ecological flows of the two rivers (Ganges and Brahmaputra) and 
otherwise comply with all other foregoing standards. Diversions out of the GBM basin on the 
other hand, which China is contemplating for the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) River, would 
be strictly limited given competing water uses. Such out-of-basin water transfers would not be 
allowed in the dry season, and would be permitted even during the wet season only when enough 
water is left to keep the GBM basin ecologically healthy and socially sound.  Even then it would 
be problematic to take excess rain water out of the basin given the engineering challenges in the 
impassable area of India where rainfall is highest.  
While the GBM basin has plentiful water overall the rivers flows feature high seasonal 
disparities. Many the prevailing tensions in the basin are due to this hydrological reality, 
especially between Bangladesh and India. These two lower riparian States are increasingly 
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dependent on steady water flows during the dry season for irrigation, to sustain underground 
drinking water supplies, and to satisfy other basic needs. As mentioned earlier, the Farakka 
barrage has already intensified dry-season water shortages for Bangladesh.  Other proposed dams 
and diversions efforts will aggravate the situation. In much the same way, China’s mega-projects 
will have similar or worse dry-season repercussions for both downstream riparians—India and 
Bangladesh. On top of these projects, climate change impacts in the region are likely to 
compound the dry season problems by causing more frequent droughts. Current international law 
remains largely silent on these issues. The reformulation proposed in this dissertation would help 
address them. 
The reformulation, as applied to the GBM basin, recommends that in times of scarcity or sudden 
and unusual circumstances—when all water uses by the basin States cannot be accommodated—
available water would go to the highest valued uses taking into account the basic needs of the 
people in the basin. This could favor water needed for agriculture yet curtail wasteful irrigation 
practices; it would maintain a minimum flow vital to recharge underground drinking-water 
aquifers and to keep inland waters immune to salinity intrusion; and it would limit upstream dam 
operations and diversions during the dry periods (October to March).  The collaborative 
governing body in the GBM basin would be vested with the tasks of redistributing and 
reallocating the available waters to handle these seasonal water shortages in the basin. The body 
might additionally impose term limits on some water uses, and authorize water trading, as a way 
to promote the highest valued uses consistent with the overall health of the GBM basin. 
As we have seen, the GBM basin has highly fragmented legal arrangements when it comes to 
transboundary water issues, evidenced by the existing bilateral agreements between Bangladesh 
and India, and between India and Nepal. There is at present no working water agreement with 
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China, except a few memorandums of understanding (those, too, bilateral ones with Bangladesh 
and India). Bhutan, despite being located well within the GBM basin, has never been a party to 
any arrangement. Good river health and basin-wide human flourishing can never be achieved in 
such a highly fragmented management system. It needs what this formulation proposes, basin-
wide management that oversees the GBM basin as a single ecological unit. A basin-wide 
oversight body would represent all five States in the GBM catchment area—Bangladesh, India, 
Nepal, Bhutan and China—and would be responsible for comprehensively managing all rivers 
within the basin.  This GBM oversight body would play the key role in implementing all of the 
foregoing formulations; i.e. setting the overall goals and criteria for a healthy GBM basin, 
monitoring compliance with binding international standards, prescribing standards applicable 
specifically to the GBM basin taking its individualistic traits and critical needs into account, 
regulating use-conflicts by diverting water to the highest-rated priorities, reallocating and 
readjusting dry season water uses, promoting cross-sectoral cooperation and basin-wide dialogue 
among States and/or non-State actors, and facilitating dispute resolution  
The reformulation here would enjoin the GBM basin-body to undertake more of an integrated 
approach basin-wide, both in its policymaking and regulation of water uses. This would 
importantly require undertaking cross-sectoral analyses of plans or policies to make sure that an 
activity in a part of the basin would not negatively impact another part of the basin. The body 
would also be required to integrate management of both surface water and ground water, a 
pivotal aspect for a basin that makes enormous use of its groundwater sources. Moreover, the 
reformulation would involve all relevant stakeholders into the decision-making process including 
the basin States and the affected people, while also calling for streamlining all laws, policies and 
land-use practices in each State within the basin to align them with the long-term visions. 
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Importantly, the reformulation would not merely look at transboundary impacts.  It would also 
call into question actions by individual States within their jurisdictional limits. For example, not 
all water related problems in Bangladesh are necessarily brought on by upstream uses. The 
country’s own actions and unwise land use patterns may be responsible for some of the degraded 
riverine conditions. Many rivers in Bangladesh suffer from acute pollution from both point and 
non-point sources within the country. Urban sprawl and the illegal occupation and expansion of 
irrigable lands have degraded many streams, stream banks, and segments of major rivers. 
Beyond that rivers are degraded by ill-conceived flood—control measures, by weak and faulty 
management of coastal zones (including a decision to build a massive coal power plant near 
Sundarbans, the largest mangrove forest in world), and by the latest attempt to export critically 
important alluvial sands by dredging river beds. The mere fact that there is no other downstream 
riparian whose rights and interests Bangladesh may violate cannot justify such actions 
considering the overall ecological health of the river basin. As the reformulation urges, all people 
within the entire GBM basin have legitimate interests in the entire stretch of the rivers and the 
catchment area as a whole, which means residents in India have legitimate concerns about 
actions within Bangladesh. The country’s own policymaking and actions would thus have to be 
compatible with the overall basin-management plan.  
Then comes the aspect of social justice. Because justice includes considerations of how we share 
the earth and its resources with one another—in a territorial sense and in our relative rates of 
consumption524--ensuring social justice would require taking due account of unequal natural 
distributions of resources, peculiar regional features, and the state of economic and political 
advancement of groups, societies or even countries in an international setting. For Bangladesh 
                                                 
524 Eric T. Freyfogle, Chapter 6: Social Justice, 183. 
315 
 
therefore, an ideal basin-wide regime would take all these differences into account and, by 
counteracting them, place the country on par with others. Mandatory membership in a robustly 
framed GBM basin governance system would furnish the country a common platform for raising 
its legitimate concerns. Without needing tough diplomatic negotiations, the mandatory 
substantive and procedural obligations along with the multi-factor reasonable use test would 
further provide enough safeguards for Bangladesh to make sure that upstream water uses do not 
compromise the country’s ecological and social needs. To ensure that the more influential States 
cannot unduly manipulate the process in their favor, the GBM basin can involve a third party as a 
watchdog in its governing framework to ensure its independence and to strengthen enforcement. 
As mentioned earlier, the joint body would also consider popular inputs, involve all relevant 
stakeholders in the process, and hear the voices of the affected and the marginalized sections of 
the society—all to make sure that decisions avoid undue hardship or injustice. 
Concerns about justice are further implicated in the ultimate distribution of costs and benefits of 
water-related projects. If, for example, a water construction project in Nepal moves forward, 
diverting or consuming water in excess of the State’s equitable amount, the reformulation would 
require Nepal to equitably share some of the project’s benefits with downstream India and 
Bangladesh—in the form of hydropower or monetary compensation or through some other 
collaborative effort. In short, the inequities of the basin States would be fully considered and 
steps taken to equalize outcomes.  
The GBM is one of the largest river basins in the world. The basin is also very dynamic in the 
way it incorporates diverse climate conditions, distinctive topography and different cultures.  
What unites all peoples and cultures is an inescapable reality: the high dependence on water of a 
very large population. The GBM basin should therefore be carefully managed, jointly by all 
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basin States concerned in a way that would meet the basic needs of this large population, 
promote long term ecological health, and stimulate overall human well-being in the basin. The 
basin-wide management body would thus have to assume long term planning, fostering good 
land uses across the basin and within individual basin States (as in Bangladesh), and reckoning 
the GBM basin as a complex, indivisible ecological whole.  
317 
 
Bibliography 
“Bangladesh: “Invisible hazard” of groundwater depletion.” IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis, 
December 13, 2011. Accessed March 8, 2017. 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/94454/bangladesh-invisible-hazard-of-groundwater-depletion. 
“Hydro Projects in Tibet: Why China's Neighbors are Worried.” HubPages. Accessed March 9, 2017.  
“The Joint River Commission of Bangladesh.” The Ministry of Water Resources, accessed January 
10, 2014, http://www.jrcb.gov.bd/. 
2030 Water Resources Group. “Charting Our Water Future.” accessed January 5, 2009. 
http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability-and-resource-productivity/our-
insights/charting-our-water-future. 
Agenda 21, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio de 
Janerio, 3 - 14 June, 1992.  
Aggarwal, Mayank. “Will First River-Interlinking Project Washout Panna Reserve?.” DNA Daily 
News and Analysis, Sunday, August 24, 2014. Accessed March 9, 2017.  
http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-will-first-river-interlinking-project-washout-panna-
reserve-2013144. 
Agreement between His Majesty's Government of Nepal and the Government of India on the Kosi 
Project, Nepal - India, April 25, 1954. 
Agreement between His Majesty's Government of Nepal and the Government of India on the Gandak 
Irrigation and Power Project, Nepal – India, December 4, 1959. Accessed April 19, 2017. 
https://indiamadhesi.files.wordpress.com/2008/11/agreement-between-his-majestys-government-
of-nepal-and-the-government-of-india-on-the-gandak-irrigation-power-project.pdf. 
Agreement between the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania and the Government of the 
Republic of Macedonia for the Protection and Sustainable Development of Lake Ohrid and its 
Watershed, Albania – Macedonia, June 17, 2004, FAOLEX No: LEX-FAOC069075. 
Agreement between the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania and the Government of the 
Republic of Macedonia for the Protection and Sustainable Development of Lake Ohrid and its 
Watershed, Albania – Macedonia, 17 June 2004, http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/bi-
69075E.pdf. 
Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, April 5, 
1995, accessed April 20, 2017, https://www.ecolex.org/details/treaty/agreement-on-the-
cooperation-for-the-sustainable-development-of-the-mekong-river-basin-tre-001223/. 
318 
 
Ahmed, Inam, and Aasha Mehreen Amin. “Bangladesh Waiting for a Miracle.” People and the 
Planet 15:3 (1996). 
Alam, Nazmul, and M. Abul Kashem Mozumder. Tipaimukh and Beyond. Dhaka: A H Development 
Publishing House, 2009. 
Alam, Shawkat. “An Examination of the International Environmental Law Governing the Proposed 
Indian River-Linking Project and an Appraisal of Its Ecological and Socio-Economic 
Implications for Lower Riparian Countries.” Georgetown International Environmental Law 
Review 19 (2007): 211. https://litigation-
essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&doci
d=19+Geo.+Int'l+Envtl.+L.+Rev.+209&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=9e0d320306550c5a9c2
6a0f0ad8443d4. 
Ali, Imran. “Interlinking of Indian Rivers.” Current Sci. 86 (2004): 498 – 499. 
Azim, M.E., M.A. Wahab, and M.C.J. Verdegem. “Status of Aquaculture and Fisheries in 
Bangladesh.” World Aquaculture (2002): 37–67. 
Bandyopadhyay, Jayanta, and Shama Perveen. “The Interlinking of Indian Rivers: Some Questions 
on the Scientific, Economic and Environmental Dimensions of the Proposal.” Occasional Paper 
No 60, SOAS Water Issues Study Group School of Oriental and African Studies/King’s College 
London University of London, June 2003, Paper presented at Seminar on Interlinking Indian 
Rivers: Bane or Boon? at IISWBM, Kolkata 17 June 2003.  
Bari, M. Fazlul. “Water Resources.” In Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh.” 
Accessed March 7, 2017. http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Water_Resources. 
Beaumont, Peter. “The 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses: Its Strengths and Weaknesses from a Water Management Perspective and the 
Need for New Workable Guidelines,” International Journal of Water Resources Development 
16:4 (2000): 477. doi: 10.1080/713672536. 
Bednarek, Angela T. Bednarek. “Undamming Rivers: A Review of the Ecological Impacts of Dam 
Removal.” Environmental Management 27 (2001): 803. Accessed March 7, 2017. doi: 
10.1007/s002670010189. 
Biswas, Asit K. “Cooperation or Conflict in Transboundary Water Management: Case Study of South 
Asia.” Hydrological Sciences Journal 56:4 (2011): 662-670, doi: 
10.1080/02626667.2011.572886.  
Biswas, Asit K. “Management of Ganges-Brahamaputra-Meghna System: Way Forward.” In 
Management of Transboundary Rivers and Lakes, edited by Olli Varis, Cecilia Tortajada and 
319 
 
Asit K. Biswas, 143-164. Berlin: Springer, 2008. Accessed March 7, 2017. 
http://www.thirdworldcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/gbmspringer.pdf.  
Bourne, Charles B. “Primacy of the Principle of Equitable Utilization in the 1997 Watercourse 
Convention.” Can. Y.B. Int’l L. 35 (1997): 219. 
Boyle, Alan. “Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?.” Eur J Int Law 23-3 (2012): 613.  
Burra, Uma Sastry. “Transboundary Rivers, International Law and India’s Water Security.” The IUP 
Law Review III-3 (2013): 28-41. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2358318. 
Callicott, J. Baird, Larry B. Crowder, and Karen Mumford. “Current Normative Concepts in 
Conservation.” Conservation Biology 13:1 (Feb. 1999): 22-39. 
Cano, Guillermo J. “The Development of the Law of International Water Resources and the Work of 
the International Law Commission.”  Water International 14 Issue 4 (1989). 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02508068908692100.  
CGIAR, Research Program on Water, Land and Ecosystems. “The Ganges River Basin.” Accessed 
February 21, 2014. http://wle.cgiar.org/focal-regions/south-asia/. 
Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, June 26, 1945, at the conclusion of the United Nations 
Conference on International Organization, came into force on 24 October 1945, accessed March 
9, 2017, http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/. 
Chazournes, Laurence Boisson De. Freshwater in International Law. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press (2013). 
Clemons, Karlie Shea. “Hydroelectric Dams: Transboundary Environmental Effects and International 
Law.” Florida State University Law Journal 36 (2009): 487 - 536. 
Coleman, James M. Coleman. “Brahmaputra River: Channel Processes and Sedimentation.” 
Sedimentary Geology 3 (1969): 129-239. Accessed March 7, 2017. doi: 10.1016/0037-
0738(69)90010-4. 
Conca, Ken. Governing Water:Contentious Transnational Politics and Global Institution Building. 
Cambrisge. MA: The MIT Press (2006). 
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, adopted by the 
General Conference of UNESCO, on 16 November, 1972, 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/conventiontext/. 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters (The Aarhus Convention), Aarhus, Denmark, 25 June, 1998, U.N.T.C. 
37770, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
13&chapter=27&clang=_en. 
320 
 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, U.N.T.S. 30619, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
8&chapter=27&lang=en.  
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (the Espoo 
Convention Espoo, Finland, 25 February 1991, U.N.T.C. 34028. 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
4&chapter=27&clang=_en 
Convention on the Conservation of the Migratory Species (The Bonn Convention), Bonn, 23 June, 
1979, accessed April 20, 2017, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800bc2fb. 
Convention on the Conservation of Wild Flora and Fauna and their Habitats in Europe (The Berne 
Convention), 1979. 
Covention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourse, New York, 
adopted 21 May, 1997, U.N.T.S. 52106, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
12&chapter=27&clang=_en. 
Crow, Ben, Alan Lindquist, and David Wilson. Sharing the Ganges – the Politics and Technology of 
River Development. New Delhi: Sage Publications (1995). 
Crow, Ben, and Nirvikar Singh. “Impediments and Innovations in International Rivers: The Waters 
of South Asia.” (August 1999). http://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(00)00061-9. 
Cullet, Philippe. “Water Law in a Globalised World: the Need for a New Conceptual Framework.” J 
Environmental Law 23-2 (2011): 233. https://doi.org/10.1093/jel/eqr003. 
D., John, and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Strategic Foresight Group. The Himalayan 
Challenge: Water Security in Emerging Asia. Mumbai: Strategic Foresight Group, 2010.  
Accessed March 9, 2017. http://www.strategicforesight.com/publication_pdf/85801himalayan-
challenge.pdf. 
Dauvergne, Peter, ed. Handbook of Global Environmental Politics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Pub., 
2012. 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, adopted at the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 16 June 1972,  http://www.un-
documents.net/unchedec.htm. 
321 
 
Dellapenna, Joseph W. “The Berlin Rules on Water Resources: The New Paradigm for International 
Water Law.” World Environmental and Water Resources Congress (2006). 
http://cedb.asce.org/cgi/WWWdisplay.cgi?153030 
Department of Fisheries, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. 
http://www.fisheries.gov.bd/. 
Dhardhowa, Y. C. “China’s Controversial Plans for Dam on Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet.” The Tibet 
Post International, May 25, 2010. Accessed March 9, 2017. 
http://www.thetibetpost.com/en/features/environment-and-health/898-chinas-controversial-plans-
for-dam-on-yarlung-tsangpo-in-tibet. 
Dixit, Ajaya. “Rivers of Collective Belonging.” HIMAL South Asian 16 No. 10 (October, 2003). 
http://old.himalmag.com/component/content/article/1885-rivers-of-collective-belonging.html. 
Accessed March 24, 2017. 
Dixit, Kunda. “A New Himalayan Game.” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 34, No 1 (2010) 125. 
D'Souza, Rohan. “Supply-Side Hydrology in India: The Last Gasp.” Economic and Political Weekly 
38, 36 (2003). doi: 10.2307/4413994.  
Elahi, Sheikh Fazle. Antorjatik Nodi Ain o Bangladesh-Bharat Panibirodh. Dhaka, 2010. 
Environmental Science and Policy Workshop Columbia University School of International and 
Public Affairs. “Corruption and the Environment: A Project for Transparency International.” 
April, 2006. Accessed February 11, 2014. 
http://mpaenvironment.ei.columbia.edu/files/2014/06/Transparency-International-final-
report.pdf. 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. “National Aquaculture Sector Overview: 
Bangladesh.” Accessed March 8, 2017. 
http://www.fao.org/fishery/countrysector/naso_bangladesh/en. 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. “FAO's Information System on Water and 
Agriculture: Bangladesh.” Accessed March 8, 2017. 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/espim/country/bangladesh/index.stm. 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. “Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna River 
Basin, Water Report 37 (2011).” Accessed March 7, 2017. 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/basins/gbm/index.stm. 
322 
 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. “Irrigation in Southern and Eastern Asia in 
figures: AQUASTAT Survey – 2011.” Accessed March 8, 2017. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2809e/i2809e.pdf. 
Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin, 12 March, 2002, UNTS Vol 2366, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280069231. 
Freudenburg, William R., Kai T. Erikson, Robert Gramling, and Shirley Bradway Laska.  
Catastrophe in the Making: The Engineering of Katrina and the Disasters of Tomorrow. 
Washington D.C.: Island Press, 2009. 
Freyfogle, Eric T. Our Oldest Task:  Making Sense of Our Place in Nature. University of Chicago 
Press, forthcoming 2017. 
Freyfogle, Eric. T. “Natural Resources Law.” In the Berkshire Encyclopedia Of Sustainability: 
Natural Resources And Sustainability. 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780190622664.001.0001/acref-
9780190622664-e-430. 
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, Hungary v Slovakia, Judgment, Merits, ICJ GL No 92, (1997) ICJ 
Rep 7, (1997) ICJ Rep 88, (1998) 37 ILM 162, ICGJ 66 (ICJ 1997), 25th September 1997, 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
Giordano, Meredith A. “Managing the Quality of International Rivers: Global Principles and Basin 
Practice.” Nat. Resources J. 43-1 (2004): 111. 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228242170_Managing_the_Quality_of_International_
Rivers_Global_Principles_and_Basin_Practice. 
Giordano, Meredith A., and Aaron T Wolf. “Sharing Waters: Post-Rio International Water 
Management.” Natural Resources Forum: A United Nations Sustainable Development Journal 
27 Issue 2 (2003): 163-171. doi: 10.1111/1477-8947.00051. 
Gleick, Peter H. “Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security.” 
International Security 18-1 (1993): 79-112. 
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2539033?uid=3739656&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&si
d=21105364073863. 
Graham-Rowe, Duncan. “Hydroelectric Power’s Dirty Secret Revealed.” Newscientist, Feb. 24, 2005. 
Accessed February 8, 2014. http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7046. 
Hammer, Jesse H., and Aaron T. Wolf, “Patterns in International Water Resource Treaties: The 
Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database.” Colorado Journal of International Environmental 
Law and Policy, Natural Resources Forum Vol. 23-1 (1998): 3-33.  
323 
 
Handl, Günther. “Introductory Note on Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, Stockholm, 16 June 1972, and Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 
Rio de Janeiro, 14 June 1992.” Audiovisual Library of International Law. Accessed February 12, 
2014, http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/dunche/dunche.html. 
Haque, M. Inamul. “How far is Teesta Water Sharing Agreement?.” The Daily Star, October 16, 
2014. Accessed March 9, 2017. http://www.thedailystar.net/how-far-is-teesta-water-sharing-
agreement-45831. 
Helal, Mohammed S. “Sharing Blue Gold: The 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses Ten Years On.” COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & 
POL'Y 18 (2007): 337. 
Helston, Charlotte, and Andrew Farris. “Run of River Power.” Last updated February, 2017. 
http://energybc.ca/runofriver.html. 
Hey, Ellen. “The Watercourses Convention: To What Extent Does It Provide a Basis for Regulating 
Uses of International Watercourses?” Review of European, Comparative and International 
Environmental Law 7-3 (1998): 291-300. Doi: 10.1111/1467-9388.00162. 
Hirsch, Tim Hirsch. “Project Aims to Extract Dam Methane.” BBC News, May 10, 2007. Accessed 
February 8, 2014, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/6638705.stm. 
Homer-Dixon, Thomas. “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases.” 
International Security 19 No. 1 (1994): 5-40. 
Hossain, Ishtiaq. “Bangladesh-India Relations: The Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty and Beyond.” 
Asian Affairs: An American Review 25-3 (1998): 131-150. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00927679809601449. 
Hussain, Wasbir. “India & China: An Assessment of October 2013 Agreements, MoU on the 
Brahmaputra River.” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies 24 October 2013. Accessed March 
9, 2017. http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/india-china-an-assessment-of-october-2013-
agreements-mou-on-4149.html. 
International Commission on Large Dams. “Benefits and Concerns about Dams.” accessed March 7, 
2017, https://www.scribd.com/document/59706704/Benefits-of-and-Concerns-About-Dams.  
International Commission on Large Dams. “Role of Dams.” Accessed March 6, 2017, 
http://www.icold-cigb.org/GB/Dams/Role_of_Dams.asp. 
International Farakka Committee. “The Farakka Project.” Accessed January 12, 2014. 
http://www.farakkacommittee.com/Maps.php. 
324 
 
International Regulation regarding the Use of International Watercourses for Purposes other than 
Navigation, The Declaration of Madrid, Institute of International Law, 20 April 1911. Accessed 
March 9, 2017. http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/W9549E/w9549e08.htm#bm08.1.2. 
International Rivers. “Dams and Geology.” Accessed March 7, 2017, 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/dams-and-geology. 
International Rivers. “Merowe Dam, Sudan.” Accessed March 7, 2017. 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/merowe-dam-sudan-0. 
Islam, Md. Nazrul. “Environmental Impacts of the Ganges Water Diversion and its International 
Legal Aspects.” In The Ganges Water Diversion: Environmental Effects and Implications, 
Volume 49 of the series Water Science and Technology Library, 197-221. 
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F1-4020-2480-0_10. 
Island of Palmas case (Netherlands, USA), Perm. Ct. of Arbitration, 2 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 
829 (1928), 839. 
Iyer, Ramaswamy R. “Conflict Resolution: Three River Treaties.” Economic and Political Weekly, 
34, Issue 24 (1999), 1517. 
Jain, Abhimanyu George, and Armin Rosencranz. “The Indian Supreme Court Promotes Interlinking 
of India's Rivers: Judicial Overreach?.” Environmental Law Reporter 44 No. 5 (2014). Accessed 
March 9, 2017. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2431762. 
Jain, Abhimanyu George. “Economy of Use” in the 1997 UN Convention on Shared Watercourses: 
An Attempt at Elucidation.” Colo. Nat. Resources, Energy & Envtl. L. Rev. Vol. 25:1 (2014). 
Jones, William I. The World Bank and Irrigation. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1995. 
Karthykeyan, Deepa. “Conflict and Co-operation on Trans-boundary Waters in South Asia.” Draft 
paper for presentation at Pondicherry University.  
Khan, Tauhidul Anwar. “Management and Sharing of the Ganges.” Nat. Resources J. 36 (1996): 455. 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/narj36&div=28&id=&page=. 
Khatiwada, Dr. Som Prasad. “River Culture and Water Issue: An Overview of Sapta-Koshi High 
Dam Project of Nepal.” International Journal of Core Engineering & Management (IJCEM) 1, 
Issue 3 (2014). 
Kraska, James. “Sustainable Development Is Security: The Role of Transboundary River Agreements 
as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) in South Asia.” Yale J. Int'l L 28 (2003): 465. 
325 
 
Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), (1957) 12 R.I.A.A. 281,  24 I.L.R. 101, (Arbitral Tribunal, 
November 16, 1957). 
Lammers, J. G. Pollution of International Watercourses: The Search for Substantive Rules and 
Principles of Law. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984. 
Larson, Khett B. “Holy Water and Human Rights: Indigenous Peoples’ Religious Rights Claims to 
Water Resources.” Ariz. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 2 (2011): 81. 
Lawson, Frank. “Sustainable Development Along International Watercourses: Is Progress Being 
Made?.” U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 16 (2012-2013): 323. 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/udenwr16&div=21&id=&page. 
Layton, Kimberley. “Tibetan Waters: Coming Conflict?.” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 
July 29, 2009. Accessed March 9, 2017. http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/Tibetan-waters-
coming-conflict-2923.html. 
Ledec, George, and Juan David Quintero. “Good Dams and Bad Dams: Environmental Criteria for 
Site Selection of Hydroelectric Projects.” Latin America and Caribbean Region Sustainable 
Development Working Paper 16, the World Bank, Latin America and Caribbean Region 
(LCSES), November, 2003). 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, 
226, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 8 July 1996, accessed March 7, 2017, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf. 
Living Rivers Foundation.  http://www.living-rivers.org/Default.aspx?sifraStranica=32. 
Living Rivers: Colorado Riverkeeper. “Grand Canyon Campaign.” Accessed March 7, 2017. 
http://livingrivers.org/campaigns/grandcanyon/article3.cfm. 
Mainuddin, M. “Groundwater Irrigation in Bangladesh: 'Tool for Poverty Alleviation' or 'Cause of 
Mass Poisoning'?.” Proceedings of the Symposium on Intensive Use of Groundwater: Challenges 
and Opportunities, Valencia, Spain, 10-14 December, 2002. 
Malhotra, Pia. “Water Issues between Nepal, India and Bangladesh: A Survey of Literature.” Institute 
of Peace and Conflict Studies, IPCS Special Report (July 2010). Accessed March 9, 2017. 
http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR95.pdf. 
Mason v. Hoyle, 56 Conn. 255, 14A. 786 (1888). 
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law. “Brahmaputra.” In Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of International Law. Accessed March 8, 2017. 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL. 
326 
 
McBean, Edward, Andrew deJong, and Bahram Gharabaghi. “Groundwater in Bangladesh: 
Implications in a Climate-Changing World.” Water Research and Management 1 No. 3 (2011): 
3-8. Accessed March 8, 2017. 
http://www.wrmjournal.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=98&Itemid=101 
McCaffrey, Stephen C. “A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International Implications.” Geo. 
Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 5 (1992-1993). 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/gintenlr5&div=7&id=&page=. 
McCaffrey, Stephen C. “An Overview of the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Uses of International Uses of International Watercourses.” 20 J. Land 
Resources & Envtl. L. 57 (2000). Accessed April 19, 2017. 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/lrel20&div=9&id=&page=. 
McCaffrey, Stephen C. “Current Development: The International Law Commission Adopts Draft 
Articles on Transboundary Aquifers.” A.J.I.L. 103 (2009): 272. 
McCaffrey, Stephen C. “Introductory Summary: Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses.” Accessed April 19, 2017. 
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/clnuiw/clnuiw.html. 
McCaffrey, Stephen C. “The 1997 U.N. Watercourses Convention: Retrospect and Prospect.” 21 Pac. 
McGeorge Global Bus. & Dev L.J. (2008). Accessed April 19, 2017. 
http://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=facultyarticles. 
McCaffrey, Stephen C. “The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Buried, Not Praised.” Nat. 
Resources J. 36 (1996): 549. Accessed April 19, 2017. 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/narj36&div=31&id=&page=. 
McCaffrey, Stephen C. “The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses: Prospects and Pitfalls.” In International Watercourses: Enhancing 
Cooperation and Managing Conflict. Proceedings of a World Bank seminar, World Bank 
Technical Paper No. 414, edited by Salman M.A. Salman, Laurence Boisson de Chazournes. 
Washington, D.C., World Bank (1998). Accessed April 19, 2017. 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/cwc/legal/UNConvention_McCaffrey.pdf 
McCaffrey, Stephen C. The Law of International Watercourses: Non-Navigational Uses. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001. 
McCully, Patrick. Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams. London: Zed Books 
Ltd, 2001. 
327 
 
McNeill, J.R. Something New under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-Century 
World. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000. 
Mehta, Dharmendra, and Naveen K. Mehta. “Interlinking of Rivers in India: Issues & Challenges.” 
Geo-Eco-Marina 19 (2013). doi: 10.52De81/zenodo.56851. 
Member, Joint River Commission, Bangladesh in discussion with the candidate in November 2013. 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment.  Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Synthesis. Washington DC: 
Island Press, 2005. 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Our Human Planet, 
Summary for Decision Makers. Washington D.C.:  Island Press, 2005. 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Ecosystems and Human Well-being: A Framework for 
Assessment. Washington DC: Island Press, 2003. 
Ministry of Water Resources, the People’s Republic of China. “China and Bangladesh signed MoU 
for hydrological information exchange.” September 19, 2008. Accessed March 9, 2017. 
http://www.mwr.gov.cn/english/news/200809/t20080919_102801.html. 
Ministry of Water Resources. “India – China Co-operation.” River Development & Ganga 
Rejuvenation, Government of India. Accessed March 9, 2017. 
http://wrmin.nic.in/forms/list.aspx?Id=4&lid=349. 
Ministry of Water Resources. “The India-Nepal Cooperation.” River Development & Ganga 
Rejuvenation, Government of India. Accessed March 9, 2017. 
http://wrmin.nic.in/forms/list.aspx?Id=4&lid=347. 
Mirza, M.Q., R. A. Warrick, N. J. Ericksen, and G. J. Kenny. “Trends and Persistence in Precipitation 
in the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna River Basins.” Hydrological Sciences Journal 43 Issue 
6 (1998): 845-858. Accessed March 8, 2017. doi: 10.1080/02626669809492182. 
Namy, Sophie. “Addressing the Social Impacts of Large Hydropower Dams.” The Journal of 
International Policy Solutions 7 (2007): 12. 
National Water Development Agency, India. “National Perspective Plan (NPP).” Accessed March 9, 
2017. http://nwda.gov.in/searchdetail.asp?lid=108&skey=interlinking&langid=1. 
Notes and Comments. “The Primacy of the Principle of Equitable Utilization in the 1997 
Watercourses Convention.” Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 35 (1997): 215. Accessed April 19, 2017. 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/cybil35&div=9&id=&page=. 
328 
 
OECD (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development) Recommendation of the 
Council on Guiding Principles concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental 
Policies, 26 May 1972, accessed March 7, 2017, 
http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx?InstrumentID=4&InstrumentPID=25
5&Lang=en&Book=False. 
Pahl-Wostl, Claudia, Holger Hoff, Michel Meybeck, and Soroosh Sorooshian. “The Role of Global 
Change Research for Aquatic Sciences.” Editorial in special issue “Vulnerability of Water 
Resources to Environmental Change: A Systems’ Approach.” Aquatic Sciences 34 (2002). 
GWSP. The Global Water System Project: Science Framework and Implementation Activities. 
ESSP Report No. 3, Earth System Science Partnership, 2005. 
Petts, Geoffrey E. Impounded Rivers: Perspectives for Ecological Management. New York: Wiley, 
1985. 
Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
(Revised), August 7, 2000, 
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/Revised-SADC-
SharedWatercourse-Protocol-2000.pdf. 
PulpMills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), International Court of Justice, and judgment 
delivered on April 20, 2010, accessed March 7, 2017, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/135/15895.pdf. 
Quereshi, Ajmel. “The Search for an Environmental Filartiga: Trans-boundary Harm and the Future 
of International Environmental Litigation.” Howard L.J. 56 (2012-2013): 131. 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/howlj56&div=7&id=&page=. 
Rahman, A. Atiq. “Environmental Aspects of Surface Water Systems of Bangladesh: An 
Introduction.” In Environmental Aspects of Surface Water Systems of Bangladesh, edited by A. 
Atiq Rahman, Saleemul Huq, and Gordon R Conway, 4. Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1990. 
Rahman, Ziaur, A.S.M. Oliullah, and Rezwana Nur. Water Sharing Discord between Bangladesh and 
India: People in the Crossfire. Dhaka: News Network, 2004.. 
Raj, Anumita. “Achieving Water Security, Part 3: Striving for “Blue Peace” in the Eastern Himalayas 
Toward a True India-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission.” EarthDesk, Dyson College Institute 
for Sustainability and the Environment (DCISE) at Pace University (2013). Accessed March 9, 
2017. https://earthdesk.blogs.pace.edu/2013/07/17/achieving-water-security-part-3-striving-for-
blue-peace-in-the-eastern-himalayas/. 
Ravenscroft, Peter, William G. Burgess, Kazi Matin Ahmed, Melanie Burren, and Jerome Perrin. 
“Arsenic in Groundwater of the Bengal Basin, Bangladesh: Distribution, Field Relations, and 
329 
 
Hydrogeological Setting.” Hydrogeology Journal 13 (2005): 727–751. doi: 10.1007/s10040-003-
0314-0. 
Ray, Aparna. “India, Bangladesh: Water Disputes and Teesta River Diplomacy.” Global Voices, June 
8, 2012. Accessed April 19, 2017. http://globalvoicesonline.org/2012/06/08/india-bangladesh-
water-disputes-and-teesta-river-diplomacy/. 
Re: Networking Of Rivers vs Unknown, 27 February, 2012, Supreme Court of India, Writ Petition 
(Civil) No. 512 of 2002; http://indiankanoon.org/doc/41857247/. 
Revised Agreement between His Majesty's Government of Nepal and the Government of India on the 
Kosi Project, Nepal – India, December 19, 1966. Accessed April 19, 2017. 
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/Amended_Kosi_Project_Agreem
ent-1966.pdf 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED), informally known as the Earth Summit, Rio de 
Janeiro, 3 - 14 June, 1992, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm. 
Rosenberg, DM, RA Bodaly, and P J Usher. “Environmental and Social Impacts of Large Scale 
Hydro-electric Development: Who is listening?.” Global Environmental Change 5 No. 2 (1995): 
127 – 148. doi: 10.1016/0959-3780(95)00018-J. 
Sahoo, Narendra Kumar, Chadetrik Rout, Yanglem Sarat Chandra Khuman, Jagdamba Prasad. 
“Sustainability Issues of River Linking.” Conference proceedings of the National Specialty 
Conference on River Hydraulics, at M. M. University, Ambala, Haryana, India, 29-30 October 
2009, 145-154. Accessed April 19, 2017. 
http://www.academia.edu/197017/Sustainability_Issues_of_River_Linking 
Salman, M. A. Salman, and Kishor Uprety. Conflict and Cooperation on South Asia's International 
Rivers: A Legal Perspective. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2003.  
Salman, M. A. Salman. “Dams, International Rivers, and Riparian States: An Analysis of the 
Recommendations of the World Commission on Dams.” Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 16 (2001): 1477. 
Salman, M.A. Salman, and Kishor Uprety. “Hydro-politics in South Asia: A Comparative Analysis of 
the Mahakali and the Ganges Treaties.” Natural Resources Journal 39 (1999): 295. Accessed 
March 7, 2017. 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/narj39&div=32&id=&page=. 
Salman, M.A. Salman. “Entry into Force of the UN Watercourses Convention: Why Should It 
Matter.” International Journal of Water Resources Development, published online: 08 Aug 2014. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07900627.2014.952072. 
330 
 
Salman, M.A. Salman. “The Helsinki Rules, The UN Watercourse Convention and the Berlin Rules: 
Perspectives on International Water Law.” Water Resources Development Vol. 23 No. 4 (2007): 
625–640. Accessed April 19, 2017. 
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/bibliography/articles/general/Salman-BerlinRules.pdf. 
Salman, M.A. Salman. “The United Nations Watercourses Convention Ten Years Later: Why Has its 
Entry into Force Proven Difficult?.” Water International 32-1 (2007): 1-15. Accessed April 19, 
2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02508060708691962. 
Schnitter, Nicholas J. A History of Dams: The Useful Pyramids. Rotterdam, Netherlands: A.A. 
Balkema, 1994. 
Science Clarified. “Floodplain.” accessed March 7, 2017, 
http://www.scienceclarified.com/landforms/Faults-to-Mountains/Floodplain.html#b. 
Shah, M.S. “Human Resource Development Activities in Fisheries Sector.” In Fish Fortnight 
Compendium 2003, Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock, Bangladesh, 
57-59. Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2003. 
Shah, Tushaar Natwarlal, J. Bruke, Karen Villholth, and Jinxia Wang. “Groundwater: A Global 
Assessment of Scale and Significance.” In Water for Food, Water for Life: A Comprehensive 
Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture, edited by D. Molden, 195-419. London, UK: 
Routledge. 
Shah, Tushaar, Upali Amrasinghe, and Peter McCornick. “India’s River Linking Project: The State of 
the Debate.” Paper in the National Workshop on National River Linking Project of India: 
Analysis of Hydrological, Social and Ecological Issues, Delhi, India, 9-10 October 2007. 
Shamsudduha, M., and A. Uddin. “Quaternary Shoreline Shifting and Hydrogeologic Influence on 
the Distribution of Groundwater Arsenic in Aquifers of the Bengal Basin.” Journal of Asian 
Earth Sciences 31 Issue 2 (2007):177–194. Accessed March 8, 2017. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jseaes.2007.07.001 
Shamsudduha, M., E. Chandler, R. G. Taylor, and K. M. Ahmed. “Recent Trends in Groundwater 
Levels in a Highly Seasonal Hydrological System: the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Delta.” 
Hydrology and Earth System Sciences 13 (2009): 2373-2385. doi:10.5194/hess-13-2373-2009. 
Sherk, George William, Patricia Wouters, and Samantha Rochford. “Water Wars in the Near Future? 
Reconciling Competing Claims for the World’s Diminishing Freshwater Resources – The 
Challenge of the Next Millennium.” In Managing the Era of Great Change, edited by Gregory 
R. Copley, 130-143. International Strategic Studies Association, 1998. 
331 
 
Siddiqui, M.H. “Flood Control and Drainage Development: Physical Environmental Issues.” In 
Environmental Aspects of Surface Water Systems of Bangladesh, edited by A Atiq Rahman, 
Saleemul Huq, and Gordon R Conway, 105. Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1990. 
Sood, Aditya, and Bala Krishna Prasad Mathukumalli. “Managing International River Basins 
Reviewing India–Bangladesh Transboundary Water Issues.” International Journal of River 
Basin Management 9-1 (2011): 45-52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15715124.2011.553832.  
State of New Jersey v. State of New York et al. (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Intervener), 283 
U.S. 336 (51 S.Ct. 478, 75 L.Ed. 1104), 1931.  
Statement of Principles - Resolution of Dubrovnik, 1956, Accessed March 9, 2017. 
http://www.hlrn.org/img/documents/Resolution_Dubrovnik1956.pdf. 
Statute of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint River Commission Dhaka, Bangladesh – India, November 24, 
1972. Accessed March 9, 2017. http://jrcb.gov.bd/new/index.php/9-link-page/2-statute. 
Tarlock, A. Dan. “Changing Currents: Perspectives on the State of Water Law and Policy in the 21st 
Century: Four Challenges for International Water Law.” Tulane Environmental Law Journal 23 
(2010): 369. 
Tarlock, A. Dan. “Changing Currents: Perspectives on the State of Water Law and Policy in the 21st 
Century: Four Challenges for International Water Law.” Tul. Envtl. L.J. 23 (2009): 369. 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/tulev23&div=19&id=&page=. 
Territorial Jurisdiction of Int’l Comm’n of River Oder (U.K. v. Pol.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 23 
(Sept. 10). 
The Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River, signed 
on June 29 1994 in Sofia (Bulgaria), came into force in 1998, accessed April 20, 2017, 
https://www.icpdr.org/main/sites/default/files/DRPC%20English%20ver.pdf. 
The Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 
Helsinki, 17 March, 1992, U.N.T.S. 33207, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
5&chapter=27&clang=_en. 
The Convention on the Protection of the Rhine, 1999, Bern, April 12, 1999, accessed April 20, 2017, 
http://www.iksr.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente_en/convention_on_tthe_protection_of__t
he_rhine.pdf 
332 
 
The Convention on the Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika, 2003, June 12, 2003, 
https://www.ecolex.org/details/treaty/convention-on-the-sustainable-management-of-the-lake-
tanganyika-tre-001482/. 
The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Ramsar, 
Iran, February 2, 1971, U.N.T.S. 14583, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280104c20. 
The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, adopted by the International Law 
Association, Helsinki, Finland, August, 1966.  
The Indus River Treaty, India - Pakistan, Karachi, September 19, 1960, accessed April 18, 2017, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHASIA/Resources/223497-
1105737253588/IndusWatersTreaty1960.pdf. 
The Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India. “River Development & Ganga 
Rejuvenation.” Accessed March 8, 2017. http://wrmin.nic.in/forms/list.aspx?lid=252. 
The World Bank. “Bangladesh Transport Sector.” Accessed March 8, 2017. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/EXTSARRE
GTOPTRANSPORT/0,,contentMDK:20674801~menuPK:868784~pagePK:34004173~piPK:340
03707~theSitePK:579598,00.html. 
The World Bank. “Water.” accessed March 7, 2017, http://water.worldbank.org/topics/hydropower. 
The World Bank. Operational Directive 4.01 (1991). 
The Berlin Rules on Water Resources, Berlin, August 21, 2004, by the International Law 
Association (ILA), 
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/ILA_Berlin_Rules-2004.pdf. 
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, agreed on September 16, 1987, 
entered into force on January 1, 1989, U.N.T.C. 26369, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-2-
a&chapter=27&clang=_en. 
Thorne, Colin R., Andrew P.G. Russell, and Muhammad K. Alam. “Planform Pattern and Channel 
Evolution of the Brahmaputra River.” Geological Society London, Special Publications 75 
(1993): 257-276. doi:10.1144/GSL.SP.1993.075.01.16. 
Thorson, Erica J. “Sharing Himalayan Glacial Meltwater: The Role of Territorial Sovereignty.” Duke 
J. Comp. & Int'l L. 19 (2009): 487. 
Three Lakes Ass’n v. Kessler, 91 Mich. App. 371, 285 N.W.2d 300, 303 (1979). 
333 
 
Thukral, Enakshi Ganguly. Big Dams, Displaced People: Rivers of Sorrow, Rivers of Change. New 
Delhi: Sage Publications, 1992. 
Tidwell, Mike. Bayou Farewell: The Rich Life and Tragic Death of Louisiana’s Cajun Coast. New 
York: Vintage Books, 2004. 
Tnzi, A. “Regional Contributions to International Water Cooperation: the UNECE Contribution.” In 
International Law and Freshwater: The Multiple Challenges, edited by L. Boisson de 
Chazournes, C. Leb, and M. Tignino. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.  
Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), Arbitral Trib., 3 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 
1905 (1941).   
Trail smelter Arbitration (United States, Canada), Arbitral Trib., 3 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 1905 
(1941), 1965. 
Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University. 
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/. 
Treaty between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and The Government of India Concerning the 
Integrated Development of the Mahakali Barrage Including Sarada Barrage, Tanakpur Barrage 
and Pancheshwar Project, Nepal – India, February 12, 1996. Accessed April 19, 2017. 
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/Mahakali_Treaty-1996.pdf. 
Treaty between the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the Government of the 
Republic of India on Sharing of the Ganga / Ganges Waters at Farakka, Bangladesh – India, 
December 12, 1996, http://jrcb.gov.bd/attachment/Gganges_Water_Sharing_treaty,1996.pdf. 
Trigueros, Alezah. “The Human Right to Water: Will Its Fulfillment Contribute to Environmental 
Degradation?.” Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 19-2 (2012): 599-625. 
Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (CCRI 1827). 
Ulrich Fastenrath, Irich Fastenrath, Rudolf Geiger, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Andreas Paulus, Sabine 
von Schorlemer, and Christoph Vedder eds. From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in 
Honour of Bruno Simma. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2011). 
UN General Assembly resolution 37/7, “World Charter for Nature,” October 28, 1982, accessed 
March 7, 2017, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r007.htm. 
United Kingdom v. Albania, I.C.J., 1949 1.C.J.4. 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rio de Janeiro, adopted on 3 - 14 June 
1992, entered into force on 21 March 1994, 1771 UNTS 107; S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38; U.N. 
334 
 
Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1; 31 ILM 849 (1992), accessed March 7, 2017, 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. 
Uprety, Kishor, and Salman M. A. Salman. “Legal Aspects of Sharing and Management of 
Transboundary Waters in South Asia: Preventing Conflicts and Promoting Cooperation.” 
Hydrological Sciences Journal 56, Issue 4 (2011): 652. 
Utton, Albert E. “Which Rule Should Prevail in International Water Disputes: That of 
Reasonableness or that of No Harm?.” Nat. Resources J. 36 (1996): 635. Accessed April 19, 
2017. 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/narj36&div=33&id=&page=. 
Utton, Albert E., and John Utton. “The International Law of Minimum Stream Flows.” COLO. J. 
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 10 (1999): 7. 
Vick, Margaret J. “The Law of International Waters: Reasonable Utilization.” Chi.-Kent J. Int'l & 
Comp. L. 12 (2012): 121. 
Water and Energy Commission Secretariat, Government of Nepal. Accessed February 21, 2014. 
http://www.wecs.gov.np/. 
Weiss, Edith Brown. International Law for a Water-Scarce World. Leiden-Boston: MartinusNijhoff 
Publishers (2013). 
Wolf, Aaron T. “Conflict and Cooperation along International Waterways.” Water Policy 1 (1998): 
251-265. Accessed April 19, 2017. 
http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/ce397/Topics/conflict/Conflictandcooperation.pdf. 
Wolf, Aaron T. “Healing the Enlightenment Rift: Rationality, Spirituality and Shared Waters.” 
Journal of International Affairs (2008): 51 – 73. Accessed April 18, 2017. 
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/abst_docs/Wolf-
Healing%20the%20Enlightenment%20Rift%2008%20FINAL.pdf. 
Wolf, Aaron T., and Joshua T. Newton. “Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: the 
Ganges River Controversy.” 2007. Accessed March 9, 2017. 
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Documents/ganges.pdf. 
Wolf, Aaron T., and Joshua T. Newton. “Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: The 
Ganges River Controversy.” Oregon State University Program in Water Conflict Management 
and Transformation, College of Earth, Ocean and Atmospheric Sciences. Accessed March 9, 
2017. http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Ganges_New.htm. 
335 
 
Wolf, Jesse H. Hamner, and Aaron T. Wolf. "Patterns in International Water Resource Treaties: The 
Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database." Colorado Journal of International Environmental 
Law and Policy, Natural Resources Forum Vol 23-1 (1998) 3-33. 
World Commission on Dams. “Dams and Development: a new framework for decision-making.” The 
Report of the World Commission on Dams, 2001. 
http://www.unep.org/dams/WCD/report/WCD_DAMS%20report.pdf 
World Commission on Environment and Development. Our Common Future. Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1987. Accessed March 7, 2017. http://www.un-documents.net/our-
common-future.pdf. 
Worster, Donald. “The Shaky Ground of Sustainable Development.” In The Wealth of Nature: 
Environmental History and the Ecological Imagination, edited by Donald Worster, 142-155. 
Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1993. 
Wouters, Patricia, and Dan Tarlock. “The Third Wave of Normativity in Global Water Law: The 
Duty to Cooperate in the Peaceful Management of the World's Water Resources: An Emerging 
Obligation Erga Omnes?.” Journal of Water Law 23 (2013). 
Zahid, Anwar, and Syed Reaz Uddin Ahmed. “Groundwater Resources Development in Bangladesh: 
Contribution to Irrigation for Food Security and Constraints to Sustainability.” IWMI Books, 
Reports, International Water Management Institute (2006). Accessed March 8, 2017, 
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/iwtbosers/h039306.htm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
